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A NEW EDITION;

With References to the several Quotations in the Intellectual System; and an  
Account of the Life and Writings of the Author:

BY THOMAS BIRCH, M.A. AND F.R.S.

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IN FOUR VOLUMES:  
VOL. II. *only*

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CHAP. IV. CONTINUED.

As for the vulgar of the Greekish Pagans, whether they apprehended God to be νοῦν ἐξηρημένον τοῦ κόσμου, a mind or intellect separate from the world, or else to be a soul of the world only; —it cannot be doubted, but that by the word Zeus they commonly understood the supreme Deity in one or other of those senses, the father and king of gods; he being frequently thus styled in their solemn nuncupations of vows, Ζεῦ πάτερ, Ζεῦ ἄνα, O Jupiter father, and O Jupiter king. As he was invoked also Ζεῦ βασιλεῦ in that excellent prayer of an ancient poet, not without cause commended in Plato's Alcibiades;\*

Ζεῦ βασιλεῦ, τὰ μὲν ἐσθλά καὶ εὐχομένους καὶ ἀνύκτοις  
\* Ἄμμι δίδου, τὰ δὲ δινὰ καὶ εὐχομένους ἀπαλέξου

O Jupiter king, give us good things, whether we

\* In Alcibiad. secundo, sive de Precatione, p. 40.

pray or pray not for them ; but withhold evil things from us, though we should pray never so earnestly for them.—But the instances of this kind being innumerable, we shall forbear to mention any more of them : only we shall observe, that Zeus Sabazius was a name for the supreme God, sometime introduced amongst the Greeks, and derived in all probability from the Hebrew Sabaoth, or Adonai Tsebaoth, the Lord of hosts (that is, of the heavenly hosts) or the supreme governor of the world. Which therefore Aristophanes took notice of as a strange and foreign god, lately crept in amongst them, that ought to be banished out of Greece ; these several names of God being then vulgarly spoken of as so many distinct deities, as shall be more fully declared afterward. We shall likewise elsewhere shew, that besides Ζεύς, Πάν also was used by the Greeks as a name for that God, who is the supreme moderator and governor of the whole world.

That the Latins did in like manner, by Jupiter and Jovis, frequently denote the supreme Deity, and Monarch of the universe, is a thing unquestionable; and which does sufficiently appear from those epithets, that were commonly given to him, of *optimus* and *maximus*, the best and the greatest; as also of *omnipotens*, frequently bestowed upon him by Virgil and others. Which word Jupiter or Jovis, though Cicero<sup>a</sup> etymologize it a *juvando*, or from *juvans pater*, as not knowing how to do it otherwise; yet we may rather conclude it to have been of an Hebraical extraction, and derived from that Tetragrammaton, or name of God,

<sup>a</sup> *De Nat. Deor.* lib. ii. cap. xxv. p. 2902. tom. ix. oper.

consisting of four consonants; whose vowels (which is to be pronounced with) though they be not now certainly known, yet must it needs have some such sound as this, either Jovah or Javoh, or 'Ιένω, or 'Ιάω, or the like; and the abbreviation of this name was Jah. For as the Pagan nations had, besides appellatives, their several proper names for God, so also had the Hebrews theirs, and such as being given by God himself, was most expressive of his nature, it signifying eternal and necessary existence.

But, in the next place, we shall suggest, that the Pagans did not only signify the supreme God, by these proper names, but also frequently by the appellatives themselves, when used not for a God in general, but for the God, or God *κατ' ἕξοχὴν*, and by way of eminency. And thus *ὁ θεός* and *θεός*, are often taken by the Greeks, not for *θεῶν τις*, a God, or one of the gods, but for God, or the supreme Deity. We have several examples hereof in passages before cited occasionally in this very chapter, as in that of Aristotle's, *τί οὖν ἂν κρείττον καὶ ἐπιστήμης πλὴν ὁ θεός*; what is there, therefore, that can be better than knowledge, but only God?—As also that other of his, that happiness consisteth principally in virtue, *ἔστω συνωμολογημένον ἡμῖν μάρτυρι τῷ θεῷ χρωμένοις*, it is a thing, that ought to be acknowledged by us from the nature of God.—So likewise in that of Thales, *πρεσβύτατον πάντων ὁ θεός, ἀγένητον γάρ* God is the oldest of all things, because he is unmade;—and that of Maximus Tyrius, *πολλοὶ θεοὶ παῖδες θεοῦ καὶ συνάρχοντες θεῷ*, many gods, the sons of God, and co-reigners together with God.—Besides which, there have been others also mentioned, which we



shall not here repeat. And innumerable more instances of this kind might be added; as that of Antiphanes,<sup>a</sup> θεὸς οὐδενὶ ἔοικεν, διόπερ αὐτὸν οὐδεὶς ἔκμαθεῖν ἐξ εἰκόνοσ δύναται, God is like to nothing, for which cause he cannot be learnt by any from an image:—this of Socrates,<sup>b</sup> εἰ ταύτη φίλον τῷ θεῷ ταύτη γινέσθω, if God will have it so, let it be so.—And that of Epictetus,<sup>c</sup> σὺ μόνον μέμνησο τῶν καθολικῶν, τί ἐμόν, τί οὐκ ἐμόν; τί θέλει με ποιεῖν ὁ Θεὸς νῦν; do thou only remember these catholic and universal principles, what is mine, and what is not mine? what would God have me now to do? and what would he have me not to do?—But we shall mention no more of these, because they occur so frequently in all manner of Greek writers, both metrical and prosaical.

Wherefore we shall here only add, that as the singular θεός was thus often used by the Greeks for God κατ' ἐξοχήν, or in way of eminency, that is, for the supreme Deity; so was likewise the plural θεοὶ frequently used by them for the inferior gods, by way of distinction from the supreme. As in that usual form of prayer and exclamation, ὦ Ζεῦ καὶ Θεοὶ, O Jupiter and the gods;—and that form of obtestation, πρὸς Διὸς καὶ Θεῶν, by Jupiter and the gods.—So in this of Euripedes:<sup>d</sup>—

Ἄλλ' ἴστιν, ἴστι· κἄν τις ἰγγελά λόγῳ,  
Ζεὺς καὶ Θεοὶ, βρότεια λύσαντες πάθῃ·

Est, (sint licet qui rideant) est Jupiter,  
Superique, casus qui vident mortalium.

<sup>a</sup> Apud Hug. Grot. Excerpt. veter. Tragic. et Comicoꝝ. p. 632.

<sup>b</sup> Apud Platon. in Critone, p. 370.

<sup>c</sup> Apud Arrian. in Epictet. lib. iv. p. 385. edit. Cantabrig.

<sup>d</sup> Vide Grotii Excerpta veter. Tragicooꝝ. et Comicoꝝ. p. 417.

In which passages, as Jupiter is put for the supreme God, so is Θεοὶ likewise put for the inferior gods, in way of distinction from him. Thus also, Θεός, and Θεοὶ, are taken both together in Plato's Phædo, Θεός for the supreme unmade and incorruptible Deity, and Θεοὶ for the inferior gods only, ὁ δὲ γὰρ Θεός (οἶμαι) ἔφη

P. 106.

ὁ Σωκράτης, καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ τῆς ζωῆς εἶδος παρὰ πάντων ἀνὸμολογηθεῖη, μηδέποτε ἀπόλλυσθαι. Παρὰ πάντων μέντοι νῆ Δί (ἔφη) ἀνθρώπων γε, καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον, ὡς ἐγώμμαι, παρὰ Θεῶν. I suppose, said Socrates, that God, and the very species, essence or idea, of life will be granted by all to be incorruptible. Doubtless by all men (said Cebes) but much more, as I conceive by the gods.—But a further instance will be propounded afterward of the word Θεοὶ, thus used, by way of distinction, for the inferior gods only; as it was before declared, that the théogonia, or generation of gods was accordingly understood by the Greeks universally of the οἱ Θεοὶ, that is, the inferior gods.

Plato de Rep. οὐχ ὑπὸ Θεῶν ποτὲ ἀμελεῖται; ὅς ἂν προθυμισθεῖσθαι ἰθέλη δικαιος γίνεσθαι καὶ ἐπιτηδεύων ἀρετῆν, εἰς ἕσσαν δυνατὸν ἀνθρώπων ὁμοιωθεῖσθαι Θεῷ. He will never be neglected of the gods, who endeavours, as much as it is possible for a man, to be like to God, p. 613.

Moreover, as the word Θεός was taken κατ' ἔξοχὴν, or, by way of eminency, for the supreme God, so was Δαίμων likewise. As for example, in this passage of Callimachus, before cited imperfectly:\*

Εἰ Θεὸν οἶσθα,  
"Ἴσθ' ὅτι καὶ ῥίξαι Δαίμωνι πᾶν δυνατόν

— Si Deus est tibi notus,  
Hoc etiam noris, omnia posse Deum.

Where Θεός and Δαίμων are used both alike sig-

\* Vide Fragmenta Callimachi a Rich. Bentleio collecta, p. 372.

*nanter*, for the supreme God. And thus also in that famous passage of another poet :

Τὸς γὰρ ἄλλους,  
Εἰν ἄλλ' καὶ γὰρ, κατὰ μέγισθον θεῶν Δαίμων.

Homer, likewise, in one and the same place,<sup>a</sup> seems to use θεός and Δαίμων both together, after the same manner, for the supreme God :

\*Ὅσπον' ἀπὸς ἰδίῃσι παρὲς δαίμονα φωνὴ μάχισσάει,  
\*Ὅτι καὶ δαὲς τιμῆ, τάχα εἰ μέγα πῆμα κωλύσει.

Quoties homo vult, adverso numine, cum viro pugnare,  
Quem Deus honorat, mox in eum magna ciades devolvitur.

Again we conceive, that Jupiter, or the supreme God, was sometimes signified amongst the Pagans by that expression, θεός αὐτός, *Deus ipse*, as in that of Homer's ninth Iliad :<sup>b</sup>

Οὐδ' εἰ κεν μοι ὑπόσταινι θεὸς αὐτός,  
Γῆρας ἀπολύσας θέσειν νίη ἡβάντα.

Neque si mihi promitteret Deus ipse,  
Senectutem abrādēns, effecturum inē juvenem pubescentēra.

Contra Jul. l. i. [p. 27. edit. Spanh.] So And thus St. Cyril of Alexandria interprets Homer here, οὐ γὰρ πῶν φησὶν, εἰ Justin. Mart. ad Græ. coh. p. 22. [éd. Colon.] καὶ θεῶν τις ὑπόσχοιτό μοι τοῦ μὲν γήρωσ ἀπεμπολήν, καλινάγρετόν δὲ τὴν νεότητα, τετήρηκε δὲ τὸ χρῆμα μόνω τῷ ἐπὶ πάντας θεῶν, &c. τὸ γὰρ τοι θεός αὐτός, οὐκ ἐφ' ἓνα τῶν ἐν μύθοις πεπλασμένων τινῶν, αὐτὸν δὲ δὴ μόνον κατασημνείειν ἂν τὸν ἀληθῶς ὄντα θεόν. Homer doth not say, if any of the gods would promise me freedom from old age, and restitution of youth, but he reserves the matter only to the supreme God; neither doth he refer it to any of the

<sup>a</sup> Iliad, lib. i. ver. 98.

<sup>b</sup> Ver. 448.

fictitious poetic gods, but to the true God alone. —The same language was also spoken in the laws of the twelve tables:<sup>a</sup> “ Deos adeunto caste, opes amovento: si secus faxint, Deus ipse vindex erit.” Let the gods be worshipped chastely, superfluity of riches and pomp being removed: if men do otherwise, God himself will be the avenger.— Where, though the word *gods* be used generally, so as to comprehend both the supreme and inferior gods under it, yet *Deus ipse, God himself*, denotes the supreme God only. In like manner, ὁ δαίμων αἰνός also seems to be taken for the supreme God, in that of Euripides:<sup>b</sup>

Δόσει με ὁ Δαίμων αἰνός, ἔσται ἐγὼ Δίλω,

which was thus rendered by Horace:

—— Ipse Deus, simulatque volet, me solvet.

Notwithstanding which, Δαίμων and Δαίμονες are often distinguished from Θεός and Θεοί, they being put for an inferior rank of beings below the gods vulgarly called demons; which word in a large sense comprehends also heroes under it. For though these demons be sometimes called gods too, yet were they rather accounted Ἡμιθεοὶ demigods, than gods. And thus Θεοὶ καὶ Δαίμονες, gods and demons, are frequently joined together, as things distinct from one another; which notion of the word Plato refers to, when he concludes Love not to be a god, but a demon only. But of these demons we are to speak more afterward.

Furthermore, the Pagan writers frequently un-

<sup>a</sup> Vide Ciceron. de Legibus, lib. ii. cap. viii. p. 3345. tom. ix. oper.

<sup>b</sup> In Bacchis, ver. 497.

derstand the supreme God by the τὸ Θεῖον, when the word is used substantively. As, for example, in this of Epicharmus ;<sup>a</sup>

Οὐδὲν διαφέρει τὸ θεῖον τούτου γινώσκων σε δει-  
 Αὐτὸς ἐστὶ ἡμῶν ἐπιόστως· ἀδυνατῶν δ' οὐδὲν θεῶν.

Res nulla est Deum quæ lateat, scire quod te convenit :  
 Ipse est noster introspector, tum Deus nil non potest.

So likewise in this of Plato's,<sup>b</sup> πόρρω ἡδονῆς καὶ λύ-  
 πης ἴδρυται τὸ θεῖον, God is far removed both from  
 pleasure and grief.—And Plotinus calls the su-  
 preme God, τὸ ἐν τῷ παντὶ θεῖον, the Divinity that is  
 in the universe.—But because the instances hereof  
 are also innumerable, we shall decline the men-  
 tioning of any more, and instead of them, only set  
 down the judgment of that diligent and impartial  
 observer of the force of words, Henricus Ste-  
 phanus,<sup>c</sup> concerning it ; “ Redditur etiam τὸ θεῖον  
 sæpe Deus, sed ita tamen, ut intelligendum sit,  
 non de quolibet Deo ab ipsis etiam profanis scrip-  
 toribus dici, verum de eo quem intelligerent, cum  
 θεὸν dicebant quasi κατ' ἐξοχὴν ad differentiam eo-  
 rum, qui multi appellatione θεῶν includebantur,  
 summum videlicet supremumque Numen, et quasi  
 dicas θεὸν θεῶν ὑπατον καὶ ἄριστον, ut loquitur de Jove  
 Homerus.”

Lastly, as τὸ θεῖον, so likewise was τὸ δαιμόνιον  
 used by the Greeks for the supreme Numen, or  
 that Divinity, which governs the whole world.  
 Thus, whereas it was commonly said, (accord-

<sup>a</sup> Apud Clement. Alexandrin. Stromat. lib. v. p. 708. The transla-  
 tion is by Grotius in Excerpt. veter. Tragicor. et Comicor. p. 481.

<sup>b</sup> Epist. iii. p. 708.

<sup>c</sup> In Thesaurō Græcæ Linguae, tom. i. p. 1534.

ing to Herodotus<sup>a</sup>) ὅτι τὸ θεῖον φθονερόν, that God was envious;—the meaning whereof was, that he did not commonly suffer any great human prosperity to continue long, without some check or counterbuff; the same proverbial speech is expressed in Aristotle, φθονερόν τὸ δαιμόνιον. And in this sense the word seems to be used in Isocrates ad Demonicum, τίμα τὸ δαιμόνιον αἰὲ μὲν, μάλιστα δὲ μετὰ τῆς πόλεως, worship God always, but especially with the city, in her public sacrifices.—And doubtless it was thus taken by Epictetus, in this passage of his, μία ὁδὸς ἐπὶ εὐροίαν, τοῦτο καὶ ὄρθρον, καὶ μεθ' ἡμέραν καὶ νύκτωρ, ἔστω πρόχειρον, ἀπόστασις τῶν ἀπροαιρέτων, τὸ μηδὲν ἴδιον ἡγεῖσθαι, τὸ παραδοῦναι πάντα τῷ δαιμονίῳ, καὶ τῇ τύχῃ. There is but one way to tranquillity of mind and happiness: let this therefore be always ready at hand with thee, both when thou wakest early in the morning, and all the day long, and when thou goest late to sleep; to account no external things thine own, but to commit all these to God and fortune.—And there is a very remarkable passage in Demosthenes<sup>b</sup> (observed by Budæus) that must not be here omitted; in which we have οἱ θεοὶ plainly for the inferior or minor gods only, and τὸ δαιμόνιον for the supreme God, both together; εἴσονται οἱ θεοὶ καὶ τὸ δαιμόνιον, τὸν μὴ τὰ δίκαια ψηφισάμενον. The gods and the Deity will know or take notice of him that gives not a righteous sentence;—that is, both the inferior gods and the supreme God himself. Wherefore we see, that the word δαιμόνιον, as to its grammatical form, is

<sup>a</sup> Lib. iii. cap. xli. p. 176. He cites this from an Epistle of Amasis to the tyrant Polycrates.

<sup>b</sup> Orat. περὶ παρακλισίας, p. 266. edit. Græc. Basil. 1532. fol.

not a diminutive, as some have conceived, but an adjective substantived; as well as τὸ θεῖον is. Nevertheless in Pagan writings, δαιμόνιον also, as well as δαίμων, from whence it is derived, is often used for an inferior rank of beings below the gods, though sometimes called gods too; and such was Socrates' δαιμόνιον, so commonly known. But the grammar of this word, and its proper signification in Pagan writers, cannot better be manifested, than by citing that passage of Socrates' own, in his Apology, as written by Plato; who, though generally supposed to have had a demon, was notwithstanding by Melitus accused of atheism; ἔστιν ὅστις ἀνθρώπων, ὧς Μέλιτε, ἀνθρώπεια μὲν νομίζει πράγματα εἶναι, ἀνθρώπους δὲ οὐ νομίζει; ἢ ὅστις ἵππους μὲν οὐ νομίζει, ἵππικὰ δὲ πράγματα, &c. οὐκ ἔστιν, ὧς ἄριστοι ἀνδρῶν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐπὶ τούτῳ ἀποκρίναι, ἔσθ' ὅστις δαιμόνια μὲν νομίζει πράγματα εἶναι, δαιμόνας δὲ οὐ νομίζει; οὐκ ἔστιν' ἀλλ' ὅσων δαιμόνιά γε νομίζω κατὰ τὸν ὅσων λόγον εἰ δὲ καὶ δαιμόνια νομίζω, καὶ δαιμόνας δήπου πολλῇ ἀνάγκῃ νομίζω με ἔστιν. τοὺς δὲ δαιμόνας οὐχ ἤτοι θεούς γε ἡγοῦμεθα εἶναι, ἢ θεῶν παῖδας, &c. Is there any one, O Melitus, who acknowledging, that there are human things, can yet deny, that there are any men? or confessing that there are equine things, can nevertheless deny, that there are any horses? If this cannot be, then no man, who acknowledges demonial things, can deny demons. Wherefore I being confessed to assert δαιμόνια, must needs be granted to hold δαίμονας also. Now do we not all think, that demons are either gods, or at least sons of the gods? Wherefore for any one to conceive, that there are demons, and yet no gods, is altogether as absurd,

P. 27. Steph.  
[There are several omissions in this quotation from Plato, and some alterations.]

as if any should think, that there are mules, but yet neither horses nor asses.—However, in the New Testament, according to the judgments of Origen, Eusebius, and others of the ancient fathers, both these words δαίμονας and δαιμόνια are alike taken, always in a worsè sense, for evil and impure spirits only.

But over and besides all this, the Pagans do often characterize the supreme God by such titles, epithets, and descriptions, as are incommunicably proper to him; thereby plainly distinguishing him from all other inferior gods. He being sometimes called by them ὁ Δημιουργός, the opifex, architect, or maker of the world; ὁ Ἡγεμῶν τοῦ παντός καὶ Ἀρχηγέτης, the prince and chief ruler of the universe; ὁ Πρῶτος and ὁ Πρωτίστος θεός (by the Greeks) and (by the Latins) *Primus Deus*, the first God; ὁ Πρῶτος Νοῦς, the first Mind; ὁ μέγας Θεός, the great God; ὁ μέγιστος δαίμων, and ὁ μέγιστος θεῶν, the greatest God, and the greatest of the gods; ὁ Ὑψιστος, the Highest; and ὁ ὑπάτος θεῶν, the Supreme of the gods; ὁ ἀνωτάτω θεός, the uppermost, or most transcendent God; *Princeps ille Deus*, that chief or principal God; Θεός θεῶν, the God of gods; and Ἀρχὴ Ἀρχῶν, the Principle of principles; Τὸ πρῶτον αἴτιον, the First Cause; Ὁ τὸδε τὸ πᾶν γεννήσας, he that generated or created this whole universe; ὁ κρατεῶν τοῦ παντός, he that ruleth over the whole world; *Summus Rector et Dominus*, the supreme Governor and Lord of all; ὁ ἐπὶ πᾶσι θεός, the God over all; ὁ θεός ἀγέννητος, αὐτογενής, αὐτοφυής, αὐθυπόστατος, the ingenerate or unmade, self-originated and self-subsisting Deity; Μονάς, a Monad; Τὸ ἐν καὶ αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν, Unity and Goodness itself; Τὸ ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας, and τὸ ὑπερού-



σιον, that which is above essence or super-essential; Τὸ ἐπέκεινα νοῦ, that which is above mind and understanding; “Summum illud et æternum, neque mutabile neque interiturum,”—that supreme and eternal Being, which is immutable and can never perish; Ἀρχή, καὶ τέλος, καὶ μέσον πάντων, the beginning and end and middle of all things; Ἐν καὶ πάντα, one and all things; Deus unus et omnes, one God and all gods: and, lastly, to name no more, ἡ Πρόνοια, or Providence, as distinguished from Φύσις, Nature, is often used by them also as a name for the supreme God, which, because it is of the feminine gender, the impious and atheistical Epicureans therefore took occasion to call God, ridiculously and jeeringly, “Anum fatidicam Pronœam.”\* Now all these, and other such-like expressions, being found in the writings of professed Pagans (as we are able to shew) and some of them very frequently, it cannot be denied, but that the Pagans did put a manifest difference betwixt the supreme God, and all other inferior gods.

xv. What hath been now declared, might, as we conceive, be judged sufficient, in order to our present undertaking; which is to prove, that the more intelligent of the ancient Pagans, notwithstanding that multiplicity of gods worshipped by them, did generally acknowledge one supreme, omnipotent, and only unmade Deity. Nevertheless, since men are commonly so much prepossessed with a contrary persuasion, (the reason whereof seems to be no other than this, that because the notion of the word God, which is now

\* Vide Ciceron. de Natur. Deor. lib. i. cap. viii. p. 2890. tom. ix. oper.

generally received amongst us Christians, is such as does essentially include self-existence in it, they are therefore apt to conceit, that it must needs do so likewise amongst the Pagans ;) we shall endeavour to produce yet some further evidence for the truth of our assertion. And, first, we conceive this to be no confirmation thereof, because after the publication of Christianity, and all along during that tugging and contest, which was betwixt it and Paganism, none of the professed champions for Paganism and antagonists of Christianity, (when occasion was now offered them) did ever assert any such thing as a multiplicity of understanding deities unmade (or creators) but on the contrary, they all generally disclaimed it, professing to acknowledge one supreme self-existent Deity, the maker of the whole universe.

It is a thing highly probable, if not unquestionable, that Apollonius Tyanæus, shortly after the publication of the gospel to the world, was a person made choice of by the policy, and assisted by the powers, of the kingdom of darkness, for the doing of some things extraordinary, merely out of design to derogate from the miracles of our Saviour Christ, and to enable Paganism the better to bear up against the assaults of Christianity. For amongst the many writers of this philosopher's life, some, and particularly Philostratus, seem to have had no other aim in this their whole undertaking, than only to dress up Apollonius in such a garb and manner, as might make him best seem to be a fit corival with our Saviour Christ, both in respect of sanctity and miracles. Eunapius<sup>a</sup> therefore telling us, that he mistitled his book, and

<sup>a</sup> In *Vitis Sophistarum*, Procem. p. 6, 7. edit. Plantin.

that instead of Ἀπαλλωνίαν βίος, the life of Apollonius, he should have called it Θεοῦ εἰς ἀνθρώπους ἐπιδημίαν, the coming down, and converse of God with men; forasmuch as this Apollonius (saith he) was not a bare philosopher or man, ἀλλά τι θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπου μέσον, but a certain middle thing betwixt the gods and men.—And that this was the use commonly made by the Pagans of this history of Apollonius, namely to set him up in way of opposition and rivalry to our Saviour Christ, appears sundry ways. Marcellinus, in an Epistle of his to St. Austin,\* declares this as the grand objection of the Pagans against Christianity, (therefore desiring St. Austin's answer to the same;) “Nihil aliud Dominum, quam alii homines facere potuerunt, fecisse vel egisse mentiuntur; Apollonium siquidem suum nobis, et Apuleium, aliosque magicæ artis homines, in medium proferunt, quorum majora contendunt extitisse miracula.” The Pagans pretend, that our Saviour Christ did no more than what other men have been able to do, they producing their Apollonius and Apuleius, and other magicians, whom they contend to have done greater miracles.—And it is well known, that Hierocles, to whom Eusebius gives the commendation of a very learned man, wrote a book against the Christians (entitled, Φιλαλήθης, or Λόγοι φιλαλήθης) the chief design whereof was to compare this Apollonius Tyanæus with, and prefer him before, our Saviour Christ: Ἄνω καὶ κάτω θρυλλοῦσι, σεμνύοντες τὸν Ἰησοῦν, ὡς τυφλοῖς ἀναβλεῖψαι τε παρασχόντα, καὶ τινα τοιαῦτα δράσαντα θαυμάσια. They are Hierocles' own words in Eusebius: “The Christians (saith

\* Inter Epistol. Augustin. Epist. cxxxvi. tom. ii. oper. p. 304. edit. *Benedict.*

he) keep a great deal of stir, crying up of one Jesus, for restoring sight to the blind, and doing some such other wonders." And then mentioning the thaumaturgi or wonder-workers amongst the Pagans, but especially Apollonius Tyanæus, and insisting largely upon his miracles, he adds in the close of all, *τινος οὖν ἕνεκα τούτων ἐμήσθη; ἵνα ἐξῆ συγκρίνειν τὴν ἡμετέραν ἀκριβῆ καὶ βεβαίαν ἐφ' ἑκάστῃ κρίσει, καὶ τὴν τῶν Χριστιανῶν κουφότητα ἔπερ ἡμεῖς μὲν τὸν τοιαῦτα πεποιηκότα, οὐ θεόν, ἀλλὰ θεοῖς κεχαρισμένον ἄνδρα ἠγοῦμεθα· οἱ δὲ δι' ὀλίγας τερατείας τινας τὸν Ἰησοῦν Θεὸν ἀναγορεύουσι.* To what purpose now have we mentioned all these things? but only that the solid judgment of us [Pagans] might be compared with the levity of the Christians; forasmuch as we do not account him a god who did all these miracles, but only a person beloved of the gods; whilst they declare Jesus to be a God, merely for doing a few wonders.—Where, because Eusebius is silent, we cannot but subjoin an answer out of Lactantius (which indeed he seems to have directed against those very words of Hierocles, though not naming of him) it being both pertinent and full; “*Apparet nos sapientiores esse, qui mirabilibus factis non statim fidem divinitatis adjunximus, quam vos, qui ob exigua portenta Deum credidistis—Disce igitur, si quid tibi cordis est, non solum idcirco a nobis Deum creditum Christum, quia mirabilia fecit, sed quia vidimus in eo facta esse omnia, quæ nobis annuntiata sunt, vaticinia prophetarum. Fecit mirabilia; magnum putassemus, ut et vos nuncupatis; et Judæi tunc putaverunt: si non illa ipsa facturum Christum, prophetæ omnes uno spiritu prædicassent. Itaque Deum credimus, non magis ex factis,*

De Justi. l.  
v. c. v.

operibusque mirandis ; quam ex illa ipsa cruce, quam vos sicut canes lambitis ; quoniam simul et illa prædicta est. Non igitur suo testimonio, (cui enim de se dicenti potest credi ?) sed prophetarum testimonio, qui omnia quæ fecit ac passus est, multa ante cecinerunt ; fidem divinitatis accepit ; quod neque Apollonio neque Apuleio neque cuiquam magorum potest aliquando contingere." It is manifest, that we Christians are wiser than you Pagans, in that we do not presently attribute divinity to a person merely because of his wonders ; whereas a few portentous things, or extraordinary actions, will be enough with you to make you deify the doer of them (and so indeed did some of them, however Hierocles denies it, deify Apollonius). Let this writer against Christianity therefore learn, (if he have any understanding or sense in him) that Christ was not therefore believed to be a God by us Christians, merely because of his miracles, but because we saw all those things done by and accomplished in him, which were long before predicted to us by the prophets. He did miracles, and we should therefore have suspected him for a magician (as you now call him, and as the Jews then supposed him to be) had not all the prophets with one voice foretold, that he should do such things. We believe him therefore to be God, no more for his miracles than from that very cross of his, which you so much quarrel with, because that was likewise foretold. So that our belief of Christ's divinity is not founded upon his own testimony (for who can be believed concerning himself?) but upon the testimony of the prophets, who sang long before of all those things, which he both did and suffered. Which is such

a peculiar advantage and privilege of his, as that neither Apollonius nor Apuleius, nor any other magician, could ever share therein.—Now, as for the life and morals of this Apollonius Tyanæus, as it was a thing absolutely necessary for the carrying on of such a diabolical design, that the person made use of for an instrument should have some colourable and plausible pretence to virtue; so did Apollonius accordingly take upon him the profession of a Pythagorean; and indeed act that part externally so well, that even Sidonius Apollinaris,<sup>a</sup> though a Christian, was so dazzled with the glittering show and lustre of his counterfeit virtues, as if he had been enchanted by this magician so long after his death. Nevertheless, whosoever is not very dim-sighted in such matters as these, or partially affected, may easily perceive, that this Apollonius was so far from having any thing of that Divine Spirit which manifested itself in our Saviour Christ, (transcending all the philosophers that ever were) that he fell short of the better moralized Pagans; as for example Socrates, there being a plain appearance of much pride and vain-glory (besides other foolery) discoverable both in his words and actions. And this Eusebius<sup>b</sup> undertakes to evince from Philostratus's own history (though containing many falsehoods in it) οὐδ' ἐν ἐπιεικέσι καὶ μετρίοις ἀνδράσιν ἄξιον ἐγκρίνειν, οὐχ' ὅπως τῷ σωτῆρι ἡμῶν Χριστῷ παρατίθεται τὸν Ἀπολλώνιον, that Apollonius was so far from deserving to be compared with our Saviour Christ, that he was not fit to be ranked amongst the moderately and indifferently honest men.—Wherefore, as to his reputed

<sup>a</sup> Epistolar. lib. viii. Epist. iii. p. 462, 463.

<sup>b</sup> Advers. Hieroclem, cap. iv. p. 431.

miracle, if credit be to be given to those relations, and such things were really done by him, it must for this reason also be concluded, that they were done no otherwise than by magic and necromancy; and that this Apollonius was but an archimago or grand magician. Neither ought this to be suspected for a mereslander cast upon him by partially affected Christians only, since, during his lifetime, he was generally reputed, even amongst the Pagans themselves, for no other than a γόης,<sup>a</sup> or infamous enchanter, and accused of that very crime before Domitian the emperor:<sup>b</sup> as he was also represented such by one of the Pagan writers of his life, Mœragenes, senior to

Con. Cel. 1. 6.  
p. 302.

Philostratus, as we learn from Origen: *περὶ μαγείας φημὲν, ὅτι ὁ βουλόμενος ἐξετάσαι, πότερόν ποτε καὶ φιλόσοφοι ἄλωτοί εἰσιν αὐτῇ, εἰ μὴ, ἀναγνώτω τὰ γεγραμμένα Μοιραγένει τῶν Ἀπολλωνίου τοῦ Τυανέως μάγου καὶ φιλοσόφου ἀπομνημονευμάτων. ἐν οἷς ὁ μὴ Χριστιανός, ἀλλὰ φιλόσοφος, ἔφησεν ἄλῶναι ὑπὸ τῆς ἐν Ἀπολλωνίῳ μαγείας, οὐκ ἀγενεῖς τινὰς φιλοσόφους, ὡς πρὸς γόητα αὐτὸν εἰσελθόντας. ἐν οἷς, οἶμαι, καὶ περὶ Ἐυφράτου πάνυ διηγήσατο, καὶ τινος Ἐπικουρείου.* As concerning the infamous and diabolical magic, he that would know whether or no a philosopher be temptable by it, or illaqueable into it, let him read the writings of Mœragenes concerning the memorable things of Apollonius Tyanæus the magician and philosopher; in which he that was no Christian, but a Pagan philosopher himself, affirmeth some not ignoble philosophers to have been taken with Apollonius's magic, including (as I sup-

<sup>a</sup> This is related by Philostratus in *Vita Apollonii*, lib. ii. cap. xviii. p. 156.

<sup>b</sup> *Philostrat. ubi supra*, lib. viii. cap. vii. p. 327.

pose) in that number Euphrates and a certain Epicurean.—And no doubt but this was the reason, why Philostratus \* derogates so much from the authority of this Mœragenes, affirming him to have been ignorant of many things concerning Apollonius (ὄν γὰρ Μοιραγένοι τε προσεκτέον, &c.) Because Mœragènes had thus represented Apollonius in his true colours as a magician; whereas Philostratus's whole business and design was, on the contrary, to vindicate him from that imputation: the truth whereof, notwithstanding, may be sufficiently evinced, even from those very things that are recorded by Philostratus himself. And here by the way we shall observe, that it is reported by good historians, that miracles were also done by Vespasian at Alexandria, “Per eos menses (they are the words Hist. l. iv. p. 111. of Tacitus) multa miracula evenere, quis cœlestis favor, et quædam in Vespasianum inclinatio numinum ostenderetur. Ex plebe Alexandrina quidam, oculorum tabe notus, genua ejus advolvitur, remedium cæcitatæ exposcens gemitu; monitu Serapidis dei, quem dedita superstitionibus gens ante alios colit; precabaturque principem, ut genas et oculorum orbes dignaretur respargere oris excremento. Alius manu æger, eodem deo auctore, ut pede ac vestigio Cæsaris calcaretur orabat.” At that time many miracles happened at Alexandria, by which was manifested the heavenly favour and inclination of the Divine powers towards Vespasian. A plebeian Alexandrian, that had been known to be blind, casts himself at the feet of Vespasian,

\* *Ibid.* lib. i. cap. iii. p. 5, 6.



begging with tears from him a remedy for his sight, (and that according to the suggestion of the god Serapis) that he would deign but to spit upon his eyes and face. Another having a lame hand (directed by the same oracle) beseeches him but to tread upon it with his foot.—And after some debate concerning this business, both these things being done by Vespasian, “statim conversa ad usum manus, et cæco reluxit dies;” the lame hand presently was restored to its former usefulness, and the blind man recovered his sight: both which things (saith the historian) some who were eye-witnesses do to this very day testify, when it can be no advantage to any one to lie concerning it.—And that there seems to be some reason to suspect, that our archimago Apollonius Tyanæus might have some finger in this business also, because he was not only familiarly and intimately acquainted with Vespasian, but also at that very time (as Philostratus\* informeth us) present with him at Alexandria, where he also did many miracles himself. However, we may here take notice of another stratagem and policy of the devil in this, both to obscure the miracles of our Saviour Christ, and to weaken men’s faith in the Messiah, and baffle the notion of it; that whereas a fame of prophècies had gone abroad every where, that a king was to come out of Judea and rule over the whole world, (by which was understood no other than the Messiah) by reason of these miracles done by Vespasian, this oracle or prediction might the rather seem to have its accomplishment in him, who was first proclaimed emperor in

\* *Ubi supra*, lib. v. cap. xxvii. p. 209. et lib. viii. cap. vii. sect. ii. p. 329.

Judea, and to whom Josephus\* himself basely and flatteringly had applied it. And since this business was started and suggested by the god Serapis, that is, by the devil (of whose counsel probably Apollonius also was); this makes it still more strongly suspicious, that it was really a design or policy of the devil, by imitating the miracles of our Saviour Christ, both in Apollonius and Vespasian, to counterwork God Almighty in the plot of Christianity, and to keep up or conserve his own usurped tyranny in the Pagan world still. Nevertheless, we shall here shew Apollonius all the favour we can, and therefore suppose him not to have been one of those more foul and black magicians, of the common sort, such as are not only grossly sunk and debauched in their lives, but also knowingly do homage to evil spirits as such, for the gratification of their lusts; but rather one of those more refined ones, who have been called by themselves Theurgists, such as being in some measure freed from the grosser vices, and thinking to have to do only with good spirits; nevertheless, being proud and vain-glorious, and affecting wonders, and to transcend the generality of mankind, are, by a Divine nemesis, justly exposed to the illusions of the devil or evil spirits, cunningly insinuating here, and aptly accommodating themselves to them. However, concerning this Apollonius, it is undeniable, that he was a zealous upholder of the Pagan Polytheism, and a stout champion for the gods, he professing to have been taught by the Samian Pythagoras's ghost, how to worship these gods, invisible as

\* De Bello Judaico, lib. v. cap. v. sect. iv. p. 390. tom. ii. oper.

well as visible,<sup>a</sup> and to have converse with them. For which cause he is styled by Vopiscus,<sup>b</sup> *amicus verus deorum*, a true friend of the gods;—that is, a hearty and sincere friend to that old Pagan religion, now assaulted by Christianity, in which not one only true God, but a multiplicity of gods, were worshipped. But, notwithstanding all this, Apollonius himself was a clear and undoubted assertor of one supreme Deity; as is evident from his apologetic oration in Philostratus,<sup>c</sup> prepared for Domitian: in which he calls him, τὸν τῶν ὅλων, and τὸν πάντων δημιουργὸν θεόν, that God, who is the maker of the whole universe, and of all things. —And, as he elsewhere in Philostratus declares both the Indians and Egyptians to have agreed in this theology, insomuch that though the Egyptians condemned the Indians for many other of their opinions, yet did they highly applaud this doctrine of theirs, τῆς μὲν ὅλων γενέσεώς τε καὶ οὐσίας θεὸν δημιουργὸν εἶναι, τοῦδε ἐνθυμηθῆναι ταῦτα, αἴτιον τὸ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι αὐτὸν, that God was the maker both of the generation and essence of all things, and that the cause of his making them was his essential goodness:—so doth he himself very much commend this philosophy of Jarchas, the Indian brachman, viz. that the whole world was but one great animal, and might be resembled to a vast ship, wherein there are many inferior subordinate governors, under one supreme, the oldest and wisest; as also expert mariners of several sorts, some to attend upon the deck, and others to climb the masts and

<sup>a</sup> Vide Philostrat. ubi supra, lib. i. cap. xxxii. p. 40.

<sup>b</sup> In Vita Aurel. cap. xxiv. p. 578. edit. Obrechtii.

<sup>c</sup> Ubi supra, lib. viii. cap. vii. seet. vii. p. 337.

order the sails, ἐν ᾗ τὴν μὲν πρώτην καὶ τελευτάτην ἔδραν ἀποδοτέον θεῶ γενέτορι τοῦδε τοῦ ζώου, τὴν δὲ ὑπ' ἐκείνη, θεοῖς οἱ τὰ μέρη αὐτοῦ κυβερνώσι· καὶ τῶν ποιητῶν ἀποδεχόμεθα, ἐπειδὴ πολλοὺς μὲν φάσκωσιν ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ θεοὺς εἶναι, πολλοὺς δὲ ἐν θαλάττῃ, πολλοὺς δὲ ἐν πηγαῖς τε καὶ νάμασι, πολλοὺς δὲ καὶ περὶ γῆν, εἶναι δὲ καὶ ὑπὸ γῆν τινας. In which the first and highest seat is to be given to that God, who is the generator or creator of this great animal; and the next under it to those gods, that govern the several parts of it respectively: so that the poets were to be approved of here, when they affirm, that there are many gods in the heavens, many in the seas, many in the rivers and fountains, many also upon the earth, and some under the earth.—Wherein we have a true representation of the old Paganic theology, which both Indians, and Egyptians, and European poets, (Greek and Latin) all agree in; that there is one supreme God, the maker of the universe, and under him many inferior generated gods, or understanding beings (superior to men) appointed to govern and preside over the several parts thereof, who were also to be religiously honoured and worshipped by men. And thus much for Apollonius Tyanæus.

The first Pagan writer against Christianity was Celsus, who lived in the times of Adrian, and was so professed a Polytheist, that he taxes the Jews for having been seduced by the frauds of Moses into this opinion of one God; ὅτι τῷ ἡγή- Orig. p. 17, σαμένῳ σφῶν ἐπόμενοι Μωϋσῆ αἰπόλοι καὶ ποι- 18. μενες, ἀγροίκοις ἀπάταις ψυχαγωγηθέντες, ἕνα ἐνόμισαν εἶναι θεόν. Those silly shepherds and herdsmen, following Moses their leader, and being seduced by his rustic frauds, came to entertain this belief,

that there was but one only God.—Nevertheless, this Celsus himself plainly acknowledged, amongst his many gods, one supreme, whom he sometimes calls τὸν πρῶτον θεόν, the first God;—sometimes τὸν μέγιστον θεόν, the greatest God;—and sometimes τὸν ὑπερουράνιον θεόν, the supercelestial God,—and the like: and he doth so zealously assert the Divine omnipotence, that he casts an imputation upon the Christians of derogating from the same,

in that their hypothesis of an adversary  
Orig. l. vi. p. 303. power; σφάλονται δὲ ἀσεβέστατα ἅττα, καὶ

περὶ τήνδε τὴν μέγιστην ἄγνοιαν ὁμοίως ἀπὸ θείων αἰνιγμάτων πεπλανημένην, ποιῶντες τῷ θεῷ ἐναντίον τινα, διάβολόν τε καὶ γλώττη Ἑβραῖα Σατανᾶν ὀνομάζοντες τὸν αὐτόν. ἄλλως μὲν οὖν παντελῶς θνητὰ ταῦτα, καὶ οὐδ' ὄσια λέγειν, ὅτι δὲ ὁ μέγιστος Θεός, βουλόμενός τι ἀνθρώποις ὠφελεῖσαι, τὸν ἀντιπράσσοντα ἔχει, καὶ ἀδυνατεῖ. The Christians are erroneously led into most wicked opinions concerning God, by reason of their great ignorance of the Divine enigms; whilst they make a certain adversary to God, whom they call the devil, and in the Hebrew language Satan; and affirm, contrary to all piety, that the greatest God, having a  
Orig. con. Cels. l. viii. p. 419. mind to do good to men, is disabled or withstood by an adversary resisting him.

— Lastly, where he pleads most for the worship of demons, he concludes thus concerning the supreme God: Θεοῦ δὲ οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς ἀπολειπτόν, οὔτε μεθ' ἡμέραν, οὔτε νύκτωρ, οὔτ' ἐς κοινὸν, οὔτ' ἰδίᾳ, λόγῳ τε ἐν παντὶ καὶ ἔργῳ διηνεκῶς, ἀλλὰ γε καὶ μετὰ τῶνδε, καὶ χωρὶς, ἢ ψυχῇ αἰὲ τετάσθω πρὸς τὸν Θεόν. But God is by no means any where to be laid aside, or left out; neither by day nor by night, neither in public nor in private, either in our words or actions; but in *every thing* our mind ought constantly to be

directed towards God.—A saying, that might very well become a Christian.

The next and greatest champion for the Pagan cause in books and writings was that famous Tyrian philosopher Malchus, called by the Greeks Porphyrius; who published a voluminous and elaborate treatise (containing fifteen books) against the Christians; and yet he notwithstanding was plainly as zealous an assertor of one supreme Deity, and one only *ἀγένητον*, unmade or self-existent principle of all things, as any of the Christians themselves could be; he strenuously opposing that forementioned doctrine of Plutarch and Atticus concerning three unmade principles, a good God, an evil soul or demon, and the matter, and endeavouring to demonstrate, that all things whatsoever, even matter itself, was derived from one perfect understanding Being, or self-originated Deity. The sum of whose argumentation to which purpose we have represented by Proclus upon the *Timæus*, (vol. i. 216.)

After Porphyrius, the next eminent antagonist of Christianity and champion for Paganism, was Hierocles, the writer of that book, entitled in Eusebius) *φιλαλήθης*, or a lover of the truth;—which is noted to have been a modester inscription than that of Celsus's *ἀληθῆς λόγος*, or true oration.—For if Eusebius Pamphili were the writer of that answer to this Philalethes now extant, as we both read in our copies and as Photius also read; then must it needs be granted, that Hierocles, the author of it, was either contemporary with Porphyrius, or else but little his junior. Moreover, this Hierocles seems plainly to be the person intended by Lactantius in these following words:

De Just. l. iii. "Alius eandem materiam mordacius  
c. ii. [p. 358.] scripsit; qui erat tum e numero judi-  
cum, et qui auctor in primis faciendæ persecu-  
tionis fuit: quo scelere non contentus, etiam  
scriptis eos, quos affixerat, insecutus est. Com-  
posuit enim libellos duos, non contra Christianos,  
ne inimice insectari videretur, sed ad Christianos,  
ut humane ac benigne consulere videretur. In  
quibus ita falsitatem scripturæ sacræ arguere co-  
natus est, tanquam sibi esset tota contraria.—  
Præcipue tamen Paulum Petrumque laceravit,  
cæterisque discipulos, tanquam fallaciæ semi-  
natores; quos eisdem tamen rudes et indoctos  
fuisse testatus est."—Another hath handled the  
same matter more smartly, who was first himself  
one of the judges, and a chief author of the per-  
secution; but, being not contented with that  
wickedness, he added this afterwards, to perse-  
cute the Christians also with his pen; he compos-  
ing two books, not inscribed against the Christ-  
ians, (lest he should seem plainly to act the part  
of an enemy) but to the Christians, (that he might  
be thought to counsel them humanely and benign-  
ly :) in which he so charges the holy Scripture  
with falsehood, as if it were all nothing else but  
contradictions: but he chiefly lashes Paul and  
Peter, as divulgers of lies and deceits, whom  
notwithstanding he declares to have been rude  
and illiterate persons.—I say, though Hierocles,  
for some cause or other, be not named here by  
Lactantius in these cited words, or that which  
follows, yet it cannot be doubted, but that he  
was the person intended by him, for these two  
reasons: First, because he tells us afterward,  
that the main business of that Christiano-

mastix was to compare Apollonius with our Saviour Christ. "Cum facta Christi mirabilia destrueret, nec tamen negaret, voluit ostendere, Apollonium vel paria, vel etiam majora fecisse. Mirum quod Apuleium prætermiserit, cujus solent et multa et mira memorari. Et ex hoc insolentiam Christi voluit arguere, quod deum se constituerit: ut ille verecundior fuisse videretur, qui cum majora faceret (ut hic putat) tamen id sibi non arrogaverit." That he might obscure the miracles of our Saviour Christ, which he could not deny, he would undertake to shew, that equal or greater miracles were done by Apollonius. And it was a wonder he did not mention Apuleius too, of whose many and wonderful things the Pagans used to brag likewise. Moreover, he condemns our Saviour Christ of insolency, for making himself a god, affirming Apollonius to have been the modest person, who, though he did (as he supposes) greater miracles, yet arrogated no such thing to himself.—The second reason is, because Lactantius also expressly mentions the very title of Hierocles' book, viz. Philaethes. "Cum talia ignorantia suæ deliramenta fudisset cumque veritatem penitus excidere connixus est, ausus est libros suos nefarios, ac Dei hostes, φιλαλήθεις annotare:" Though pouring out so much folly and madness, professedly fighting against the truth, yet he presumed to call these his wicked books and enemies of God, Philaethes, or friends to truth.—From which words of Lactantius, and those foregoing, where he affirms this Christiano-mastix to have written Dr. Pearson, two books, the learned prefacer to the bp. of Chester. late edition of Hierocles, probably concludes,



that the whole title of Hierocles' book was this, λόγοι φλαλήθεις πρὸς Χριστιανούς. And I conceive, that the first of those two books of Hierocles insisted upon such things as Porphyrius had before urged against the Christians; but then in the second, he added this *de novo* of his own, to compare Apollonius with our Saviour Christ; which Eusebius only takes notice of. Wherefore Epiphanius telling us,<sup>a</sup> that there was one Hierocles, a prefect or governor of Alexandria, in those persecuting times of Diocletian, we may probably conclude, that this was the very person described in Lactantius, who is said to have been first of the number of the judges, and a principal actor in the persecution; and then afterward to have written this Philalethes against the Christians, wherein, besides other things, he ventured to compare Apollonius Tyanæus with our Saviour Christ. Now, if this Hierocles, who wrote the Philalethes in defence of the Pagan gods against the Christians, were the author of those two other philosophic books, the Commentary upon the Golden Verses, and that *De Fato et Providentia*, it might be easily evinced from both of them, that he was notwithstanding an assertor of one supreme Deity. But Photius<sup>b</sup> tells us, that that Hierocles, who wrote the book concerning Fate and Providence, did therein make mention of Jamblichus, and his junior Plutarchus Atheniensis: from whence Jonsius taking it for granted, that it was one and the same Hierocles, who wrote against the Christians, and *De Fato*, infers, that it could

<sup>a</sup> Hæres. lxxviii. Meletian. §. ii. tom. i. oper. p. 717. ]

<sup>b</sup> Biblioth. Cod. ccxiv. p. 554.

not be Eusebius Pamphili, who answered the Philalethes, but that it must needs be some other Eusebius much junior. But we finding Hierocles' Philalethes in Lactantius, must needs conclude, on the contrary, that Hierocles, the famous Christiano-mastix, was not the same with that Hierocles, who wrote *De Fato*. Which is further evident from *Æneas Gazeus* in his *Theophrastus*; where first he mentions one Hierocles, P. 7.  
an Alexandrian, that had been his mas- [edit. Barth.]  
ter, whom he highly extols, ἀλλ' εἰπέ μοι, ἔτι παρ' ὑμῖν εἰσὶν οἱ τῆς φιλοσοφίας δεκνύντες τὰς τελετὰς, οἷος ἦν Ἱεροκλῆς ὁ διδάσκαλος; but tell me, I pray you, are there yet left amongst you in Egypt any such expounders of the arcane mysteries of philosophy, as Hierocles our master was?—And this we suppose to be that Hierocles, who wrote concerning *Fate and Providence*, (if not also upon the *Golden Verses*.) But afterward, upon occasion of *Apollonius the Cappadocian*, or *Tyanæan*, he mentions another Hierocles distinct from the former; namely him, who had so boasted of *Apollonius's* miracles, in these words: ὁ Ἀπολλώνιος τὰ ψευδῆ λέγων ἐλέγχεται. Ἱεροκλῆς δὲ οὐκ ὁ διδάσκαλος, P. 24.  
ἀλλ' ὁ προβαλλόμενος τὰ θαυμάσια, ἄπιστον καὶ τοῦτο προσέθηκεν. Thus *Apollonius* is convinced of falsehood; but Hierocles (not our master) but he that boasts of the miracles (of *Apollonius*) adds another incredible thing.—And though it be probable, that one of these was the author of that commentary upon the *Golden Verses*, (for that it should be written by a Christian is but a dream) yet we cannot certainly determine, which of them it was. However, that this Hierocles, who was the mastix of Christianity, and champion for the

gods, was notwithstanding a professed assertor of one supreme Deity, is clearly manifest also from Lactantius, in these following words: "Quam tandem nobis attulisti veritatem? nisi quod assertor deorum eos ipsos ad ultimum prodidisti: prosecutus enim summi dei laudes, quem regem, quem maximum, quem opificem rerum, quem fontem bonorum, quem parentem omnium, quem factorem altoremque viventium confessus es, ademisti Jovi tuo regnum; eumque summa potestate depulsum in ministrorum numerum rededisti. Epilogus ergo te tuus arguit stultitiæ, vanitatis, erroris. Affirmas deos esse; et illos tamen subjicis et mancipas ei deo, cujus religionem conaris evertere." Though you have entitled your book *Philalethes*, yet what truth have you brought us therein, unless only this, that being an assertor of the gods, (contradicting yourself) you have at last betrayed those very gods? For in the close of your book, prosecuting the praises of the supreme God, and confessing him to be the king, the greatest, the opifex of the world, the fountain of good, the parent of all things, the maker and conserver of all living beings, you have by this means dethroned your Jupiter, and, degrading him from his sovereign power, reduced him into the rank of inferior ministers. Wherefore your epilogue argues you guilty of folly, vanity and error, in that you both assert gods, and yet subject and mancipate them under that one God, whose religion you endeavour to overthrow.—Where we must confess we understand not well Lactantius's logic; forasmuch as Hierocles' Zeus, or Jupiter, was one and the same with his supreme God (as is also here intimated); and

though he acknowledged all the other gods to be but his inferior ministers, yet nevertheless did he contend, that these ought to be religiously worshipped, which was the thing that Lactantius should have confuted. But that, which we here take notice of, is this; that Hierocles, a grand persecutor of the Christians, and the author of that bitter invective against them, called Philalethes, though he were so strenuous an assertor of Polytheism, and champion for the gods, yet did he nevertheless at the same time clearly acknowledge one supreme Deity, calling him the king, (that is, the monarch of the universe) the greatest, the opifex of the world, the fountain of good, the parent of all things, and the maker and conserver of all life.

But the greatest opposer of Christianity every way was Julian the emperor, who cannot reasonably be suspected to have disguised or blanched Paganism, because he was an emperor, and had so great an animosity against Christianity, and was so superstitiously or bigotically zealous for the worship of the gods; and yet this very Julian, notwithstanding, was an unquestionable assertor of one supreme Deity. In his book Cyrl. cont. written against the Christians, he de- Jul. 4. p. 115. clares the general sense of the Pagans [edit. Spanhem.]

after this manner: οἱ γὰρ ἡμέτεροι φασίν, τὸν δημιουργὸν ἀπάντων μὲν εἶναι κοινὸν πατέρα καὶ βασιλέα, νενεμησθαι δὲ τὰ λοιπὰ τῶν ἔθνῶν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ, ἐθνάρχαις καὶ πολιούχοις θεοῖς, ὧν ἕκαστος ἐπιτροπέυει τὴν ἑαυτοῦ λῆξιν οἰκείως αὐτῷ· ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ἐν μὲν τῷ πατρὶ πάντα τέλεια, καὶ ἐν πάντα, ἐν δὲ τοῖς μεριστοῖς, ἄλλη παρ' ἄλλῃ κρατεῖ δύναμις, &c.—Our theologers affirm the Maker of all to be a common

father and king; but that the nations, as to particular things, are distributed by him to other inferior gods, that are appointed to be governors over countries and cities, every one of which administers in his own province agreeably to himself. For whereas in the common father all things are perfect, and one is all, in the particular or partial deities one excels in one power, and another in another. Afterward, in the same book he contends, that the Pagans did entertain righter opinions concerning the supreme God P. 146. [p. 148. than the Jews themselves: *ὡς εἰ μὲν ὁ edit. Spanhem.] προσεχῆς εἶη τοῦ κόσμου δημιουργὸς ὁ κληρονομήσας ὑπὸ τοῦ Μωσέως, ἡμεῖς ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ βελτίους ἔχομεν δόξας, οἱ κοινὸν μὲν ἐκείνον ὑπολαμβάνοντες ἀπάντων δεσπότην, ἐθνάρχας δὲ ἄλλους, οἱ τυγχάνουσι μὲν ὑπ' ἐκείνον, εἰσὶ δὲ ὡσπερ ἑπαρχοὶ βασιλέως, ἕκαστος τὴν ἑαυτοῦ διαφερόντως ἐπανορθούμενος φροντίδα, καὶ οὐ καθίσταμεν αὐτὸν, οὐδὲ ἀντιμερίτην τῶν ὑπ' αὐτὸν θεῶν καθισταμένων. If that God, who is so much spoken of by Moses, be the immediate opificer of the whole world, we Pagans entertain better opinions of him, who suppose him to be the common Lord of all; but that there are other governors of nations and countries under him, as prefects or presidents appointed by a king; we not ranking him amongst those partial governors of particular countries and cities, as the Jews do.—From both which places it is evident that, according to Julian's theology, all those other gods, whose worship he contended so much for, were but the subordinate ministers of that one supreme God, the maker of all.*

The same thing might be further manifested from Julian's oration made in praise of the sun, as

a great God in this visible world; he therein plainly acknowledging another far more glorious Deity, which was the cause of all things; *εἰς μὲν ὁ τῶν ὄλων δημιουργός, πολλοὶ δὲ οἱ κατ' οὐρανὸν περιπολοῦντες δημιουργικοὶ θεοί.* There is one God, P. 262. the maker of all things; but besides him <sup>[Edit. Petav. Spanhemii vero p. 140.]</sup> there are many other demiurgical gods moving round the heavens—in the midst of which is the sun. Where we have a clear acknowledgment of one supreme God, and of many inferior deities, both together. Moreover, in the same oration,\* he declareth, that the ancient poets, making the sun to have been the offspring of Hyperion, did by this Hyperion understand nothing else but the supreme Deity; *τὸν πάντων ὑπερέχοντα, πάντων ἐπέκεινα, περὶ ὃν πάντα, καὶ οὐ ἕνεκα πάντα ἐστίν,* him who is above all things, and about whom, and for whose sake, are all things.—Which supreme Deity is thus more largely described by him in the same oration (where he calls him the king of all things): *οὗτος τοίνυν, εἴτε τὸ ἐπέκεινα τοῦ νοῦ καλεῖν αὐτὸν θέμις· εἴτε ἰδέαν* <sup>P. 248. [p. 132. edit. Spanhem.]</sup> *τῶν ὄντων ὃ δὴ φημὶ τὸ νοητὸν σύμπαν· εἴτε ἐν, ἐπειδὴ πάντων τὸ ἐν δοκεῖ ὡς πρεσβύτατον· εἴτε ὁ Πλάτων εἶωθεν ὀνομάζειν τὸ ἀγαθόν· αὕτη δὲ οὖν ἡ μονοειδῆς τῶν ὄλων αἰτία, πᾶσι τοῖς οὖσιν ἐξηγουμένη κάλλους τε, καὶ τελειότητος, ἐνώσεώς τε, καὶ δυνάμεως ἀμηχάνου· κατὰ τὴν ἐν αὐτῇ μένουσαν πρωτουργὸν οὐσίαν, ἥλιον θεὸν μέγιστον ἀνέφηνεν, &c.* This God, whether he ought to be called that, which is above mind and understanding, or the idea of all things, or the one (since unity seems to be the oldest of all things) or else, as Plato was wont to call him, the good; I say, this uni-

\* P. 136. edit. Spanhem.

form cause of all things, which is the original of all pulchritude and perfection, unity and power; produced from himself a certain intelligible sun, every way like himself, of which the sensible sun is but an image.—For thus Dionysius Petavius rightly declares the sense of Julian in this oration;

P. 274.

“ Vanissimæ hujus et loquacissimæ disputationis mysterium est ; a principe ac primario Deo, νοητὸν quendam, et archetypum solem editum fuisse ; qui eandem prorsus σχέσις et τάξιν in genere τῶν νοητῶν habeat, quam in αἰσθητοῖς ille, quem videmus, solaris globus obtinet. Tria itaque discernenda sunt, princeps ille Deus, qui τὰγαθὸν a Platone dicitur, ὁ νοητὸς ἥλιος, ὁ φαινόμενος δίσκος. The mystery of this most vain and loquacious disputation is this, that from the first and chief Deity was produced a certain intelligible and archetypal sun, which hath the same place or order in the rank of intelligible things, that the sensible sun hath in the rank of sensibles. So that here are three things to be distinguished from one another ; first, the supreme Deity, which Plato calls the good ; secondly, the intelligible sun, or eternal intellect ; and lastly, the corporeal or sensible sun (animated).—Where, notwithstanding, we may take notice, how near this Pagan philosopher and emperor, Julian, approached to Christianity, though so much opposed by him, in that he also supposed an eternal mind or intellect, as the immediate offspring of the first fountain of all things ; which seems to differ but a little from the Christian λόγος. However, it is plain, that this devout restorer of Paganism, and zealous contender for the worship of the gods, asserted no multiplicity of indepen-

dent self-existent deities, but derived all his gods from one.

As for those other philosophers and learned men, who, in those latter times of the declining of Paganism, after Constantine, still stood out in opposition against Christianity; such as Jamblichus, Syrianus, Proclus, Simplicius, and many others, it is unquestionably evident concerning them all, that they clearly acknowledged one supreme Deity as the original of all things. Maximus Madaurensis, a confident and resolved Pagan in St. Austin's time, expressed both his own and the general sense of Pagans after this manner: \* "Equidem unum esse Deum summum, sine initio, naturæ ceu patrem magnum atque magnificum, quis tam demens, tam mente captus neget esse certissimum? Hujus nos virtutes per mundanum opus diffusas multis vocabulis invocamus, quoniam nomen ejus cuncti proprium videlicet ignoramus. Ita fit, ut dum ejus quasi quædam membra carptim variis supplicationibus prosequimur, totum colere profecto videamur." Truly that there is one supreme God, without beginning, as the great and magnificent father of nature; who is so mad or devoid of sense as not to acknowledge it to be most certain? His virtues diffused throughout the whole world (because we know not what his proper name is) we invoke under many different names. Whence it comes to pass, that whilst we prosecute, with our supplications, his, as it were, divided members severally, we must needs be judged to worship the whole Deity.—And then he concludes his epistle

\* Ep. 43.  
[inter August.  
Epistol.  
epist. 16.  
p. 15. tom. ii.  
oper. edit.  
Benedict.]



thus: "Dii te servant, per quos et eorum, atque cunctorum mortalium, communem patrem, universi mortales, quos terra sustinet, mille modis, concordî discordia venerantur." The gods keep thee, by and through whom, we Pagans, dispersed over the whole world, do worship the common father, both of those gods, and all mortals, after a thousand different manners, neverthe-

less with an agreeing discord.—Longinianus, likewise, another more modest Pagan philosopher, upon the request of the same St. Austin, declares his sense concern-

Ep. 21. [Inter  
Epist. Augus-  
tin. epist. 234.  
p. 647. ]

ing the way of worshipping God, and arriving to happiness, to this purpose: "Per minores deos perveniri ad summum Deum non sine sacris purificatoriis;"<sup>a</sup> that we are to come to the supreme God by the minor or inferior gods, and that not without purifying rites and expiations:—he supposing, that besides a virtuous and holy life, certain religious rites and purifications were necessary to be observed in order to that end. In which epistle, the supreme God is also styled by him "unus, universus, incomprehensibilis, infatigabilis et infatigabilis Creator."

Moreover, that the Pagans generally disclaimed this opinion of many unmade self-existent deities, appeareth plainly from Arnobius, where he brings them in complaining, that they were falsely and maliciously accused by some Christians as guilty thereof, after this manner:

Lib. i. p. 19.

"Frustra nos falso et calumnioso incesitis et appetitis crimine, tanquam inficias eamus

<sup>a</sup> These words are not Longinianus's, but the argument of the epistle prefixed to it.

Deum esse majorem; cum a nobis et Jupiter nominetur, et optimus habeatur et maximus: cumque illi augustissimas sedes, et capitolia constituerimus immania." In vain do you Christians calumniate the Pagans, and accuse us, as if we denied one supreme omnipotent God; though we both call him Jupiter, and account him the best and the greatest, having dedicated the most august seats to him, the vast capitols.—Where Arnobius, in way of opposition, shews first, how perplexed and entangled a thing the Pagans' theology was, their poetic fables of the gods nonsensically confounding herology together with theology; and that it was impossible, that that Jupiter of theirs, which had a father and a mother, a grandfather and a grandmother, should be the omnipotent God. "Nam Deus omnipotens, mente una omnium, et communi mortalitatis assensu, neque genitus scitur, neque novam in lucem aliquando esse prolatus; nec ex aliquo tempore cœpisse esse, vel sæculo. Ipse enim est fons rerum, sator sæculorum ac temporum. Non enim ipsa per se sunt, sed ex ejus perpetuitate perpetua, et infinita semper continuatione procedunt. At vero Jupiter (ut vos fertis) et patrem habet et matrem, avos et avias, nunc nuper in utero matris suæ formatus," &c. You Pagans confound yourselves with contradictions; for the omnipotent God, according to the natural sense of all mankind, was neither begotten nor made, nor ever had a beginning in time, he being the fountain and original of all things. But Jupiter (as you say) had both father and mother, grandfathers and grandmothers, and was but lately formed in the womb; and therefore he cannot be

the eternal omnipotent God.—Nevertheless, Arnobius afterward considering (as we suppose) that these poetic fables were by the wiser Pagans either totally rejected, or else some way or other allegorized, he candidly dismisseth this advantage, which he had against them, and grants their Jupiter to be the true omnipotent Deity, and consequently that same God, which the Christians worshipped; but from thence infers, that the Pagans therefore must needs be highly guilty, whilst worshipping the same God with the Christians, they did hate and persecute them after that manner. “*Sed sint, ut vultis, unum, nec in aliquo, vi numinis, et majestate distantes; ecquid ergo injustis persequimini nos odiis? Quid, ut omnis pessimi, nostri nominis inhorrescitis mentione, si, quem Deum colitis, eum et nos? aut quid in eadem causa vobis esse contenditis familiares Deos, inimicos atque infestissimos nobis? etenim, si una religio est nobis vobisque communis, cessat ira cœlestium.*” But let it be granted, that (as you affirm) your Jupiter, and the eternal omnipotent God are one and the same; why then do you prosecute us with unjust hatreds, abominating the very mention of our names, if the same God that you worship be worshipped by us? Or if your religion and ours be the same, why do you pretend, that the gods are propitious to you, but most highly provoked and incensed against us?—Where the Pagan defence and reply is, “*Sed non idcirco Dii vobis infesti sunt, quod omnipotentem colatis Deum; sed quod hominem natum, et quod personis infame est vilibus, crucis supplicio interemptum, et Deum fuisse contenditis, et superesse adhuc creditis, et quotidianis*

supplicationibus adoratis.” But we do not say, that the gods are therefore displeased with you Christians, because you worship the omnipotent God; but because you contend him to be a god, who was not only born a mortal man, but also died an ignominious death, suffering as a malefactor; believing him still to survive, and adoring him with your daily prayers.—To which Arnobius retorts in this manner: “Tell us now, I pray you, who these gods are, who take it as so great an injury and indignity done to themselves, that Christ should be worshipped? Are they not Janus and Saturn, Æsculapius and Liber, Mercurius the son of Maia, and the Theban or Tyrian Hercules, Castor and Pollux, and the like?”

“Hic ergo Christum coli, et a nobis accipi, et existimari pro numine, vulneratis accipiunt auri-  
 bus? et obliti paulo ante sortis et conditionis suæ, id, quod sibi concessum est, impertiri alteri nolunt? hæc est justitia cœlitum? hoc deorum iudicium sanctum? Nonne istud livoris est et avaritiæ genus? non obtrectatio quædam sordens, suas eminere solummodo velle fortunas, aliorum res premi et in contempta humilitate calcari? natum hominem colimus; quid enim, vos hominem nullum colitis natum? non unum et alium? non innumeros alios? quinimo non omnes quos jam templis habetis vestris, mortalium sustulistis ex numero, et cœlo sideribusque donastis? Concedamus interdum manum vestris opinationibus dantes, unum Christum fuisse de nobis, mentis, animæ, corporis, fragilitatis et conditionis unius; nonne dignus a nobis est tantorum obmunerum gratiam, Deus dici, Deusque sentiri? Si enim

vos Liberum, quod reperit usum vini; si quod panis, Cererem; si Æsculapium, quod herbarum si Minervam, quod oleæ; si Triptoleum, quod aratri; si denique Herculem, quod feras, quod fures, quod multiplicium capitum superavit compescuitque natrices, divorum retulistis in cœlum: honoribus quantis afficiendus est nobis, qui ab erroribus nos magnis in sinuata veritate traduxit?" &c. Are these the gods, who are so much offended with Christ's being worshipped, and accounted a god by us? they, who being forgetful of their former condition, would not have the same bestowed upon another, which hath been granted to themselves? Is this the justice of the heavenly powers? this the righteous judgment of gods? or is it not rather base envy and covetousness, for them thus to engross all to themselves? We worship indeed one, that was born a man: what then? do you worship no such? not one, and another, and innumerable? and are not almost all your gods such as were taken from out of the rank of men, and placed among the stars? and will you account that damnable in us, which yourselves practise? Let us for the present yield thus much to your infidelity, and grant, that Christ was but an ordinary man, of the same rank and condition with other mortals; yet might we not for all that (according to your principles) think him worthy, by reason of the great benefits we received from him, to be accounted a god? For if you have advanced into the number of your Divi, Bacchus or Liber for inventing the use of wine, Ceres of corn, Æsculapius of herbs, Minerva of the olive, Triptolemus of the plough,

and Hercules for subduing beasts, thieves, and monsters; with how great honours ought he to be affected by us, who by the insinuation of Divine truth hath delivered us from such great errors of mind? &c.—Which argumentation of Arnobius, though it were good enough *ad homines*, to stop the mouths of the Pagans, there being more reason, that Christ should be made a god, for the benefits that mankind receive from him, than that Bacchus, or Ceres, or Hercules should be so; yet as the same Arnobius himself seems to intimate, it is not sufficient without something else superadded to it, for the justification of Christianity. Neither indeed was that the chief quarrel, which the Pagans had with the Christians, that they had deified one, who was crucified, (though the cross of Christ was also a great offence to them) but that they condemning the Pagans, for worshipping others besides the supreme omnipotent God, and decrying all those gods of theirs, did themselves notwithstanding worship one mortal man for a god. This Celsus urges in Origen, *εἰ μὲν δὴ μηδένα ἄλλον ἐθεράπευον οὗτοι πλὴν ἑνα Θεόν, ἢν ἂν τις αὐτοῖς ἴσως πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ἀτενῆς λόγος. νυνὶ δὲ τὸν ἑναγχοσ φανέντα τουτον ὑπερβηροσκεύουσι, καὶ ὅμως οὐδὲν πλημμελεῖν νομίζουσι περὶ τὸν Θεόν, εἰ καὶ ὑπηρέτης αὐτοῦ θεραπευθήσεται*. If these Christians themselves worshipped no other but one God, or the pure Divinity, then might they perhaps seem to have some just pretence of censuring us; but now they themselves give Divine honour to one that lately rose up, and yet they persuade themselves, that they do not at all offend God in worshipping that supposed

Lib. viii.  
p. 385.

minister of his.—Which, as Origen makes there a reply to it, so shall it be further considered by us afterwards.

As for the judgment of the fathers in this particular, Clemens Alexandrinus was not only of this opinion, that the Pagans (at least the Greekish) did worship the true God, and the same God with the Christians, (though not after a right manner) but also endeavours to confirm it

Strom. 6. p. 635. [c. v. p. 759. edit. Potteri.] from the authority of St. Peter: “That the Greeks knew God, Peter intimates in his predication. There is one God,

saith he, who made the beginning of all things, and hath power over their end, &c. Worship this God, not as the Greeks do. Wherein he seemeth to suppose the Greeks to worship the same God with us, though not according to the right tradition received by his Son. He does not enjoin us not to worship that God, which the Greeks worship, but to worship him otherwise than they do; altering only the manner of the worship, but not the object, or preaching another God. And what that is, not to worship God as the Greeks do, the same Peter intimated in those words: They worship him in images of wood and stone, brass and iron, gold and silver, and sacrifice to the dead also, as to gods.” Where he adds further out of St. Peter’s predication, “Neither worship God as the Jews do,” &c. “The one and only God (saith Clemens) is worshipped by the Greeks Paganically, by the Jews Judai- cally, but by us newly and spiritually. For the same God, who gave the two testaments to the Jews and Christians, gave philosophy to the *Greeks*, δι’ ἧς ὁ παντοκράτωρ παρ’ Ἑλλησι δοξάζεται, by

which the omnipotent God is glorified amongst the Greeks.

Lactantius Firmianus also, in many places, affirms the Pagans to have acknowledged one supreme Deity; “*Summum Deum et philosophi et poetæ, et ipsi denique, qui deos colunt, sæpe fatentur.*” That there is one supreme Deity, both philosophers and poets, and even the vulgar worshippers of the gods themselves, frequently acknowledge.—From whence he concludes, that all the other Pagan gods were nothing but the ministers of this one supreme, and creatures made by him, (he then only blaming them for calling them gods, and giving them religious worship)—lib. i. When he had declared, that it was altogether as absurd to suppose the world to be governed by many independent gods, as to suppose the body of a man to be governed by many minds or souls independent; he adds: “*Quod quia intelligunt isti assertores deorum, ita eos præesse singulis rebus ac partibus dicunt, ut tantum unus sit rector eximius. Jam ergo cæteri non dii erunt, sed satellites ac ministri, quos ille unus, maximus et potens omnium, officiis his præfecit, ut ipsi ejus imperio et nutibus serviant. Si universi pares non sunt, non igitur dñi omnes sunt. Nec enim potest hoc idem esse, quod servit et quod dominatur. Nam si Deus est nomen summæ potestatis incorruptibilis esse debet, perfectus, impassibilis, nulli rei subjectus. Ergo dii non sunt, quos parere uni maximo Deo necessitas cogit.*” Which because the assertors of gods well understand, they affirm these gods of theirs so to preside over the seven

De Ira Dei.  
p. 727.  
[cap. xi.  
p. 934.]

Lib. i. p. 16.  
[cap. iii. p.  
25.]



ral parts of the world, as that there is only one chief rector or governor. Whence it follows, that all their other gods can be no other thing than ministers and officers, which one greatest God, who is omnipotent, hath variously appointed and constituted, so as to serve his command and beck. Now, if all the Pagan gods be not equal, then can they not be all gods; since that which ruleth, and that which serveth, cannot be the same. God is a name of absolute power, and implies incorruptibility, perfection, impassibility, and subjection to nothing.

P. 28. [cap. v. p. 40.] Wherefore these ought not to be called gods, whom necessity compels to obey

one greatest God.—Again, in the same book, “Nunc satis est demonstrare, summo ingenio viros attigisse veritatem ac prope tenuisse; nisi eos retrorsum infatuata pravis opinionibus consuetudo rapuisset, qua et deos alios esse opinabantur, et ea, quæ in usum hominis Deus fecit, tanquam sensu prædita essent, pro diis habenda et colenda credebant.” It is now sufficient to have shewn, that the more ingenious and intelligent Pagans came very near to the truth, and would have fully reached it, had not a certain customary infatuation of evil opinions snatched them away to an acknowledgment of other gods, and to a belief, that those things, which God made for the use of men, as endued with sense (or animated) ought to be accounted gods and worshipped;

P. 39. [c. vii. p. 51.] namely, the stars.—And afterward,

“Quod si cultores deorum eos ipsos se colere putant, quos summi Dei ministros appellamus, nihil est quod nobis faciant invidiam, qui unum Deum dicamus, multos negemus.” If the worshippers of the gods think, that they worship

no other than the ministers of the one supreme God, then there is no cause, why they should render us as hateful, who say, that there is one God, and deny many gods.—

Eusebius Cæsariensis likewise gives us this account of the Pagans' creed, or the tenor of their theology, as it was then

Præp. Evang.  
lib. iii. c. xiii.  
[p. 121.]

held forth by them; *ἓνα γὰρ ὄντα θεόν, παντοίαις δυνάμεσι, τὰ πάντα πληροῦν, καὶ διὰ πάντων διήκειν, καὶ τοῖς πᾶσιν ἐπιστατεῖν· ἄσωμάτως δὲ καὶ ἀφανῶς ἐν πᾶσιν ὄντα, καὶ διὰ πάντων διήκοντα· καὶ τοῦτον εἰκότως διὰ τῶν δεδηλωμένων σέβειν φασί.* The Pagans declare themselves in this manner, that there is one God, who with his various powers filleth all things; and passeth through all things, and presideth over all things; but being incorporeally and invisibly present in all things, and pervading them, he is reasonably worshipped by or in those things that are manifest and visible.—Which passage of Eusebius will be further considered afterward, when we come to give a more particular account of Paganism.

What St. Austin's sense was \* concerning the theology of the Pagans, hath been already declared; namely, "That they had not so far degenerated as to have lost the knowledge of one supreme God, from whom is all whatsoever nature; and that they derived all their gods from one." We shall now, in the last place, conclude with the judgment of Paulus Orosius, who was his contemporary: "Philosophi dum intento mentis studio quærunt scrutanturque omnia, unum Deum authorem omnium repperunt, ad quem unum omnia referrentur; unde etiam nunc Pagani, quos jam declarata veritas de contu-

His. l. vi. c. i.  
[p. 416. edit.  
Fabricii.]

\* *Lib. xx. contra Faustum Manich. cap. xix. p. 246. tom. vi. oper.*

macia magis quam de ignorantia convincit, cum a nobis discutuntur, non se plures sequi, sed sub uno Deo magno, plures ministros venerari fatentur. Restat igitur de intelligentia veri Dei, per multas intelligendi suspiciones, confusa dissensio quia de uno Deo omnium pene una est opinio." The philosophers of the Gentiles, whilst with intent study of mind they inquired and searched after things found, that there was one God, the author of all things, and to which one all things should be referred. Whence also the Pagans at this very day, whom the declared truth rather convinceth of contumacy than of ignorance, when they are urged by us, confess themselves not to follow many gods, but only under one God to worship many ministers. So that there remaineth only a confused dissension concerning the manner of understanding the true God, because about one God there is almost one and the same opinion of all.

And by this time we think it is sufficiently evident, that the Pagans, (at least after Christianity) though they asserted many gods, they calling all understanding beings superior to men by that name, (according to that of St. Jerome, "Deum quicquid supra se esset, Gentiles putabant;") yet they acknowledged one supreme, omnipotent and only unmade Deity.

xvi. But because it is very possible, that some may still suspect all this to have been nothing else but a refinement and interpolation of Paganism, after that Christianity had appeared upon the stage; or a kind of mangonization of it, to render it more vendible and plausible, the better able to *defend itself*, and bear up against the assaults of

Christianity; whilst in the mean time the genuine doctrine of the ancient Pagans was far otherwise: although the contrary hereunto might sufficiently appear from what hath been already declared, yet however, for the fuller satisfaction of the more strongly prejudiced, we shall, by an historical deduction made from the most ancient times all along downwards, demonstrate, that the doctrine of the greatest Pagan Polytheists, as well before Christianity as after it, was always the same; that, besides their many gods, there was one supreme, omnipotent and only unmade Deity.

And this we shall perform, not as some<sup>a</sup> have done, by laying the chief stress upon the Sibylline oracles, and those reputed writings of Hermes Trismegist, the authority whereof hath been of late so much decried by learned men; nor yet upon such oracles of the Pagan deities,<sup>b</sup> as may be suspected to have been counterfeited by Christians; but upon such monuments of Pagan antiquity, as are altogether unsuspected and indubitate. As for the Sibylline oracles, there may (as we conceive) be two extremes concerning them; one, in swallowing down all that is now extant under that title as genuine and sincere, whereas nothing can be more manifest, than that there is much counterfeited and supposititious stuff in this Sibylline farrago, which now we have. From whence, besides other instances of the like kind, it appears too evidently to be denied, that some pretended Christians of former times have been for pious and religious frauds, and endeavoured to uphold

<sup>a</sup> Augustinus Eugubinus, Mutius Pansa, and others.

<sup>b</sup> These oracles are produced by Justin Martyr, in *Orat. ad Græcos* et Eusebius in *Præpar. Evang.* and others.

the truth of Christianity by figments and forgeries of their own devising. Which, as it was a thing ignoble and unworthy in itself, and argued that those very defenders of Christianity did themselves distrust their own cause; so may it well be thought, that there was a policy of the devil in it also, there being no other more effectual way than this, to render all Christianity (at least in after-ages) to be suspected. Insomuch that it might perhaps be questioned, whether the truth and divinity of Christianity appear more in having prevailed against the open force and opposition of its professed enemies, or in not being at last smothered and oppressed by these frauds and forgeries of its seeming friends and defenders. The other extreme may be, in concluding the whole business of the Sibylline oracles (as any ways relating to Christianity) to have been a mere cheat and figment; and that there never was any thing in those Sibylline books, which were under the custody of the Quindecimviri, that did in the least predict our Saviour Christ, or the times of Christianity. For notwithstanding all that the learned Blondel\* hath written, it seems to be undeniably evident from Virgil's fourth Idyllium, that the Cumean Sibyl was then supposed to have predicted a new flourishing kingdom or monarchy, together with a happy state of justice or righteousness to succeed in the latter age of the world:

Ultima Cumæi venit jam carminis ætas,  
 Magnus ab integro seclorum nascitur ordo.  
 Jam redit et virgo, redeunt Saturnia regna,  
 Jam nova progenies cœlo delabitur alto, &c.

\* In his Treatise of the Sibyls, printed in French at Paris, 1649, in 4to.

Moreover, it is certain, that in Cicero's time the Sibyllina prophesies were interpreted by some in favour of Cæsar, as predicting a monarchy; "Sibyllæ versus observamus, quos illa Cic. Div. lib. ii. [cap. liv. p. 238. tom. ix. oper.] furens fudisse dicitur. Quorum interpretas nuper falsa quadam hominum fama

dicturus in senatu putabatur, eum, quem revera regem habebamus, appellandum quoque esse regem, si salvi esse vellemus." We take notice of the verses of the Sibyl, which she is said L. Cotta Quindecimvir. to have poured out in a fury or prophetic frenzy, the interpreter whereof was lately thought to have been about to declare in the senate-house, that if we would be safe, we should

acknowledge him for a king, who really was so.—Which interpretation of the Sibylline oracles (after Cæsar's death) Cicero was so much offended with (he also looking upon a Roman monarchy as a thing no less impossible than undesirable), that upon this occasion he quarrels with those very Sibylline oracles themselves, as well as the readers and expounders of them, after this manner: "Hoc si est in libris, in quem ho- De Div. lib. ii. [ubi supra.] minem, et in quod tempus est? Callide

enim, qui illa composuit, perfecit, ut, quodcumque accidisset, prædictum videretur, hominum et temporum definitione sublata. Adhibuit etiam latebram obscuritatis, ut iidem versus alias in aliam rem posse accommodari viderentur. Non esse autem illud carmen furentis, tum ipsum poema declarat, (est enim magis artis et diligentiae quam incitationis et motus) tum vero ea quæ ἀκροατικῆς dicitur, cum deinceps ex primis versuum literis aliquid connectitur. Quamobrem Sibyllam quidem repositam et conditam habeamus, ut, id, quod

proditum est a majoribus, injussu senatus ne legantur quidem libri." If there be any such thing contained in the Sibylline books, then we demand, concerning what man is it spoken, and of what time? For whoever framed those Sibylline verses, he craftily contrived, that whatsoever should come to pass, might seem to have been predicted in them, by taking away all distinction of persons and times. He also purposely affected obscurity, that the same verses might be accommodated sometime to one thing, and sometime to another. But that they proceeded not from fury and prophetic rage, but rather from art and contrivance, doth no less appear otherwise, than from the acrostic in them. Wherefore let us shut up the Sibyl, and keep her close, that, according to the decree of our ancestors, her verses may not be read without the express command of the senate.—And lastly, he addeth, "Cum antistitibus agamus, ut quidvis potius ex illis libris quam regem proferant, quem Romæ posthac nec dii nec homines esse patientur." Let us also deal with the quindecimviri and interpreters of the Sibylline books, that they would rather produce any thing out of them, than a king; whom neither gods nor men will hereafter suffer at Rome. Where, though Cicero were mistaken as to the event of the Roman government, and there were doubtless some predictions in these Sibylline books of a new kingdom or monarchy to be set up in the world; yet that the Roman empire was not the thing intended in them, doth manifestly appear from that description in Virgil's forementioned eclogue; wherein there is accordingly another completion of them *expected*, though flatteringly applied to Saloni-

nus. Wherefore we conclude, that the kingdom, and happy state, or golden age, predicted in the Sibylline oracles, was no other than that of the Messiah, or our Saviour Christ, and the times of Christianity. Lastly, in that other passage of Cicero's, concerning the Sibylline oracles: "Valent ad deponendas potius quam ad suscipiendas religiones;" let them be made use of rather for the extinguishing than the begetting of religions and superstitions;—there seems to be an intimation, as if, of themselves, they rather tended to the lessening than increasing of the Pagan superstitions; and therefore may probably be thought to have predicted a change of that Pagan religion, by the worship of one sole Deity to be introduced. Neither ought it to seem a jot more strange, that our Saviour Christ should be foretold by the Pagan Sibyl, than that he was so clearly predicted by Balaam the Aramitic sorcerer. However, those things in the Sibylline verses might have been derived, some way or other, from the Scripture-prophecies; which there is indeed the more probability of, because that Sibylline prophet made use of those very same figures and allegories in describing the future happy state, that are found in the Scripture. As for example:

\* ——— Nec magnos metuent armenta leones;  
Occidet et serpens, &c.

Now, as Cicero seems to complain, that in his time these Sibylline oracles were too much exposed to view, so is it very probable, that notwithstanding they were to be kept under the guard of the quindecimviri, yet many of them

\* *Virgil. Eclog. iv. ver. 22. 24.*



might be copied out, and get abroad; and thereby an occasion be offered to the ignorantly-zealous Christians, who were for officious lies and pious frauds, to add a great deal more of their own forging to them. Neither indeed is it imaginable, how any such cheat as this should either at first have been attempted, or afterward have proved successful; had there not been some foundation of truth to support and countenance it. Besides which it is observable, that Celsus, who would have had the Christians rather to have made the Sibyl than our Saviour Christ a God; taking notice of their using of those Sibylline testimonies against the Pagans, did not tax them for counterfeiting the whole business of these Sibylline oracles, but only for inserting many things of their own into

Orig. o. Cels. them; ἡμεῖς δὲ καὶ τὴν Σίβυλλαν, ἣ χρῶνται τινες  
lib. vii. p. 368.

ὑμῶν, εἰς ὅπως ἐν μᾶλλον προσθήσασθε, ὡς τοῦ θεοῦ παῖδα, τῶν δὲ παρεγγράφειν μὲν εἰς τὰ ἐκείνης, πολλὰ καὶ βλάσφημα εἰκῆ δύνασθε. You Christians might much rather have acknowledged even the Sibyl for the offspring of God; but now you can boldly insert into her verses many, and those maledicent things of your own.—Where Origen, that he might vindicate, as well as he could, the honour of Christians, pleads in their defence, that Celsus, for all that, could not shew what they had foisted into those Sibylline verses; because, if he had been able to have produced more ancient and incorrupt copies, in which such things were not found, he would certainly have done it. Notwithstanding which, it is likely, that there were other ancient copies then to be found, and that Celsus might have met with them too, and that from thence he took occasion to write as he did. However, this

would not justify the present Sibylline books, in which there are forgeries plainly discoverable without copies. Nevertheless it seems, that all the ancient Christians did not agree in making use of these Sibylline testimonies, thus much being intimated by Celsus himself, in the forecited words, ἡ χρῶνται τινες ὑμῶν, which some of you make use of;—as they did not all acknowledge the Sibyl to have been a prophetess: since, upon Celsus' mentioning a sect of Christians called Sibyllists, Origen tells us, that these were such as using the Sibylline testimonies were called so in way of disgrace by other Christians, who would not allow the Sibyl to have been a prophetess; they perhaps conceiving it derogatory to the Scriptures. But though there may be some of the ancient Sibylline verses still left in that farrago which we now have, yet it being impossible for us to prove which are such, we shall not insist upon any testimonies at all from thence, to evince, that the ancient Pagans acknowledged one supreme Deity. Notwithstanding which, we shall not omit one Sibylline passage, which we find recorded in Pausanias<sup>b</sup> (from whence, by the way, it appears also, that the Sibylline verses were not kept up so close, but that some of them got abroad), he telling us, that the defeat of the Athenians at Ægos Potamos was predicted by the Sibyl in these words (amongst others):

καὶ τὸς Ἀθηναίους βασιότρον κίδια Σίρσι  
Ζεὺς ὑψιβεμέτης, ὅστις ἀπὸς ἐστὶ μέγιστος, &c.

Ac tum Cecropidis luctum gemitusque ciebit  
Jupiter alittonans, rerum cui summa potestas, &c.

<sup>a</sup> Orig. contra Celsum, lib. v. p. 272.

<sup>b</sup> In Phocicis, lib. x. cap. ix. p. 820. edit. Kuhnii.

Whereto might be added also that of another ancient Peliadean prophetess, in the same writer,\* wherein the Divine eternity and immutability is plainly declared :

*Ζεὺς ἔσσι, Ζεὺς ἔσσι, Ζεὺς ἔσσηται, ὃ μέγας Ζεῦ.*

Jupiter est, fuit, atque erit: O bone Jupiter alme.

Besides these Sibylline prophecies, there are also other oracles of the Pagan deities themselves, in which there was a clear acknowledgment of one supreme and greatest God. But as for such of them, as are said to have been delivered since the times of Christianity, when the Pagan oracles began to fail, and such as are now extant only in Christian writings, however divers of them are cited out of Porphyrius's book of oracles; because they may be suspected, we shall not here mention any of them. Nevertheless, we shall take notice of one oracle of the Clarian Apollo, that is recorded by Macrobius,\* in which one supreme Deity is not only asserted, but is also called by that Hebrew name (or Tetragrammaton) Jao :

*Ὁρᾶξο τὸν πάντων ὑπαρτῶν θεῶν ἱμμεν ἰάω.*

You are to call the highest and supreme of all the gods, Jao—though it be very true, that that Clarian devil there cunningly endeavoured to divert this to the sun, as if that were the only supreme Deity and true Jao. To which might be added another ancient oracle (that now occurs) of the Dodonean Jupiter,<sup>b</sup> together with the interpretation of Themistocles, to whom it was delivered; wherein he was commanded πρὸς τὸν ὁμώνυμον τοῦ

\* Ibid. cap. xii. p. 828.

<sup>b</sup> Saturnal. lib. i. cap. xviii. p. 290.

<sup>c</sup> Apud Plutarch. in Vita Themistocl. tom. i. oper. p. 225.

θεοῦ βαδίζειν, to repair to him, who was called by the same name with God; which Themistocles apprehended to be the king of Persia, *μεγάλους γὰρ ἀμφοτέρους εἶναι τε καὶ λέγεσθαι βασιλέας*, because both he and God were alike called (though in different respects and degrees) the great king or monarch.

But as for those writings, commonly imputed to Hermes Trismegist, that have been generally condemned by the learned of this latter age, as wholly counterfeit and supposititious, and yet on the contrary are asserted by Athanasius Kircherus<sup>a</sup> for sincere and genuine; we shall have occasion to declare our sense concerning them more opportunely afterward.

The most ancient theologers, and most eminent assertors of Polytheism amongst the Pagans, were Zoroaster in the eastern parts, and Orpheus amongst the Greeks. The former of which was of so great antiquity, that writers cannot well agree about his age. But that he was a Polytheist is acknowledged by all, some affirming it to be signified in his very name, as given him after his death; it being interpreted by them a worshipper of the stars.<sup>b</sup> Neither is it to be doubted, but that *ster* or *ester*, in the Persian language, did signify a star, as it hath been observed also by learned men concerning sundry other words, now familiar in these European languages, that they derived their original from the Persian. Notwithstanding which, it may be suspected, that this was here but a Greek termination; the word being not only in

<sup>a</sup> In *Œdipo Ægyptiaco et Obelisco Pamphilio*, p. 35.

<sup>b</sup> Thus it was explained by Dinon and Hermodorus, as we are informed by Laertius in his proem. segm. 8. p. 6. of which opinion is likewise Scaliger, with others of the moderns.

the oriental languages written *zertoost* and *zara-dust*, but also in Agathias, *zarades*. However, Zoroaster's Polytheism is intimated by Plato; where his magic is defined to have been nothing else but *θεῶν θεραπεία*, the worship of the gods.—

Whence by the way we learn also, that the word *μάγεια*, or magic, was first taken in a good sense,

De Abâ. lib. iv. p. 165. *ῥάγε μὲν τοῖς Πέρσαις, οἱ περὶ τὸ θεῖον σοφοὶ καὶ τούτου θεράποντες, Μάγοι μὲν προσαγορεύονται*

Amongst the Persians, those who were skilful in the knowledge of the Deity, and religious worshippers of the same were called magi.

—And as magic is commonly conceived to be founded in a certain vital sympathy that is in the universe, so did these ancient Persian magi and Chaldeans (as Psellus tells us<sup>b</sup>) suppose *συμπᾶθῆ εἶναι τὰ ἄνω τοῖς κάτω*, that there was a sympathy betwixt the superior and inferior beings;—but it seems the only way at first by them approved, of attracting the influence and assistance of those superior invisible powers, was by piety, devotion, and religious rites. Nevertheless, their devotion was not carried out only to one omnipotent God, but also to many gods; neither is it to be questioned but that this Divine magic of Zoroaster shortly after degenerated in many of his followers into the theurgical magic, and at length into *γοητεία*, downright sorcery and witchcraft; the only thing which is now vulgarly called magic. But how many gods soever this Zoroaster worshipped, that he ac-

<sup>a</sup> In Alcibiade i. oper. p. 32.

<sup>b</sup> In brevi dogmat. Chaldaicorum declaratione, published at the end of Servatius Gallæus's edition of the Sibylline Oracles, Amst. 1689, in 4to.

knowledged notwithstanding one supreme Deity, appeareth from the testimony of Eubulus, cited by Porphyrius in his *De Antro Nympharum*, *πρῶτα μὲν, ὡς ἔφη Εὐβουλος, Ζωροάστρου αυτοφυῆς σπήλαιον ἐν τοῖς πλησίον ὄρεσι τῆς Περσίδος, ἀνθρῶν καὶ πηγᾶς ἔχον, ἀνιερῶσαντος εἰς τιμὴν τοῦ πάντων ποιητοῦ καὶ πατρὸς Μίθραος, εἰκόνα φέροντος αὐτῷ τοῦ σπηλαίου τοῦ κόσμου, ὃν ὁ Μίθραος ἐδημιούργησε*. Zoroaster, first of all, as Eubulus testifieth, in the mountains adjoining to Persis, consecrated a native orbicular cave, adorned with flowers, and watered with fountains, to the honour of Mithras, the maker and father of all things: this cave being an image or symbol to him of the whole world, which was made by Mithras.—Which testimony of Eubulus is the more to be valued, because, as Porphyrius elsewhere\* informeth us, he wrote the history of Mithras at large in many books; from whence it may be presumed, that he had thoroughly furnished himself with the knowledge of what belonged to the Persian religion. Wherefore, from the authority of Eubulus, we may well conclude, also, that notwithstanding the sun was generally worshipped by the Persians as a god, yet Zoroaster, and the ancient magi, who were best initiated in the Mithraic mysteries, asserted\* another Deity, superior to the sun, for the true Mithras, such as was πάντων ποιητῆς καὶ πατὴρ, the maker and father of all things; or of the whole world—whereof the sun is a part. However, these also looked upon the sun as the most lively image of this Deity, in which it was worshipped by them; as they likewise wor-

P. 254.

\* That Mithras, which was called *κρυπτός θεός*, the hidden God—was not the visible sun.

shipped the same Deity symbolically in fire, as Maximus Tyrius informeth us;<sup>a</sup> agreeable to which is that in the magic oracles:<sup>b</sup>

————— πάντα αὐτῆς ἐκ τῆς ἰσχυροῦς.

All things are the offspring of one fire; that is, of one supreme Deity.—And Julian the emperor was such a devout sun-worshipper as this, who acknowledged, besides the sun, another incorporeal Deity, transcendent to it. Nevertheless, we deny not, but that others amongst the Persians, who were not able to conceive of any thing incorporeal, might, as well as Heraclitus, Hippocrates, and the Stoics amongst the Greeks, look upon the fiery substance of the whole world (and especially the sun) as animated and intellectual, to be the supreme Deity, and the only Mithras, according to that inscription,<sup>c</sup> Deo Soli Invicto Mithræ.—However, Mithras, whether supposed to be corporeal or incorporeal, was unquestionably taken by the Persians for the supreme Deity, according to that of Hesychius, *Μίθρας, ὁ πρῶτος ἐν Πέρσαις θεός*, Mithras, the first god among the Persians—who was therefore called in the inscription<sup>d</sup> Omnipotent, Omnipotenti Deo Mithræ. Which first, supreme and omnipotent God was acknowledged by Artabanus, the Persian, in his conference with Themistocles, in these words:

Plat. Themist. ἡμῖν δὲ πολλῶν νόμων καὶ καλῶν ὄντων, κάλι-  
στος οὗτός ἐστι τὸ τιμῆν βασιλεία, καὶ προσ-  
κυνεῖν εἰκόνα θεοῦ τοῦ τὰ πάντα σώζοντος. Amongst

<sup>a</sup> Vide Dissertat. xxxviii. p. 371.

<sup>b</sup> Commonly ascribed to Zoroaster, sect. ii. vers. 29. in Stanley's History of Philosophy.

<sup>c</sup> Vide Anton. Van Dale Dissert. ix. ad Antiquit. et Marmora, p. 16.

<sup>d</sup> Apud Gruter, Thesaur. Inscript. p. 34. n. 5.

those many excellent laws of ours, the most excellent is this; that the king is to be honoured and worshipped religiously, as the image of that God, which conserveth all things.—Scaliger<sup>a</sup> with some others (though we know not upon what certain grounds) affirm, that *mither*, in the Persian language, signified *great*, and *mithra*, *greater* or *greatest*; according to which, Mithras would be all one with *Deus major* or *maximus*<sup>b</sup>, the greatest God. Wherefore we conclude, that either Herodotus was mistaken, in making the Persian Mithras the same with Mylitta or Venus, (and perhaps such a mistake might be occasioned from hence, because the word *mader* or *mether* in the Persian language signified *mother*, as *mylitta* in the Syrian did); or else, rather, that this Venus of his is to be understood of the Ἀφροδίτη οὐράνια, the heavenly Venus or Love; and thus indeed is she there called in Herodotus, Urania; by which, though some would understand nothing else but the moon, yet we conceive the supreme Deity, true heavenly Love (the mother and nurse of all things) to have been primarily signified therein.

But Zoroaster and the ancient magi are said to have called the supreme God also by another name, viz. Oromasdes or Ormisdas; however Oromasdes, according to Plato,<sup>c</sup> seems to have been the father of Zoroaster. Thus, besides Plutarch and others, Porphyrius, in the life of Pythagoras, παρήνει μάλιστα δ' ἀληθεύειν, τοῦτο γὰρ μόνον δύνασθαι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ποιεῖν θεῶν

Genitrix.

P. 191.

[p. 41. edit.

Kuster.]

<sup>a</sup> De Emendat. Temporum, lib. vi. cap. de Hebdom. Daniel, p. 588;

<sup>b</sup> Hist. lib. i. cap. cxxxi. p. 65.

<sup>c</sup> In Alcibiade, tom. i. oper. p. 32.



παραπλεσίονος, ἐπὶ καὶ παρὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ, ὡς παρὰ τῶν Μάγων ἐπυθάνετο, ὃν Ὀρομάζην καλοῦσιν ἑκάνοι, ἐοικέναι τὸ μὲν σῶμα φωσὶ τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν ἀληθείᾳ. Which we would understand thus: Pythagoras exhorted men chiefly to the love of truth, as being that alone which could make them resemble God, he having learned from the magi, that God, whom they call Oromasdes, was as to corporeals most like to light, and as to incorporeals to truth.—Though perhaps some would interpret these words otherwise, so as to signify Oromasdes to have been really compounded of soul and body, and therefore nothing else but the animated sun, as Mithras is commonly supposed also to have been. But the contrary hereunto is plainly implied in those Zoroastrian traditions or fables concerning Oromasdes, recorded in Plutarch,<sup>a</sup> ὅτι ἀπέστησε τοῦ ἡλίου τοσοῦτον, ὅσον ὁ ἥλιος τῆς γῆς ἀπέστηκε, that Oromasdes was as far removed from the sun, as the sun was from the earth.—Wherefore Oromasdes was, according to the Persians, a deity superior to the sun; God properly as the fountain of light and original of good, and the same with Plato's *ἀγαθόν*, or first good.—From whom the Persians, as Scaliger informs us, called the first day of every month Ormasda, probably because he was the beginning of all things. And thus Zoroaster and the ancient magi acknowledged one and the same supreme Deity, under the different names of Mithras and Oromasdes.

But it is here observable, that the Persian Mithras was commonly called *Τριπλάσιος*, threefold or treble.—Thus Dionysius,<sup>b</sup> the Pseudo-Areopagite,

<sup>a</sup> De Iside et Osir. p. 370. tom. ii. oper.

<sup>b</sup> Epistol. vii. ad Polycarpum, p. 91. tom. ii. oper.

καὶ εἰσὶτε Μάγοι τὰ μνημόσυνα τοῦ τριπλασίου Μίθρου τελοῦσιν. The Persian magi to this very day celebrate a festival solemnity in honour of the triplasian (that is, the threefold or triplicated) Mithras. And something very like to this is recorded in Plutarch<sup>a</sup> concerning Oromasdes also, ὁ μὲν Ὀρομάζης τρίς ἑαυτὸν ἀύξήσας, Oromasdes thrice augmented or triplicated himself;—from whence it further appears, that Mithras and Oromasdes were really one and the same Numen. Now the scholiasts upon Dionysius pretend to give a reason of this denomination of the Persian Mithras, Triplasion, or threefold, from the miracle done in Hezekiah's time, when the day was increased, and almost triplicated; as if the magi then observing the same had thereupon given the name of Τριπλάσιος, or threefold, to their god Mithras, that is, the sun, and appointed an anniversary solemnity for a memorial thereof. But learned men have already shewn the foolery of this conceit; and therefore it cannot well be otherwise concluded, but that here is a manifest indication of a higher mystery, viz. a trinity in the Persian theology; which Gerardus I. Vossius<sup>b</sup> would willingly understand, according to the Christian hypothesis, of a Divine trinity, or three hypostases in one and the same Deity, whose distinctive characters are goodness, wisdom, and power. But the magical or Zoroastrian oracles seem to represent this Persian trinity more agreeably to that Pythagoric or Platonic hypothesis, of three distinct substances subordinate one to another,

<sup>a</sup> De Iside et Osiride, p. 370. tom. ii. oper.

<sup>b</sup> De Orig. et Progressu Idololat. lib. ii. cap. ix. p. 131.

the two first whereof are thus expressed in the following verses:<sup>a</sup>

Πάντα γὰρ ἐξετίλισε πατήρ, καὶ τῷ παρίδοκε  
Δευτέρῳ, ὃν πρῶτον κληίζεται Ἰθνα ἀνδρῶν.

To this sense: The Father, or first Deity, perfected all things, and delivered them to the second Mind, who is that, whom the nations of men commonly take for the first.—Which oracle Psel-lus<sup>b</sup> thus glosseth upon; τὴν πᾶσαν κτίσιν δημιουργήσας ὁ τῆς τριάδος πρῶτος πατήρ, παρέδωκε ταύτην τῷ νῷ ὄντινα νοῦν τὸ ζύμπαν γένος τῶν ἀνδρῶν, ἀγνοοῦντες τὴν πατρικὴν ὑπερόχην πατήρ, Θεὸν πρῶτον καλοῦσι. The first Father of the Trinity having produced this whole creation, delivered to it Mind or Intellect; which Mind, the whole generation of mankind, being ignorant of the paternal transcendency, commonly call the first God.—After which, Psel-lus takes notice of the difference here betwixt this magical or Chaldaic theology, and that of Christians: Πλὴν τὸ παρ' ἡμῖν δόγμα ἐναντίως ἔχει, ὡς αὐτὸς ὁ πρῶτος νοῦς, ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ μεγάλου πατρὸς, τὴν κτίσιν πᾶσαν ἐδημιούργησεν, &c. But our Christian doctrine is contrary hereunto, namely thus: that the first Mind or Intellect, being the Son of the great Father, made the whole creation. For the Father, in the Mosaic writings, speaks to his Son the idea of the creation; but the Son is the immediate opifex thereof.—His meaning is, that according to this Persian or Chaldaic theology, the first hypostasis of the Divine Triad was the δημιουργός, or immediate architect of the world—whereas,

<sup>a</sup> In Oraculis Zoroastri adscriptis, sect. ii. ver. 27, 28. apud Stanley, ubi supra.

<sup>b</sup> He and Pletho wrote commentaries on the oracles of Zoroaster.

according to the Christian as well as Platonic doctrine, he is the second. For which cause, Pletho framed another interpretation of that magic oracle, to render it more conformable both to the Christian and Platonic doctrine; ὁ γὰρ πατήρ ἅπαντα ἐξέτελεσε, τὰ νοητὰ δηλαδὴ εἶδη (ταῦτα γὰρ ἔστι τὰ ἐκτετελεσμένα τε καὶ τέλεια) καὶ τῷ μετ' ἑαυτὸν δευτέρῳ θεῷ παρέδωκεν, ἄρχεν δηλαδὴ καὶ ἡγεῖσθαι αὐτῶν, &c. The Father perfected all things, that is, the intelligible ideas (for these are those things which are complete and perfect), and delivered them to the second God, to rule over them. Wherefore whatsoever is produced by this God, according to its own exemplar and the intelligible essence, must needs owe its original also to the highest Father.

Which second God, the generations of men commonly take for the first, they looking up no higher than to the immediate architect of the world.—According to which interpretation of Pletho's (the more probable of the two) the second hypostasis in the magic (or Persian) trinity, as well as in the Platonic and Christian, is the immediate opifex or architect of the world; and this seems to be properly that which was called Mithras in Eubulus.

But, besides these two hypostases, there is also a third mentioned in a certain other magic or Chaldaic oracle, cited by Proclus, under the name of Psyche, or the mundane soul;

Μετὰ δὲ Πατρικῆς Διανοίας,

Ψυχὴ ἐγὼ ναίω.

After (or next below) the paternal Mind, I Psyche dwell.—Now the paternal Mind, as Psellus informs us, is the second hypostasis before mentioned: ὁ πατρικὸς νοῦς, ὁ δεύτερος δηλαδὴ Θεός, καὶ τῆς

*ψυχῆς προσεχῆς δημιουργός*. The paternal Mind is the second God, and the immediate demiurgus or opifex of the soul. Wherefore though both those names, Oromasdes and Mithras, were frequently used by the magi for the τὸ θεῖον, or whole Deity in general, yet this being triplasian, or threefold, according to their theology, as containing three hypostases in it; the first of those three seems to have been that which was most properly called Oromasdes, and the second Mithras. And this is not only confirmed by Pletho, but also with this further 'superaddition to it, that the third hypostasis of that Persian trinity was that which they called Arimanius; he gathering as much even from Plutarch\* himself: *φασὶ περὶ Ζωροάστρου, ὡς τριχῆ τὰ ὄντα διέλοι· καὶ τῇ μὲν πρώτῃ αὐτῶν μορφῇ, Ὀρομάζην ἐπιστήνῃ τούτων δ' εἶναι, τὸν ὑπὸ τῶν λογίων πατέρα καλούμενον· τῷδε ἐσχάτῃ Ἀρεμιάνην· Μίθραν δὲ τῇ μέσῃ, καὶ τούτου δ' ἂν εἶναι τὸν Δεύτερον Νοῦν καλούμενον ὑπὸ τῶν λογίων.* They say, that Zoroaster made a threefold distribution of things, and that he assigned the first and highest rank of them to Oromasdes, who in the oracles is called the Father; the lowest to Arimanes; and the middle to Mithras, who in the same oracles is likewise called the second Mind.—Whereupon he observes, how great an agreement there was betwixt the Zoroastrian and the Platonic trinity, they differing in a manner only in words. And the middle of these, namely, the eternal Intellect, that contains the ideas of all things, being, according to the Platonic hypothesis, the immediate δημιουργός and architect of the world, this probably was that Mithras, as we have already intimated, who is called in

\* De Iside et Osir. p. 370.

Eubulus, the demiurgus of the world, and the maker and father of all things. Now, if that third hypostasis of the magic or Chaldaic oracles be the same with that which the Persians call Arimanius, then must it be upon such an account as this, because this lower world (wherein are souls vitally united to bodies, and lapsable) is the region, where all manner of evils, wickedness, pains, corruption and mortality reign. And herewith Hesychius seemeth to agree: Ἀριμάνης (saith he) ὁ Ἅιδης παρὰ Πέρσαις, Arimanius among the Persians is Hades—that is, either Orcus or Pluto; wherein he did but follow Theopompus, who in Plutarch calls Arimanius likewise Hades or Pluto: which it seems was as well the third in the Persian Trinity (or triplasian Deity) as it was in the Homerican. And this was that Arimanius, whom the Persian king in Plutarch, upon Themistocles' flight, addressed his devotion to;

κατευξάμενος αἰεὶ τοῖς πολεμίοις τοιαύτας φρένας  
 δίδόναι τὸν Ἀριμάνιον, ὅπως ἐλαθῶσι τοὺς ἀρίσ-  
 τούς τῶν ἑαυτῶν, he prayed, that Arimanius

In Vit.  
 Them.  
 [p. 326.]

would always give such a mind to his enemies, as thus to banish and drive away their best men from them.—And indeed from that which Plutarch affirms, διὸ καὶ Μίθρην Πέρσαι τὸν Μεισίτην ὀνομάζουσι, that the Persians from their god Mithras, called any mediator, or middle betwixt two, Mithras; it may be more reasonably concluded, that Mithras, according to the Persian theology, was properly the middle hypostasis of that triplasian or triplicated Deity of theirs, than that he should be a middle self-existent god or mediator betwixt two adversary gods unmade, one good, and the other evil, as Plutarch would suppose.

Notwithstanding which, if that, which the same Plutarch and others do so confidently affirm, should be true, that Zoroaster and the ancient magi made good and evil, light and darkness, the two substantial principles of the universe; that is, asserted an evil demon co-eternal with God, and independent on him, in the very same manner that Plutarch himself and the Manicheans afterward did: yet however it is plain, that in this way also Zoroaster and the magi acknowledged one only fountain and original of all good, and nothing to be independent upon that one good principle or God, but only that, which is so contrary to his nature and perfection, as that it could not proceed from him, namely, evil. But we have already discovered a suspicion, that the meaning of those ancient magi might possibly be otherwise; they philosophizing only concerning a certain mixture of evil and darkness, together with good and light, that was in the composition of this lower world, and personating the same; as also perhaps taking notice especially therein of evil demons (who are acknowledged likewise in the magic oracles, and called *θηρες χθονος*, beasts of the earth—and *χθονιοι κυνες*, terrestrial dogs;) the head of which might be sometimes called also emphatically *ο πονηρος δαιμων Περσων*, the evil demon of the Persians—as being the very same with the devil: all which was under the immediate presidency or government of that God, called by them Arimanius, Hades, or Plato, the third hypostasis in the triplasian Deity of the Persians. Which suspicion may be yet further confirmed from hence, because the Persian theologers, as appears by the inscriptions, expressly

acknowledged the Divine omnipotence, which they could not possibly have done, had they admitted of a Manichean substantial evil principle, co-eternal with God, and independent on him. Besides which, it is observable, that whereas the Gnostics in Plotinus's time asserted this world to have been made, not so much from a principle essentially evil and eternal, as from a lapsed soul, to weigh down the authority of Plato, that was against them, did put Zoroaster in the other scale, producing a book entitled *ἀποκαλύψεις Ζωροάστρου*, or the Revelations of Zoroaster—Porphyrus tells us, that himself wrote purposely to disprove those Zoroastrian revelations, as new and counterfeit, and forged by those Gnostics themselves; therein implying also the doctrine of the ancient Zoroaster no way to have countenanced or favoured that Gnostic heresy. Moreover, the tenets of these ancient magi, concerning that duplicity of principles, are by writers represented with great variety and uncertainty. That account, which Theodorus in Photius<sup>b</sup> (treating of the Persian magic) gives thereof, as also that other of Eudemus in Damascius,<sup>c</sup> are both of them so nonsensical, that we shall not here trouble the reader with them: however, neither of them suppose the Persian Artimanius, or Satanas, to be an unmade self-existing demon. But the Arabians, writing of this Altawiah, or Persian duplicity of good and evil principles, affirm, that according to the most approved magi, light was Kadiman, the most ancient and first God, and that darkness

<sup>a</sup> In Vita Plotini, cap. xvi. p. 119. edit. Fabricii.

<sup>b</sup> Biblioth. Cod. lxxx. p. 199.

<sup>c</sup> *επι τῶν ἑβραίων ἀρχῶν*, a work never yet printed.



was but a created God; they expressly denying the principle of evil and darkness to be coeve with God, or the principle of good and light. And Abulfeda represents the Zoroastrian doctrine (as the doctrine of the magi reformed) after this manner: "That God was older than darkness and light, and the creator of them, so that he was a solitary being, without companion or corrival; and that good and evil, virtue and vice, did arise from a certain commixture of light and darkness together, without which this lower world could never have been produced; which mixture was still to continue in it, till at length light should overcome darkness: and then light and darkness shall each of them have their separate and distinct worlds, apart from one another."

If it were now needful, we might still make it further evident, that Zoroaster, notwithstanding the multiplicity of gods worshipped by him, was an assertor of one supreme, from his own description of God, extant in Eusebius. Θεός ἐστὶν ὁ πρῶτος ἀφθαρτος, αἰδίας, ἀγέννητος, ἀμερής, ἀνομοίωτος, ἄνιστος, ἄνιστος πάντος καλοῦ, ἀδιωρητόκηντος, ἀγαθῶν ἀγαθώτατος, φρονίμων φρονιμώτατος, ἔστι δὲ καὶ πατὴρ ἐννομίας καὶ δικαιοσύνης, αὐτοδίδακτος, τέλειος, καὶ ἱεροῦ φυσικοῦ μόνος ἐυρετής. God is the first incorruptible, eternal, unmade, indivisible, most unlike to every thing, the head or leader of all good, unbribable, the best of the good, the wisest of the wise; he is also the father of law and justice; self-taught, perfect, and the only inventor of the natural holy.—Which Eusebius tells us, that this Zoroastrian description of God was contained *verbatim* in a book entitled, A holy

Роговк Spec.  
Hist. Ar. P.  
146, 147,  
148.

Ригер. Ев.  
I. I.  
[cap. x. p.  
42.]

Collection of the Persian Monuments; as also that Ostanes (himself a famous magician and admirer of Zoroaster) had recorded the very same of him in his Octateuchon.

Now we having, in this discourse concerning Zoroaster and the magi, cited the oracles, called by some magical, and imputed to Zoroaster, but by others Chaldaical; we conceive it not improper to give some account of them here. And indeed if there could be any assurance of the antiquity and sincerity of those reputed oracles, there would then need no other testimony to prove, that either Zoroaster and the Persian magi, or else at least the Chaldeans, asserted not only a Divine monarchy, or one supreme Deity the original of all things, but also a trinity consistently with the same.

And it is certain, that those oracles are not such novel things as some would suspect, they being cited by Synesius,\* as then venerable, and of great authority, under the name of *ιερά λόγια*, holy oracles;—and there being, of this number, some produced by him, that are not to be found in the copies of Psellus and Pletho; from whence it may be concluded, that we have only some fragments of these oracles now left. And that they were not forged by Christians, as some of the Sibylline oracles undoubtedly were, seems probable from hence, because so many Pagan philosophers make use of their testimonies, laying no small stress upon them; as for example Damascius, out of whom Patritius hath made a considerable collection of such of these oracles as are wanting in Psellus and Pletho's copies. And

\* De Insomniis, passim.

we learn from Photius, that whereas Hierocles' book of Fate and Providence was divided into seven parts, the drift of the fourth of them was this, τὰ λεγόμενα λόγια, εἰς συμφωνίαν ἀνάγειν, οἷς Πλάτων ἐδημάσσει, to reconcile the reputed oracles with Plato's doctrines.—Where it is not to be doubted, but that those reputed oracles of Hierocles were the same with these magic or Chaldaic oracles; because these are frequently cited by philosophers under that name of λόγια, or oracles. Proclus upon the Timæus, ὑπὸ τε Πλάτωνος, καὶ Ὀρφίως, καὶ Λογίων, ποιητῆς καὶ πατρὸς ὑμνεῖται τοῦ παντός, πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε, γεννῶν μὲν τὰ στήθεσι τῶν θεῶν, ψυχὰς δὲ πέπλων, εἰς γενέσει εὐδούν. The maker of the universe is celebrated both by Plato and Orpheus and the oracles, as the father of gods and men, who both produceth multitudes of gods and sends down souls for the generations of men.—And as there are other fragments of these cited by Proclus elsewhere under the name of λόγια or oracles, so doth he sometimes give them that higher title of θεοπαράδοτος, θεολογία, and μυσταγωγία, the theology that was of Divine tradition or revelation.—Which magnificent encomium was bestowed in like manner upon Pythagoras's philosophy by Jamblichus, that being thought to have been deriyed in great part from the Chaldeans and the magi; ἐκ θεῶν αὐτῆς παραδοθείσας τὸ κατ' ἀρχάς. This philosophy of Pythagoras having been first divinely delivered, or revealed by the gods, ought not to be handled by us without a religious invocation of them.—And that Porphyrius was not unacquainted with these oracles neither, may be

<sup>a</sup> Biblioth. Cod. cexiv. p. 553.

<sup>b</sup> In Vita Pythag., cap. i. p. 1, 2, ed. Kusteri.

concluded from that book of his, entitled, *περὶ τῆς ἐκ λόγων φιλοσοφίας*, concerning the philosophy from oracles;—which consisting of more parts, one of them was called, *τὰ τῶν Χαλδαίων λόγια*, the oracles of the Chaldeans:—which, that they were the very same with those we now speak of, shall be further proved afterward. Now, though Psellus affirms, that the Chaldean dogmata contained in those oracles were some of them admitted both by Aristotle and Plato; yet does he not pretend these very Greek verses themselves to have been so ancient. But it seems probable from Suidas, that Julian, a Chaldean and Theurgist, the son of Julian a philosopher (who wrote concerning Demons and Telesiurgics), was the first, that turned those Chaldee or magic oracles into Greek verse; *Ἰουλιανός, ἐπὶ Μάρκου Ἀντονίνου τοῦ βασιλέως, ἔγραψε θεουργικὰ, τελεστικὰ, λόγια δι' ἐπῶν*. Julian, in the time of Marcus Antoninus the emperor, wrote the Theurgic and teletic oracles in verse.—For that there is something of the Theurgical magic mixed together with mystical theology in these oracles, is a thing so manifest from that operation about the Hecatone circle, and other passages in them, that it cannot be denied; which renders it still more unlikely that they should have been forged by Christians. Nevertheless, they carry along with them (as hath been already observed) a clear acknowledgment of a Divine Monarch, or one supreme Deity, the original of all things; which is called in them the Father, and the paternal Principle, and that Intelligible, \* *ὁ ὅς σε νοεῖν νόου ἄνδει*, that cannot be apprehended otherwise than by the flower of the mind;—as also that

\* Oraculor, sect. iii. vers. 58.

was any such man as Orpheus, but only in Fairy-land; and that the whole history of Orpheus was nothing but a mere romantic allegory, utterly devoid of all truth and reality. But there is nothing alleged for this opinion from antiquity, save only this one passage of Cicero's concerning De Nat. D. l. i. p. 211. Aristotle: "Orpheum poetam docet Aristoteles nunquam fuisse;" Aristotle teacheth, that there never was any such man as Orpheus the poet:—in which notwithstanding Aristotle seems to have meant no more than this, that there was no such poet as Orpheus senior to Homer, or that the verses vulgarly called Orphical were not written by Orpheus. However, if it should be granted, that Aristotle had denied the existence of such a man, there seems to be no reason at all, why his single testimony should here preponderate against that universal consent of all antiquity, which is for one Orpheus, the son of Oeager, by birth a Thracian, the father or chief founder of the mythical and allegorical theology amongst the Greeks, and of all their most arcane religious rites and mysteries; who is commonly supposed to have lived before the Trojan war (that is, in the time of the Israelitish judges), or at least to have been senior both to Hesiod and Homer; and also to have died a violent death, most affirming him to have been torn in pieces by de Rep. l. x. lib. iv. p. 162. women. For which cause, in that vision of Herus Pamphylus in Plato, Orpheus's soul being come down again into another body, is said to have chosen rather that of a swan (a reputed musical animal) than to be born again of a woman, by reason of that great hatred, which he had conceived of all womankind, for

his suffering such a violent death from them: And the historic truth of Orpheus was not only acknowledged by Plato, but also by Isocrates, senior to Aristotle likewise (in his oration in the praise of Busiris<sup>a</sup>); and confirmed by that sober historiographer Diodorus Siculus, b he giving this account of Orpheus, That he was a man, who diligently applied himself to literature, and having learned τὰ μυθολογούμενα, or the mythical part of theology, travelled into Egypt, where he attained to further knowledge, and became the greatest of all the Greeks in the mysterious rites of religion, theological skill, and poetry. To which Pausanias addeth, that he gained great authority, οἷα πιστευόμενος εἰρηκέναι ἔργων ἀπορίων καθαρῶν, νόσων τεύματα, καὶ τροπὰς μητιμάτων ἕλων<sup>c</sup> Lib. ix. p. 586. as being believed, to have found out expiations for wicked actions, remedies for diseases, and appeasements of the Divine displeasure.—Neither was this history of Orpheus contradicted by Origen, d when Celsus gave him, so, fit an occasion, and so strong a provocation to do it, by his preferring Orpheus before our Saviour Christ. To all which may be added, in the last place, that it being commonly concluded from the Greek word θρησκεία, that the Greeks derived their Teletæ and mysteries of religion from the Thracians, it is not so reasonable to think with the learned Vossius, e that Xamolxis was the founder of them (and not Orpheus), this Xamolxis being by most reported to have been Pythagoras's servant, and consequently too much a junior; and though Herodo-

<sup>a</sup> P. 452.

<sup>b</sup> Lib. iv. cap. xxv. p. 221.

<sup>c</sup> Advers. Cels. lib. vii. p. 368.

<sup>d</sup> De Artis Poetic. Natur. cap. xiii.

tus \* attribute more antiquity to him, yet did he conceive him to have been no other than a demon, who appearing to the Thracians, was worshipped by them; whereas in the meantime, the general tradition of the Greeks derived the Thracian religious rites and mysteries from Orpheus and no other, according to this of Suidas; λέγεται ὡς Ὀρφεὺς Θραξ, πρῶτος ἐτεχνολόγησε τὰ Ἑλλήνων μυστήρια, καὶ τὸ τιμᾶν θεὸν θρησκεύειν ἐκάλεσεν, ὡς Θρακίας οὔσης τῆς εὐρώσεως. It is commonly said, that Orpheus the Thracian was the first inventor of the religious mysteries of the Greeks, and that religion was from thence called Threskeia, as being a Thracian invention.—Wherefore though it may well be granted, that by reason of Orpheus's great antiquity, there have been many fabulous and romantic things intermingled with this history; yet there appears no reason at all, why we should disbelieve the existence of such a man.

But though there were such a man as Orpheus, yet it may very well be questioned for all that, whether any of those poems, commonly entitled to him, and called Orphical, were so ancient, and indeed written by him. And this the rather, because Herodotus declares it as his own opinion, that Hesiod and Homer were the ancientest of all the Greek poets, οἱ δὲ πρότερον ποιηταὶ λεγόμενοι τούτων

L. ii. p. 53.  
[cap. liii.  
p. 109.]

τῶν ἀνδρῶν γενέσθαι ὕστερον ἐγένοντο, and that those other poets, said to have been before them, were indeed juniors to them;—meaning

hereby, in all probability, Orpheus, Musæus and Linus. As also because Aristotle seems plainly to have followed Herodotus in this, he mentioning the Orphic poems (in his book of the soul) after

\* Hist. lib. iv. cap. xcvi. p. 252, 253.

this manner, τὰ Ὀρφικὰ καλούμενα ἔπη, the L. i. c. vii. § 7. verses that are called Orphical.—Besides which Cicero<sup>a</sup> tells us, that some imputed all the Orphic poems to Cercops, a Pythagorean; and it is well known, that many have attributed the same to another of that school, Onomacritus, who lived in the times of the Pisistratidæ: wherefore we read more than once in Sextus Empiricus of Ὀνομάκριτος ἐν τοῖς Ὀρφικοῖς, Onomacritus in the Orphics.—Suidas also reports, that some of the Orphic poems were anciently ascribed to Theognetus, others to Timocles, others to Zopyrus, &c. From all which Grotius seems to Proleg. in Flor. Stob. have made up this conclusion: That the Pythagorics entitled their own books to Orpheus and Linus, just in the same manner as ancient Christians entitled theirs, some to the Sibyls, and others to Hermes Trismegist.—Implying therein, that both the Orphic poems and doctrine owed their very being and first original only to the Pythagoreans. But on the other side Clemens Alexandrinus,<sup>b</sup> affirmeth, that Heraclitus the philosopher borrowed many things from the Orphic poems. And it is certain, that Plato<sup>c</sup> does not only very much commend the Orphic hymns for their suavity and deliciousness, but also produce some verses out of them, without making any scruple concerning their author. Cicero himself, notwithstanding what he cites out of Ari- De N. De. L. p. 201. Lamb. stotle to the contrary, seems to acknowledge Orpheus for the most ancient poet, he writing

<sup>a</sup> De Natur. Deor. lib. i. cap. xxxviii. p. 2940. tom. ix. oper.

<sup>b</sup> Stromat. lib. vi. cap. ii. p. 752.

<sup>c</sup> Vide Plat. de Legib. l. viii. p. 623, et Cratylum, p. 265. Io, p. 144. et in Convivio, p. 318.



thus of Cleanthes: "In secundo libro de natura deorum, vult Orphei, Musæi, Hesiodi, Homerique fabellas accommodare ad ea, quæ ipse de diis immortalibus scripserat, ut etiam veterrimi poetæ, qui hæc ne suspicati quidem sint, Stoici fuisse videantur." Cleanthes, in his second book of the nature of the gods, endeavours to accommodate the fables of Orpheus, Musæus, Hesiod, and Homer, to those very things, which himself had written concerning them; so that the most ancient poets, who never dreamed of any such matter, are made by him to have been Stoics.—Diodorus Siculus<sup>a</sup> affirmeth Orpheus to have been the author of a most excellent poem: and Justin Martyr,<sup>b</sup> Clemens Alexandrinus,<sup>c</sup> Athenagoras,<sup>d</sup> and others, take it for granted, that Homer borrowed many passages of his poems from the Orphic verses, and particularly that very beginning of his Iliad—

Μῆνιν ἄειδε, θεὰ

Lastly, Jamblichus testifieth, that by most writers Orpheus was represented as the ancientest of all the poets; adding, moreover, what dialect he wrote in, αἱ πλείους τῶν ἱστοριῶν ἀποφαίνουσι, De V. Pyth. c. xxxiv. κελῆσθαι τῇ Δωρικῇ διαλέκτῳ καὶ τὸν Ὀρφέα, [p. 195, 196.] πρεσβύτερον ὄντα τῶν ποιητῶν. Most of the historiographers declare, that Orpheus, who was the ancientest of all the poets, wrote in the Doric dialect.—Which, if it be true, then those Orphic fragments, that now we have, (preserved in the writings of such as did not Dorize) must

<sup>a</sup> Lib. iv. cap. xxv. p. 221.

<sup>b</sup> Cohortat. ad Græcos, p. 17. oper.

<sup>c</sup> Stromat. lib. vi. cap. ii. p. 738. 751.

<sup>d</sup> Legat. pro Christianis, cap. xv. p. 64, 65.

have been transformed by them out of their native idiom. Now as concerning Herodotus, who supposing Homer and Hesiod to have been the ancientest of all the Greek poets, seemed therefore to conclude the Orphic poems to have been pseudepigraphous; himself intimates, that this was but a singular opinion, and as it were paradox, of his own, the contrary thereunto being then generally received. However Aristotle probably might therefore be the more inclinable to follow Herodotus in this; because he had no great kindness for the Pythagoric or Orphic philosophy. But it is altogether irrational and absurd to think, that the Pythagorics would entitle their books to Orpheus, as designing to gain credit and authority to them thereby, had there been no such doctrine before; either contained in some ancient monument of Orpheus, or at least transmitted down by oral tradition from him. Wherefore the Pythagorics themselves constantly maintain, that before Pythagoras's time, there was not only an Orphic cabala extant, but also Orphic poems. The former was declared in that ancient book called *Ἱερός λόγος*, or The holy Oration—if we may believe Proclus upon the Timæus: Πυθαγόρειός ὦν ὁ Τιμαῖος, ἔπειτα ταῖς Πυθαγορείων ἀρχαῖς· αὐταὶ δὲ εἰσὶν αἱ Ὀρφικαὶ παραδόσεις· Ἄ γὰρ Ὀρφεὺς δι' ἀπορρήτων λόγων μυστικῶς παράδεδωκε, ταῦτα Πυθαγόρας ἐξέμαθεν ὀργιασθεὶς ἐν Λεβήθροισι τοῖς Θρακικοῖς, Ἀγλαοφήμῳ τελεστικῶς μεταδιδόντος· Ταῦτα γὰρ φησὶν ὁ Πυθαγόρας ἐν τῷ Ἱερῷ λόγῳ. Timæus being a Pythagorean, follows the Pythagoric principles, and these are the Orphic traditions; for what things Orpheus delivered mystically, (or in arcane allegories,) these Py-

thagoras learned when he was initiated by Aglaophemus in the Orphic mysteries, Pythagoras himself affirming as much in his book, called *The holy Oration*.—Where Proclus, without any doubt or scruple, entitles the book inscribed Ἱερός λόγος, or *The holy Oration*, to Pythagoras himself. Indeed, several of the ancients have resolved Pythagoras to have written nothing at all; as Fla. Josephus, Plutarch, Lucian, and Porphyrius; and Epigenes in Clemens Alex. affirms, that the Ἱερός λόγος, or *holy Oration*; was written by Cercops, a Pythagorean. Nevertheless, Diogenes Laertius thinks them not to be in good earnest, who deny Pythagoras to have written any thing; and he tells us, that Heraclides acknowledged this Ἱερός λόγος, or *holy Oration*, for a genuine and indubitate foetus of Pythagoras. Jamblichus is also of the same opinion, as the most received; though confessing some to have attributed that book to Telauges, Pythagoras's son. But whoever was the writer of this Hieros Logos, whether Pythagoras himself, or Telauges, or Cercops, it must needs be granted to be of great antiquity, according to the testimony whereof, Pythagoras derived much of his theology from the Orphic traditions.

Moreover, Ion Chius in his *Trigrammi* testified, as Clemens Alexandrinus informeth us, that Pythagoras himself referred some poems to Orpheus as their author; which is also the general sense of Platonists as well as Pythagoreans. Wherefore upon all accounts it seems most probable, that either Orpheus himself wrote some philosophic or theologic poems, though certain other poems might be also fathered on him, because written in the

Strom. l. i.  
p. 333.  
[p. 397. edit.  
Potteri.]

same strain of mystical and allegorical theology, and as it were in the same spirit, with which this Thracian prophet was inspired; or, at least, that the Orphic doctrine was first conveyed down by oral cabala or tradition from him, and afterwards, for its better preservation, expressed in verses, that were imputed to Orpheus, after the same manner as the Golden Verses written by Lysis were to Pythagoras. And Philoponus<sup>a</sup> intimates this latter to have been Aristotle's opinion concerning the Orphic verses; he glossing thus upon those words of Aristotle before cited: *καλουμένοις εἶπε, ὅτι μὴ δοκεῖ Ὀρφέως τὰ ἔπη, ὡς καὶ αὐτὸς ἐν τῷ περὶ φιλοσοφίας λέγει. Αὐτοῦ γὰρ εἰσι, τὰ δόγματα, ταῦτα δὴ φασιν Ὀνομάκριτον ἐν ἔπεισι καταθεῖναι.* Aristotle calls them the reputed Orphic verses, because they seem not to have been written by Orpheus himself, as the same Aristotle affirmeth in his book of philosophy. The doctrine and opinions of them indeed were his, but Onomacritus is said to have put them into verse.—However, there can be no doubt at all made, but that the Orphic verses, by whomsoever written, were some of them of great antiquity (they being much older than either Aristotle, Plato, or Herodotus) as they were also had in great esteem amongst the Pagans; and therefore we may very well make a judgment of the theology of the ancient Pagans from them.

Now that Orpheus, the Orphic doctrine, and poems, were Polytheistical, is a thing acknowledged by all. Justin Martyr<sup>b</sup> affirms, that Orpheus asserted three hundred and sixty gods; he also bestows upon him this honourable title (if it

<sup>a</sup> Comment. in Aristot. lib. iii. de Anima, fol. 2. edit. Græcæ, Venet. 1553. fol.

<sup>b</sup> Apolog. ii. pro Christianis, p. 104.

may be so accounted) of πολυθεότητος πατήρ καὶ πρῶτος διδάσκαλος, the father and first teacher of Polytheism amongst the Greeks—he supposing,\* that Homer derived his Polytheism from him; Ὅμηρος τῆς πολυθεότητος Ὀρφέως ζηλώσας δόξαν, μυθωδῶς μὲν πλειόνων θεῶν μέμνηται, ἵνα μὴ δόξη τῆς Ὀρφέως ἀπάδειν ποιήσεως. Homer emulating Orpheus's Polytheism, did himself therefore fabulously write of many gods, that he might not seem to dissent from his poems, whom he had so great a veneration for.—With which also agreeth the testimony of Athenagoras :<sup>b</sup> Ὀρφεὺς καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα θεῶν πρῶτος ἔξευρεν, καὶ τὰς γενέσεις διεξῆλθε, καὶ ὅσα ἐκάστοις πέπρακται εἶπε, ᾧ καὶ Ὅμηρος τὰ πολλὰ καὶ περὶ θεῶν μάλιστα ἔπεται. Orpheus first invented the very names of the gods, declaring their generations, and what was done by each of them; and Homer for the most part follows him therein.—Indeed, the whole mythical theology, or fables of the gods, together with the religious rites amongst the Greeks, are commonly supposed to have owed their first original to no other but Orpheus. In which Orphic fables, not only the things of nature, and parts of the world, were all theologized, but also all manner of human passions, imperfections, and vices (according to the literal sense) attributed to the gods. Insomuch that divers of the Pagans themselves took great offence at them; as for example Isocrates, who concludes that a divine Nemesis or vengeance was inflicted upon Orpheus for this impiety, Ὀρφεὺς ὁ μάλιστα τῶν τοιοῦτων λόγων ἀψάμενος, διασπασθεῖς τὸν βίον ἐτελεύτησε,

In Læu. Busir.  
[p. 452.]

\* Cohert. ad Græcor. p. 17.

<sup>b</sup> Apolog. pro Christian. cap. xv. p. 64.

Orpheus, who was most of all guilty in this kind, died a violent death.—Also Diog. Laertius for this cause made a question, whether he should reckon Orpheus amongst the philosophers or no: and others have concluded, that Plato ought to have banished Orpheus likewise out of his commonwealth, for the same reason that he did Homer; \* which is thus expressed—for not lying well concerning the gods.—And here we may take notice of the monstrosity and extravagancy of Orpheus's fancy, from what Damascius<sup>b</sup> and others tell us, that he made one of his principles to be δράκοντα κεφαλὰς ἔχοντα προσπεφυκίας ταύρου καὶ λέοντος, ἐν μέσῳ δὲ θεοῦ πρόσωπον, καὶ ἐπὶ ὤμων πτερὰ, a dragon, having the heads both of a bull and a lion, and in the midst the face of a god, with golden wings upon his shoulders—which forsooth must be an incorporeal deity and Hercules, with which nature (called Ananche and Adrastea) was associated. Nevertheless the generality of the Greekish Pagans, looking upon this Orpheus, not as a mere fanciful poet and fabulator, but as a serious and profound philosopher, or mystical theologer, a person transcendently holy and wise; they supposed all his fables of the gods to be deep mysteries and allegories, which had some arcane and recondite sense under them; and therefore had a high veneration for him, as one who did ἀληθέστερον θεολογεῖν (as Athenagoras writes)<sup>c</sup> more truly theologise than the rest—and was indeed divinely inspired. Insomuch, that Celsus would rather have had the Christians to have taken Orpheus for a god, than our Saviour Christ, C. Cels. l. vii. p. 367.

\* De Legibus, lib. ii. p. 429.

<sup>b</sup> περι πρώτων ἀρχῶν, a MS. cited above.

<sup>c</sup> Apol. pro Christian, cap. xv. p. 64.

ἄνδρα ὁμολογουμένως ὅτι χρησάμενον πνεύματι, καὶ αὐτὸν βίαιως ἀποθανόντα, as being a man unquestionably endued with a holy spirit, and one, who also (as well as the Christians' Jesus) died a violent death.

But that Orpheus, notwithstanding all his Polytheism, or multiplicity of gods, acknowledged one supreme unmade Deity, as the original of all things, may be first presumed from hence, because those two most religious philosophic sects, the Pythagoreans and Platonists, not only had Orpheus in great esteem, he being commonly called by them ὁ Θεολόγος, the theologer, but were also thought in great measure to have owed their theology and philosophy to him, as deriving the same from his principles and traditions. This hath been already intimated, and might be further proved. Pythagoras, as we are informed by Porphyrius and Jamblichus,<sup>a</sup> learned something from all these four, from the Egyptians, from the Persian magi, from the Chaldeans, and from Orpheus, or his followers. Accordingly,

MS. Coll. Caj.  
Cant. p. 14.  
[in Comment.  
ad lib. iii. xiii.  
xiv. Metaphys  
Aristot. fol.  
59.]

Syrianus makes Ὀρφικαὶ καὶ Πυθαγορικαὶ ἀρχαί, the Orphic and Pythagoric principles to be one and the same.—And as we understand from Suidas,<sup>b</sup> the same Syrianus wrote a book entitled, Συμφωνία Ὀρφέως, Πυθαγόρου καὶ Πλάτωνος, the Harmony of Orpheus, Pythagoras and Plato.—Proclus, besides the place before cited, frequently insists upon this elsewhere, in his commentary upon the Timæus, as p. 63. Πυθαγόρειον δὲ καὶ τὸ ταῖς Ὀρφικαῖς ἐπεσθαι γενεαλογίαις. Ἄνωθεν γὰρ ἀπὸ τῆς Ὀρφικῆς

<sup>a</sup> De Vita Pythag. cap. xxviii. p. 122.

<sup>b</sup> Voce Συριανός tom. iii. Lexic. p. 410. edit. Kusteri.

παραδόσεως διὰ Πυθαγόρου καὶ εἰς Ἑλληνας ἢ περὶ θεῶν ἐπιστήμη προῆλθεν. It is Pythagorical to follow the Orphic genealogies. For from the Orphic tradition downward by Pythagoras was the knowledge of the gods derived to the Greeks.—And that the Orphic philosophy did really agree and symbolize with that which afterward was called Pythagoric and Platonic, and was of the same strain with it, may be gathered from that of Plato in his Cratylus, where he speaks concerning the etymology of the Greek word *σῶμα*: *δοκοῦσι μέντοι μοι μάλιστα Δέσθαι οἱ ἀμφὶ Ὀρφέα τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα, ὡς δίκην διδούσης τῆς ψυχῆς, τοῦτον δὲ περιβόλον ἔχειν, ἵνα σώζηται, δεσμοτηρίου εἰκόνα· εἶναι οὖν τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἕως ἂν ἐκτίσῃ τὰ ὀφειλόμενα τὸ σῶμα*. Orpheus and his followers seem to me to have given the best etymology of this word *σῶμα* (from *σώζεσθαι*) that the soul is here in a state of punishment, its body being a prison to it, wherein it is kept in custody till its debts or faults be expiated, and is therefore called *σῶμα*.—Now these three philosophies, the Platonic, Pythagoric, and Orphic, symbolizing so much together, it is probable, that as the Platonic and Pythagoric, so the Orphic likewise derived all their gods from one self-existent Deity.

Which may be further manifested from that epitome of the Orphic doctrine made long since by Timotheus the chronographer in his *Cosmopœia*, still extant in Cedrenus<sup>a</sup> and Eusebii *Chronica*, and imperfectly set down by Suidas (upon the word Orpheus) as his own, or without mentioning the author's name:—*Ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἀνεδείχθη*

<sup>a</sup> In Chronograph. fol. 46.



τῷ κόσμῳ ὁ αἰθήρ, ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ δημιουργηθείς. First of all, the ether was made by God, and after the ether a chaos; a dark and dreadful night then covering all under the whole ether. *Σημαίνων τὴν νύκτα προτερεῖν*, Orpheus hereby signifying (saith Timotheus) that night was senior to day, or that the world had a beginning; *Εἰρηκῶς ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ ἐκθέσει, ἀκατάληπτόν τινα καὶ πάντων ὑπέριστον εἶναι, προγενέστερόν τε καὶ δημιουργὸν ἀπάντων, καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ αἰθέρος, καὶ πάντων τῶν ὑπ' αὐτὸν τὸν αἰθέρα*. He having declared also in his explication, that there was a certain incomprehensible Being, which was the highest and oldest of all things, and the maker of every thing, even of the ether itself, and all things under the ether. But the earth being then invisible by reason of the darkness, a light breaking out through the ether illuminated the whole creation; this light being said by him to be that highest of all beings, (before mentioned) which is called also counsel and life.—*Ταῦτα τὰ τρία ὀνόματα (to use Suidas's words here) μίαν δύναμιν ἀπεφύνατο, καὶ ἐν κράτος τοῦ δημιουργοῦ πάντων θεοῦ, τοῦ πάντα ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος παραγόντος εἰς τὸ εἶναι*. These three names in Orpheus (light, counsel and life) declaring one and the same force and power of the God, who is the maker of all, and who produceth all out of nothing into being, whether visible or invisible.—To conclude with Timotheus: *Ὁ δὲ αὐτὸς Ὀρφεὺς ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ βίβλῳ συνέταξεν, ὅτι διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν τριῶν ὀνομάτων μίας θεότητος, τὰ πάντα ἐγένετο καὶ αὐτὸς ἐστὶ τὰ πάντα*. And the same Orpheus in his book declared, that all things were made by one Godhead in three names, and that this God is all things.

But that Orpheus asserted one supreme Deity,

as the original of all things, is unquestionably evident from the Orphic verses themselves; of which notwithstanding, before we mention any in way of proof, we shall premise this observation, or rather suspicion of our own, that there seem to be some Orphic verses supposititious, as well as there were Sibylline; they being counterfeited either by Christians or Jews. For we must freely profess, for our own part, that we cannot believe all that to be genuine, which is produced by ancient fathers as Orphical; that is, either to have been written by Orpheus himself, or else by Onomacritus, or any other Pagan of that antiquity, according to the Orphic cabala or tradition.

As, for example, this concerning Moses;\*

Ὡς λόγος ἀρχαίων, ὡς ἰβρογενῆς δίδαξεν,  
Ἐκ θεῶν γνῶμαισι λαβὴν παρὰ δίπλακα θεομῶν

Ut habet sermo antiquorum, ut ex-aqua-ortus descripsit,  
Accepta divinitus lege, quæ duplicia præcepta continet.

And this that is commonly understood of Abraham,

Οὐκ ἄρ' γὰρ τις Ἴβρι θνητῶν, μερόπων κραινοντα,  
Εἰ μὴ μουσογενῆς τις ἀποφῆδ' φύλου ἄνωθεν  
Χαλδαίων, ἴθεις γὰρ ἴην ἀστραιο πορείης.

Non enim quispiam mortalium videre posset eum, qui hominibus  
imperat,

Nisi Unigenitus quidam profectus ab antiqua origine gentis  
Chaldæorum; sciebat enim atri cursum.

The manifest forgery of which might make one suspect also some other passages, such as this concerning the Divine Logos;

Εἰς δὲ λόγον θεῶν βλέψας, τῶν τε προσέειπεν,  
Ἰθύναν κραδίης νοερὸν κύτος.

Wherefore it being not ingenuous to lay stress up-

\* Apud Euseb. Præparat. Evangel. lib. xiii. cap. xii. p. 664, 665.

on that for the proof of any thing, which ourselves believe not to be sincere and genuine; we shall here cite no Orphic verses for the acknowledgment of one supreme Deity, but only such as we find attested in Pagan writings. As first of all

P. 95. that copy produced by Proclus upon the Timæus :

Τούτῃκα σὶν τῷ παντὶ Διὶς πάλιν ἐντὸς ἐτύχθη  
 Αἰθέρος εὐρεῖς, ἢ δ' οὐρανοῦ ἀγλαῖη ὕψος,  
 Πόντου τ' ἀπεργέτου, γαίης τ' ἐριμυθῆος εἴρη,  
 Ὠκεανὸς τε μέγας, καὶ νείατα τάρταρα γαίης,  
 Καὶ ποταμῶ, καὶ πόντος ἀπύρμιτος, ἄλλα τε πάντα·  
 Πάντες τ' ἀθάνατοι μάκαρες θεοὶ, ἕδι θείαναι,  
 Ὅσσα ὕψι γεγαῶτα, καὶ ἕσπερον ὀπίσω ἔμελλον,  
 Ἐγγήκετο Ζηνὸς δ' ἐνὶ γαστέρι σύμῃσι πεφύκει.

To this sense : Wherefore, together with the universe, were made within Jupiter the height of the ethereal heaven, the breadth of the earth and sea, the great ocean, the profound Tartara, the rivers and fountains, and all the other things, all the immortal gods and goddesses. Whatsoever hath been, or shall be, was at once contained in the womb of Jupiter.—

Proclus understands this of the ideas of all things being in God, before the world was produced, that is, in order of nature only, he supposing them in time coeue. However, it is plain, that all things are said to be contained in the womb and fecundity of one self-originated Deity, not only all the other gods and goddesses, but every thing else whatsoever.

Again Proclus, in the same place, ushers in another copy of Orphic verses (which are also found in the writer De Mundo) after this manner :

τῶν δὲ Ἰδεῶν πλήρης ὦν, διὰ τούτων ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὰ ὅλα περιεί-

ληφε, ὡς καὶ τοῦτο ἐνδεικνύμενος ὁ θεολόγος ἐπήγαγε· The demiurgus, or maker of the world, being full of ideas, did by these comprehend all things within himself, as that theologer also declareth in these following verses :

Ζεὺς πρῶτος γένητο, Ζεὺς ὕστατος ἀρχιμέρανος·  
 Ζεὺς κεφαλὴ, Ζεὺς μέσσα· Διὸς δ' ἐκ πάντα τέτυκται·  
 Ζεὺς ἄρσεν γένητο, Ζεὺς ἄμβροτος ἐπλετο νόμῳ·  
 Ζεὺς πυθμὴν γαίης τε καὶ οὐρανῷ ἀσπερόστροφος·  
 Ζεὺς ποιὴ πάντων· Ζεὺς ἀκαμάτου πυρὸς ὀρμή·  
 Ζεὺς πάντου μίξα· Ζεὺς ἥλιος ἠδὲ σελήνη·  
 Ζεὺς βασιλεύς· Ζεὺς αὐτὸς ἀπάντων ἀρχιγένεθλας·  
 Ἐν κρᾶτος, εἰς Δαίμων γένητο, μέγας ἀρχὸς ἀπάντων.

Which likewise in plain prose is this :—The high thundering Jove is both the first and the last; Jove is both the head and middle of all things; all things were made out of Jupiter; Jove is both a man and an immortal maid; Jove is the profundity of the earth and starry heaven; Jove is the breath of all things; Jove is the force of the untameable fire; Jove the bottom of the sea; Jove is sun, moon, and stars; Jove is both the original and king of all things: there is one power, and one God, and one great ruler over all.—

Where though there be many strange expressions, yet this seems to be the strangest of them all, that Jupiter should be said to be both a man and an immortal maid. But this is nothing but a poetic description of ἀρρῆνόθηλος, male and female together.—And it was a thing very familiar with all the mystical theologers amongst the Pagans, to call God ἀρρῆνόθηλιν, male and female together;—they signifying thereby emphatically—the divine fecundity, or the generative and creative power of the Deity;—that God was able from himself alone to produce all things. Thus Damascius,

the philosopher,\* writing of this very Orphic theology, expounds it, ἀρσενόθηλον αὐτὴν ὑπεστήσατο, πρὸς ἔνδειξιν τῆς πάντων γεννητικῆς οὐσίας· the Orphic theology calls the first principle hermaphroditic, or male and female together ; thereby denoting that essence, that is generative or productive of all things.—And that learned and pious Christian bishop, Synesius, it seems, thought the expression so harmless, that he scrupled not himself to make use of it, in those elegant and devout hymns of his to God Almighty :

Σὺ πατήρ, Σὺ δ' ἴσσι μάτηρ,  
Σὺ δ' ἄρσση, Σὺ δὲ θήλυς,

Tu Pater, Tu es Mater,  
Tu Mas, Tu Fœmina.

Besides these, there are also certain other Orphic verses, scattered up and down in Proclus, but cited altogether in Eusebius out of Porphyrius, in which the whole world is represented as one great animal, God being the soul thereof

Ἐν δὲ θέμας βασίλειον, ἐν ᾧ τὰδε πάντα κυκλεῖται,  
Πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ, καὶ γαῖα, καὶ αἰθήρ, νύξ τε καὶ ἡμέρα·  
Καὶ Μῦτις, πρῶτος γενέτας, καὶ Ἔρως πολυτερεπής·  
Πάντα γὰρ ἐν μεγάλῳ Ζηνὸς τὰδε σώματι κεῖται·  
Τοῦ θέντοι κεφαλὴν μὲν ἰδεῖν, καὶ καλὰ πρόσωπα,  
Οὐρανὸς αἰγλήεις, ὃν χροῖσται ἀμφὶς ἔθιραι  
Ἄστρων μαρμαρέων περιμαλλίης ἠερίθουται, &c.

Omnia regali sunt hæc in corpore clausa,  
Ignis, et unda, et terra, æther cum nocte dieque ;  
(Consilium, primus genitor, cum numine amoris :)  
Juppiter immenso sub corpore cuncta coercet :  
En hujus caput eximium, vultusque decoros  
Undique resplendens coelum, cui pendula circum  
Aurea Cæsaries astrorum lumina fundit :  
Sunt oculi Phœbus, Phœboque adversa recurrens  
Cynthia, &c.

\* Vide Wolfii Excerpta ex Damascio περὶ πρώτων ἀρχῶν in Anecdotis Græcis tom. iii. p. 254.

Where probably that one verse,

Καὶ Μῆτις, πρῶτος γενέτωρ, καὶ Ἔρως πολυτελής,

though truly Orphical, and indeed divine, it (signifying, that Mind and Love were the first begetters and original of all things) was notwithstanding clapped in unduly out of some other place. But from all these citations it plainly appears, that, according to the Orphic theology, though there were many gods and goddesses too admitted, yet there was one original and king of them all, one supreme Deity acknowledged. We are not ignorant, that some of the ancient and learned fathers,\* conceiving it contradictory, for Orpheus at the same time to assert both many gods and one God, apprehended this to be a convenient salvo for this difficulty, to suppose, that Orpheus had by fits and turns been of different humours and persuasions; first a rank Polytheist, asserting three hundred gods and more; and then afterwards a converted Monotheist, they being the rather led into this opinion, by reason of certain counterfeit Orphic verses in Aristobulus, made probably by some ignorant Jew; wherein Orpheus is made to sing a palinodia or recantation, for his former error and Polytheism. But we must crave leave, with all due respect, to dissent from reverend antiquity in this; it plainly appearing from that first Orphic excerption in Proclus, that Orpheus at the same time acknowledged both one unmade Deity (the original of all things) and many generated gods and goddesses, that were all contained in it.

\* Justin. Martyr in Cohortat. ad Græcos, p. 15. et Apol. ii. pro Christian. p. 104. Clemens Alexandr. in Protreptico, cap. vii. p. 63. et Cyrillus Alexandr. lib. i. advers. Julian. p. 25.

Having now made it sufficiently evident from such Orphic fragments, as have been acknowledged by Pagan writers, and by them cited out of Orpheus's hymns and rhapsodies, that the opinion of monarchy, or one self-existent Deity, the original of all things, was an essential part of the Orphic theology or cabala; we shall here further observe, that besides this opinion of monarchy, (but consistently with the same) a trinity also of Divine hypostases subordinate was another part of this Orphic cabala. Proclus upon Plato's Timæus, making an inquiry into Plato's demiurgus, or opifex of the world, gives us an account, amongst other Platonists, of the doctrine of Amelius (who was contemporary with Plotinus, and who is said to have taken notice of what St. John the evangelist had written concerning the Logos, as agreeing with the Platonic and Pythagoric hypothesis\*) after this manner: 'Αμέλιος δὲ τρίτον ποιεῖ τὸν Δημιουργόν, καὶ Νοῦς τρεῖς, Βασιλεῖς τρεῖς, τὸν ὄντα, τὸν ἔχοντα, τὸν ὀρώντα· διαφέρουσι δὲ οὗτοι, ὅτι ὁ μὲν πρῶτος Νοῦς ὄντως ἐστὶν ὃ ἐστὶν· ὁ δὲ δεύτερος, ἐστὶ μὲν τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ νοητόν, ἔχει δὲ τὸ πρὸ αὐτοῦ, καὶ μετέχει πάντως ἐκείνου, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο δεύτερος· Ὁ δὲ τρίτος, ἐστὶ μὲν τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ, καὶ οὗτος νοητόν· (πᾶς γὰρ νοῦς τῷ συζυγοῦντι νοητῷ ὁ αὐτός ἐστιν) ἔχει δὲ τὸ ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ· καὶ ὁρᾷ τὸ πρῶτον· ὅσῳ γὰρ πλείω ἢ ἀπόστασις, τοσοῦτῳ τὸ ἔχον ἀμορβότερον. This passage being very remarkable, we thought fit to set it down at large, and shall here translate it.—Amelius makes a threefold demiurgus or opifex of the world, three minds and three kings; him that is, him that hath, and him that beholds. Which three minds differ thus, in that the first is

\* Vide Euseb. Præparat. Evang. lib. xi. cap. xviii. xix. p. 540.

essentially that, which he is (or all perfection:) the second is its own intelligible, but hath the first (as something distinct from it) and indeed partakes thereof, and therefore is second. The third is also that intelligible of its own, (for every mind is the same thing with its correspondent intelligible) but hath that which is in the second, and beholds the first. For how much soever every being departs from the first, so much the obscurer is it.—After which Proclus immediately subjoins, *τούτους οὖν τοὺς τρεῖς νόους καὶ δημιουργοὺς ὑποτίθεται, καὶ τοὺς παρὰ τῷ Πλάτῳ, τρεῖς βασιλέας; καὶ τοὺς παρ' Ὀρφεῖ τρεῖς, Φάνητα, καὶ Οὐρανόν, καὶ Κρόνον, καὶ ὁ μάλιστα παρ' αὐτῷ δημιουργός ὁ Φάνης ἐστίν.* Amelius therefore supposeth these three minds and demiurgic principles of his to be both the same with Plato's three kings and with Orpheus's trinity of Phanes, Uranus, and Chronus; but Phanes is supposed by him to be principally the demiurgus. Where though Proclus (who had some peculiar fancies and whimsies of his own, and was indeed a confounder of the Platonic theology, and a mingler of much unintelligible stuff with it) does himself assert a monad or unity, superior to this whole trinity; yet does he seem nevertheless rightly to contend against Amelius, that it was not the first hypostasis neither in the Platonic nor Orphic trinity, that was chiefly and properly the demiurgus or opifex of the world, but the second. And thus Proclus's master Syrianus<sup>a</sup> had before determined, that in the Orphic theology, the title of Opifex did properly belong to Orpheus's *πρωτόγονος θεός*, or first-begotten God, which was the same with Plato's *Νοῦς* or Divine

<sup>a</sup> *Comment. in Libr. aliquot Metaphys. Aristot. p. 33.*



**Intellect.**—Agreeably whereunto Proclus's conclusion is, *τις μὲν ὅν ὁ δημιουργός ἐστὶ καὶ ὅτι Νοῦς θεῖος τῆς ὅλης ποιήσεως αἴτιος, εἰρήσθω διὰ τούτων· καὶ ὅτις ὑπὸτε Ὀρφέως καὶ Πλάτωνος, ὁ αὐτὸς ἀνυμνεῖται δημιουργός Ζεὺς, ἀπὸ τούτων ὑπεμνήσθω*. Thus much may suffice to have declared, who is the demiurgus of the world, namely, that it is the Divine Intellect, which is the proper and immediate cause of the whole creation; and that it is one and the same demiurgical Jupiter, that is praised both by Orpheus and Plato.—Now, besides this, it is observable, that Damascius in his book *περὶ ἀρχῶν*,\* or concerning the principles (not yet published) giving an account of the Orphic theology, tells us, amongst other things, that Orpheus introduced *τρίμορφον θεόν*, a triform deity.—To all which may be added what was before cited out of Timotheus the chronographer, that God had three names light—counsel and life; and that all things were made by one Deity under these three several names. Where Cedrenus, the preserver of that excellent fragment of antiquity, concludes in this manner: *ταῦτα Τιμόθεος συνεγράψατο ὁ χρονογράφος, λέγων τὸν Ὀρφέα πρὸ τοσοῦτων χρόνων εἰπόντα, Τριάδα ὁμοούσιον δημιουργῆσαι τὰ πάντα*. These things Timotheus the chronographer wrote, affirming Orpheus, so long ago, to have declared, that all things were made by a coessential or consubstantial Trinity.—Which, though otherwise it might be looked upon suspiciously, because that Timotheus was a Christian (especially in regard of that word *ὁμοούσιον*) yet by comparing it with what we have before alleged out of Pagan writers, it appears, that so far as

\* Vido Wolfii Excerpta ex hoc Opere Damascii, §. xiii. in *Anecd. Græcis*, tom. iii. p. 252, 253.

concerns an Orphic trinity, it was not altogether vainly written, or without ground by him.

But we have not yet done with Orpheus and the Orphic theology, before we have made one further reflection upon it, so as to take notice of that strong and rank haut-goust, which was in it, of making God to be all. As for example, if we may repeat the forecited passages, and put in the name of God, instead of Ζεύς, or Jupiter; Διὸς πάλιν ἐντὸς ἐτύχθη, this universe, and all things belonging to it, were made within God.—Ζηνὸς δ' ἐνὶ γαστέρι σὺρρα πεφύκει, all things were contained together in the womb of God:—Ζεύς κεφαλῇ, Ζεύς μέσσα, God is the head and middle of all things:—Ζεύς πυθμῆν γαίης, &c. God is the basis of the earth and heaven; God is the depth of the sea; God is the breath of all (or the air that we breathe); God is the force of the untameable fire; God is sun, moon, and stars.—Ἐν δὲ δέμας βασιλειον, there is one kingly (or divine) body—and

*Πάντα γὰρ ἐν μεγάλῳ Ζηνὸς τὰδε σώματι κείται,*

for all these things lie in the great body of God. And thus was the Orphic theology before represented also by Timotheus\* the chronographer, διὰ τῆς θεότητος πάντα ἐγένετο, καὶ αὐτός ἐστι πάντα, all things were made by God, and himself is all things.

But further to prove, that the ancient Greekish Pagans were indeed of such a religious humour as this, to resolve all things into God, and to make God all, we shall here cite a remarkable testimony of Plutarch's, out of his Defect of Oracles: δύο πάσης γενέσεως αἰτίας ἐχούσης, οἱ μὲν σφόδρα παλαιοὶ

\* Apud Cedren. et Malalain, in Histor. Chron. tom. i. p. 92.

P. 436. θεολόγοι καὶ ποιηταὶ τῇ κρείττονι μόνῃ τὸν νοῦν  
 προσέχουσιν εἶλοντο, τοῦτο δὲ τὸ κοινὸν ἐπιφθεγ-  
 γόμενοι πᾶσι πράγμασι,

*Zōs ἀρχῇ, Ζεὺς μέσσα, Διὸς δ' ἐκ πάντα πίπεται.*

ταῖς δ' ἀναγκαίαις καὶ φυσικαῖς οὐκ ἔτι προσήεσαν αἰτίαις· οἱ δὲ νεώτεροι τούτων καὶ φυσικοὶ προσαγορευόμενοι τὸναντίον ἐκείνοις, τῆς καλῆς καὶ θείας ἀποπλανηθέντες ἀρχῆς, ἐν σώμασι καὶ πάθεσι σωμάτων, πληγαῖς τε καὶ μεταβολαῖς καὶ κράσεσι τίθενται τὸ σύμπαν. Whereas there are two causes of all generation (the Divine and the natural) the most ancient theologers and poets attended only to the more excellent of these two (the Divine cause) resolving all things into God, and pronouncing this of them universally, that God was both the beginning and middle, and that all things were out of God. Insomuch that these had no regard at all to the other natural and necessary causes of things. But on the contrary their juniors, who were called Physici (or naturalists) straying from this most excellent and Divine principle, placed all in bodies, their passions, collisions, mutations and commixtures together.—Where by the most ancient theologers and poets, Plutarch plainly meant Orpheus and his followers, it being an Orphic verse that is here cited by him, whereby he gives also an acknowledgment of their antiquity. But by their juniors, who are called Physici, he could understand no other than those first Ionic philosophers, Anaximander, Anaximenes, Hippo, and the rest, whom those degenerate Italics afterward followed, atomizing atheistically, Leucippus, Democritus, and Epicurus. So that here we have another confirmation also of what was before asserted by us, that the Ionic philosophers after Thales, and

before Anaxagoras, were generally atheistical. And indeed from them the word φυσικοί, or Naturalists, came to be often used as synonymous with ἄθεοι, or Atheists. Now these two are here condemned by Plutarch for two contrary extremes; the one, who resolved all into natural and necessary causes, that is, into matter, motion, and qualities of bodies, leaving out the Divine Cause, as guilty of Atheism; the other, who altogether neglecting the natural and necessary causes of things, resolved all into the Divine Cause, as it were swallowing up all into God, as guilty of a kind of fanaticism. And thus we see plainly, that this was one grand arcanum of the Orphic cabala, and the ancient Greekish theology, that God is all things.

Some fanatics of latter times\* have made God to be all, in a gross sense, so as to take away all real distinction betwixt God and the creature, and indeed to allow no other being besides God; they supposing the substance of every thing, and even of all inanimate bodies, to be the very substance of God himself, and all the variety of things, that is in the world, to be nothing but God under several forms, appearances and disguises. The Stoics anciently made God to be all, and all to be God, in somewhat a different way; they conceiving God properly to be the active principle of the whole corporeal universe, which yet (because they admitted of no incorporeal substance) they supposed, together with the passive or the matter, to make up but one and the same complete substance. And others, who acknowledged God to be an incorporeal sub-

\* Rob. Fludd, M. D. in the Preface to his *Philosophia Mosaica*; and Jacob Behmen.

stance, distinct from the matter, have notwithstanding made all to be God also, in a certain sense; they supposing God to be nothing but a soul of the world, which, together with the matter, made up all into one entire Divine animal. Now the Orphic theologers cannot be charged with making God all, in that first and grossly fanatic sense; as if they took away all real distinction betwixt God and the creature, they so asserting God to be all, as that notwithstanding they allowed other things to have distinct beings of their own. Thus much appearing from that riddle, which in the Orphic verses was proposed by the maker of the world to Night;

Proclus in  
[lib. ii. p. 112.]

Ὡς δὲ μοι ἔν τι τὰ πάντα ἴσται, καὶ ἄχωρις ἑκάστω;

How can all things be one, and yet every thing have a distinct being of its own?—Where *Ἐν τι τὰ πάντα*, all things one, or one all things—seems to be the supreme Deity, or Divine Intellect, as Proclus also interprets it, *τὰ ὅλα περιέχων ὁ Ζεὺς καὶ πάντα μοναδικῶς καὶ νοερώς, κατὰ τοῦτους χρησμοὺς, μετὰ τῆς νυκτὸς ὑφίστησι, καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐγκόσμη θεῶν, καὶ τὰς μοίρας τοῦ παντός*. Jupiter, who containeth the universe, and all things within himself, unitively and intellectually, according to these Orphic oracles, gives a particular subsistence of their own also to all the mundane gods, and other parts of the universe.—And this is *ἄχωρις ἑκάστων*, in that fore-cited Orphic verse, Every thing apart by itself—the whole produced or created universe, with all its variety of things in it; which yet are Orphically said to be God also in a certain other sense, that shall be declared afterward. Nor can the Orphic theologers be charged with making God all in the se-

cond Stoical sense, as if they denied all incorporeal substance, they plainly asserting, as Damascius and others particularly note, *θεὸν ἀσώματον*, an incorporeal Deity.—But as for the third way, it is very true, that the Orphic theologers did frequently call the world, the body of God, and its several parts his members, making the whole universe to be one Divine animal; notwithstanding which, they supposed not this animated world to be the first and highest God, but either *δεύτερον θεόν*, as the Hermaic or Trismegistic writers call it, the second God—or else, as Numenius and others of the Platonists speak, *τρίτον θεόν*, the third God;—the soul thereof being as well in the Orphic as it was in the Pythagoric and Platonic trinity, but the third hypostasis; they supposing two other Divine hypostases superior thereunto, which were perfectly secrete from matter. Wherefore, as to the supreme Deity, these Orphic theologers made him to be all things, chiefly upon the two following accounts: first, because all things coming from God, they inferred, that therefore they were all contained in him, and consequently were in a certain sense himself; thus much being declared in those Orphic verses cited by Proclus \* and others,

*πάντα γὰρ κείρας, αἰθερὶ φάος ἐς κολυγῆθις  
μίλλαν ἀπὸ κραθῆς ἀφορίμην, παλιθίσταλα ῥίζων.*

Which Apuleius <sup>b</sup> thus renders,

*Namque sinu occultans, dulces in luminis oras  
Cuncta tulit, sacro versans eub pectore curas.*

The sense whereof is plainly this: That God at

\* Comment. in Timæum Platon, lib. ii, p. 95.

<sup>b</sup> Libro de Mundo, p. 25.

first hiding or occultly containing all things within himself, did from thence display them, and bring them forth into light, or distinct beings of their own, and so make the world.—The second is, because the world produced by God, and really existing without him, is not therefore quite cut off from him, nor subsists alone by itself as a dead thing, but is still livingly united to him, essentially dependent on him, always supported and upheld, quickened and enlivened, acted and pervaded by him; according to that Orphic passage,\* *Ἐν δ' αὐτοῖς αὐτὸς περιτίσσειται*, God passes through and intimately pervades all things.

Now it is very true, that some Christian theologians also have made God to be all, according to these latter senses; as when they affirm the whole world to be nothing else but *Deum explicatum*, God expanded or unfolded—and when they call the creatures, as St. Jerome and others often do, *radios Deitatis*, the rays of the Déity.—Nay, the Scripture itself may seem to give some countenance also hereunto, when it tells us, that “of Col. i. 16. him, and through him, and to him are all things;” which in the Orphic theology was thus expressed; God is the beginning, and middle, and end of all things; that *ἐν αὐτῷ ἐκτίσθη τὰ πάντα*, all things were made in him, as in the Orphic verses, —*Διὸς ἐντὸς ἐρύχθη*; that *τὰ πάντα ἐν αὐτῷ* Col. i. 17. *συνίστηκε*, “all things consist in him;” that, “in him we live, and move, and have our being;” that God doth *ζωοποιεῖν πάντα*, “quicken all things,” and that he ought to be

\* Apud Justin. Martyr. in Cohortat. ad Gentes, et in Apol. ii. et apud Clement. Alexandrin. Euseb. &c.

made πάντα ἐν πᾶσι, "all in all;" which <sup>1 Cor. xv. 28.</sup> supposeth him in some sense to be so.

Notwithstanding which, this is a very ticklish point, and easily liable to mistake and abuse: and, as we conceivè it was the mistake and abuse of this one thing, which was the chief ground and original of the both seeming and real Polytheism, not only of the Greekish and European, but also of the Egyptian and other Pagans, as will be more particularly declared afterwards; they concluding, that because God was all things, and consequently all things God, that therefore God ought to be worshipped in all things, that is, in all the several parts of the world, and things of nature, but especially in those animated intellectual beings, which are superior to men. Consentaneously whereunto, they did both θεολογεῖν ἅπαντα, theologize or deify all things—looking upon every thing as having ὑπερφύσικόν τι, something supernatural—or a kind of divinity in it; and also bestow several names upon God, according to all the several parts of the world, and things of nature, calling him in the starry heaven and ether, Jupiter; in the air, Juno; in the winds, Æolus; in the sea, Neptune; in the earth and subterraneous parts, Pluto; in learning, knowledge and invention, Minerva and the Muses; in war, Mars; in pleasure, Venus; in corn, Ceres; in wine, Bacchus; and the like.

However, it is unquestionably evident from hence, that Orpheus with his followers, that is, the generality of the Greekish Pagans, acknowledged one universal and all-comprehending Deity, one that was all; consequently could not admit of many self-existent and independent deities.



XVIII. Having treated largely concerning the two most eminent Polytheists amongst the ancient Pagans, Zoroaster and Orpheus, and clearly proved, that they asserted one supreme Deity; we shall in the next place observe, that the Egyptians themselves also, notwithstanding their multifarious Polytheism and idolatry, had an acknowledgment amongst them of one supreme and universal Numen.

There hath been some controversy amongst learned men, whether Polytheism and idolatry had their first rise from the Egyptians, or the Chaldeans, because the Pagan writers for the most part give the precedency here to the Egyptians; Lucian himself, who was by birth a Syrian, and a diligent inquirer into the antiquities of his own country, affirming that the Syrians and Assyrians received their religion and gods first from the Egyptians: and before Lucian, Herodotus,<sup>a</sup> the father of history, reporting likewise, that the Egyptians were the first that erected temples and statues to the gods. But whether the Egyptians or Chaldeans were the first Polytheists and idolaters, there is no question to be made; but that the Greeks and Europeans generally derived their Polytheism and idolatry from the Egyptians. Herodotus affirms in one place,<sup>b</sup> that the Greeks received their twelve gods from thence; and in another,<sup>c</sup> that *σχεδόν καὶ πάντα τὰ ὀνόματα τῶν θεῶν ἐξ Αἰγύπτου ἐλήλυθεν εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα*, almost all the names of the gods came first out of Egypt into Greece.—

<sup>a</sup> Lib. ii. cap. iv. p. 90.

<sup>b</sup> Ibid. et lib. iv. cap. l. p. 108.

<sup>c</sup> Lib. iv. cap. l. p. 108.

In what sense this might be true of Ζεύς itself, though the word be originally Greekish, shall be declared afterwards : but it is probable, that Herodotus had here a further meaning, that the very names of many of the Greekish gods were originally Egyptian. In order to the confirmation of which, we shall here propound a conjecture concerning one of them, viz. Ἀθηνᾶ, called otherwise by the Greeks Pallas, and by the Latins Minerva. For, first, the Greek etymologies of this word seem to be all of them either trifling and frivolous, or violent and forced. Plato in his Cratylus<sup>a</sup> having observed, that according to the ancient allegorical interpreters of Homer, Ἀθηνᾶ was nothing else but νοῦς, or διάνοια, mind or understanding, personated and deified, conceived, that the first imposers of that name, intending to signify thereby Divine wisdom, called it Ἀθηνᾶ, as θεοῦ νόησιν, the understanding of God; or the knowledge of Divine things—as if the word had been at first Θεονόη, and thence afterward transformed into Ἀθηνᾶ.—But being not fully satisfied himself with this etymology, he afterward attempts another, deriving the word from νόησις ἐν τῷ ἤθει, knowledge concerning manners, or practical knowledge—as if it had been at first Ἡθονόη, and from thence changed into Ἀθηνᾶ.—Others of the Greeks have deduced this word ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀθρεῖν, because it is the property of wisdom, to collect all into one, supposing that it was at first Ἀθρηναῖ. Others would fetch it from θῆλυς and alpha primitive, because Minerva, or wisdom, though she be a goddess, yet hath nothing of feminine imperfection in her. Others again would etymologize it,

<sup>a</sup> P. 267.

ἀπὸ τοῦ μὴ πεφκέναι θήνεσθαι καὶ ὑποτάττεσθαι τὴν ἀρετὴν; because virtue or wisdom is of such a noble and generous temper, as that it scorns to subject itself to any base and unworthy servitude. Lastly, others would derive it, ἀπὸ τοῦ αἰθέρος, affirming it to have been at first Αἰθερονεία.<sup>a</sup> From all which uncertainty of the Greeks concerning the etymon of this word Ἄθηνᾶ, and from the frivolousness or forcedness of these conjectures, we may rather conclude that it was not originally Greekish, but exotical, and probably, according to Herodotus, Egyptian. Wherefore let us try, whether or no we can find any Egyptian word, from whence this Ἄθηνᾶ might be derived. Plato in his Timæus,<sup>b</sup> making mention of Sais, a city in Egypt, where Solon sometimes sojourned, tells us, αἱ τῆς πόλεως θεὸς ἀρχηγός ἐστιν, Αἰγυπτιστὶ μὲν τοῦνομα Νηῖθ, Ἑλληνιστὶ δὲ, ὡς ὁ ἐκείνων λόγος, Ἄθηνᾶ, that the president or tutelar God of that city was called in the Egyptian language Neith, but in the Greeks, as the same Egyptians affirm, Ἄθηνᾶ.—Now, why might not this very Egyptian word Neith, by an easy inversion, have been at first turned into Thien, or Θῆν, (men commonly pronouncing exotic words ill-favouredly) and then by additional alphas at the beginning and end, transformed into Ἄθηνᾶ? This seems much more probable than either Plato's Θεονόη, or Ἡθουόη, or any other of those Greek etymologies beforementioned. And as the Greeks thus derived the names of many of their gods from the Egyptians, so do the Latins seem to have done the like, from this one instance of the word

<sup>a</sup> Vide Phornut. in Libro de Natur. Deor. Cap. xx. p. 185. inter Scriptor. Mytholog. à Tho. Gale editos.

<sup>b</sup> P. 524. Oper.

Neptune; which though Varro<sup>a</sup> would deduce a *nubendo*, as if it had been *Nuptunus*, because the sea covers and hides the land, and Scaliger with others, ἀπό τῶν νίπτειν, from washing—this being the chief use of water; yet as the learned Borchart<sup>b</sup> hath observed, it may with greater probability be derived from the Egyptian word Nephthus, Plutarch telling us,<sup>c</sup> ὅτι Νέφθον καλοῦσι τῆς γῆς τὰ ἔσχατα καὶ παράγια καὶ ψάοντα τῆς θαλάσσης, that the Egyptians called the maritime parts of land, or such as border upon the sea, Nephthus.—Which conjecture may be further confirmed from what the same Plutarch elsewhere<sup>d</sup> writes, that as Isis was the wife of Osiris, so the wife of Typhon was called Nephthus. From whence one might collect, that as Isis was taken sometimes for the earth, or the goddess presiding over it, so Nephthus was the goddess of the sea. To which may be further added out of the same writer, that Nephthus was sometimes called by the Egyptians Ἀφροδίτη, or Venus, probably because Venus is said to have risen out of the sea. But whatever may be thought of these etymological conjectures, certain it is, that no nation in the world was ever accounted by the Pagans more devout, religious and superstitious, than the Egyptians, and consequently none was more polytheistical and idolatrous. Isocrates, in his praise of Busiris, gives them a high encomium for their sanctity; and Herodotus<sup>e</sup> affirmeth of them, that they were θεοσεβέες περισσῶς ἰόντες μάλιστα πάντων ἀνθρώπων, exceedingly more

<sup>a</sup> Vide Vossium de Origine et Progressu Idololatriæ, lib. ii. cap. lxxvii. p. 259.

<sup>b</sup> In Phaleg. lib. i. cap. ii. p. 9, 10. et lib. iv. cap. xxx. p. 283.

<sup>c</sup> De Iside et Osiride, p. 366.

<sup>d</sup> Ibid. p. 355.

<sup>e</sup> Lib. ii. cap. xxxvii. p. 102.

religious and more devout worshippers of the Deity than all other mortals.—Wherefore they were highly celebrated by Apollo's oracle, (recorded by Porphyrius) and preferred before all other nations for teaching rightly *αἰπείνην ὁδὸν μακάρων*, that hard and difficult way, that leadeth to God and happiness.—But in the Scripture, \* Egypt is famous for her idols, and for her spiritual whoredoms and fornications; to denote the uncleanness whereof she is sometimes joined with Sodom. For the Egyptians, besides all those other gods, that were worshipped by the Greeks and other barbarians; besides the stars, demons and heroes; and those artificial gods, which they boasted so much of their power of making, viz. animated statues; and this peculiar intoxication of their own, which rendered them infamous and ridiculous even amongst all the other Pagans, that they worshipped brute animals also, in one sense or other;

Juv. Sat. 15. Quis nescit, Volusi Bithynice, qualia demens  
Ægyptus portenta colat? Crocodilon adorat  
Pars hæc, illa pavet saturam serpentibus Ibin.

Concerning which Origen against Celsus thus

Lib. iii. p. 121. writeth; *παρ' οἷς προσιόντι μὲν ἐστὶ λαμπρὰ*  
[These words *τεμένη, καὶ ἄλση, καὶ προπυλαίων μεγέθη τε*  
are not Ori- *καὶ κάλλη καὶ νεῶ θαυμάσιοι, καὶ σκηναὶ πέριξ*  
gen's, but *ὑπερήφανοι, καὶ θρησκείαι μάλα δεισιδαίμονες*  
Celsus's:] *καὶ μυστηριώτιδες ἤδη δὲ εἰσιόντι, καὶ ἐνδοτέρῳ γενομένῳ,*  
*θεωρεῖται προσκυνούμενος αἰλουρος, ἢ πίθηκος, ἢ κροκόδειλος,*  
*ἢ τράγος, ἢ κύων* To him, that cometh to be a  
spectator of the Egyptian worship, there first  
offer themselves to his view most splendid and

\* Revelat. xi. 8.

stately temples, sumptuously adorned together with solemn groves, and many pompous rites and mystical ceremonies; but as soon as he enters in, he perceives, that it was either a cat, or an ape, a crocodile, or a goat, or a dog, that was the object of this religious worship.—

But notwithstanding this multifarious Polytheism and idolatry of these Egyptians, that they did nevertheless acknowledge one supreme and universal Numen, may first be probably collected from that fame, which they had anciently over the whole world for their wisdom. The Egyptians are called by the Elei in Herodotus,<sup>a</sup> σοφώτατοι ἀνθρώπων, the wisest of men;—and it is a commendation, that is given to one<sup>b</sup> in the same writer, that he excelled the Egyptians in wisdom, who excelled all other mortals. Thus it is set down in the Scripture for Moses's encomium, that he was “learned in all the wisdom of the Egyptians;”<sup>c</sup> and the transcendency of Solomon's wisdom is likewise thus expressed by the writer of the Book of Kings,<sup>d</sup> that it excelled “the wisdom of all the children of the east country, and all the wisdom of Egypt.” Where by the children of the east are chiefly meant the Persian magi, and the Chaldeans; and there seems to be a climax here, that Solomon's wisdom did not only excel the wisdom of the magi, and of the Chaldeans, but also that of the Egyptians themselves. From whence it appears, that in Solomon's time Egypt was the chief school of literature in the whole world; and that the Greeks were then but

<sup>a</sup> Lib. ii. cap. clx. p. 151.

<sup>b</sup> Ramsinitus, king of Egypt. Herod. lib. ii. cap. cxxi. p. 135.

<sup>c</sup> Acts vii. 22.

<sup>d</sup> 1 Kings iv. 29.

little or not at all taken notice of, nor had any considerable fame for learning. For which cause, we can by no means give credit to that of Philo, in the life of Moses, <sup>a</sup> that besides the Egyptian priests, learned men were sent for by Pharaoh's daughter out of Greece to instruct Moses. Whereas it is manifest from the Greekish monuments themselves, that for many ages after Solomon's time, the most famous of the Greeks travelled into Egypt to receive culture and literature, as Lycurgus, Solon, Thales, and many others, amongst whom were Pythagoras and Plato. Concerning the former of which Isocrates writes, <sup>b</sup> that coming into Egypt, and being there instructed by the priests, he was the first that brought philosophy into Greece; and the latter of them is perstringed by Xenophon, <sup>c</sup> because *Αιγύπτου ἠρώσθη καὶ τῆς Πυθαγόρου τερατώδους σοφίας*, not contented with that simple philosophy of Socrates (which was little else besides morality) he was in love with Egypt, and that monstrous wisdom of Pythagoras.—Now, as it is not probable, that the Egyptians, who were so famous for wisdom and learning, should be ignorant of one supreme Deity, so is it no small argument to the contrary, that they were had in so great esteem by those two divine philosophers, Pythagoras and Plato. We grant, indeed, that after the Greeks began to flourish in all manner of literature, the fame of the Egyptians was not only much eclipsed (so that we hear no more of Greeks travelling into Egypt upon the former account), but also that

<sup>a</sup> Lib. i. p. 605.

<sup>b</sup> In Encomio Busiridis, p. 450.

<sup>c</sup> In fragmento Epistolæ ad Æschinem, apud Euseb. Præpar. Evangel. lib. xiv. cap. xii. p. 745.

their ardour towards the liberal sciences did by degrees languish and abate; so that Strabo in his time could find little more in Egypt besides the empty houses and palaces, in which priests, formerly famous for astronomy and philosophy, had dwelt. Nevertheless, their arcane theology remained more or less amongst them unextinct to the last, as appears from what Origen, Porphyrius, and Jamblichus have written concerning them.

The learning of the Egyptians was either historical, or philosophical, or theological. First the Egyptians were famous for their historic learning and knowledge of antiquity, they being confessed in Plato <sup>b</sup> to have had so much ancients records of time than the Greeks, that the Greeks were but children or infants compared with them. They pretended to a continued and uninterrupted series of history from the beginning of the world downward, and therefore seem to have had the clearest and strongest persuasions of the Cosmogonia. Indeed, it cannot be denied, but that this tradition of the world's beginning was at first in a manner universal among all nations. For concerning the Greeks and Persians we have already manifested the same; and as Sanchoniathon testifieth the like concerning the Phœnicians, so does Strabo likewise of the Indian Brachmans, affirming, that they did agree with the Greeks in many things, and particularly in this, *ὅτι γενητὸς ὁ κόσμος καὶ φθαρετός*, that the world was both made and should be destroyed.—And though Diodorus <sup>c</sup> affirm the con-

<sup>a</sup> Lib. xvii. p. 764.

<sup>b</sup> In Timæo. p. 524.

<sup>c</sup> Lib. ii. p. 83. edit. Hanov. 1604.



trary of the Chaldeans, yet we ought in reason to

Euseb. Chron. P. 6. assent rather to Berosus, <sup>a</sup> in respect of his greater antiquity, who represents the

sense of the ancient Chaldeans after this manner :

*γενέσθαι χρόνον ἐν ᾧ τὸ πᾶν σκότος καὶ ὕδωρ—τὸν δὲ Βῆλον, ὃν Δία μεθερμηνεύουσι, μέσον ταμόντα τὸ σκότος, χωρίσαι γῆν καὶ οὐρανὸν ἀπ' ἀλλήλων, καὶ διατάξαι τὸν κόσμον—ἀποτελέσαι. δὲ τὸν Βῆλου καὶ ἄστρα καὶ ἥλιον καὶ σελήνην καὶ τοὺς πέντε πλανήτας.* That there was a

time, when all was darkness and water, but Bell (who is interpreted Jupiter) cutting the darkness in the middle, separated the earth and heaven from one another, and so framed the world ; this Bell also producing the stars, the sun, and the moon, and the five planets.—From which testimony of Berosus, according to the version of Alexander Polyhistor, by the way it appears also, that the ancient Chaldeans acknowledged one supreme Deity, the maker of the whole world, as they are also celebrated for this in that oracle of Apollo, which is cited out of Porphyry by Eusebius,

Euseb. Præp. Evang. l. ix. c. x.

Μοῦνοι Χαλδαῖοι σοφίην λάχον, ἐδ' ἀρ' Ἑβραῖοι,  
Αὐτογένεθλον ἄνακτα σεβάζεμενοι θεὸν ἀγῶς.

Where the Chaldeans are joined with the Hebrews, as worshipping likewise in a holy manner one self-existent Deity. Wherefore, if Diodorus were not altogether mistaken, it must be concluded, that in the latter times, the Chaldeans (then perhaps receiving the doctrine of Aristotle) did desert and abandon the tradition of their ancestors concerning the Cosmogonia. But the Egyptians, however they attributed more antiquity

<sup>a</sup> Apud Georg. Syncell. in Chronico, p. 29.

to the world than they ought, yet seem to have had a constant persuasion of the beginning of it, and the firmest of all other nations: they (as Kircher tells us \*) therefore picturing Horus, or the world, as a young man beardless, not only to signify its constant youthful and flourishing vigour, but also the youngness and newness of its duration. Neither ought it to be suspected, that though the Egyptians held the world to have had a beginning, yet they conceived it to be made by chance without a God, as Anaximander, Democritus, and Epicurus afterward did; the contrary thereunto being so confessed a thing, that Simplicius, a zealous contender for the world's eternity, affirms the Mosaic history of its creation by God to have been nothing else but *μύθοι Αιγύπτιοι*, Egyptian fables.—The place is so considerable, that I shall here set it down in the author's own language: *Εἰ δὲ τὸν τῶν Ἰουδαίων νομοθέτην* Simpl. in Arist. Phys. l. viii. fol. 268. col. 1. *ἐνδείκνυται λέγοντα, ἐν ἀρχῇ ἐποίησεν ὁ θεὸς τοῦ οὐρανὸν καὶ τὴν γῆν· ἡ δὲ γῆ ἦν ἀόρατος καὶ ἀκατασκεύαστος· καὶ σκότος ἐπάνω τῆς ἀβύσσου, καὶ πνεῦμα θεοῦ ἐπεφέρετο ἐπάνω τοῦ ὕδατος. εἶτα ποιήσαντος αὐτοῦ τὸ φῶς, καὶ διαχωρίσαντος ἀνὰ μέσον τοῦ φωτός καὶ ἀνὰ μέσον τοῦ σκότους, ἐπήγαγε, καὶ ἐκάλεσεν ὁ θεὸς τὸ φῶς ἡμέραν, καὶ τὸ σκότος νύκτα· καὶ ἐγένετο ἑσπέρα καὶ ἐγένετο πρωὶ ἡμέρα μία· εἰ οὖν ταύτην τοῦ χρόνου νομίζει γένεσιν τὴν ἀπὸ χρόνου, ἐννοεῖτω ὅτι μυθικὴ τίς ἐστιν ἡ παράδοσις, καὶ ἀπὸ μύθων Αἰγυπτίων εἰλικυμένη.* If Grammaticus here mean the lawgiver of the Jews, writing thus, [In the beginning God made heaven and earth, and the earth was invisible and unadorned, and darkness was upon the deep, and the Spirit of God moved upon the water ;] and then afterward when

\* In *Oedipo Aegyptiaco*.

he had made light, and separated the light from the darkness, adding, [And God called the light day, and the darkness night, and the evening and the morning were the first day :] I say, if Grammaticus think this to have been the first generation and beginning of time ; I would have him to know, that all this is but a fabulous tradition, and wholly drawn from Egyptian fables.—

As for the philosophy of the Egyptians, that besides their physiology, and the pure and mixed mathematics (arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy), they had another higher kind of philosophy also concerning incorporeal substances, appears from hence, because they were the first assertors of the immortality of souls, their pre-existence and transmigration, from whence their incorporeity is necessarily inferred. Thus He-

rodotus: *πρῶτοι τόνδε τὸν λόγον Αἰγύπτιοι*  
 Enterp. 123.

*εἰσι οἱ εἰπόντες, ὡς ἀνθρώπου ψυχὴ ἀθάνατος ἐστὶ τοῦ σώματος δὲ καταφθίνοντος, ἐς ἄλλο ζῶον αἰεὶ γινόμενον ἐσδύεται, &c.* The Egyptians were the first assertors of the soul's immortality, and of its transmigration, after the death and corruption of this body, into the bodies of other animals successively, viz. until it have run round through the whole circuit of terrestrial, marine, and volatile animals, after which, they say, it is to return again into a human body; they supposing this revolution or apocatastasis of souls to be made in no less space than that of three thousand years.—But whether Herodotus were rightly catechised and instructed in the Egyptian doctrine as to this particular or no, may very well be questioned ; because the Pythagoreans, whom

he there tacitly reprehends for arrogating the first invention of this to themselves, when they had borrowed it from the Egyptians, did represent it otherwise; namely, that the descent of human souls into these earthy bodies was first in way of punishment, and that their sinking lower afterward into the bodies of brutes, was only to some a further punishment for their future degeneracy; but the virtuous and pious souls should after this life enjoy a state of happiness in celestial or spiritual bodies. And the Egyptian doctrine is represented after the same manner by Porphyrius in Stobæus,<sup>a</sup> as also in the Hermetic or Trismegistic writings. Moreover, Chalcidius reports, that Hermes Trismegist, when he was about to die, made an oration to this purpose: That he had here lived in this earthly body but an exile and stranger, and was now returning home to his own country; so that his death ought not to be lamented, this life being rather to be accounted death.—Which persuasion the Indian Brachmans also were embued withal, whether they received it from the Egyptians (as they did some other things) or no; τὸν μὲν ἐνθάδε βίον, ὡς ἂν ἀκμῆν κνομένων εἶναι, τὸν δὲ θάνατον γένεσιν εἰς τὸν ὄντως βίον, that this life here is but the life of embryo's, and that death [to good men] is a generation or birth into true life.—And this may the better be believed to have been the Egyptian doctrine, because Diodorus himself hath some passages sounding that way; as that the Egyptians lamented not the death of good men, but applauded their happiness, ὡς τὸν αἰῶνα διατρέβειν μέλ-

Strabo, l. xv.  
p. 715.

<sup>a</sup> Eclog. Phys. lib. ii. cap. vii. p. 200.

λόντες καθ' ἑδον μετὰ τῶν εὐσεβῶν, as being to live ever in the other world with the pious.—However, it being certain from this Egyptian doctrine of pre-existence and transmigration, that the Egyptians did assert the soul's incorporeity, it cannot reasonably be doubted, but that they acknowledged also an incorporeal Deity. The objection against which, from what Porphyrius writeth concerning Chæremon, will be answered afterward.

We come in the last place to the theology of the Egyptians. Now it is certain, that the Egyptians besides their vulgar and fabulous theology (which is for the most part that which Diodorus Siculus\* describes) had another ἀπόρρητος θεολογία, arcane and recondite theology—that was concealed from the vulgar, and communicated only to the kings, and such priests and others, as were thought capable thereof; these two theologies of theirs differing, as Aristotle's Exoterics and Acroamatics. Thus much is plainly declared by Origen, whose very name was Egyptian, it being interpreted Horo-genitus (which Horus was an Egyptian God), upon occasion of

Lib. i. p. 11.

Celsus's boasting that he thoroughly understood all that belonged to Christianity: "Celsus (saith he) seemeth here to me to do just as if a man travelling into Egypt, where the wise men of the Egyptians, according to their country-learning, philosophize much about those things, that are accounted by them Divine, whilst the idiots in the mean time hearing only certain fables, which they know not the meaning of, are very much pleased therewith: Celsus, I say, doth as

\* Lib. i. p. 33.

if such a sojourner in Egypt, who had conversed only with those idiots, and not been at all instructed by any of the priests in their arcane and recondite mysteries, should boast, that he knew all that belonged to the Egyptian theology." Where the same Origen also adds, that this was not a thing proper neither to the Egyptians only to have such an arcane and true theology, distinct from their vulgar and fabulous one, but common with them to the Persians, Syrians, and other Barbarian Pagans; *ἀ δὲ εἶπον περὶ Αἰγυπτίων σοφῶν τε καὶ ἰδιωτῶν δυνατὸν εἰπεῖν καὶ περὶ Περσῶν, &c.* What we have now affirmed (saith he) concerning the difference betwixt the wise men and the idiots amongst the Egyptians, the same may be said also of the Persians, amongst whom the religious rites are performed rationally by those, that are ingenious; whilst the superficial vulgar look no further in the observation of them, than the external symbol or ceremony. And the same is true likewise concerning the Syrians and Indians, and all those other nations, who have, besides their religious fables, a learning and doctrine.—Neither can it be dissembled, that Origen in this place plainly intimates the same also concerning Christianity itself; namely, that besides the outside and exterior cortex of it (in which notwithstanding there is nothing fabulous) communicated to all, there was a more arcane and recondite doctrine belonging thereunto, which all were not alike capable of; he elsewhere observing this to be that wisdom, that St. Paul spake amongst the perfect. From whence he concludes, that Celsus vainly boasted, *πάντα γὰρ οἶδα*, for I know all things belonging to Christianity—when he was ac-

acquainted only with the exterior surface of it. But concerning the Egyptians, this was a thing most notorious and observed by sundry other writers; as, for example, Clemens of Alexandria, a man also well acquainted with the affairs of

*Strom. l. v. p. 508.* **Egypt; Αἰγύπτιοι οὐ τοῖς ἐπιτεχνούσι τὰ παρὰ**

**σφίσιν ἀνετίθεατο μυστήρια, οὐδὲ μὴν βεβήλους τῆν τῶν θεῶν εἶδησιν ἐξέφερον, ἀλλ' ἢ μόνοις γε τοῖς μάλ-  
λουσιν ἐπὶ τὴν βασιλείαν προίεσθαι, καὶ τῶν ἱερέων τοῖς κρι-  
θεῖσιν εἶναι δοκιμωτάτους, ἀπὸ τε τῆς τροφῆς, καὶ τῆς παι-  
δείας, καὶ τοῦ γένους.** The Egyptians do not reveal

their religious mysteries promiscuously to all, nor communicate the knowledge of Divine things to the profane, but only to those, who are to succeed in the kingdom, and to such of the priests, as are judged most fitly qualified for the same, upon account both of their birth and education.—With which agreeth also the testimony of Plutarch, he adding a further confirmation thereof from the

*De Is. et Os. 354.* **Egyptian sphinges: ὁ ἐκ μαχίμων ἀποδεδειγ-**

**μένος [βασιλεὺς] εὐθὺς ἐγένετο τῶν ἱερέων, καὶ μετέχε τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἐπικεκρομμένης τὰ πολλὰ μύθοις καὶ λόγοις, ἀμυδράς ἐμφάσεις τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ διαφάσεις ἔχουσι ὥσπερ ἀμέλει καὶ παραδηλοῦσιν αὐτοὶ πρὸ τῶν ἱερών τὰς σφίγγας ἐπιεικῶς ἰστάντες, ὡς αἰνιγματώδη σοφίαν τῆς θεολογίας αὐτῶν ἐχούσης.** When amongst the Egypt-

ians there is any king chosen out of the military order, he is forthwith brought to the priests, and by them instructed in that arcane theology, which conceals mysterious truths under obscure fables and allegories. Wherefore they place sphinges before their temples, to signify, that their theology contained a certain arcane and enigmatical wisdom in it.—And this meaning of the sphinges in the Egyptian temples is confirmed likewise by

Clemens Alexandrinus, \* *διὰ τοῦτό τοι καὶ Αἰγύπτιοι πρὸ τῶν ἱερῶν τὰς σφίγγας ἰδρύνονται, ὡς αἰνιγματώδους τοῦ περὶ θεοῦ λόγου, καὶ ἀσαφοῦς ὄντος.* Therefore do the Egyptians place sphinges before their temples, to declare thereby, that the doctrine concerning God is enigmatical and obscure.—Notwithstanding which, we acknowledge, that the same Clemens gives another interpretation also of these sphinges, or conjecture concerning them, which may not be unworthy to be here read; *τέχα δὲ καὶ ὅτι φιλεῖν τε δεῖ καὶ φοβεῖσθαι τὸ θεῖον· ἀγαπᾶν μὲν ὡς προσηνὲς καὶ εὐμενὲς τοῖς ὀσίοις, δεδιέναι δὲ ὡς ἀπαρατήτως δίκαιον τοῖς ἀνοσίοις, θηρίου γὰρ ὅμου καὶ ἀνθρώπου ἢ σφιγξ αἰνίσσεται τὴν εἰκόνα.* But perhaps the meaning of those Egyptian sphinges might be also to signify, that the Deity ought both to be loved and feared; to be loved as benign and propitious to the holy, but to be feared as inexorably just to the impious, the sphinx being made up of the image both of a man and a lion.—Moreover, besides these sphinges, the Egyptians had also Harpocrates and sigalions in their temples, which are thus described by the poet; <sup>b</sup>

*Quique premunt vocem, digitoque silentia suadent;*

they being the statues of young men pressing their lips with their finger. The meaning of <sup>De Is. et Osir.</sup> which Harpocrates is thus expressed by

Plutarch: *τὸν δὲ Ἄρποκράτην, οὐ θεὸν ἀτελῆ καὶ νήπιον, ἀλλὰ τοῦ περὶ θεῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποις λόγου νεαροῦ καὶ ἀτελοῦς καὶ ἀδιαρθρώτου προστάτην καὶ σωφρονίστην, διὸ τῷ στόματι τὸν δάκτυλον ἔχει προσκείμενον, ἐχεμυθίας καὶ σιωπῆς σύμβολον.* The Harpocrates of the Egyptians is not to be taken for an imperfect and infant God, but

\* *Stromat. lib. v. cap. iv. p. 664.*

<sup>b</sup> *Ovid. Metam. lib. ix.*



for the president of men's speech concerning the gods, that is but imperfect, balbutient and inarticulate, and the regulator or corrector of the same; his finger upon his mouth being a symbol of silence and taciturnity.—It is very true, that some Christians have made another interpretation of this Egyptian Harpocrates, as if the meaning of it had been this: that the gods of the Egyptians had been all of them really nothing else but mortal men, but that this was a secret, that was to be concealed from the vulgar. Which conceit, however it be witty, yet it is devoid of truth; and doubtless the meaning of those Egyptian Harpocrates was no other than this, that either the supreme and incomprehensible Deity was to be adored with silence, or not spoken of without much caution and circumspection; or else that the arcane mysteries of theology were not to be promiscuously communicated, but concealed from the profane vulgar. Which same thing seems to have been also signified by that yearly feast kept by the Egyptians in honour of Thoth or Hermes, when the priests eating honey and figs pronounced those words, *γλυκὴ ἡ ἀλήθεια*, truth is sweet—as also by that amulet, which Isis was fabled to have worn about her, the interpretation whereof was *φώνη ἀληθής*,<sup>a</sup> true speech.

This *ἀπόρρητος θεολογία*, this arcane and recondite theology of the Egyptians, was concealed from the vulgar two manner of ways, by fables or allegories, and by symbols or hieroglyphics. Eusebius informs us, that Porphyrius wrote a book *Περὶ τῆς ἀλληγορουμένης Ἑλληνῶν καὶ Αἰγυπτίων θεολογίας*, concerning the allegorical theology both

<sup>a</sup> De Iside et Osiride, p. 378.

of the Greeks and Egyptians.—And here by the way we may observe, that this business of allegorizing in matters of religion had not its first and only rise amongst the Christians, but was a thing very much in use among the Pagan theologers also: and therefore Celsus in Origen<sup>a</sup> commends some of the Christians for this, that they could allegorize ingeniously and handsomely. It is well known, how both Plutarch<sup>b</sup> and Synesius<sup>c</sup> allegorized those Egyptian fables of Isis and Osiris, the one to a philosophical, the other to a political sense. And the Egyptian hieroglyphics, which were figures not answering to sounds or words, but immediately representing the objects and conceptions of the mind, were chiefly made use of by them to this purpose, to express the mysteries of their religion and theology, so as that they might be concealed from the profane vulgar. For which cause the hieroglyphic learning of the Egyptians is commonly taken for one and the same thing with their arcane theology, or metaphysics. And this the author of the questions and answers ad Orthodoxos<sup>d</sup> tells us was anciently had in much greater esteem amongst the Egyptians, than all their other learning; and that therefore Moses was as well instructed in this hieroglyphic learning and metaphysical theology of theirs, as in their mathematics. And, for our parts, we doubt not, but that the *Mensa Isiaca* lately published, containing so many strange and uncouth hieroglyphics in it, was something of this ἀπάρρητος θεολογία, this arcane

<sup>a</sup> Lib. i. p. 14. edit. Cantab.

<sup>b</sup> De Iside et Osiride.

<sup>c</sup> De Providentia, p. 89. oper.

<sup>d</sup> Inter Justini Martyris Opera, Quæstion. et Respon. xxv. p. 406.

theology of the Egyptians, and not mere history, as some imagine; though the late confident Oedipus seems to arrogate too much to himself, in pretending to such a certain and exact interpretation of it. Now as it is reasonable to think, that in all those Pagan nations, where there was another theology besides the vulgar, the principal part thereof was the doctrine of one supreme and universal Deity, the Maker of the whole world; so can it not well be conceived, what this ἀρρήτος and ἀπόρρητος and αἰνιγματώδης θεολογία, this arcane, and mysterious, and enigmatic theology of the Egyptians, so much talked of, should be other than a kind of metaphysics concerning God, as one perfect incorporeal Being, the original of all things.

We know nothing of any moment, that can be objected against this, save only that, which Porphyrius, in his Epistle to Anebo, an Egyptian priest, writeth concerning Chæremon:\*

Pr. Ev. lib. iii. c. iv. *Χαιρήμων μὲν γὰρ, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι, οὐδ' ἄλλο τι πρὸ τῶν ὀρωμένων κόσμων ἡγούνται, ἐν ἀρχῇ λόγων τιθέμενοι τοὺς Αἰγυπτίων, οὐδ' ἄλλους θεοὺς, πλὴν τῶν πλανητῶν λεγομένων, καὶ τῶν συμπληροῦντων τὸν ζωδιακόν, &c.* Chæremon and others acknowledge nothing before this visible and corporeal world, alleging for the countenance of their opinion such of the Egyptians, as talk of no other gods but the planets, and those stars, that fill up the zodiac, or rise together with them, their decans, and horoscopes, and robust princes, as they call them; whose names are also inserted into their almanacks or ephemerides, together with the times of

\* This Epistle is prefixed to Jamblichus de *Mysteriis Aegyptior.* published at Oxford by Dr. T. Gale.

their risings and settings, and the prognostics or significations of future events for them. For he observed, that those Egyptians, who made the sun the demiurgus or architect of the world, interpreted the stories of Isis and Osiris, and all those other religious fables, into nothing but stars, and planets, and the river Nile, *καὶ ὅλως πάντα εἰς τὰ φυσικὰ, καὶ οὐδὲν εἰς ἀσωμάτους καὶ ζώσας οὐσίας ἐρμηνεύειν*, and referred all things universally into natural or inanimate, nothing into incorporeal and living substances.—Which passage of Porphyrius concerning Chæremón, we confess, Eusebius lays great stress upon, endeavouring to make advantage of it, first against the Egyptians, and then against the Greeks and other Pagans, as deriving their religion and theology from them: “It is manifest from hence, (saith he) that the very arcane theology of the Egyptians deified nothing but stars and planets, and acknowledged no incorporeal principle or demiurgic reason as the cause of this universe, but only the visible sun.” And then he concludes in this manner: “See now what is become of this arcane theology of the Egyptians, that deifies nothing but senseless matter or dead inanimate bodies.” But it is well known, that Eusebius took all advantages possible, to represent the Pagans to the worst, and render their theology ridiculous and absurd; nevertheless what he here urgeth against the Egyptians, is the less valuable, because himself plainly contradicts it elsewhere, declaring, that the Egyptians acknowledged a demiurgic reason and intellectual architect of the world, which consequently was the maker of the sun; and confessing the same of the other Pagans also. Now to affirm, that the Egypt-

ians acknowledged no other deity than inanimate matter and the senseless corporeal world, is not only to deny that they had any *ἀπόρητος θεολογία*, any arcane theology at all (which yet hath been sufficiently proved) but also to render them absolute Atheists. For if this be not Atheism, to acknowledge no other deity besides dead and senseless matter, then the word hath no signification, Chæremon indeed seems to impute this opinion (not to all the Egyptians) but to some of them; and it is very possible, that there might be some Atheists amongst the Egyptians also, as well as amongst the Greeks and their philosophers. And doubtless this Chæremon himself was a kind of astrological Atheist; for which cause we conclude, that it was not Chæremon the Stoic, from whom notwithstanding Porphyrius in his book of Abstinence citeth certain other things concerning the Egyptians; but either that Chæremon, whom Strabo made use of in Egypt, or else some other of that name. But that there ever was or can be any such religious Atheists, as Eusebius with some others imagine, who though acknowledging no Deity, besides dead and senseless matter, notwithstanding devoutly court and worship the same, constantly invoking it and imploring its assistance, as expecting great benefit to themselves thereby; this we confess is such a thing, as we have not faith enough to believe, it being a sottishness and contradictory nonsense, that is not incident to human nature. Neither can we doubt, but that all the devout Pagans acknowledged some living and understanding deities or other; nor easily believe, that they ever worshipped any inanimate or senseless bodies, otherwise than as some way

referring to the same, or as images and symbols of them. But as for that passage in Porphyrius's Epistle concerning Chæremon, where he only propounds doubts to Anebo, the Egyptian priest, as desiring further information from him concerning them, Jamblichus hath given us a full answer to it, under the person of Abammo, another Egyptian priest, which notwithstanding hath not hitherto been at all taken notice of, because Ficinus and Scutellius, not understanding the word Chæremon to be a proper name, ridiculously turned it in their translations, *optarem* and *gaudere*, thereby also perverting the whole sense. The words in the Greek MS. (now in the hands of my learned friend Mr. Gale) run thus: <sup>a</sup> Χαιρήμων δὲ καὶ οἵτινες ἄλλοι τῶν περὶ τὸν κόσμον ἄπτονται πρώτων αἰτίων, τὰς τελευταίας ἀρχὰς ἐξηγοῦνται, ὅσοι τε τοὺς πλανήτας, καὶ τὸν Ζωδιακὸν, τοὺς δὲ δεκανοὺς, καὶ ὠροσκοποὺς, καὶ τοὺς λεγομένους κραταιοὺς ἡγεμόνας παραδιδούσι, τὰς μεριστὰς τῶν ἀρχῶν διανομὰς ἀναφαίνουσι· τότε ἐν τοῖς ἀλμεικτικακῶς μέρος τι βραχύτατον περιέχει τῶν Ἑρμαϊκῶν διατάξεων, καὶ τὰ περὶ ἀστέρων ἢ φάσεων, ἢ κρύψεων, ἢ σελήνης αὐξήσεων, ἢ μειώσεων ἐν τοῖς ἐσχάτοις εἶχε τὴν ἐν Αἰγυπτίῳ αἰτιολογίαν· φυσικὰ τε οὐ λέγουσιν εἶναι πάντα Αἰγύπτιοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ζωὴν, καὶ τὴν νοερὰν ἀπὸ τῆς φύσεως διακρίνουσιν· οὐκ ἐπὶ τοῦ παντός μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐφ' ἡμῶν, νοῦν τε καὶ λόγον προστησάμενοι καθ' ἑαυτοὺς ὄντας, οὕτως δημιουργεῖσθαι φασὶ τὰ γινόμενα. But Chæremon and those others, who pretend to write of the first causes of the world, declare only the last and lowest principles, as likewise they who treat of the planets, the zodiac, the decans, the horoscopes, and the robust princes. And those things, that are in the Egyptian alma-

<sup>a</sup> Jamblich, de Myster. Ægyptior. sect. viii. cap. iv. p. 160.

nack (or ephemerides) contain the least part of the Hermaical institutions, namely the phases and occultations of the stars, the increase and decrease of the moon, and the like astrological matters; which things have the lowest place in the Egyptian ætiology. Nor do the Egyptians resolve all things into (senseless) nature, but they distinguish both the life of the soul and the intellectual life from that of nature, and that not only in ourselves, but also in the universe; they determining mind and reason first to have existed of themselves, and so this whole world to have been made. Wherefore they acknowledge before the heaven, and in the heaven, a living Power, and place pure mind above the world, as the Demiurgus and architect thereof.—From which testimony of Jamblichus, who was but little junior to Porphyrius, and contemporary with Eusebius, and who had made it his business to inform himself thoroughly concerning the theology of the Egyptians, it plainly appears, that the Egyptians did not generally suppose (as Chæremon pretended concerning some of them) a senseless inanimate nature to be the first original of all things, but that as well in the world as in ourselves, they acknowledged soul superior to nature, and mind or intellect superior to soul, this being the Demiurgus of the world. But we shall have afterward occasion more opportunely to cite other passages out of this Jamblichus's Egyptian mysteries to the same purpose.

Wherefore there is no pretence at all to suspect, that the Egyptians were universally Atheists and Anarchists, such as supposed no living un-

derstanding Deity, but resolved all into senseless matter, as the first and highest principle; but all the question is, whether they were not Polyarchists, such as asserted a multitude of understanding deities, self-existent or unmade. Now, that monarchy was an essential part of the arcane and true theology of the Egyptians A. Steuchus Eugubinus, and many other learned men, have thought to be unquestionably evident from the Hermetic or Trismegistic writings, they taking it for granted, that these are all genuine and sincere. Whereas there is too much cause to suspect, that there have been some pious frauds practised upon these Trismegistic writings, as well as there were upon the Sibylline; and that either whole books of them have been counterfeited by pretended Christians, or at least several spurious and supposititious passages here and there inserted into some of them. Isaac Casaubon,\* who was the first discoverer, has taken notice of many such in that first Hermetic book, entitled, Pœmander; some also in the fourth book, inscribed Crater, and some in the thirteenth called the Sermon in the Mount concerning Regeneration; which may justly render those three whole books, or at least the first and last of them, to be suspected. We shall here repeat none of Casaubon's condemned passages, but add one more to them out of the thirteenth book, or Sermon in the Mount, which, however omitted by him, seems to be more rankly Christian than any other; λέγε μοι τοῦτο, τίς ἐστι γενεσιουργὸς τῆς παλιγγενεσίας; ὁ τοῦ θεοῦ παῖς, ἄνθρωπος εἷς, θελήματι θεοῦ. Tell me this

\* Exercitat. i. in Baron. Num. xviii. p. 54.



also, who is the cause or worker of regeneration? The Son of God, one man by the will of God.— Wherefore, though Ath. Kircherus \* contend with much zeal for the sincerity of all these Trismegistic books; yet we must needs pronounce of the three forementioned, at least Pœmander properly so called, and the Sermon in the Mount; that they were either wholly forged and counterfeited by some pretended Christians, or else had many spurious passages inserted into them. Wherefore, it cannot be solidly proved from the Trismegistic books after this manner, as supposed to be all alike genuine and sincere, that the Egyptian Pagans acknowledged one supreme and universal Numen: much less can the same be evinced from that pretended Aristotelic book, *De secretiore parte divinæ sapientiæ secundum Ægyptios*—greedily swallowed down also by Kircherus, but unquestionably pseudepigraphous.

Notwithstanding which, we conceive, that though all the Trismegistic books, that now are or have been formerly extant, had been forged by some pretended Christians, as that book of the arcane Egyptian wisdom was by some philosopher, and imputed to Aristotle; yet would they, for all that, upon another account, afford no inconsiderable argument to prove, that the Egyptian Pagans asserted one supreme Deity, viz. because every cheat and imposture must needs have some basis or foundation of truth to stand upon; there must have been something truly Egyptian in such counterfeit Egyptian writings, (and therefore this at least of one supreme Deity)

\* In *Obelisco Pamphylio*, p. 35, and in *Oedipo Ægyptiaco Class. xii. cap. iii.*

or else they could never have obtained credit at first, or afterwards have maintained the same. The rather, because these Trismegistic books were dispersed in those ancient times, before the Egyptian Paganism and their succession of priests were yet extinct; and therefore had that, which is so much insisted upon in them, been dissonant from the Egyptian theology, they must needs have been presently exploded as mere lies and forgeries. Wherefore, we say again, that if all the Hermaic or Trismegistic books, that are now extant, and those to boot, which being mentioned in ancient fathers have been lost, as the *τὰ γενικά*; and the *τὰ διεξοδικά*, and the like, had been nothing but the pious frauds and cheats of Christians, yet must there needs have been some truth at the bottom to give subsistence to them; this, at least, that Hermes Trismegist, or the Egyptian priests, in their arcane and true theology, really acknowledged one supreme and univereal Numen.

But it does not follow, that, because some of these Hermaic or Trismegistic books now extant were counterfeit or supposititious, that therefore all of them must needs be such; and not only so, but those also, that are mentioned in the writings of ancient fathers, which are now lost. Wherefore, the learned Casaubon seems not to have reckoned or concluded well, when from the detection of forgery in two or three of those Trismegistic books at most, he pronounces of them all universally, that they were nothing but Christian cheats and impostures. And probably he was led into this mistake, by reason of his too securely following that vulgar error, (which yet had been confuted by Patricius) that all that was

published by Ficinus, under the name of *Hermes Trismegist*, was but one and the same book, *Pœmander*, consisting of several chapters; whereas they are all indeed so many distinct and independent books, whereof *Pœmander* is only placed first. However, there was no shadow of reason, why the *Asclepius* should have fallen under the same condemnation, nor several other books superadded by *Patricius*, they being unquestionably distinct from the *Pœmander*, and no signs of spuriousness or bastardy discovered in them. Much less ought those *Trismegistic* books cited by the fathers, and now lost, have been condemned also unseen. Wherefore, notwithstanding all that *Casaubon* has written, there may very well be some *Hermetic* or *Trismegistic* books genuine, though all of them be not such; that is, according to our after-declaration, there may be such books, as were really *Egyptian*, and not counterfeited by any *Christian*, though perhaps not written by *Hermes Trismegist* himself, nor in the *Egyptian* language. And as it cannot well be conceived, how there should have been any counterfeit *Egyptian* books, had there been none at all real; so that there were some real and genuine, will perhaps be rendered probable by these following considerations.

That there was anciently, amongst the *Egyptians* such a man as *Thoth*, *Theuth*, or *Taut*, who, together with letters, was the first inventor of arts and sciences, as arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and of the hieroglyphic learning, (therefore called by the *Greeks* *Hermes*, and by the *Latins* *Mercurius*) cannot reasonably be denied; it being a thing confirmed by general fame

in all ages, and by the testimonies not only of Sanchoniathon<sup>a</sup> a Phœnician historiographer, who lived about the times of the Trojan war, and wrote a book concerning the theology of the Egyptians, and Manetho's Sebennyta,<sup>b</sup> an Egyptian priest, contemporary with Ptol. Philadelphus; but also of that grave philosopher Plato, who is said to have sojourned thirteen years in Egypt, that in his Philebus<sup>c</sup> speaks of him as the first inventor of letters, (who distinguished betwixt vowels and consonants determining their several numbers) there calling him either a god or divine man; but in his Phædrus<sup>d</sup> attributeth to him also the invention of arithmetic, geometry and astronomy, together with some ludicrous recreations, making him either a god or demon: *ἤκουσα περὶ Ναυκρατίου τῆν Αἰγύπτου, γενέσθαι τῶν ἐκεῖ παλαιῶν τινὰ θεῶν, οὗ καὶ τὸ ὄρνειον τὸ ἰερόν δ καὶ καλοῦσιν Ἴβιν, αὐτῷ δὲ ὄνομα τῷ δαίμονι εἶναι Θεῦθ·* I have heard (saith he) that about Naucratis, in Egypt, there was one of the ancient Egyptian gods, to whom the bird Ibis was sacred, as his symbol or hieroglyphic; the name of which demon was Theuth.—In which place the philosopher subjoins also an ingenious dispute betwixt this Theuth, and Thamus, then king of Egypt, concerning the convenience and inconvenience of letters; the former boasting of that invention *ὡς μνήμης καὶ σοφίας φάρμακον* as a remedy for memory, and great help to wisdom—but the latter contending, that it would rather beget oblivion, by the neglect of memory, and therefore was not so properly *μνήμης* as *ὑπομνήσεως*

<sup>a</sup> Apud Euseb. Præpar. Evang. lib. i. cap. ix. p. 31, 32.

<sup>b</sup> Apud Geogr. Syncellum in Chron. p. 40.

<sup>c</sup> P. 75.

<sup>d</sup> P. 356.

*φάρμακον*, a remedy for memory, as reminiscence, or the recovery of things forgotten—adding, that it would also weaken and enervate men's natural faculties by slugging them, and rather beget *δόξαν σοφίας*, than *ἀλήθειαν*, a puffy conceit and opinion of knowledge—by a multifarious rabble of indigested notions, than the truth thereof. Moreover, since it is certain, that the Egyptians were famous for literature before the Greeks, they must of necessity have some one or more founders of learning amongst them, as the Greeks had: and Thoth is the only or first person celebrated amongst them upon this account, in remembrance of whom the first month of the year was called by that name. Which Thoth is generally supposed to have lived in the times of the patriarchs, or considerably before Moses; Moses himself being said to have been instructed in that learning, which owed its original to him.

Again, besides this Thoth, or Theuth, who was called the first Hermes, the Egyptians had also afterwards another eminent advancer or restorer of learning, who was called *δευτερος Ἑρμῆς*, the second Hermes—they perhaps supposing the soul of Thoth, or the first Hermes, to have come into him by transmigration; but his proper Egyptian name was Siphos, as Syncellus<sup>a</sup> out of Manetho informs us: *Σιφῶας, ὁ καὶ Ἑρμῆς, υἱὸς Ἡφαιστοῦ*; Siphos, (who is also Hermes) the son of Vulcan.—This is he, who is said to have been the father of Tat, and to have been surnamed *Τρισμέγιστος*, Ter Maximus, (he being so styled by Manetho, Jamblichus, and others.) And he is placed by Eusebius<sup>b</sup> in the fiftieth year after the Israelitish

<sup>a</sup> *In Chron.* p. 124.

<sup>b</sup> *In Chronico*, p. 556.

Exitus, though probably somewhat too early. The former of these two Hermes was the inventor of arts and sciences; the latter, the restorer and advancer of them: the first wrote in hieroglyphics upon pillars, ἐν τῇ Σφριγγικῇ γῆ, (as the learned Valesius<sup>a</sup> conjectures it should be read, instead of Σηριαδικῇ<sup>c</sup>) which Syringes what they were, Am. Marcellinus<sup>b</sup> will instruct us. The second interpreted and translated those hieroglyphics, composing many books in several arts and sciences; the number whereof set down by Jamblichus<sup>c</sup> must needs be fabulous, unless it be understood of paragraphs or verses. Which Trismegistic or Hermetic books were said to be carefully preserved by the priests in the interior recesses of their temples.

But besides the hieroglyphics written by the first Hermes, and the books composed by the second, (who was called also Trismegist) it cannot be doubted, but that there were many other books written by the Egyptian priests successively in several ages. And Jamblichus informs us, in the beginning of his mysteries—That Hermes, the God of eloquence, and president or patron of all true knowledge concerning the gods, was formerly accounted common to all the priests, insomuch, that τὰ αὐτῶν τῆς σοφίας εὐρήματα αὐτῷ ἀνετίθεσαν, Ἐροῦν πάντα τὰ οἰκεία συγγράμματα ἐπονομάζοντες, they dedicated the inventions of their wisdom to him, entitling their own books to Hermes Trismegist.—Now though one reason hereof might probably have been thought to have been

<sup>a</sup> Not. ad Ammian. Marcellin. lib. xxii. p. 339.

<sup>b</sup> Hist. lib. xxii. cap. xv. p. 339.

<sup>c</sup> De *Myster. Egyptior.* sect. viii. cap. i. p. 157.

this, because those books were supposed to have been written according to the tenor of the old Hermetic or Trismegistic doctrine; yet Jamblichus here acquaints us with the chief ground of it, namely this: that though Hermes was once a mortal man, yet he was afterwards deified by the Egyptians, (which is testified also by Plato) and made to be the tutelar god, and fount of all arts and sciences, but especially theology; by whose inspiration therefore all such books were conceived to have been written. Nay, further, we may observe, that in some of the Hermaic or Trismegistic books now extant, Hermes is sometimes put for the Divine wisdom or understanding itself. And now we see the true reason, why there have been many books called Hermetical and Trismegistical; some of which, notwithstanding, cannot possibly be conceived to have been of such great antiquity, nor written by Hermes Trismegist himself, viz. because it was customary with the Egyptian priests to entitle their own philosophic and theologic books to Hermes. Moreover, it is very probable, that several of the books of the Egyptian priest of latter times were not originally written in the Egyptian language, but the Greek; because, at least from the Ptolemaic kings downward, Greek was become very familiar to all the learned Egyptians, and in a manner vulgarly spoken, as may appear from those very words, Hermes, Trismegist, and the like, so commonly used by them, together with the proper names of places; and because the Coptic language to this very day hath more of Greek than Egyptian words in it; nay, Plutarch ventures to *etymologize* those old Egyptian names, Isis, Osi-

ris, Horus and Typhon, from the Greek, as if the Egyptians had been anciently well acquainted with that language.

Now, that some of those ancient Hermaic books, written by Hermes Trismegist himself, or believed to be such by the Egyptians, and kept in the custody of their priests, were still in being, and extant amongst them, after the times of Christianity, seems to be unquestionable from the testimony of that pious and learned father, Clemens Alexandrinus, he giving this particular account of them, after the mentioning of their opinion concerning the transmigration of souls: "The Egyptians follow a certain peculiar philosophy of their own, which may be best declared by setting down the order of their religious procession. First, therefore, goes the precentor, carrying two of Hermes's books along with him; the one of which contains the hymns of the gods, the other directions for the kingly office. After him follows the horoscopus, who is particularly instructed in Hermes's astrological books, which are four. Then succeeds the hierogrammateus, or sacred scribe, with feathers upon his head, and a book and rule in his hands, to whom it belongeth to be thoroughly acquainted with the hieroglyphics, as also with cosmography, geography, the order of the sun and moon and five planets, the chorography of Egypt, and description of Nile: In the next place cometh the stolistes, who is to be thoroughly instructed in those ten books, which treat concerning the honour of the gods, the Egyptian worship, sacrifices, first-fruits, prayers, pomps, and festivals. And last of all marcheth

Strom. 6. p.  
633.  
[cap. iv. p.  
757. edit.  
Pottieri.]



the prophet, who is president of the temple and sacred things, and ought to be thoroughly versed in those other ten books called sacerdotal, concerning laws, the gods, and the whole discipline of the priests. Wherefore, amongst the books of Hermes, there are forty-two accounted most necessary; of which thirty-six, containing all the Egyptian philosophy, were to be learned by those particular orders beforementioned; but the other six, treating of medicinal things, by the pastophori.—From which place we understand, that at least forty-two books of the ancient Hermes Trismegist, or such reputed by the Egyptians, were still extant in the time of Clemens Alexandrinus, about two hundred years after the Christian epocha.

Furthermore, that there were certain books really Egyptian, and called Hermaical or Trismegistical, (whether written by the ancient Hermes Trismegist himself, or by other Egyptian priests of latter times, according to the tenor of his doctrine, and only entitled to him) which, after the times of Christianity, began to be taken notice of by other nations, the Greeks and Latins, seems probable from hence, because such books are not only mentioned and acknowledged by Christian writers and fathers, but also by Pagans and philo-

sophers. In Plutarch's discourse De Iside  
P. 374. et Osiride, we read thus of them: 'Εν δὲ  
[P. 375.] ταῖς Ἑρμοῦ λεγομέναις βίβλοις, ιστοροῦσι γεγράφθαι, περὶ τῶν ἱερῶν ὀνομάτων, ὅτι τὴν μὲν ἐπὶ τῆς τοῦ ἡλίου περιφορᾶς τεταγμένην δύναμιν, Ὄρον, Ἕλληνας δὲ Ἀπόλλωνα καλοῦσι, τὴν δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ πνεύματος, οἱ μὲν Ὀσιριν, οἱ δὲ Σάραπιν, οἱ δὲ Σωθὶ Αἰγυπτιστὶ. In the books called Hermes's, or Hermaical, it is reported to have been written con-

cerning sacred names, that the power appointed to preside over the motion of the sun is called by the Egyptians Horus (as by the Greeks Apollō) and that, which presides over the air and wind, is called by some Osiris, by others Sarapis, and by others Sothi, in the Egyptian language.—Now these sacred names in Plutarch seem to be several names of God; and therefore, whether these Hermaic books of his were the same with those in Clemens Alexandrinus, such as were supposed by the Egyptians to have been written by Hermes Trismegist himself, or other books written by Egyptian priests, according to the tenor of this doctrine; we may by the way observe, that, according to the Hermaical or Trismegistic doctrine, one and the same Deity was worshipped under several names and notions, according to its several powers and virtues, manifested in the world; which is a thing afterwards more to be insisted on. Moreover, it hath been generally believed, that L. Apuleius Madaurensis, an eminent Platonic philosopher, and zealous assertor of Paganism, was the translator of the Asclepian dialogue of Hermes Trismegist out of Greek into Latin; which therefore hath been accordingly published with Apuleius's works. And Barthius affirms, that St. Austin does somewhere expressly impute this version to Apuleius; but we confess we have not yet met with the place. However, there seems to be no sufficient reason, why Colvius should call this into question from the style and Latin. Again, it is certain, that Jamblichus doth not only mention these Hermaic books, under the name of τὰ φερόμενα ὡς Ἑρμοῦ, the books that are carried up and down as Hermes's, or vulgarly

imputed to him; but also vindicate them from the imputation of imposture. Not as if there were any suspicion at all of that, which Causaubon is so confident of, that these Hermaic books were all forged by Christians; but because some might then possibly imagine them to have been counterfeited by philosophers; wherefore it will be convenient here to set down the whole passage of Jamblichus<sup>a</sup> concerning it, as it is in the Greek MS. *διευκρινιθέντων οὖν τούτων οὕτως, καὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς συγγράμμασιν οἷς λέγει ἐπιτετυχηκέναι, σαφὴς ἐστὶν ἡ διάλυσις· τὰ μὲν γὰρ φερόμενα, ὡς Ἑρμοῦ, Ἑρμαϊκὰς περιέχει δόξας, εἰ καὶ τῆ τῶν φιλοσόφων γλώττῃ παλλάκις χρῆται· μεταγέγραπται γὰρ ἀπὸ τῆς Αἰγυπτίας γλώττης ὑπ' ἀνδρῶν φιλοσοφίας οὐκ ἀπίεως ἐχόντων. Χαιρήμων δέ, &c.* These things being thus discussed and determined, the solution of that difficulty, from those books which Porphyrius saith he met withal, (namely the Hermaics, and those writings of Chæremon) will be clear and easy. For the books vulgarly imputed to Hermes do really contain the Hermaic opinions and doctrines in them, although they often speak the language of philosophers; the reason whereof is, because they were translated out of the Egyptian tongue by men not unacquainted with philosophy. But Chæremon and those others, &c.—Where it is first observable, that Jamblichus doth not affirm these Hermaic books to have been written by Hermes Trismegist himself, he calling them only *τὰ φερόμενα ὡς Ἑρμοῦ*, the books that were carried about as Hermes's.—But that which he affirmeth of them is this, that they did really contain the Hermaical opinions, and de-

<sup>a</sup> Sect. viii. cap. iv. p. 160. edit. Gale.

rive their original from Egypt.—Again, whereas some might then possibly suspect, that these Hermaic books had been counterfeited by Greek philosophers, and contained nothing but the Greek learning in them, because they speak so much the philosophic language; Jamblichus gives an account of this also, that the reason hereof was because they were translated out of the Egyptian language by men skilled in the Greek philosophy—who therefore added something of their own phrase and notion to them. It is true, indeed, that most of these Hermaic books, which now we have, seem to have been written originally in Greek; notwithstanding which, others of them, and particularly those that are now lost, as τὰ Γενικά, and the like, might, as Jamblichus here affirmeth, have been translated out of the Egyptian tongue, but by their translators disguised with philosophic language, and other Grecanic things intermixed with them. Moreover, from the forecited passage of Jamblichus we may clearly collect, that Porphyrius in his epistle to Anebo, the Egyptian priest (of which epistle there are only some small fragments left<sup>a</sup>) did also make mention of these Hermaic writings; and whereas he found the writings of Chæremon to be contradictory to them, therefore desired to be resolved by that Egyptian priest, whether the doctrine of those Hermaic books were genuine and truly Egyptian or no. Now, Jamblichus in his answer here affirmeth, that the doctrine of the ancient Hermes, or the Egyptian theology, was as to the substance truly represented in those books, (vul-

<sup>a</sup> These fragments are prefixed to Dr. Gale's edition of Jamblichus de Myst. Ægyptior.

garily imputed to Hermes) but not so by Chæremon. Lastly, St. Cyril of Alexandria informs us, that there was an edition of these Hermaic or Trismegistic books (compiled together) formerly made at Athens under this title, Ἑρμαϊκὰ πεντεκαίδεκα βιβλία, fifteen Hermaic books.—Which Hermaics, Casaubon, conceiving them to have been published before Jamblichus's time, took them for those Salaminiaca, which he found in the Latin translations of Jamblichus, made by Ficinus and Scutellius; whereas, indeed, he was here abused by those translators, there being no such thing to be found in the Greek copy. But the word ἀλμενικιακά, (not understood by them) being turned into Salaminiaca, Casaubon therefore conjectured them to have been those Hermaic books published at Athens, because Salamin was not far distant from thence. Now, it cannot be doubted, but that this edition of Hermaic books at Athens was made by some philosopher or Pagans, and not by Christians; this appearing also from the words of St. Cyril himself, where, having spoken of Moses and the agreement of Hermes with him, he adds, πεποιήται δὲ καὶ τούτου μνήμην, ἐν ἰδίαῖς συγγραφαῖς, ὁ συνθετικῶς Ἀθήνησαι τὰ ἐπίκλην Ἑρμαϊκὰ πεντεκαίδεκα βιβλία. Of which Moses also, who compiled and published the fifteen Hermaic books at Athens, makes mention in his own discourse—(annexed thereunto.) For thus we conceive that place is to be understood, that the Pagan publisher of the Hermaic books himself took notice of some agreement, that was betwixt Moses and

\* Exercit. I. in Baronii Annal. p. 55.

**Hermès.** But here it is to be noted, that because **Hermes** and the **Hermaic** books were in such great credit, not only among the **Christians**, but also the **Greek** and **Latin Pagans**, therefore were there some counterfeit writings obtruded also under that specious title; such as that ancient **botanic** book mentioned by **Galen**, and those **Christian forgeries** of later times, the **Pœmander** and **Sermon on the Mount**; which being not cited by any ancient father or writer, were both of them doubtless later than **Jamblichus**, who discovers no suspicion of any **Christian forgeries** in this kind.

But **Casaubon**, who contends, that all the **theologic** books imputed to **Hermes Trismegist** were counterfeited by **Christians**, affirms all the **philosophy**, **doctrine** and **learning** of them (excepting what only is **Christian** in them), to be merely **Platonical** and **Grecanical**, but not at all **Egyptian**: thence concluding, that these books were forged by such **Christians**, as were skilled in the **Platonic** or **Grecanic** learning. But first, it is here considerable, that since **Pythagorism**, **Platonism** and the **Greek** learning in general was in great part derived from the **Egyptians**, it cannot be concluded, that whatsoever is **Platonical** or **Grecanical**, therefore was not **Egyptian**. The only instance, that **Casaubon** insists upon, is this dogma in the **Trismegistic** books, that nothing in the world perisheth, and that death is not the destruction, but change and translation of things only—which, because he finds amongst some of the **Greek** philosophers, he resolves to be peculiar to them only, and not common with the **Egyptians**. But since the chief design and tendency

of that dogma was plainly to maintain the immortality, pre-existence and transmigration of souls, which doctrine was unquestionably derived from the Egyptians; there is little reason to doubt but that this dogma was itself Egyptian also. And Pythagoras, who was the chief propagator of this doctrine amongst the Greeks, οὐδὲν οὐδὲ γίγνεσθαι οὐδὲ φθίρεσθαι τῶν ὄντων, that no real entity (in generations and corruptions) was made or destroyed—according to those Ovidian verses before cited,

Nec perit in toto quicquam, mihi credite, mundo,  
Sed variat faciemque novat. Nascique vocatur  
Incipere esse aliud, &c.

did in all probability derive it, together with its superstructure, (the pre-existence and transmigration of souls, at once from the Egyptians. But it is observable, that the Egyptians had also a peculiar ground of their own for this dogma (which we do not find insisted upon by the Greek philosophers) and it is thus expressed in the eighth of Ficinus's Hermetic books or chapters; εἰ δεύτερος θεὸς ὁ κόσμος, καὶ ζῶν ἀθάνατον, ἀδύνατόν ἐστι τοῦ ἀθανάτου ζῶου μέρος τι ἀποθανεῖν· πάντα δὲ τὰ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ μέρη ἐστὶ τοῦ κόσμου, μάλιστα δὲ ὁ ἄνθρωπος τὸ λογικὸν ζῶον. If the world be a second god and an immortal animal, then is it impossible, that any part of this immortal animal should perish or come to nothing; but all things in the world are parts of this great mundane animal, and chiefly man, who is a rational animal.—Which same notion we find also insisted on in the Asclepian dialogue; “Secundum deum hunc crede, o Asclepi, omnia gubernantem, omniaque mundana illustrantem animalia. Si enim animal,

mundus, vivens, semper et fuit et est et erit, nihil in mundo mortale est: viventis enim uniuscujusque partis, quæ in ipso mundo, sicut in uno eodemque animale semper vivente, nullus est mortalitatis locus." Where though the Latin be a little imperfect, yet the sense is this: You are to believe the world, O Asclepius, to be a second god governing all things, and illustrating all mundane animals. Now if the world be a living animal, and immortal, then there is nothing mortal in it, there being no place for mortality as to any living part or member of that mundane animal, that always liveth.—Notwithstanding which, we deny not, but that though Pythagoras first derived this notion from the Egyptians, yet he and his followers might probably improve the same farther (as Plato tells us, that the Greeks generally did what they received from the Barbarians) namely, to the taking away the qualities and forms of bodies, and resolving all corporeal things into magnitude, figure and motion. But that there is indeed some of the old Egyptian learning contained in these Trismegistic books now extant, shall be clearly proved afterwards, when we come to speak of that grand mystery of the Egyptian theology (derived by Orpheus from them) that God is all. To conclude Jamblichus's judgment in this case ought without controversy to be far preferred before Casaubon's, both by reason of his great antiquity, and his being much better skilled, not only in the Greek, but also the Egyptian learning; that the books imputed to Hermes Trismegist did *Ἑρμαϊκὰς περιέχειν δόξας*, really contain the Hermaic opinions, though they spake



sometimes the language of the Greek philosophers.

Wherefore, upon all these considerations, we conceive it reasonable to conclude, that though there have been some Hermaic books counterfeited by Christians, since Jamblichus's time, as namely the Pœmander and the Sermon on the Mount concerning Regeneration, neither of which is found cited by any ancient father; yet there were other Hermaic books, which though not written by Hermes Trismegist himself, nor all of them in the Egyptian language, but some of them in Greek, were truly Egyptian, and did, for the substance of them, contain the Hermaic doctrine. Such probably were those mentioned by the ancient fathers, but since lost, as the *τὰ Γενικά*, which seems to have been a discourse concerning the cosmogonia, and the *τὰ διεξοδικά*, and the like. And such also may some of these Hermaic books be, that are still extant; as to instance particularly, the Asclepian dialogue, entitled in the Greek *ὁ τέλειος λόγος*, the perfect oration—and in all probability translated into Latin by Apuleius. For it can hardly be imagined, that he who was so devout a Pagan, so learned a philosopher, and so witty a man, should be so far imposed upon by a counterfeit Trismegistic book, and mere Christian cheat, as to bestow translating upon it, and recommend it to the world, as that which was genuinely Pagan. But, however, whether Apuleius were the translator of this Asclepian dialogue or no, it is evident, that the spirit of it is not at all Christian, but rankly Pagan; one instance whereof we have, in its glorying of a power, that men

have of making gods; upon which account St. Austin<sup>a</sup> thought fit to concern himself in the confutation of it. Moreover, it being extant and vulgarly known before Jamblichus's time, it must needs be included in his τὰ φερόμενα ὡς Ἑρμοῦ, and consequently receive this attestation from him, that it did contain not merely the Greekish, but the Hermaical and Egyptian doctrine.

There are indeed some objections made against this, as first, from what we read in this P. 607. dialogue, concerning the purgation of Col. the world, partly by water and partly by fire; “Tunc ille Dominus et pater Deus, primipotens, et unus gubernator mundi, intuens in mores factaque hominum, voluntate sua (quæ est dei benignitas) vitiis resistens, et corruptelæ errorem revocans, malignitatem omnem vel alluvione diluens, vel igne consumens, ad antiquam faciem mundum revocabit.” When the world becomes thus degenerate, then that Lord and Father, the supreme God, and the only governor of the world, beholding the manners and deeds of men, by his will (which is his benignity) always resisting vice, and restoring things from their degeneracy, will either wash away the malignity of the world by water, or else consume it by fire, and restore it to its ancient form again.—But since we find in Julius Firmicus,<sup>b</sup> that there was a tradition amongst the Egyptians, concerning the apocatastasis of the world, partim per κατακλυσμόν, partim per ἐκπύρωσιν, partly by inundation and partly by conflagration—this objection can signify nothing. Wherefore

<sup>a</sup> De Civitate Dei, lib. viii. cap. xxiii. p. 162. tom. vii. oper.

<sup>b</sup> Matheseos, lib. iii. cap. i. p. 34.

there is another objection, that hath some more plausibility, from that prophecy, which we find in this Asclepius, concerning the overthrow of the Egyptian Paganism (ushered in with much lamentation) in these words; "Tunc terra ista, sanctissima sedes delubrorum, sepulchrorum erit mortuorumque plenissima:" then this land of Egypt, formerly the most holy seat of the religious temples of the gods, shall be every where

Civ. D. l. viii. c. xxvi. [p. 166. tom. vii. oper.]

full of the sepulchres of dead men. The sense whereof is thus expressed by St. Austin: "Hoc videtur dolere, quod memoriæ martyrum nostrorum templis eorum delubrisque succederent; ut ii, qui hæc legunt, animo a nobis averso atque perverso, putent a Paganis deos cultos fuisse in templis, a nobis autem colli mortuos in sepulchris:" He seems to lament this; that the memorials of our martyrs should succeed in the place of their temples; that so they, who read this with a perverse mind, might think, that by the Pagans the gods were worshipped in temples, but by us (Christians) dead men in sepulchres.—Notwithstanding which, this very thing seems to have had its accomplishment too soon after, as may be gathered from these passages of

De Cur. G. A. l. viii. [p. 544. tom. ii. oper.]

Theodoret: καὶ γὰρ αὐτῶν τῶν καλουμένων θεῶν τὴν μνήμην, ἐκ τῆς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐξήλειψαν. (οἱ μάρτυρες) διανοίας. Now the martyrs have utterly abolished and blotted out of the minds of men the memory of those, who were formerly called gods.—And again, τοὺς γὰρ οἰκείους νεκροὺς ὁ δεσπότης ἀντεσιῆξε τοῖς ὑμετέροις θεοῖς, καὶ τοὺς μὲν φρούδους ἀπέφηνε, τούτοις δὲ τὸ ἐκείνων ἀπένευμε γέρας, &c. Our Lord hath now brought his dead (*that is, his martyrs*) into the room and place

(that is, the temples) of the gods; whom he hath sent away empty, and bestowed their honour upon these his martyrs. For now instead of the festivals of Jupiter and Bacchus, are celebrated those of Peter and Paul, Thomas and Sergius, and other holy martyrs.—Wherefore this being so shrewd and plain a description in the Asclepian Dialogue of what really happened in the Christian world, it may seem suspicious, that it was rather a history, written after the event, than a prophecy before it, as it pretends to be: it very much resembling that complaint of Eunapius Sardinianus in the life of Ædesius,<sup>a</sup> when the Christians had demolished the temple of Serapis in Egypt, seizing upon its riches and treasure, that instead of the gods, the monks then gave Divine honour to certain vile and flagitious persons deceased, called by the name of martyrs. Now if this be granted, this book must needs be counterfeit and supposititious. Nevertheless, St. Austin entertained no such suspicion concerning this Asclepian passage, as if it had been a history written after the fact, that is, after the sepulchres and memorials of the martyrs came to be so frequented; he supposing this book to be unquestionably of greater antiquity. Wherefore he concludes it to be a prophecy or prediction made *instinctu fallacis spiritus*, by the instinct or suggestion of some evil spirit;—they sadly then presaging the ruin of their own empire. Neither was this Asclepian Dialogue only ancients than St. Austin, but it is cited by Lactantius Firmianus<sup>b</sup> also under the name of ὁ τέλειος λόγος, the perfect oration—as was

<sup>a</sup> In *Vitis Sop historiarum*, p. 8, 85. edit. Plantin.

<sup>b</sup> *Divinar. Institut. lib. iv. cap. vi. p. 418.*

said before, and that as a thing then reputed of great antiquity. Wherefore, in all probability, this Asclepian passage was written before that described event had its accomplishment. And indeed if Antoninus the philosopher (as the fore-mentioned Eunapius\* writes) did predict the very same thing, that after his decease, that magnificent temple of Serapis in Egypt, together with the rest, should be demolished, καὶ τὰ ἱερὰ τάφους γενήσασθαι, and the temples of the gods turned into sepulchres—why might not this Egyptian or Tris-megistic writer receive the like inspiration or tradition; or at least make the same conjecture?

But there is yet another objection made against the sincerity of this Asclepian dialogue, from Lactantius's citing a passage out of it for the second person in the Trinity, the Son of God; Hermes in eo libro (saith Lactantius) qui ὁ τέλειος λόγος inscribitur, his usus est verbis, ὁ κύριος καὶ ὁ πάντων ποιητής, ὃν θεὸν καλεῖν νενομίκαμεν, ἐπεὶ τὸν δεύτερον ἐποίησε θεὸν, ὁρατὸν καὶ αἰσθητὸν (αἰσθητὸν δὲ φημι οὐ διὰ τὸ αἰσθέσθαι αὐτὸν, περὶ γὰρ τούτου οὐκ ἔστι πότερον αὐτὸς αἰσθητὸς, ἀλλ' ὅτι εἰς αἰσθησὴν ὑποπέμπει, καὶ εἰς νοῦν) ἐπεὶ τοῦτον ἐποίησε, πρῶτον, καὶ μόνον, καὶ ἓνα, καλὸς δὲ ἐφάνη αὐτῷ, καὶ πληρῆστατος πάντων τῶν ἀγαθῶν, ἡγίασέ τε καὶ πάνν ἐφίλησεν ὡς ἴδιον τόκον. Which we find in Apuleius's Latin translation thus rendered; "Dominus et omnium conformator, quem recte Deum dicimus, a se secundum deum fecit, qui videri et sentiri possit; quem secundum [deum] sensibilem ita dixerim, non ideo quod ipse sentiat (de hoc enim an ipse sentiat annon alio dicemus tempore) sed eo quod videntium sensus incurrit:.) quoniam ergo

Lib. iv. cap. vi.  
[Divin. In-  
stit. p. 419.]

Colv. p. 588.

\* Ubi supra, p. 76.

hunc fecit ex se primum, et a se secundum, visusque est ei pulcher, utpote qui est omnium bonitate plenissimus, amavit eum ut divinitatis suæ prolem" (for so it ought to be read, and not *patrem*, it being *τόκον* in the Greek). The Lord and Maker of all, whom we rightly call God, when he had made a second God, visible and sensible (I say, sensible, not actively, because himself hath sense; for concerning this, whether he have sense or no, we shall speak elsewhere but passively, because he incurs into our senses), this being his first and only production, seemed both beautiful to him, and most full of all good, and therefore he loved him dearly as his own offspring.—Which Lactantius, and after him St. Austin,<sup>a</sup> understanding of the perfect Word of God, or eternal *Λόγος*, made use of it as a testimony against the Pagans for the confirmation of Christianity; they taking it for granted, that this Hermaic book was genuinely Egyptian, and did represent the doctrine of the ancient Hermes Trismegist. But Dionysius Petavius,<sup>b</sup> and other later writers, understanding this place in the same sense with Lactantius and St. Austin, have made a quite different use of it, namely, to infer from thence, that this book was spurious and counterfeited by some Christian. To which we reply, first, that if this Hermaic writer had acknowledged an eternal *Λόγος*, or Word of God, and called it a second God and the Son of God; he had done no more in this than Philo the Jew did, who speaking of this same *Λόγος* expressly calls it *δευτερον θεον* and *νηπιον*

<sup>a</sup> Vide *Librum contra quinque Hæreses*, cap. iii. p. 3. tom. viii. oper. Append.

<sup>b</sup> *Dogmat. Theol.* tom. ii. lib. ii. de Trinit. cap. ii. §. 5. p. 20.

γονον υἱὸν θεοῦ, the second God and the first-begotten Son of God. Notwithstanding which, those writings of Philo's are not at all suspected. And

Origen affirms, that some of the ancient philosophers did the like: "Multi philosophorum veterum, unum esse deum, qui cuncta creavit, dixerunt; atque in hoc consentiunt legi. Aliquanti autem hoc adjiciunt; quod Deus cuncta per verbum suum fecerit et regat, et verbum Dei sit, quo cuncta moderentur; in hoc non solum legi; sed et evangelio quoque consona scribant." Many of the old philosophers (that is, all besides a few atheistic ones) have said, that there is one God who created all things, and these agree with the law: but some add further, that God made all things by his Word; and that it is the Word of God, by which all things are governed; and these write consonantly not only to the law, but also to the gospel.—But whether Philo\* derived this doctrine from the Greek philosophers, or from Egyptians and Hermes Trismegist, he being an Alexandrian, may well be a

Con. Jul. lib. 1.  
p. 53.

question. For St. Cyril doth indeed cite several passages out of Hermaic writings then extant to this very purpose. We shall only set down one of them here; ὁ κόσμος ἔχει ἄρχοντα ἐπικείμενον δημιουργὸν λόγον τοῦ πάντων δεσπότου, ὃς μετ' ἐκείνου πρώτη δύναμις, ἀγένητος, ἀπέραντος, ἐξ ἐκείνου προκύψασα, καὶ ἐπικείται, καὶ ἄρχει τῶν δι' αὐτοῦ δημιουργηθέντων· ἔστι δὲ τοῦ παντελείου πρόγονος καὶ τέλειος καὶ γόνιμος υἱός. The world hath a governor set over it, that Word of the Lord of all which was the maker of it; this is the first power

\* Vide Joan. Clerici Comment in xviii. priora Commata Evangel. Joannis in Hammondi Nov. Test. tom. i. p. 396. et Epist. Critic. viii. p. 223.

after himself, uncreated, infinite, looking out from him, and ruling over all things that were made by him; this is the perfect and genuine Son of the first omnipotent Being.—Nevertheless the author of the *τέλειος λόγος*, or Asclepian Dialogue, in that forecited passage of his, by his second God, the son of the first, meant no such thing at all as the Christian Logos, or second person of the Trinity, but only the visible world. Which is so plain from the words themselves, that it is a wonder how Lactantius and St. Austin could interpret them otherwise, he making therein a question, whether this second God were [actively] sensible or no. But the same is farther manifested from other places of that Dialogue, as this for example: “*Æternitatis Dominus Deus primus est, secundus est mundus;*” The Lord of eternity is the first God, but the second God is the world.—And again, “*Summus qui dicitur Deus rector gubernatorque sensibilis Dei, ejus qui in se complectitur omnem locum, omnemque rerum substantiam;*” The supreme God is the governor of that sensible god, which contains in it all place and all the substance of things.—And that this was indeed a part of the Hermaic or Egyptian theology, that the visible world animated was a second god, and the son of the first God, appears also from those Hermaic books published by Ficinus, and vulgarly called Pæmander, though that be only the first of them. There hath been one passage already cited out of the eighth book, *δεύτερος θεός ὁ κόσμος*, the world is a second god.—After which followeth more to the same purpose; *πρῶτος γὰρ πάντων ὄντως, αἰδιος καὶ ἀγέννητος, καὶ δημιουργὸς τῶν ὅλων θεός. δεύτερος δὲ ὁ κατ’ εἰκόνα αὐτοῦ*



ὑπ' αὐτοῦ γενόμενος καὶ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ συνεχόμενος καὶ τροφόμενος καὶ ἀθανατιζόμενος ὡς ὑπ' ἰδίου πατρός. The first God is that eternal unmade maker of all things; the second is he that is made according to the image of the first, which is contained, cherished, or nourished and immortalized by him, as by his own parent, by whom it is made an immortal animal.— So again in the ninth book, πατήρ ὁ θεὸς τοῦ κόσμου, καὶ ὁ μὲν κόσμος υἱὸς τοῦ θεοῦ, God is the father of the world, and the world is the son of God.— And in the twelfth, ὁ δὲ σύμπας κόσμος οὗτος ὁ μέγας θεὸς καὶ τοῦ μείζονος εἰκῶν, this whole world is a great god, and the image of a greater.—

As for the other Hermetic or Trismegistic books, published partly by Ficinus and partly by Patricius, we cannot confidently condemn any of them for Christian cheats or impostures, save only the Pœmander, and the Sermon in the Mount concerning Regeneration, the first and thirteenth of Ficinus's chapters or books. Neither of which books is cited by any of the ancient fathers, and therefore may be presumed not to have been extant in Jamblichus's time, but more lately forged; and that probably by one and the self-same hand, since the writer of the latter (the Sermon in the Mount) makes mention of the former (that is, the Pœmander) in the close of it. For that, which Casaubon objects against the fourth of Ficinus's books or chapters (entitled the Crater,) seems not very considerable, it being questionable, whether by the Crater any such thing were there meant as the Christian Baptisterion. Wherefore, as for all the rest of those Hermaic books, especially such of them as being cited by ancient fathers, may be presumed to

have been extant before Jamblichus's time; we know no reason why we should not concur with that learned philosopher in his judgment concerning them, that though they often speak the language of philosophers, and were not written by Hermes Trismegist himself, yet they do really contain *δόξας Ἑρμαϊκὰς*, Hermaical opinions, or the Egyptian doctrine. The ninth of Ficinus's books mentions the Asclepian Dialogue, under the Greek title of *ὁ τέλειος λόγος*, pretending to have been written by the same hand; *χθές ὦ Ἀσκληπτε, τὸν τέλειον ἀποδέδωκα Λόγον, νῦν δὲ ἀναγκαῖον ἡγοῦμαι ἀκολουθῶν ἐκείνῳ, καὶ τὸν περὶ αἰσθήσεως λόγον διέξελεῖν*. The meaning of which place (not understood by the translator) is this: I lately published (O Asclepius) the book entitled *ὁ Τέλειος λόγος* (or the perfect oration) and now I judge it necessary, in pursuit of the same, to discourse concerning sense.—Which book, as well as the perfect oration, is cited by Lactantius.\* As is also the tenth of Ficinus, called the Clavis, which does not only pretend to be of kin to the ninth, and consequently to the Asclepius likewise, but also to contain in it an epitome of that Hermaic book called *τὰ γενικὰ*, mentioned in Eusebius's Chronicon, *τὸν χθές λόγον, ὃ Ἀσκληπτε, σοι ἀνέθηκα, τὸν δὲ σήμερον δικαίον ἐστὶ τῷ Τάτ. ἀναθεῖναι, ἐπὶ καὶ τῶν Γενικῶν Λόγων, πῶν πρὸς αὐτὸν λελαλημένων ἐστὶν ἐπιτομή.* My former discourse was dedicated to thee, O Asclepius, but this to Tatius, it being an epitome of those Genica that were delivered to him. Which *Γενικὰ* are thus again afterward mentioned in the same book, *οὐκ ἤκουσας ἐν τοῖς Γενικοῖς, ὅτι*

\* Vide Divin. Instit. lib. ii. cap. xv. p. 254.

† Vide Scalig. ad Græca Eusebii, p. 409.

ἀπὸ μιᾶς ψυχῆς τῆς τοῦ παντός πᾶσαι αἱ ψυχαὶ εἰσιν; Have you not heard in the Genica, that all souls are derived from one soul of the universe?—Neither of which two places were understood by Ficinus. But doubtless this latter Hermaic book had something foisted into it, because there is a manifest contradiction found therein; forasmuch as that transmigration of human souls into brutes, which in the former part thereof is asserted after the Egyptian way, ὡς καταδίκη ψυχῆς κακῆς, as the just punishment of the wicked—is afterwards cried down and condemned in it, as the greatest error. And the eleventh and twelfth following books seem to us to be as Egyptian as any of the rest; as also does that long book entitled *κόρη κόσμου*, the thirteenth in Patricius. Nay, it is observable, that even those very books themselves, that are so justly suspected and condemned for Christian forgeries, have something of the Hermaical or Egyptian philosophy, here and there interspersed in them. As, for example, when in the Pæmander God is twice called ἀρρενόθηλος, male and female together:—this seems to have been Egyptian (and derived from thence by Orpheus) according to that elegant passage in the Asclepian Dialogue concerning God: “Hic ergo, qui solus est omnia, utriusque sexus fecunditate plenissimus, semper voluntatis suæ pregnans, parit semper quicquid voluerit procreare:” he therefore, who alone is all things, and most full of the fecundity of both sexes, being always pregnant of his own will, always produceth whatsoever he pleaseth.—Again, when death is thus described in it, παραδιδόναι τὸ σῶμα εἰς ἀλλοίωσιν καὶ τὸ εἶδος, ὁ εἶχες, εἰς ἀφανὲς γίνεσθαι, to be nothing else but the

change of the body, and the form or life's passing into the invisible.—This agreeth with that in the eleventh book or chapter: τὴν μεταβολὴν θάνατον εἶναι, διὰ τὸ μὲν σῶμα διαλύεσθαι, τὴν δὲ ζωὴν εἰς τὸ ἀφανὲς χωρεῖν: That death is nothing but a change, it being only the dissolution of the body, and the life or soul's passing into the invisible or inconspicuous.—In which book it is also affirmed of the world, γίνεσθαι μέρος αὐτοῦ καθ' ἑκάστην ἡμέραν ἐν τῷ ἀφανεί, that every day some part or other of it goes into the invisible, or into Hades;—that is, does not utterly perish, but only disappears to our sight, it being either translated into some other place, or changed into another form.—And accordingly it is said of animals, in the twelfth book, διαλύεται, οὐχ ἵνα ἀπόληται, ἀλλ' ἵνα νέα γένηται, that they are dissolved by death, not that they might be destroyed, but made again anew.—As it is also there affirmed of the world, that it doth πάντα ποιεῖν καὶ εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἀποποιεῖν, make all things out of itself, and again unmake them into itself; καὶ διαλύων πάντα ἀνανεοῖ, and that dissolving all things it doth perpetually renew them.—For that nothing in the whole world utterly perisheth, as it is often declared elsewhere in these Trismegistic writings, so particularly in this twelfth book of Ficinus, σύμπας ὁ κόσμος ἀμετάβλητος, τὰ δὲ μέρη αὐτοῦ πάντα μεταβλητὰ, οὐδὲν δὲ φθαρτὸν ἢ ἀπολλύμενον. The whole world is unchangeable, only the parts of it being alterable; and this so, as that none of these neither utterly perisheth, or is absolutely destroyed;—πῶς μέρος τι δύναται φθαρῆναι τοῦ ἀφθάρτου, ἢ ἀπολείσθαι τι τοῦ θεοῦ; for how can any part of that be corrupted, which is incorruptible, or any thing of God perish or go to nothing?—all which, by Casaubon's leave, we take to have been originally

Egyptian doctrine, and thence in part afterward transplanted into Greece. Moreover, when in the *Pœmander* God is styled more than once *φῶς καὶ ζωὴ*, light and life—this seems to have been Egyptian also, because it was Orphical. In like manner the appendix to the *Sermon in the Mount*, called *ὑμνοδία κρυπτή*, or the occult cantion, hath some strains of the Egyptian theology in it, which will be afterward mentioned.

The result of our present discourse is this; that though some of the Trismegistic books were either wholly counterfeited, or else had certain supposititious passages inserted into them by some Christian hand, yet there being others of them originally Egyptian, or which, as to the substance of them, do contain Hermaical or Egyptian doctrines (in all which one supreme Deity is every where asserted) we may well conclude from hence, that the Egyptians had an acknowledgment amongst them of one supreme Deity. And herein several of the ancient fathers have gone before us; as first of all Justin Martyr, \* *Ἀμμων πάγκρυφον τὸν θεὸν ὀνομάζει, Ἑρμῆς δὲ σαφῶς καὶ φανερώς λέγει, θεὸν νοῆσαι μὲν ἐστὶ χαλεπὸν, φράσαι δὲ ἀδύνατον*. Ammon in his books calleth God most hidden; and Hermes plainly declareth, that it is hard to conceive God, but impossible to express him.—Neither doth it follow that this latter passage is counterfeit, as Casaubon concludes, because there is something like it in Plato's *Timæus*, there being doubtless a very great agreement betwixt Platonism and the ancient Egyptian doctrine.—Thus again St. Cyprian: “*Hermes quoque Trismegistus unum Deum loquitur, eum-*

De Idol. van.  
[p. 226.  
oper.]

\* Cohortat. ad Græcos, p. 37. oper.

que ineffabilem et inestimabilem confitetur;" Hermes Trismegist also acknowledgeth one God, confessing him to be ineffable and inestimable;— which passage is also cited by St. Austin.<sup>a</sup> Lactantius likewise; "Thoth antiquissimus Lib. i. p. 30. et instructissimus omni genere doctrinæ, [Divin. Instit. cap. vi. p. 42.] adeo ei in multarum rerum et artium scientia Trismegisti cognomen imponeret; hic scripsit libros et quidem multos, ad cognitionem divinarum rerum pertinentes, in quibus majestatem summi et singularis Dei asserit, iisdemque nominibus appellat, quibus nos, Deum et patrem. Ac ne quis nomen ejus requireret; ἀνώνυμον esse dixit." Thoth (that is Hermes) the most ancient and most instructed in all kind of learning (for which he was called Trismegist) wrote books, and those many belonging to the knowledge of Divine things, wherein he asserts the majesty of one supreme Deity, calling him by the same names that we do, God and Father; but (lest any one should require a proper name of him) affirming him to be anonymous.—Lastly, St. Cyril<sup>b</sup> hath much more to the same purpose also: and we must confess, that we have the rather here insisted so much upon these Hermetic or Trismegistic writings, that in this particular we might vindicate these ancient fathers from the imputation either of fraud and imposture, or of simplicity and folly.

But that the Egyptians acknowledge, besides their many gods, one supreme and all-comprehending Deity, needs not be proved from these

<sup>a</sup> De Baptismo contra Donatistas, lib. vi. §. lxxxvii. p. 126. tom. ix. oper.

<sup>b</sup> Contra Julianum, lib. i. p. 31.

Trismegistic writings (concerning which we leave others to judge as they find cause) it otherwise appearing, not only because Orpheus (who was an undoubted assertor of monarchy; or one first principle of all things) is generally affirmed to have derived his doctrine from the Egyptians; but also from plain and express testimonies. For besides Apollonius Tyanæus's

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affirmation concerning both Indians and Egyptians, before cited, Plutarch throughout his whole book *De Iside et Osiride*, supposes the Egyptians thus to have asserted one supreme Deity, they commonly calling him τὸν πρῶτον θεόν, the first God.—Thus in the beginning of that book he tells us, that the end of all the religious rites and mysteries of that Egyptian goddess Isis, was ἡ τοῦ πρώτου, καὶ κυρίου, καὶ νοητοῦ γνώσις, ὃν ἡ θεὸς παρακαλεῖ ζητεῖν, παρ' αὐτῆ καὶ μετ' αὐτῆς ὄντα καὶ συνόντα: the knowledge of that first God, who is the Lord of all things, and only intelligible by the mind, whom this goddess exhorteth men to seek, in her communion.—After which he declareth, that this first God of the Egyptians was accounted by them an obscure and hidden Deity, and accordingly he gives the reason, why they made the crocodile to be a

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μόνου δέ φασιν ἐν ὕγρῳ δαιτουμένου, τὰς ὄψεις ὑμένα λιῶν καὶ διαφανῆ παρακαλύπτειν, ἐκ τοῦ μετώπου κατερχόμενον, ὥστε βλέπειν μὴ βλέπόμενον. ὃ τῷ πρώτῳ θεῷ συμβέβηκεν. Because they say the crocodile is the only animal, which, living in the water, hath his eyes covered by a thin transparent membrane, falling down over them, by reason whereof it sees and is not seen; which is a thing that belongs to the first God, to see all

things, himself being not seen.—Though Plutarch in that place gives also another reason why the Egyptians made the crocodile a symbol of the Deity; οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ ὁ κροκόδειλος αἰτίας πιθανῆς ἀμοιροῦσαν ἔσχκε τιμὴν, ἀλλὰ μίμημα θεοῦ λέγεται γεγονέναι μόνος μὲν ἄγλωσσος ὢν, φωνῆς γὰρ ὁ θεῖος λόγος ἀπροσδεής ἐστὶ, καὶ δι' ἀφόφον βαίνων κελεύθου καὶ δίκης τὰ θνητὰ ἄγει κατὰ δίκην. Neither were the Egyptians without a plausible reason for worshipping God symbolically in the crocodile, that being said to be an imitation of God, in that it is the only animal without a tongue. For the Divine λόγος, or reason, standing not in need of speech, and going on through a silent path of justice in the world, does without noise righteously govern and dispense all human affairs.—In like manner, Horus Apollo in his Hieroglyphics\* tells us, that the Egyptians acknowledging a παντοκράτωρ and κοσμοκράτωρ, an omnipotent Being, that was the governor of the whole world, —did symbolically represent him by a serpent, ἐν μέσῳ αὐτοῦ οἶκον μέγαν δεικνύοντες, ὁ γὰρ βασιλεῖος οἶκος αὐτοῦ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ, they picturing also a great house or palace within its circumference, because the world is the royal palace of the Deity. —Which writer also gives us another reason, why the serpent was made to be the hieroglyphic of the Deity; τὸ εἰς τροφῇ χρῆσθαι τῷ ἑαυτοῦ σώματι, Lib. i. c. ii. σημαίνει, τὸ πάντα ὅσα ἐκ τῆς θείας προνοίας [p. 5.] ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ γεννᾶται, ταῦτα πάλιν καὶ τὴν μείωσιν εἰς αὐτὸν λαμβάνειν.—Because the serpent feeding as it were upon its own body, doth aptly signify, that all things generated in the world by Divine Providence are again resolved into him.—And Philo Byblius,<sup>b</sup>

\* Lib. i. cap. lxi. p. 75.

<sup>b</sup> Apud Euseb. Præpar. Evangel. lib. i. cap. x. p. 41.



from Sauchoniathon, gives the same reason why the serpent was deified by Taut, or the Egyptian *Hermes*, *ὅτι ἀθάνατον καὶ εἰς αὐτὸν ἀναλύεται*, because it is immortal, and resolved into itself.—Though sometimes the Egyptians added to the serpent also a hawk, thus complicating the hieroglyphic of the Deity; according to that of a famous Egyptian priest in Eusebius, *τὸ πρῶτον ὄν θεώτατον, ὄφας ἐστὶ ἰέρακος ἔχων μορφήν*, that the first and divinest being of all is symbolically represented by a serpent having the head of a hawk.—And that a hawk was also sometimes used alone for a hieroglyphic of the Deity, appeareth from that of Plutarch,<sup>a</sup> that in the porch of an Egyptian temple at Sais, were engraven these three hieroglyphics; a young man, an old man, and a hawk; to make up this sentence, that both the beginning and end of human life dependeth upon God, or Providence. But we have two more remarkable passages in the forementioned Horus Apollo,<sup>c</sup> concerning the Egyptian theology, which must not be permitted; the first this, *παρ' αὐτοῖς τοῦ παντός κόσμου τὸ διηκόν ἐστι πνεῦμα*, that according to them, there is a spirit passing through the whole world, to wit, God.—And again, *δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς δίχα θεοῦ μηδὲν ὄλως συνεστάναι*, it seemeth to the Egyptians, that nothing at all consists without God.—In the next place, Jamblichus was a person, who had made it his business to inform himself thoroughly concerning the theology of the Egyptians, and who undertakes to give an account thereof, in his answer to Porphyrius's epistle to Anebo, an Egyptian

<sup>a</sup> Præpar. Evang. lib. i. cap. x. p. 41.

<sup>b</sup> De Iside et Osiride, p. 363.

<sup>c</sup> Lib. i. cap. lxiv. p. 77. and lib. i. cap. xiii. p. 27.

priest; whose testimony therefore may well seem to deserve credit. And he first gives us a summary account of their theology after this manner: *χωριστός, ἐξερημένος, μετέωρος, καὶ καθ' ἑαυτὸν ὑπερηπλωσμένος τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ δυνάμεων τε καὶ στοιχείων, ὁ τῆς γενέσεως καὶ φύσεως ὅλης, καὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς στοιχείοις δυνάμεων πασῶν, αἴτιος θεός· ἅτε δὴ ὑπερέχων τούτου, ἄυλος, καὶ ἀσώματος, καὶ ὑπερφυῆς, ἀγέννητός τε καὶ ἀμέριστος, ὅλος ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἀναφανείς, προηγείται πάντων τούτων, καὶ ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὰ ὅλα περιέχει, καὶ διότι μὲν συνέλιψε πάντα, καὶ μεταδίδωσιν* That God, who is the cause of generation and the whole nature, and of all the powers in the elements themselves, is separate, exempt, elevated above, and expanded over, all the powers and elements in the world. For being above the world, and transcending the same, immaterial, and incorporeal, supernatural, unmade, indivisible, manifested wholly from himself, and in himself, he ruleth over all things, and in himself containeth all things. And because he virtually comprehends all things, therefore does he impart and display the same from himself.—According to which excellent description of the Deity, it is plain, that the Egyptians asserting one God that comprehends all things, could not possibly suppose a multitude of self-existent deities. In which place, also, the same Jamblichus<sup>b</sup> tells us, that as the Egyptian hieroglyphic for material and corporeal things was mud or floating water, so they pictured God “in loto arbore sedentem super lutum;” sitting upon the lote-tree above the watery mud.—“Quod innuit Dei eminentiam altissimam, qua fit ut nullo modo attingat lutum ipsum. Demonstratque Dei

<sup>a</sup> Jamblich. de *Myster. Egyptior.* sect. vii. cap. ii. p. 151.

<sup>b</sup> *Ibid.* p. 151.

imperium intellectuale, quia loti arboris omnia sunt rotunda tam frondes quam fructus," &c. Which signifies the transcendent eminency of the Deity above the matter, and its intellectual empire over the world; because both the leaves and fruit of that tree are round, representing the motion of intellect.—Again, he there adds also, that the Egyptians sometimes pictured God sitting at the helm of a ship. But afterward, in the Seg. viii. c. i. same book, he sums up the queries, which Porphyrius had propounded to the Egyptian priest, to be resolved concerning them, in this manner: βούλει σοι δηλωθῆναι, τί τὸ πρῶτον αἴτιον ἡγούνται εἶναι Αἰγύπτιοι; πότερον νοῦν ἢ ὑπὲρ νοῦν; καὶ μόνον ἢ μετ' ἄλλου ἢ ἄλλων; καὶ πότερον ἀσώματον ἢ σωματικόν; καὶ εἰ τῷ δημιουργῷ τὰ αὐτά, ἢ πρὸ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ; καὶ εἰ ἐξ ἐνὸς τὰ πάντα ἢ ἐκ πολλῶν; καὶ εἰ ὕλην ἴσασι ἢ σώματα ποῖα πρῶτον; καὶ εἰ ἀγένητον ὕλην ἢ γενητήν; You desire to be resolved, what the Egyptians think to be the first cause of all; whether intellect or something above intellect? and that whether alone or with some other? whether incorporeal or corporeal? whether the first principle be the same with the Demiurgus and architect of the world, or before him? whether all things proceed from one or many? whether they suppose matter, or qualified bodies, to be the first? and if they admit a first matter, whether they assert it to be unmade or made?—In answer to which Porphyrian queries, Jamblichus thus begins: καὶ πρῶτον μὲν, ὃ πρῶτον ἠρώτησας, περὶ τοῦτου ἄκουε· πρὸ τῶν ὄντως ὄντων καὶ τῶν ὄλων ἀρχῶν, ἐστὶ θεὸς εἰς· πρῶτος, καὶ τοῦ πρώτου θεοῦ καὶ βασιλέως, ἀκίνητος· ἐν μονότητι τῆς ἐαυτοῦ ἐνότητος μέμων· οὔτε γὰρ νοητὸν αὐτῷ ἐπιπλέκεται, οὔτε ἄλλό τι· I shall first reply to that you first demanded, that, according to the Egyptians,

before all entities and principles there is one God, who is in order of nature before (him that is commonly called) the first God and King; immovable; and always remaining in the solitariness of his own unity, there being nothing intelligible, nor any thing else complicated with him, &c.—In which words Jamblichus, and those others that follow after, though there be some obscurity (and we may perhaps have occasion further to consider the meaning of them elsewhere), yet he plainly declares, that according to the Egyptians, the first Original of all things was a perfect unity above intellect; but intimating withal, that besides this first unity, they did admit of certain other Divine hypostases (as a perfect intellect, and mundane soul) subordinate thereunto, and dependent on it, concerning which he thus writeth afterward; <sup>a</sup> τὴν πρὸ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, καὶ τὴν ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ ζωτικὴν δύναμιν γινώσκουσι, καθαρὸν τε νοῦν ὑπὲρ τὸν κόσμον προτιθέασαι. The Egyptians acknowledge, before the heaven, and in the heaven, a living power (or soul) and again they place a pure mind or intellect above the world.—But that they did not acknowledge a plurality of coordinate and independent principles is further declared by him after this manner; <sup>b</sup> καὶ οὕτως ἀνωθεν ἄχρι τῶν τελευταίων ἢ περὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν Αἰγυπτίους πραγματεία, ἀφ' ἑνὸς ἀρχεται, καὶ πρόεισι εἰς πλῆθος, τῶν πολλῶν αὐθις ἀφ' ἑνὸς διακυβερνωμένων, καὶ πανταχοῦ τοῦ ἀορίστου φύσεως ἐπικρατουμένης ὑπὸ τινὸς ὀρισμένου μέτρου, καὶ τῆς ἀνωτάτω ἐνιαίας πάντων αἰτίας. And thus the Egyptian philosophy, from first to last, begins from unity; and thence descends to multitude; the many being always governed by

<sup>a</sup> Cap. iy. p. 160.

<sup>b</sup> Sect. viii. cap. iii. p. 159.

the one; and the infinite or undeterminate nature every where mastered and conquered by some finite and determined measure; and all ultimately by that highest Unity, that is the first cause of all things.—Moreover, in answer to the last Porphyrian question concerning matter, whether the Egyptians thought it to be unmade and self-existent or made, Jamblichus thus replies: ἤλην δὲ παράγαγεν ὁ θεὸς ἀπὸ οὐσιότητος ὑποσχισθείσης ὑλότηρος. That according to Hermes and the Egyptians, matter was also made or produced by God: “ab essentialitate succisa ac subscissa materialitate.”

P. 117. as Scutellius turns it. Which passage of Jamblichus, Proclus upon the *Timæus* (where he asserts that God was ἀρρήτος αἰτία τῆς ὑλης, the ineffable cause of matter) takes notice of in this manner: καὶ ἡ τῶν Αἰγυπτίων παράδοσις τὰ αὐτὰ περὶ αὐτῆς φησιν· ὁ γὰρ τοι θεῖος Ἰάμβλιχος ιστόρησεν, ὅτι καὶ Ἐρμῆς ἐκ τῆς οὐσιότητος τὴν ὑλότητα παράγεσθαι βούλεται, καὶ δὴ καὶ εἰκὸς καὶ τούτου τὸν Πλάτωνα τὴν τοιαύτην περὶ τῆς ὑλης δόξαν ἔχειν. And the tradition of the Egyptians agreeth herewith, that matter was not unmade or self-existent, but produced by the Deity: for the divine Jamblichus has recorded, that Hermes would have materiality to have been produced from essentiality, (that is, the passive principle of matter from that active principle of the Deity:); and it is very probable from hence, that Plato was also of the same opinion concerning matter; viz. because he is supposed to have followed Hermes and the Egyptians. Which indeed is the more likely, if that be true, which the same Proclus affirmeth concerning Orpheus, ὡς τε καὶ Ὀρφεὺς κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἀπὸ τῆς πρωτίστης τῶν νοητῶν ὑποστάσεως παράγει τὴν ὑλην, that Orpheus also did,

after the same manner, deduce or derive matter from the first hypostasis of intelligibles, that is, from the supreme Deity. We shall conclude here in the last place with the testimony of Damascius, in his book of Principles,<sup>a</sup> writing after this manner concerning the Egyptians: *Αἰγυπτίους δὲ ὁ μὲν Εὐδήμος οὐδὲν ἀκριβὲς ἱστορεῖ· οἱ δὲ Αἰγύπτιοι καθ' ἡμᾶς φιλόσοφοι γεγονότες, ἐξήνεγκαν αὐτῶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν κεκρυμμένην, εὑρόντες ἐν Αἰγυπτίῳ δὴ τισὶ λόγοις· ὡς εἶη κατ' αὐτοῦς ἡ μὲν μία τῶν ὄλων ἀρχὴ σκότος ἀγνωστον ὑμνουμένη, καὶ τοῦτο τρίς ἀναφωνούμενον οὕτως·* Eudemus hath given us no exact account of the Egyptians; but the Egyptian philosophers, that have been in our times, have declared the hidden truth of their theology, having found in certain Egyptian writings, that there was, according to them, one Principle of all things, praised under the name of the unknown darkness, and that thrice repeated:— which unknown darkness is a description of that supreme Deity, that is incomprehensible.

But that the Egyptians amongst their many gods did acknowledge one supreme, may sufficiently appear also, even from their vulgar religion and theology; in which they had first a peculiar and proper name for him as such. For as the Greeks called the supreme God Ζεὺς, the Latins Jupiter or Jovis, so did the Egyptians call him Hammon or Ammon, according to Herodotus,<sup>b</sup> whose testimony to this purpose hath been already cited, and confirmed by Origen,<sup>c</sup> who was an Egyptian born. Thus also Plutarch in his book De Iside,<sup>d</sup>

<sup>a</sup> Vide Wolfii Anecd. Græc. tom. iii. p. 260.

<sup>b</sup> Lib. ii. cap. xlii. p. 105.

<sup>c</sup> Or rather Celsus in Origen *contra Celsum*, lib. v. p. 261.

<sup>d</sup> Tom. ii. oper. p. 354.

τῶν πολλῶν νομιζόντων, ἴδιον παρ' Αἰγυπτίοις ὄνομα τοῦ Διὸς εἶναι, τὸν Ἀμοῦν, ὃ παράγοντες ἡμεῖς Ἀμμωνα λέγομεν. It is supposed by most, that the proper name of Zeus, or Jupiter (that is, the supreme Deity) amongst the Egyptians is Amous, which the Greeks pronounce Hammon. To the same purpose Hesychius, Ἀμμοῦς ὁ Ζεὺς, Ἀριστοτέλης, Ammous, according to Aristotle, is the same with Zeus. Whence it came to pass, that by the Latin writers Hammon was vulgarly called Jupiter Hammon. Which Hammon was not only used as a proper name for the supreme Deity by the Egyptians, but also by the Arabians and all the Africans, according to that of Lucan, \*

Quamvis Æthiopum populis Arabumque beatis  
Gentibus, atque Indis, unus sit Jupiter Ammon.

Wherefore not only Marmarica (which is a part of Africa, wherein was that most famous temple of this Ammon) was from thence denominated Ammonia, but even all Africa, as Stephanus informs us, was sometimes called Ammonis from this god Ammon, who hath been therefore styled Ζεὺς Λιβυκός, the Libyan Jupiter. <sup>b</sup>

Indeed it is very probable, <sup>c</sup> that this word Hammon or Ammon was first derived from Ham or Cham, the son of Noah, whose posterity was chiefly seated in these African parts, and from whom Egypt was called, not only in the Scripture, "the land of Ham," but also by the Egyptians themselves, as Plutarch testifieth, Χήμεια, or Che-

\* Lib. ix. ver. 517, 518.

<sup>b</sup> Vide Voss. de Idolatr. lib. ii. c. xi. p. 134, 135, et Sam. Bochart. in Phæleg. lib. i. cap. i. p. 6, 7.

<sup>c</sup> Vide Bochart. ubi supra lib. iv. cap. i. p. 204, 205. et lib. i. cap. i. p. 6, 7, et Marsham. in Canon. Chron. Sæcul. i. p. 39.

mia, and as St. Jerome, Ham; and the Coptites also to this very day call it Chemi. Nevertheless this will not hinder, but that the word Hammon, for all that, might be used afterwards by the Egyptians, as a name for the supreme God, because, amongst the Greeks Ζεύς in like manner, was supposed to have been at first the name of a man or hero, but yet afterwards applied to signify the supreme God. And there might be such a mixture of herology or history, together with theology, as well amongst the Egyptians as there was amongst the Greeks. Nay, some learned men\* conjecture, and not without probability, that the Zeus of the Greeks also was really the very same with that Ham or Cham, the son of Noah, whom the Egyptians first worshipped as an hero or deified man; there being several considerable agreements and correspondences between the poetic fables of Saturn and Jupiter, and the true Scripture story of Noah and Cham; as there is likewise a great affinity betwixt the words themselves; for as Cham signifies heat or fervour, so is Ζεύς derived by the Greek grammarians from ζέω. And thus will that forementioned testimony of Herodotus in some sense be verified, that the Greeks received the names of most of their gods, even of Ζεύς himself, from the Egyptians.

Perhaps it may be granted also, that the sun was sometimes worshipped by the Egyptians under the name of Hammon; it having been in like manner sometimes worshipped by the Greeks under the name of Zeus. And the word very well agreeth herewith, חמה in the Hebrew language signifying not only heat, but the sun; from whence חמנים

\* Vide Bochart. ubi supra, lib. i. cap. i. p. 7, 8.



Chamanim, also was derived. Nevertheless, it will not follow from hence, that therefore the visible sun was generally accounted by the Egyptians the supreme Deity, no more than he was amongst the Greeks: but, as we have often occasion to observe, there was in the Pagan religion a confused jumble of herology, physiology, and theology all together. And that the notion of this Egyptian god Ammon was neither confined by them to the sun, nor yet the whole corporeal world or nature of the universe (as some have conceived), is evident from hence, because the Egyptians themselves interpreted it, according to their own language, to signify that which was hidden and obscure, as both Manetho, an ancient Egyptian priest, and Hecataeus (who wrote concerning the philosophy of the Egyptians) in Plutarch agree: *Μανεθῶς μὲν ὁ Σεβεννίτης τὸ κεκρυμμένον οἶεται καὶ τὴν κρύψιν ὑπὸ ταύτης δηλοῦσθαι τῆς φωνῆς· Ἐκαταῖος δὲ Ἀβδερίτης φησὶ τούτῳ καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους τῷ ῥήματι χρῆσθαι τοὺς Αἰγυπτίους, ὅταν τιὰ προσκαλοῦνται, προσκλητικὴν γὰρ εἶναι τὴν φωνήν· διὸ τὸν πρῶτον θεὸν ὡς ἀφανῆ καὶ κεκρυμμένον ὄντα, προσκαλούμενοι καὶ παρακαλοῦντες, ἐμφανῆ γενέσθαι καὶ δῆλον αὐτοῖς, Ἀμοῦν λέγουσι·* Manetho Sebennites conceives the word Amoun to signify that which is hidden; and Hecataeus affirmeth, that the Egyptians use this word, when they call any one to them that was distant or absent from them: wherefore the first God, because he is invisible and hidden, they as it were inviting him to approach near, and to make himself manifest and conspicuous to them, call him Amoun.—And, agreeably hereunto, Jamblichus gives us this account of the true notion of this Egyp-

\* De Iside et Osiride, p. 354. tom. ii. oper.

† De Myster. Egypt. sect. viii. c. iii. p. 159.

tian god. Ammon : ὁ δημιουργικὸς νοῦς, καὶ τῆς ἀληθείας προστάτης, καὶ σοφία ἐρχόμενος μὲν ἐπὶ γένεσιν, καὶ τὴν ἀφανῆ τῶν κεκρυμμένων λόγων δύναμιν εἰς φῶς ἄγων, Ἄμμων κατὰ τὴν τῶν Αἰγυπτίων γλῶσσαν λέγεται. The demiurgical Intellect, and President of Truth, as with wisdom it proceedeth to generation, and produceth into light the secret and invisible powers of the hidden reasons, is, according to the Egyptian language, called Hammon.—Wherefore we may conclude, that Hammon, amongst the Egyptians, was not only the name of the supreme Deity, but also of such a one as was hidden, invisible and incorporeal.

And here it may be worth our observing, that this Egyptian Hammon was in all probability taken notice of in Scripture, though vulgar interpreters have not been aware thereof. For thus we understand that of Jeremy xlii. 25. “The Lord of hosts, the God of Israel saith, behold I will  $\text{אמון}$  (that is, not the multitude of Noe, but) Ammon (the God) of Noe, and Pharaoh and Egypt with her (other) gods and kings, and all that trust in him; I will deliver them into the hands of those that seek their lives, and into the hands of Nebuchadnezzar, king of Babylon.” For the understanding of which place, we must observe, that according to the language of those ancient Pagans, when every country or city had their peculiar and proper names, for the gods presiding over them or worshipped by them, the several nations and places were themselves commonly denoted and signified by the names of those their respective gods. With which kind of language the Scripture itself also complieth; as when the Moabites are called in it—the people of Chemosh, (Numbers xxi.) and when the gods of

Damascus are said to have smitten Ahaz, because the Syrians smote him. (2 Chron. xxviii.) Accordingly whereunto also, whatsoever was done or attempted against the several nations or countries, is said to have been done or attempted against their gods. Thus Moab's captivity is described, Jeremy xlviii. "Thou shalt be taken, and Chemosh shall go into captivity." And the overthrow of Babylon is predicted after the same manner, in the prophecy of Isaiah, chap. xlvi. "Bell boweth down, Nebo stoopeth, themselves are gone into captivity." And also the same is threatened in that of Jeremy, ch. li. "I will visit Bell in Babylon, and will bring out of his mouth that which he hath swallowed up, and the nations shall not flow unto him any more, for the wall of Babylon shall be broken down." Now Bell, according to Herodotus,\* was a name for the supreme god amongst the Babylonians, as well as Ammon was amongst the Egyptians; who notwithstanding by both of them was worshipped after an idolatrous manner. And therefore, as in these latter places, by the visiting and punishing of the Babylonians, so in that former place of Jeremy, by the visiting of Ammon, and the gods of Egypt, is understood the visiting of the Egyptians themselves; accordingly as it is there also expressed. No was, it seems, the metropolis of all Egypt; and therefore Ammon, the chief god of those ancient Egyptians, and of that city, was called Ammon of No. As likewise the city No is denominated from this god Ammon in the Scripture, and called both No-Ammon and Ammon-No.

\* This seems to be a mistake for Diodorus Siculus, who mentions it, *lib. ii. p. 69.*

The former in the prophecy of Nahum, chap. iii. "Art thou better than No-Ammon?" or that No in which the god Ammon is worshipped? Which is not to be understood of the oracle of Ammon in Marmarica, as some have imagined\* (they taking No for an appellative, and so to signify habitation;) it being unquestionably the proper name of a city in Egypt. The latter in that of Ezekiel, chap. xxx. "I will pour out my fury upon Sin, the strength of Egypt, and will cut off Hammon-No." In which place as by Sin is meant Pelusium, so Hammon-No, by the Seventy, is interpreted Diospolis, the city of Jupiter; that is, the Egyptian Jupiter, Hammon. Which Diospolis was otherwise called the Egyptian Thebes, (anciently the metropolis of all Egypt) but whose proper name, in the Egyptian language, seems to have been No; which from the chief god there worshipped was called both No-Ammon and Hammon-No; as that god himself was also denominated from the city, Ammon of No. And this is the rather probable, because Plato In Phædro, [p. 356. oper.] tells us expressly, that Ammon was anciently the proper or chief god of the Egyptian Thebes or Diospolis, where he speaks of Theuth or Thoth, the Egyptian Hermes, in these words: βασιλέως δ' αὐ τότε ὄντος Αἰγύπτου ὄλης Θαμοῦ, περὶ τὴν μεγάλην πόλιν τοῦ ἄνω τόπου, ὃν οἱ Ἕλληνες Αἰγυπτίας Θήβας καλοῦσι καὶ τὸν θεὸν Ἀμμωνα. Thamus was then king over all Egypt, reigning in that great city (the metropolis thereof) which the Greeks call the Egyptian Thebes, and whose God was Ammon. But whereas the prophet

\* Voss. de Idol. lib. i. cap. xxxii. p. 89.

Nahum (who seems to have written after the completion of that judgment upon No, predicted both by Jeremy and Ezekiel) describes the place, as situate among the rivers, and having the sea for its wall and rampart; whence many learned men<sup>a</sup> have concluded, that this was rather to be understood of Alexandria than Diospolis (notwithstanding that Alexandria was not then in being, nor built till a long while after, in Alexander the Great's time): this may very well, as we conceive, be understood of Egypt in general, whose metropolis this No was; that it was situate amongst the rivers, and had the seas for its wall and rampart, the Red and Mediterranean. And thus much for the Egyptian Jupiter, or their supreme Deity, called by them Hammon.

There is an excellent monument of Egyptian antiquity preserved by Plutarch<sup>b</sup> and others, from whence it may be made yet further evident, that the Egyptians did not suppose a multitude of unmade, self-existent deities, but acknowledged one supreme, universal and all-comprehending Numen. And it is that inscription upon the temple at Sais; *Ἐγώ εἰμι πᾶν τὸ γεγυός, καὶ ὄν, καὶ εἰσόμενον, καὶ τὸν ἐμὸν πέπλον οὐδεὶς πω θνητὸς ἀπεκάλυψεν*, I am all that hath been, is, and shall be, and my peplum or veil no mortal hath ever yet uncovered.—Which though perhaps some would understand thus, as if that Deity therein described were nothing but the senseless matter of the whole corporeal universe, according to that opinion of Chæremon beforementioned and confuted; yet it

<sup>a</sup> The Chaldean Interpreter, St. Jerome, Drusius, and many others. Vid. Voss. ubi supra.

<sup>b</sup> De Iside et Osir. p. 354. tom. ii. oper.

is plain, that this could not be the meaning of this inscription: first, because the god here described is not a mere congeries of disunited matter, or aggregation of divided atoms, but it is some one thing, which was all: according to that other inscription upon an altar dedicated to the goddess Isis, which we shall also afterward make use of, “Tibi, una, quæ es omnia;” To thee, who being one, art all things.—Again, in the Deity here described, there is both a veil or outside, and also something hidden and recondite; the sense seeming to be this: I am all that was, is, and shall be; and the whole world is nothing but myself veiled; but my naked and unveiled brightness no mortal could ever yet behold or comprehend. Which is just as if the sun should say, I am all the colours of the rainbow (whose mild and gentle light may easily be beheld) and they are nothing but my simple and uniform lustre, variously refracted and abated; but my immediate splendour and the brightness of my face no mortal can contemplate, without being either blinded or dazzled by it. Wherefore this description of the Deity may seem not a little to resemble that description, which God makes of himself to Moses, “Thou shalt see my back parts, but my face shall not be seen.” Where there is also something exterior and visible in the Deity, and something hidden and recondite, invisible and incomprehensible to mortals. And Philo thus glosseth upon those words: *αὐταρκής ἐστὶ σοφῶ, τὰ ἀκόλουθα καὶ ὅσα μετὰ τὸν Θεὸν γινῶναι, τὴν δὲ ἡγεμονικὴν οὐσίαν ὁ βουλόμενος καταθεάσασθαι, τῷ περιαιυγεί τῶν ἀκτίων πρὶν ἰδεῖν πηρὸς ἔσται.* It is sufficient for

*Ἄφαντις ἄρα  
καὶ ἑμφαντις*  
Proclus of this  
Egyptian God,  
that it was  
both invisible  
and manifest.  
In *Timæe*.  
p. 30.

P. 474. [li-  
bro de Pro-  
fugis.]

a wise man to know God *a posteriori*, or from his effects; but whosoever will needs behold the naked essence of the Deity, will be blinded with the transcendent radiancy and splendour of his beams.—Whereas, according to Philo, the works of God, as manifesting the attributes of his power, goodness and wisdom, are called the back parts of the Deity; so are they here in this inscription called the peplum, the veil and exterior garment of it, or else God himself veiled. Wherefore it is plain, that the Deity here described cannot be the mere visible and corporeal world as senseless and inanimate, that being all outside and exposed to the view of sense, and having nothing hidden or veiled in it. But, thirdly, this will yet be more evident, if we do but take notice of the name of this God, which was here described, and to whom that temple was

νεῦμα, in  
Procl. upon  
Plato's Tim.  
p. 30. dedicated; and that was in the Egyptian language Neith, the same with Ἀθηνᾶ amongst the Greeks, and Minerva amongst the Latins; by which is meant wisdom or understanding: from whence it is plain, that the inscription is to be understood not of such a god as was merely senseless matter (which is the god of the Atheists) but a mind. Athenagoras\* tells us, that the Pagan theologers interpreted τὴν Ἀθηνᾶν, or Minerva, to be τὴν φρόνησιν διὰ πάντων διήκουσαν, wisdom or mind passing and diffusing itself through all things—than which there cannot be a better commentary on this inscription. Wherefore it may be here observed, that those Pagans, who acknowledged God to be a mind, and incorporeal being secrete from

\* Legat. pro Christianis, cap. xix. p. 86.

matter, did notwithstanding frequently consider him, not abstractly by himself alone, but concretely together with the result of his whole fecundity, or as displaying the world from himself, and diffusing himself through all things, and being in a manner all things. Accordingly, we learned before from Horus Apollo, that the Egyptians by God meant a spirit diffusing itself through the world, and intimately pervading all things; and that they supposed that nothing at all could consist without God. And after this manner, Jamblichus in his *Mysteries*\* interprets the meaning of this Egyptian inscription: for when he had declared that the Egyptians did, both in their doctrine and their priestly hierurgies, exhort men to ascend above matter, to an incorporeal Deity, the maker of all, he adds, *ὑφηγήσατο δὲ καὶ ταύτην τὴν ὁδὸν ὁ Ἑρμῆς, ἡρμῆνευσε δὲ Βίθις προφήτης Ἀμμων βασιλεῖ, ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐνρῶν ἀναγεγραμμένην, ἐν ἱερογλυφικοῖς γράμμασι κατὰ Σαῖν τὴν ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ, τότε τοῦ Θεοῦ ὄνομα παρέδωκε τὸ δῆκον δι' ὅλου τοῦ κόσμου.* Hermes also propounded this method, and Bythis, the prophet, interpreted the same to King Ammon, having found it written in hieroglyphic letters in the temple of Sais in Egypt; as he also there declared the name of that God, who extends or diffuses himself through the whole world.—And this was Neith, or Athena, that God thus described, “I am all that was, is, and shall be, and my peplum or veil no mortal could ever uncover.” Where we cannot but take notice also that whereas the Athena of the Greeks was derived from

*μία τῶν θεῶν ὡς  
λεον ἴφρος τῆς  
τε Σαῖως καὶ τῶν  
Ἀθηνῶν: Sais  
and Athens had  
one and the  
same tutelary  
god. Procl. in  
Tim. p. 30.  
Where also*

\* De Myster. Ægypt. sect. viii. cap. v. p. 164.



Theopompus affirmeth the Athenians to have been a colony of the Saites.

the Egyptian Neith, that she also was famous for her peplum too, as well as the Egyptian goddess. "Peplum (saith Servius) est proprie palla picta fœminea; Minervæ consecrata;" Peplum is properly a womanish pall or veil, embroidered all over, and consecrated to Minerva.—Which rite was performed at Athens, in the great Panathenæics, with much solemnity, when the statue of this goddess was also by those noble virgins of the city, who embroidered this veil, clothed all over therewith. From whence we may probably conclude, that the statue of the Egyptian Neith also, in the temple of Sais, had likewise, agreeably to its inscription, such a peplum or veil cast over it, as Minerva or Arthemis at Athens had; this hieroglyphically to signify, that the Deity was invisible and incomprehensible to mortals, but had veiled itself in this visible corporeal world, which is, as it were, the peplum, the exterior variegated or embroidered vestment of the Deity. To all which considerations may be added, in the last place,

In Timæ.  
p. 30.

what Proclus hath recorded, that there was something more belonging to this Egyptian inscription, than what is mentioned by Plutarch; namely these words: *καὶ ὃν ἔτεκεν κάρπον, ἥλιος ἐγένετο*, and the sun was the fruit or offspring, which I produced:—from whence it is manifest, that, according to the Egyptians, the sun was not the supreme Deity, and that the God here described, was, as Proclus also observeth, *δημιουργικὸς θεός*, a demiurgical Deity, the Creator of the whole world, and of the sun. Which supreme incorporeal Deity was, notwithstanding, in their theo-

logy said to be all things, because it diffused itself through all.

Wherefore, whereas Plutarch \* cites this passage out of Hecatæus, concerning the Egyptians, τὸν πρῶτον θεὸν τῷ Παντὶ τὸν αὐτὸν νομίζουσιν, that they take the first God, and the universe, for one and the same thing ;—the meaning of it cannot be, as if the first or supreme God of the Egyptians were the senseless corporeal world, Plutarch himself in the very next words declaring him to be ἀφανῆ καὶ κεκρυμμένον, invisible and hidden—whom therefore the Egyptians, as inviting him to manifest himself to them, called Hammon ; as he elsewhere affirmeth, That the Egyptians' first God, or supreme Deity, did see all things, himself being not seen.—But the forementioned passage must needs be understood thus, that according to the Egyptians, the first God, and τὸ Πᾶν, or the universe, were synonymous expressions, often used to signify the very same thing ; because the first supreme Deity is that, which contains all things, and diffuseth itself through all things. And this doctrine was from the Egyptians derived to the Greeks, Orpheus declaring, ἐν τι τὰ πάντα, that all things were one—and after him Parmenides and other philosophers, ἐν εἶναι τὸ πᾶν, that one was the universe or all—and that τὸ πᾶν was ἀκίνητον, that the universe was immoveable—they meaning nothing else hereby, but that the first supreme Deity was both one and all things, and immoveable. And thus much is plainly intimated by Aristotle in these words : εἰσὶ δὲ τινες οἱ περὶ τοῦ παντός ὡς ἂν μιᾶς οὐσῆς φύσεως ἀπεφῆσαντο.

Metaph. l. i.  
[cap. v. p. 270  
tom. iv. oper.]

There are some, who pronounced concerning the whole universè, as being but

\* *De Iside et Osir*: p. 354. tom. ii. oper.

one nature—that is, who called the supreme Deity τὸ πᾶν, or the universe—because that virtually contained all things in it.

Nevertheless τὸ πᾶν, or the universe, was frequently taken by the Pagan theologers also, as we have already intimated, in a more comprehensive sense, for the Deity, together with all the extent of its fecundity, God as displaying himself in the world; or, for God and the world both together; the latter being looked upon as nothing but an emanation or efflux from the former. And thus was the word taken by Empedocles in Plutarch,<sup>a</sup> when he affirmed, οὐ τὸ πᾶν εἶναι τὸν κόσμον, ἀλλ' ὀλίγον τι τοῦ παντός μέρος, that the world was not the universe, but only a small part thereof.—And according to this sense was the god Pan understood both by the Arcadians and other Greeks, not for the mere corporeal world as senseless and inanimate, nor as endued with a plastic nature only (though this was partly included in the notion of Pan also) but as proceeding from a rational and intellectual principle, diffusing itself through all; or for the whole system of things, God and the world together, as one Deity. For that the Arcadic Pan was not the corporeal world alone, but chiefly the intellectual ruler and governor of the same, appears from this testimony of Macrobius;<sup>b</sup> “Hunc Deum Arcades colunt, appellantes τὸν τῆς ὕλης κύριον, non sylvarum dominum, sed universæ substantiæ materialis dominatorem:” the Arcadians worship this god Pan (as their most ancient and honourable god) calling him the Lord of Hyle, that is, not the Lord of the woods,

<sup>a</sup> De Placit. Philos. lib. i. cap. v. p. 879.

<sup>b</sup> Saturnal, lib. i. cap. xxii. p. 307.

but the Lord or dominator over all material substance. And thus does Phornutus<sup>a</sup> likewise describe the Pan of the other Greeks, not as the mere corporeal world, senseless and inanimate; but as having a rational and intellectual principle for the head of it, and presiding over it; that is, for God and the world both together, as one system; the world being but the efflux and emanation of their Deity. The lower parts of Pan (saith he) were rough and goatish, because of the asperity of the earth; but his upper parts of a human form, because the ether being rational and intellectual, is the Hegemonic of the world:” adding hereunto, that “Pan was feigned to be lustful or lascivious, because of the multitude of spermatic reasons contained in the world, and the continual mixtures and generations of things; to be clothed with the skin of a libbard, because of the bespangled heavens, and the beautiful variety of things in the world; to live in a desert, because of the singularity of the world; and, lastly, to be a good demon, by reason of the *προσωπῶς αὐτοῦ λόγος*, that supreme mind, reason, and understanding, that governs all in it.” Pan therefore was not the mere corporeal world senseless and inanimate, but the Deity as displaying itself therein, and pervading all things. Agreeable to which, Diodorus Siculus<sup>b</sup> determines, that Πάν and Ζεὺς were but two several names for one and the same Deity (as it is well known, that the whole universe was frequently called by the Pagans Jupiter, as well as Pan). And Socrates

<sup>a</sup> Libro de Natura Deor. cap. xxvii. p. 203. inter Scriptor. Mythol. Tho. Gale editos.

<sup>b</sup> Lib. i. p. 7.

himself in Plato \* directs his prayer, in a most devout and serious manner, to this Pan; that is, not the corporeal world or senseless matter, but an intellectual principle ruling over all, or the supreme Deity diffusing itself through all; he therefore distinguishing him from the inferior gods: "ὦ φίλε Παν, καὶ ἄλλοι ὅσοι τῆδε θεοὶ, δοίητέ μοι καλῶ γενέσθαι τᾶνδοθεν· τᾶζωθεν δὲ ὅσα ἔχω, τοῖς ἐντός εἶναι μοι φίλια. O good (or gracious) Pan, and ye other gods, who preside over this place, grant that I may be beautiful or fair within, and that those external things, which I have, may be such as may best agree with a right internal disposition of mind; and that I may account him to be rich, that is wise and just.—The matter of which prayer, though it be excellent, yet it is paganically directed to Pan (that is, the supreme god) and the inferior gods both together. Thus we see, that as well according to the Greeks, as the Egyptians; the first or supreme God, and τὸ πᾶν, or the universe, were really the same thing.

And here we cannot but by the way take notice of that famous and remarkable story of Plutarch's in his *Defect of Oracles*, concerning demons lamenting the death of the great Pan.—In the time of Tiberius (saith he) certain persons embarking from Asia for Italy, towards the evening sailed by the Echinades, where being becalmed, they heard from thence a loud voice calling one Thamous, an Egyptian mariner amongst them, and after the third time commanding him, when he came to the Palodes, to declare, that the great Pan was dead. He with the advice of his company resolved, that if they had a quick

\* In *Phædro*, p. 358. oper.

gale, when they came to the Palodes, he would pass by silently; but if they should find themselves there becalmed, he would then perform what the voice had commanded: but when the ship arrived thither, there neither was any gale of wind nor agitation of water. Whereupon Thamous looking out of the hinder deck towards the Palodes, pronounced these words with a loud voice, ὁ μέγας Πάν τέθνηκε, the great Pan is dead—which he had no sooner done, but he was answered with a choir of many voices, making a great howling and lamentation, not without a certain mixture of admiration. Plutarch, who gives much credit to this relation, adds, how solicitous Tiberius the emperor was, first, concerning the truth thereof; and afterwards, when he had satisfied himself therein, concerning the interpretation; he making great inquiry amongst his learned men, who this Pan should be. But the only use, which that philosopher makes of this story, is this, to prove that demons, having bodies as well as men, (though of a different kind from them, and much more longeve) yet were notwithstanding mortal; he endeavouring from thence to solve that phenomenon of the defect of oracles, because the demons, who had formerly haunted those places, were now dead. But this being an idle fancy of Plutarch's, it is much more probably concluded by Christian writers, that this thing coming to pass in the reign of Tiberius, when our Saviour Christ was crucified, was no other than a lamentation of evil demons (not without a mixture of admiration) upon account of our Saviour's death happening at that very time; they not mourning out of love for him that was dead, but as sadly

presaging evil to themselves from thence, as that which would threaten danger to their kingdom of darkness, and a period to that tyranny and domination which they had so long exercised over mankind; according to such passages of scripture as these: "Now is the prince of this world judged; and having spoiled principalities and powers (by his death upon the cross) he triumphed over them in it." Now our Saviour Christ could not be called Pan, according to that notion of the word, as taken for nothing but the corporeal world devoid of all manner of life, or else as endued only with a plastic nature; but this appellation might very well agree to him, as Pan was taken for the λόγος προεστώς τοῦ κόσμου, that reason and understanding, by which all things were made, and by which they are all governed, or for φρόνησις διὰ πάντων δεικνύουσα, that Divine wisdom, which diffuseth itself through all things.—Moreover, Pan being used not so much for the naked and abstract Deity, as the Deity as it were embodied in this visible corporeal world, might therefore the better signify God manifested in the flesh, and clothed with a particular human body (in which respect alone he was capable of dying). Neither indeed was there any other name, in all the theology of the Pagans, that could so well besit our Saviour Christ as this.

We have now made it manifest, that according to the ancient Egyptian theology, (from whence the Greekish and European were derived) there was one intellectual Deity, one mind or wisdom, which as it did produce all things from itself, so doth περιέχειν τὸ ὅλον, contain and comprehend the whole—and is itself in a manner all things. We

think fit in the next place to observe, how this point of the old Egyptian theology, viz. God's being all things, is every where insisted upon throughout the Hermaic or Trismegistic writings: We shall begin with the Asclepian Dialogue or the *τελειος λόγος*, translated into Latin by Apuleius; in the entrance of which, the writer having declared, "*Omnia unius esse, et unum esse omnia,*" that all things were of one, and that one was all things, he afterwards adds this explication thereof: "*Nonne hoc dixi, Omnia unum esse, et unum omnia, utpote quia in creatore fuerint omnia, antequam creasset omnia? Nec immerito unus est dictus omnia, cuius membra sunt omnia. Hujus itaque, qui est unus omnia, vel ipse est Creator omnium, in tota hac disputatione curato meminisse.*" Have we not already declared, that all things are one, and one all things? forasmuch as all things existed in the Creator, before they were made; neither is he improperly said to be all things, whose members all things are. Be thou therefore mindful in this whole disputation of him, who is one and all things, or was the creator of all.—And thus afterwards does he declare, that all created things were in the Deity before they were made; "*Idcirco non erant quando nata non erant, sed in eo jam tunc erant unde nasci haberunt;*" they did not properly then exist before they were made, and yet at that very time were they in him, from whom they were afterwards produced. Again, he writes thus concerning God: "*Non spero totius majestatis effectorem, omnium rerum patrem vel dominum, uno posse quamvis e multis composito nomine nuncupari. Hunc voca potius omni nomine, siquidem sit unus et omnia;*



ut necesse sit aut omnia ipsius nomine, aut ipsum omnium nomine nuncupari. Hic ergo solus omnia," &c. I cannot hope sufficiently to express the author of majesty, and the father and lord of all things, by any one name, though compounded of never so many names. Call him therefore by every name, forasmuch as he is one and all things; so that of necessity, either all things must be called by his name, or he by the names of all things.—And when he had spoken of the

P. 612. Colv.

mutability of created things, he adds, "Solus deus ipse in se, et a se, et circum se, totus est plenus atque perfectus, isque sua firma stabilitas est; nec alicujus impulsu, nec loco moveri potest, cum in eo sint omnia, et in omnibus ipse est solus." God alone, in himself, and from himself, and about himself, is altogether perfect; and himself is his own stability. Neither can he be moved or changed, by the impulse of any thing, since all things are in him, and he alone is in all things.—Lastly, to omit other places, "Hic

P. 617.

sensibilis mundus receptaculum est omnium sensibilium specierum, qualitatum, vel corporum; quæ omnia sine Deo vegetari non possunt: Omnia enim Deus, et a Deo omnia, et sine hoc, nec fuit aliquid, nec est, nec erit; omnia enim ab eo, et in ipso, et per ipsum—Si totum animadvertes, vera ratione perdisces, mundum ipsum sensibilem, et quæ in eo sunt omnia, a superiore illo mundo, quasi vestimento, esse connecta." This sensible world is the receptacle of all forms, qualities, and bodies, all which cannot be vegetated and quickened without God: for God is all things, and all things are from God, and all things the effect of his will; and without

God there neither was any thing, nor is nor shall be; but all things are from him, and in him, and by him—and if you will consider things after a right manner, you shall learn, that this sensible world, and all the things therein, are covered all over with that superior world (or Deity) as it were with a garment.—As for the other Trisemigistic books of Ficinus's edition, the third of them, called *ἱεραὶς λόγος*, is thus concluded; τὸ γὰρ θεῖον ἢ πᾶσα κοσμικὴ σύγκρασις, φύσει ἀναθεωρουμένη· ἐν γὰρ τῷ θεῷ καὶ ἡ φύσις συγκαθέστηκεν· The Divinity is the whole mundane compages, or constitution; for nature is also placed in the Deity.—In the fifth book, written upon this argument, *ὅτι ἀφανὴς θεὸς φανερώτατός ἐστι*, that the invisible God is most manifest—we read thus: οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐστὶν ἐν παντὶ ἐκείνῳ, ὃ οὐκ ἐστὶν αὐτός, ἐστὶν αὐτός καὶ τὰ ὄντα καὶ μὴ ὄντα: τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὄντα αὐτὸς ἐφάνερωσε· τὰ δὲ μὴ ὄντα ἔχει ἐν ἑαυτῷ· For there is nothing in the whole world, which he is not; he is both the things that are, and the things that are not; for the things that are, he hath manifested; but the things that are not, he contains within himself.—And again, οὗτος ὁ ἀσώματος καὶ ὁ πολυσώματος· μᾶλλον δὲ παντὸς σώματος οὐδὲν ἐστὶν, ὃ οὗτος οὐκ ἐστὶ· πάντα γὰρ ἢ ἐστὶ, καὶ οὗτός ἐστι· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο αὐτὸς ὀνόματα ἔχει πάντα, ὅτι ἑνὸς ἐστὶ πατρός· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ὄνομα οὐκ ἔχει, ὅτι πάντων ἐστὶ πατήρ· He is both incorporeal and omnicorporeal, for there is nothing of any body, which he is not; he is all things that are, and therefore he hath all names, because all things are from one father; and therefore he hath no name, because he is the Father of all things.—And in the close of the same book: ὑπὲρ τίνος σε ὑμνήσω, ὑπὲρ ὧν ἐποίησας, ἢ ὑπὲρ ὧν οὐκ ἐποίησας; ὑπὲρ ὧν ἐφάνερωσας, ἢ ὑπὲρ ὧν ἐκρυψας; διὰ τί

δε και ὑμνήσω σε; ὡς ἱμαντοῦ ὄν; ὡς ἔχων τι ἴδιον; ὡς ἄλλος ὢν; σὺ εἰ γὰρ ὁ εἶν ὦ· σὺ εἰ δὲ ποιῶ· σὺ εἰ δὲ ἂν λέγω· σὺ γὰρ πάντα εἰ, τὸ ἄλλο οὐδὲν ἐστίν· ὁ μὴ εἰ· σὺ πάν· τὸ γενόμενον, σὺ τὸ μὴ γενόμενον· For what shall I praise thee? for those things which thou hast made, or for those things which thou hast not made? for those things which thou hast manifested, or for those things which thou hast hidden and concealed within thyself? And for what cause shall I praise thee? because I am my own, as having something proper, and distinct from thee? thou art whatsoever I am; thou art whatsoever I do, or say, for thou art all things, and there is nothing which thou art not; thou art that which is made, and thou art that which is unmade.—Where it is observable, that before things were made, God is said κρύπτειν, to hide them within himself:—but when they are made, φανεροῦν, to manifest and reveal them from himself.—Book the eighth, νόησον ὅτι ὁ μὲν κόσμος ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ ἐν τῷ θεῷ, ἀρχὴ δὲ καὶ περιοχὴ καὶ σύστασις πάντων ὁ θεός· Understand that the whole world is from God, and in God; for God is the beginning, comprehension and constitution of all things.—Book the ninth, μᾶλλον δὲ λέγω ὅτι οὐκ αὐτὸς αὐτὰ ἔχει, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἀποφαίνομαι, αὐτὸς ἅπαντὰ ἐστίν· οὐκ ἔξωθεν αὐτὰ προσλαμβάνων, ἔξω δὲ ἐπιδιδούς· I would not say, that God hath all things, but rather declare the truth, and say that he is all things; not as receiving them from without, but as sending them forth from himself.—Again, afterward in the same book, καὶ οὐκ ἔσται πότε χρόνος, ὅτε ἀπολειφθήσεται τι τῶν ὄντων· ὅταν δὲ λέγω τῶν ὄντων, λέγω τοῦ θεοῦ· τὰ γὰρ ὄντα ὁ θεός ἔχει, καὶ οὔτε αὐτοῦ οὐδὲν ἔκτος, οὔτε αὐτὸς οὐδενός· There shall never be a time, when any thing that is shall cease to be; for

when I say any thing that is, I say any thing of God; for God hath all things in him, and there is neither any thing without God, nor God without any thing.—Book the tenth, *τί γάρ ἐστι θεός καὶ πατήρ, καὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἢ τὸ τῶν πάντων εἶναι οὐκ ἐπιδυντων ἀλλὰ ὑπάρξει αὐτῇ τῶν ὄντων*; What is God, but the very being of all things that yet are not, and the subsistence of things that are?—And again, *ὁ θεός, καὶ πατήρ καὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν, τῷ εἶναι τὰ πάντα*, God is both the father and good, because he is all things.—Book the eleventh, *αὐτουργός γὰρ ὦν ἀεὶ ἐστίν ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ αὐτός ὦν ὁ ποιεῖ· εἰ γὰρ χωρισθεῖν αὐτοῦ, πάντα μὲν συμπεσεῖσθαι, πάντα δὲ τεθνήξεσθαι ἀνάγκη*. God acting immediately from himself is always in his own work, himself being that which he makes; for if that were never so little separated from him, all would of necessity fall to nothing and die.—Again, *πάντᾳ ἐστίν ἐν τῷ θεῷ, οὐχ ὡς ἐν τόπῳ κείμενα*, all things are in God, but not as lying in a place.—And further, since our own soul can by cogitation and fancy become what it will, and where it will, any thing, or in any place, *τοῦτον οὖν τὸν τρόπον νόησόν τὸν θεόν, ὡσπερ νοήματα πάντα ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἔχειν, τὸν κόσμον αὐτὸν ἔλον*. You may consider God in the same manner, as containing the whole world within himself, as his own conceptions and cogitations.—And in the close of that chapter, that, which is also thence cited by St. Cyril, <sup>a</sup> is to the same purpose; *ἀόρατος ὁ θεός; εὐφήμησον καὶ τίς αὐτοῦ φανερώτερος· δι' αὐτὸ τοῦτο πάντα ἐποίησεν, ἵνα διὰ πάντων αὐτὸν βλέπῃς· τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ ἀγαθὸν τοῦ θεοῦ· τοῦτο δὲ αὐτοῦ ἀρετὴ, τὸ αὐτὸν φαίνεσθαι διὰ πάντων*. Is God invisible? speak worthily of him, for who is more manifest than he? for this very reason did he make all

<sup>a</sup> Advers. Julian. lib. ii. p. 52. edit. Spanhem.

things, that thou mightest see him through all things. The mind is seen in thinking, but God in working or making.—Book the twelfth, ἤκουσα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ δαίμονος λέγοντος (ἐκεῖνος γὰρ μόνος, ὃ τέκνον, ἀληθῶς ὡς πρωτόγονος θεός, τὰ πάντα κατιδὼν, θεῖους λόγους ἐφθέγγετο) ἤκουσα γοῦν αὐτοῦ ποτε λέγοντος, ὅτι ἓν ἐστὶ τὰ πάντα. I have heard the good demon (for he alone, as the first-begotten God, beholding all things, spake divine words); I have heard him sometimes saying, that one is all things.—Again, in the same chapter, ὁ δὲ σύμπας κόσμος οὗτος ἠνωμένος ἐκείνῳ, καὶ συσώζων τὴν τάξιν, καὶ βούλησιν τοῦ πατρὸς, πλήρωμά ἐστι τῆς ζωῆς· καὶ οὐδέν ἐστιν ἐν τούτῳ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ αἰῶνος, οὔτε τοῦ παντὸς, οὔτε τῶν κατὰ μέρος, ὃ οὐχὶ ζῆ, νεκρὸν γὰρ οὐδὲ ἓν, οὔτε γέγονεν, οὔτε ἐστίν, οὔτε ἔσται ἐν κόσμῳ. This whole world is intimately united to him, and observing the order and will of its father, hath the fulness of life in it; and there is nothing in it through eternity (neither whole nor part) which does not live; for there neither is, nor hath been, nor shall be, any thing dead in the world.—The meaning is, that all things vitally depend upon the Deity, who is said in Scripture to quicken and enliven all things· τοῦτό ἐστιν ὁ θεός, τὸ πᾶν ἐν δὲ τῷ παντί, οὐδέν ἐστιν ὃ μὴ ἔστιν· ὅθεν οὔτε μέγεθος, οὔτε τόπος, οὔτε ποιότης, οὔτε σχῆμα, οὔτε χρόνος περὶ τὸν θεόν ἐστὶ πᾶν γὰρ ἐστὶ, τὸ δὲ πᾶν διὰ πάντων καὶ περὶ πάντα. This is God, the universe or all. And in this universe there is nothing which he is not: wherefore there is neither magnitude, nor place, nor quality, nor figure, nor time about God, for he is all or the whole (but those things belong to parts).—And the Arcane Cantion, though that thirteenth book, to which it is subjoined, be supposititious, yet harps much upon this point

of the Egyptian theology, that God is all: *ὕμναι μὲλλω τὸν τῆς κτίσεως κύριον, καὶ τὸ πᾶν, καὶ τὸ ἐν.* I am about to praise the Lord of the creation, the all and the one.—And again, All the powers that are in me praise the one and the all.—Book the fifteenth, *ἐάν τις ἐπιχειρήσῃ τὸ πᾶν καὶ ἐν χωρίσαι, τὸ πᾶν τοῦ ἐνὸς λύσας, ἀπολέσει τὸ πᾶν, πάντα γὰρ ἐν εἶναι δεῖ.* If any one go about to separate the all from the one, he will destroy the all, or the universe, for all ought to be one.—Book the sixteenth, *ἄρξομαι τοῦ λόγου ἔνθεν, τὸν θεὸν ἐπικαλεσάμενος, τὸν τῶν ὄλων δεσπότην, καὶ ποιητὴν, καὶ πατέρα, καὶ περίβολον, καὶ πάντα ὄντα τὸν ἐνᾶ, καὶ ἐνᾶ ὄντα τὰ πάντα· τὸ πάντων γὰρ τὸ πλήρωμα ἐν ἐστί, καὶ ἐν ἐνί.* I will begin with a prayer to him, who is the Lord and maker and father and bound of all things; and who being all things, is one; and being one, is all things; for the fulness of all things, is one and in one.—And again, *μόρια τοῦ Θεοῦ πάντα ἐστίν· εἰ δὲ πάντα μόρια, πάντα ἄρα ὁ Θεός· πάντα οὖν ποίων, ἐαυτὸν ποιεῖ.* All things are parts of God, but if all things be parts of God, then God is all things; wherefore he making all things, doth, as it were, make himself.—

Now, by all this we see, how well these Trismegistic books agree with that ancient Egyptian inscription in the temple of Sais, That God is all that was, is, and shall be.—Wherefore the Egyptian theology thus undoubtedly asserting one God that was all things; it is altogether impossible, that it should acknowledge a multitude of self-existent and independent deities.

Hitherto we have taken notice of two several Egyptian names for one and the same supreme Deity; Hammon and Neith: but we shall find, that, besides these, the supreme God was some-

times worshipped by the Egyptians under other names and notions also; as of Isis, Osiris, and Serapis. For, first, though Isis have been taken by some for the moon, by others for the whole earth, by others for Ceres or corn, by others for the land of Egypt (which things, in what sense they were deified by the Egyptians, will be elsewhere declared), yet was she undoubtedly taken also sometimes for an universal and all-comprehending Numen. For Plutarch<sup>a</sup> affirms, that Isis and Neith were really one and the same god among the Egyptians, and therefore the temple of Neith or Minerva at Sais, where the forementioned inscription was found, is called by him the temple of Isis; so that Isis, as well as Neith or Minerva among the Egyptians, was there described, as that God, who is all that was, is, and shall be, and whose veil no mortal hath ever uncovered; that is, not a particular God, but an universal and all-comprehending Numen. And this may be yet further confirmed from that ancient inscription and dedication to the goddess Isis, still extant at Capua:

## TIBI.

VNA. QVÆ.

ES. OMNIA.

DEA. ISIS.

Where the goddess Isis is plainly declared to be *ἑν καὶ πάντα*, one and all things,—that is, an universal and all-comprehending Deity. And with this

agreeth also that oration of this goddess Isis in Apuleius; “En adsum tuis commota, Luci, precibus, rerum natura parens, elementorum omnium domina, seculorum

Metam. l. xii.  
[Lib. xi. p.  
243.]

<sup>a</sup> De Iside et Osir. p. 354, tom. ii. oper.

progenies initialis : summa numinum, regina marium, prima cœlitum, deorum dearumque facies uniformis; quæ cœli luminosa culmina, maris salubria flamina, inferorum deplorata silentia, nubibus meis dispenso. Cujus numen unicum multiformi specie, ritu vario, nomine multijugo totus veneratur orbis." Behold, here am I, moved by thy prayers, Lucius, that nature, which was the parent of things; the mistress of all the elements; the beginning and original of ages; the sum of all the divine powers; the queen of the seas; the first of the celestial inhabitants; the uniform face of gods and goddesses; which with my becks dispense the luminous heights of the heavens, the wholesome blasts of the sea, and the deplorable silences of hell; whose only divine power the whole world worships and adores, in a multiform manner, and under different rites and names.—From which words it is plain, that this goddess Isis was not the mere animated moon (which was rather a symbol of her) but that she was an universal Deity, comprehensive of the whole nature of things; the one supreme God, worshipped by the Pagans under several names, and with different rites. And this is the plain meaning of those last words, *Numen unicum*, &c. that the whole world worshippeth one and the same supreme God, in a multiform manner, with various rites and under many different names.—For, besides the several names of the other Pagans there mentioned, the Egyptians worshipped it under the names of Hammon, Neith, and others that shall be afterwards declared. And thus was Isis again worshipped and invoked, as the *unicum numen*, or only divine power, by Apuleius himself, in these



following words: "Tu sancta humani generis sospitatrix perpetua, dulcem matris affectionem miseris tribuis, fatorum inextricabiliter contorta retractas litia, fortunæ tempestates mitigas, et stellarum noxios meatus cohibes: Te superi colunt, observant inferi. Tu rotas orbem, lumnas solem, regis mundum, calcas Tartarum. Tibi respondent sydera, gaudent numina, serviunt elementa: tuo nutu spirant flamina," &c. Thou holy and perpetual saviour of mankind, that art always bountiful in cherishing mortals, and dost manifest the dear affections of a mother to them in their calamities, thou extricatest the involved threads of fate, mitigatest the tempests of fortune, and restrainest the noxious influences of the stars; the celestial gods worship thee, the infernal powers obey thee; thou rollest round the heavens, enlightenest the sun, governest the world, treadest upon Tartarus, or hell; the stars obey thee, the elements serve thee, at thy beck the winds blow, &c.—Where Isis is plainly supposed to be an universal Numen and supreme monarch of the world. Neither may this hinder, that she was called a goddess, as Neith also was; these Pagans making their deities to be indifferently of either sex, male or female. But much more was Osiris taken for the supreme Deity, whose name was sometimes said to have signified in the Egyptian language, πολυόφθαλμος, that which had many eyes—sometimes κράτος ενεργούν και αγαθοποιόν, an active and beneficent force—(and whose hieroglyphic was an eye and a sceptre); the former signifying providence and wisdom, and the latter power and ma-

\* Lib. xi. p. 254.

jesty (as Plutarch tells us),<sup>a</sup> who also is thus described in Apuleius: “Deus deorum magnorum potior, et majorum summus, et summorum maximus, et maximorum regnator, Osiris:” That God who is the chiefest of the greater gods, and the greatest of the chiefest, and which reigneth over the greatest.—Wherefore the same Apuleius<sup>b</sup> also tells us, that Isis and Osiris were really one and the same supreme Numen, though considered under different notions, and worshipped with different rites, in these words; <sup>c</sup> “Quanquam connexa, imo vero unica, ratio Numinis, religionisque esset, tamen teletæ discrimen esse maximum:” Though Isis and Osiris be really one and the same Diviue power, yet are their rites and ceremonies very different.—The proper notion of Osiris being thus declared by Plutarch,<sup>d</sup> τὸ πρῶτον καὶ κυριώτατον πάντων, ὃ ἴαγαθῶ ταύτόν ἐστι, that first and highest of all beings, which is the same with good.—Agreeably whereunto, Jamblichus<sup>e</sup> affirmeth, ἀγαθῶν ποιητικὸς ὢν Ὀσίρις κέκληται, that God, as the cause of all good, is called Osiris by the Egyptians.—Lastly, as for Serapis, though Origen<sup>f</sup> tells us, that this was a new upstart deity, set up by Ptolemy in Alexandria, yet this god in his oracle<sup>g</sup> to Nicocrion, the king of Cyprus, declares himself also to be an universal Numen, comprehending the whole world, in these words: οὐράνιος κόσμος κεφαλῆ, &c. to this sense: The starry

<sup>a</sup> De Iside et Osiride, p. 354, et p. 371. tom. ii. oper.

<sup>b</sup> Metamorphos. lib. xi. p. 258.

<sup>c</sup> Ibid. p. 256.

<sup>d</sup> De Iside et Osir. p. 372.

<sup>e</sup> De Myster. Ægypt. sect. viii. cap. iii. p. 159.

<sup>f</sup> Advers. Cels. lib. v. p. 257. ed. Cantabr.

<sup>g</sup> Apud Macrobius Saturnal. lib. i. cap. xx. p. 299.

heaven is my head, the sea my belly, my ears are in the ether, and the bright light of the sun is my clear piercing eye." And doubtless he was worshipped by many under this notion. For as Philarchus<sup>a</sup> wrote thus concerning him, *Σαράτις ἄνομια τοῦ τὸ πᾶν κοσμοῦντος*, That Serapis was the name of that God, which orders and governs the whole world;—so doth Plutarch<sup>b</sup> himself conclude, that Osiris and Serapis were *ἄμφω ἐνὸς θεοῦ καὶ μιᾶς δυνάμεως*, both of them names of one God, and the same Divine power.—Accordingly whereunto Diodorus Siculus<sup>c</sup> determines, that these three, Hammon, Osiris, and Serapis, were but different names for one and the same Deity, or supreme God. Notwithstanding which, Porphyrius,<sup>d</sup> it seems, had a very ill conceit of that power which manifested itself in the temple of this god Serapis, above all the other Pagan gods, he suspecting it to be no other than the very prince of evil demons or devils: *Τοὺς δὲ πονηροὺς δαίμονας οὐκ εἰκὴν ὑπὸ τοῦ Σαράτιν ὑποπτεύομεν· οὐδ' ἐκ τῶν συμβολῶν μόνον ἀναπεισθέντες, &c.* We do not vainly or without ground suspect and conjecture, that the evil demons are under Serapis as their prince and head: this appearing (saith he) not only from those rites of appeasement used in the worship of this god, but also from the symbol of him, which was a three-headed dog, signifying that evil demon which ruleth in those three elements, water, earth, and air.—Neither indeed can it be doubted, but that it was an evil demon or devil, that delivered oracles in this

<sup>a</sup> De Iside et Osir. p. 362.

<sup>b</sup> Ibid. p. 361, 362.

<sup>c</sup> Vide lib. i. cap. xxv. p. 21.

<sup>d</sup> Libro de Philosophia et Oraculis apud Euseb. Præpar. Evang. lib. iv. cap. xxiii. p. 175.

temple of Serapis as well as elsewhere among the Pagans, however he affected to be worshipped as the supreme God.

Besides all this, Eusebius himself from Porphyrius informs us, that the Egyptians acknowledged one intellectual Demiurgus, or maker of the world, under the name of Eneph, whom they worshipped in a statue of human form, and a blackish sky-coloured complexion; holding in his hand a girdle and a sceptre, and wearing upon his head a princely plume, and thrusting forth an egg out of his mouth. The reason of which hieroglyphic is thus given, *ὅτι λόγος δυσεύρετος*

*καὶ κεκρυμμένος, καὶ οὐ φανὸς, καὶ ὅτι ζωοποιός, καὶ ὅτι βασιλεύς, καὶ ὅτι νοερῶς κινεῖται.* Præp. l. iii. c. xi. p. 115. διὰ τὴν τοῦ πτεροῦ φύσιν ἐν τῇ κεφαλῇ κείται

Because that wisdom and reason, by which the world was made, is not easy to be found out, but hidden and obscure. And because this is the fountain of life and king of all things; and because it is intellectually moved, signified by the feathers upon his head. Moreover, by the egg thrust out of the mouth of this God, was meant the world, created by the eternal λόγος, and from this Eneph was said to be generated or produced another God, whom the Egyptians call Phtha, and the Greeks Vulcan—of which Phtha more afterward. That the Egyptians were the most eminent assertors of the cosmogonia, or temporary beginning of the world, hath been already declared; for which cause the scholiast upon Ptolemy thus perstringeth them, *περιττῶς εἰώθασι λέγειν γένεσιν Αἰγύπτιοι κόσμου,* the Egyptians were wont to talk perpetually of the genesis or creation of the world.—And Ascle-

Scal. Emend.  
Temp. l. v. de  
condit. mundi.

pius, an ancient Egyptian writer, in his Myriogenesis, affirms, that according to the Egyptian tradition, the sun was made in Libra. But, that the Egyptians did not suppose the world to have been made by chance, as Epicurus and other atheistical philosophers did, but by an intellectual Demiurgus called by them Cneph, is evident from this testimony of Porphyrius. Which Cneph was looked upon by them as an unmade and eternal Deity, and for this very cause the inhabitants of Thebais refused to wor-

ship any other god besides him, as Plutarch informs us in these words: *εις δὲ τὰς τροφὰς τῶν τιμωμένων ζώων, τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους συντεταγμένα τελεῖν, μόνους δὲ μὴ δίδόναι τοὺς Θεβαῖδας κατοικοῦντας, ὡς θνητὸν θεὸν οὐδένα νομίζοντες, ἀλλὰ ὄντα καλοῦσιν αὐτοὶ Κνήφ, ἀγέννητον ὄντα καὶ ἀθάνατον.* Whilst the other Egyptians paid their proportion of tax imposed upon them, for the nourishment of those sacred animals, worshipped by them, the inhabitants of Thebais only refused, because they would acknowledge no mortal god, and worshipped him only, whom they call Cneph, an unmade and eternal Deity.—

Having now made it undeniably manifest, that the Egyptians had an acknowledgment amongst them of one supreme universal and unmade Deity, we shall conclude this whole discourse with the two following observations: First, That a great part of the Egyptian Polytheism was really nothing else but the worshipping of one and the same supreme God, under many different names and notions, as of Hammon, Neith, Isis, Osiris, Serapis, Cneph, to which may be added Phtha, and those

other names in Jamblichus, of Eicton and Emeph. And that the Pagans universally over the whole world did the like, was affirmed also by Apuleius, in that forecited passage of his: "Numen unicum, multiformi specie, ritu vario, nomine multijugo, totus veneratur orbis," the whole world worshippeth one only supreme Numen in a multiform manner, under different names, and with different rites.—Which different names for one and the same supreme God might therefore be mistaken by some of the sottish vulgar amongst the Pagans, as well as they have been by learned men of these later times, for so many distinct, unmade, and self-existent deities.

Nevertheless, here may well be a question started, whether amongst those several Egyptian names of God, some might not signify distinct Divine hypostases subordinate; and particularly, whether there were not some footsteps of a trinity to be found in the old Egyptian theology? For since Orpheus, Pythagoras, and Plato, who all of them asserted a trinity of Divine hypostases, unquestionably derived much of their doctrine from the Egyptians, it may reasonably be suspected, that these Egyptians did the like before them. And indeed Athanasius Kircherus makes no doubt at all hereof, but tells us that, in the Pamphylian obelisk, that first hieroglyphic of a winged globe, with a serpent coming out of it, was the Egyptian hieroglyphic of a triform Deity, or trinity of Divine hypostases; he confirming the same, from the testimony of Abenephius, an Arabian writer, and a Chaldaic fragment imputed to Sanchoniathon; the globe being said to signify the first incomprehensible Deity, without beginning or end,

self-existent; the serpent the Divine wisdom and creative virtue; and lastly, the wings that active spirit, that cherisheth, quickeneth, and enliveneth all things. How far credit is to be given to this, we leave others to judge; but the clearest footsteps that we can find any where of an Egyptian trinity is in Jamblichus's book, written concerning their mysteries; which whole place therefore is worth the setting down: Κατ' ἄλλῃ δὲ τάξει προστάττει [Ἑρμῆς] θεὸν τὸν Ἥμηφ, τῶν ἐπουρανίων θεῶν ἀγοόμενον, ὃν φησὶν νοῦν εἶναι αὐτὸν ἑαυτὸν νοοῦντα, καὶ τὰς νοήσεις εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἐπιστρέφοντα. Τούτου δὲ ἐν ἡμέρας; καὶ ὁ φησὶ τὸ πρῶτον μάγευμα, προτάττει, ὃν καὶ Εἰκτὼν ἐπωνομάζει, ἐν ᾧ τὸ πρῶτον ἐστὶ νοοῦν καὶ τὸ πρῶτον νοητῶν, ὃ δὴ καὶ διὰ σιγῆς μόνης θεραπεύεται. Ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖσις——— ἡ δημιουργικὸς νοῦς καὶ τῆς ἀληθείας προστάτης, καὶ σοφία ἐρχόμενος μὲν εἰς γένεσιν, καὶ τὴν ἀφανῆ τῶν κεκρυμμένων λόγων δύναμιν εἰς φῶς ἄγων, Ἀμῶν κατὰ τὴν τῶν Αἰγυπτίων γλώσσαν λέγεται, συντελών δὲ ἀψευδῶς ἕκαστα καὶ τεχνικῶς μετ' ἀληθείας Θεῶν, Ἕλληνας δὲ εἰς Ἡφαιστον μεταλαμβάνουσι τὸν Θεῶν, τῶν πενυκῶν μόνον προσβάλλοντες; ἀγαθῶν δὲ ποιητικὸς ὢν Ὁμοίως κέκληται, καὶ ἄλλας δι' ἄλλας δυνάμεις τε καὶ ἐνεργείας ἐπωνυμίας ἔχει. According to another order or method, Hermes

places the god Emeph, \* as the prince and ruler over all the celestial gods, whom he affirmeth to be a mind understanding himself, and converting his cogitations or intel-

\* Or Cneph. lections into himself. Before which Emeph, \* he placeth one indivisible, whom he calleth Eicton, in which is the first intelligible, and which is worshipped only by silence. After which two, Eicton and

\* Or Cneph. Emeph, \* the demiurgic mind and president of truth, as with wisdom it proceedeth to generations, and bringeth forth the hidden powers

of the occult reasons into light, is called in the Egyptian language Ammon; as it artificially affects all things with truth, Phtha (which Phtha, the Greeks, attending only to the artificialness thereof, call Hephestus or Vulcan); as it is productive of good, Osiris, besides other names that it hath, according to its other powers and energies.—In which passage of Jamblichus\* we have plainly three Divine hypostases, or universal principles subordinate, according to the Hermaic theology; first, an indivisible unity called Eicton; secondly, a perfect mind, converting its intellections into itself, called Emeph or Hemphtha; and thirdly, the immediate principle of generation, called by several names, according to its several powers, as Phtha, Ammon, Osiris, and the like: so that these three names with others, according to Jamblichus, did in the Egyptian theology signify, one and the same third Divine hypostasis. How well these three Divine hypostases of the Egyptians agree with the Pythagoric or Platonic trinity, of, first,  $\tau\acute{o}$   $\acute{\epsilon}\nu$  or  $\tau\acute{\alpha}$ - $\gamma\alpha\theta\acute{o}\nu$ , unity and goodness itself—secondly,  $\nu\acute{o}\acute{\upsilon}\varsigma$ , mind—and thirdly,  $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ , soul—I need not here declare. Only we shall call to mind what hath been already intimated, that that reason or wisdom, which was the Demiurgus of the world, and is properly the second of the fore-mentioned hypostases, was called also among the Egyptians, by another name, Cnepth; from whom was said to have been produced or begotten the god Phtha, the third hypostasis of the Egyptian trinity; so that Cnepth and Emeph are all one. Wherefore we have here plainly an Eyp-

\* De Myster. Egypt. sect. viii. cap. lii. p. 158, 159.



tian trinity of Divine hypostases subordinate, Eicton, Emeph (or Cneph), and Phtha. We know not what to add more to this of Jamblichus concerning an Egyptian trinity, unless we should insist upon those passages, which have been cited by some of the fathers to this purpose out of Hermaic or Trismegistic books, whereof there was one before set down out of St. Cyril; or unless we should again call to mind that citation out of Damascius, \* *μία τῶν ὄλων ἀρχὴ σκοτός ἀγνωστον ὑμνουμένη καὶ τοῦτο τρεῖς ἀναφωνούμενον οὕτως*, that, according to the Egyptians, there is one principle of all things: praised under the name of the unknown darkness, and this thrice repeated.—Agreeably to which, Augustinus Steuchus produces another passage out of the same philosophic writer; that the Egyptians made *πρώτην ἀρχὴν σκοτός ὑπὲρ πᾶσαν νόησιν, σκοτός ἀγνωστον, τρεῖς τοῦτο ἐπιφημιζόντες*, the first principle of all to be darkness above all knowledge and understanding (or unknown darkness), they thrice repeating the same.—Which the forementioned Steuchus takes to be a clear acknowledgment of a trinity of Divine hypostases in the Egyptian theology.

Our second observation is this; That the Egyptian theology as well as the Orphic (which was derived from it) asserting one incorporeal Deity, that is, all things; as it is evident, that it could not admit a multitude of self-existent and independent deities, so did the seeming Polytheism of these Egyptians proceed also in great measure from this principle of theirs not rightly understood; they being led thereby, in a certain sense, *θεοποιεῖν*,

\* Vide Wolfii Anædot. Græca, p. 260.

to personate and deify the several parts of the world, and things of nature, bestowing the names of gods and goddesses upon them. Not that they therefore worshipped the inanimate parts of the world as such, much less things not substantial, but mere accidents, for so many real, distinct, personal deities; but because, conceiving that God, who was all things, ought to be worshipped in all things (such especially as were most beneficial to mankind), they did, according to that Asclepian and Trismegistic doctrine beforementioned, call God by the name of every thing, or every thing by the name of God. And that the wiser of them very well understood, that it was really one and the same simple Deity, that was thus worshipped amongst them by piecemeal, in the several parts of the world, and things of nature, and under different names and notions, with different ceremonies, is thus declared by *De Is. et Os.* Plutarch; Ἑλληνικὸν ἡ Ἴσις ἐστὶ, καὶ ὁ Τυφῶν <sup>351.</sup>

πολέμιος τῇ θεῷ, καὶ δι' ἄγνοιαν καὶ ἀπάτην τετυφωμένος, καὶ διασπῶν καὶ ἀφανίζων τὸν ἱερὸν λόγον, ὃν ἡ θεὸς συνάγει καὶ συντίθησι, καὶ παραδίδωσι τοῖς τελουμένοις θεώσεως. Isis is a Greek word, which signifies knowledge; and Typhon is the enemy to this goddess; who being puffed up by ignorance and error, doth distract and disceip the holy doctrine (of the simple Deity), which Isis collects together again, and makes up into one, and thus delivers it to those who are initiated into her sacred mysteries, in order to deification.—In which words Plutarch intimates, that the Egyptian fable of Osiris being mangled and cut in pieces by Typhon, did allegorically signify the disceip and distraction of the simple Deity, by reason of the weakness

and ignorance of vulgar minds (not able to comprehend it altogether at once), into several names and partial notions, which yet true knowledge and understanding, that is, Isis, makes up whole again, and unites into one.

XIX. It is well known, that the poets, though they were the prophets of the Pagans, and, pretending to a kind of Divine inspiration, did otherwise embue the minds of the vulgar with a certain sense of religion, and the notions of mortality, yet these notwithstanding were the grand depravers and adulterators of the Pagan theology. For this they were guilty of upon several accounts. As, first, their attributing to the gods, in their fables concerning them, all manner of human imperfections, passions, and vices. Which abuse of theirs the wiser of the Pagans were in all ages highly sensible of and offended with, as partly appears from these free passages vented upon the stage;

Eurip. in Ione.  
[Ex Florilegio Stobœi  
apud Hugon.  
Grotium in  
Excerpt. veterum Comico-  
et Tragicor. p. 334.]

Καὶ γὰρ, ὅστις ἐν θεοῦν  
κακῶς πεφύκη, ἑμιῶσιν οἱ θεοί·  
Πῶς οὖν δίκαιον, τοὺς νόμους ἡμῶς θεοῦς  
γράψαντας αὐτοὺς ἀνομίαν ἐφλισκάνει;

Si quis est mortalium  
Qui scelera patrat, exigunt poenam dei:  
At nonne iniquum est, vos, suas leges quibus  
Gens debet hominum, jure nullo vivere?

To this sense: Since mortal men are punished by the gods for transgressing their laws, is it not unjust, that ye, gods, who write these laws, should yourselves live without law?—And again:

οὐκ ἐστὶν ἀνθρώπους κακῶς  
λέγειν δίκαιον, εἰ τὰ τῶν θεῶν κακὰ  
μιμούμεθα, ἀλλὰ τοὺς διδάσκοντες τὰς:

————— Nulla nos posthac notet  
 Censura, siquando ista, quæ superos decent,  
 Imitamur homines. Culpa ad auctores redit.

Let men no longer be blamed for imitating the evil actions of the gods; for they can only be justly blamed, who teach men to do such things by their examples.—

Secondly, The poets were further guilty of depraving the religion and theology of the Pagans, by their so frequently personating and deifying all the things of nature and parts of the world, and calling them by the names of those gods, that were supposed to preside over them; that is, of the several Divine powers manifested in them. This Plutarch<sup>a</sup> taxes the poets with, where giving directions for young men's reading of their writings, he thus seasonably cautions against the danger of it; *τοῦτο δὲ ἀναγκαῖον, καὶ χρήσιμον, εἰ μέλλομεν ἐκ τῶν ποιημάτων ὠφελήθησθαι καὶ μὴ βλαβήσθαι, τὸ γινώσκειν πῶς τοῖς τῶν θεῶν ὀνόμασιν οἱ ποιηταὶ χρῶνται. — χρῶνται δὲ τοῖς τῶν θεῶν ὀνόμασι οἱ ποιηταί, ποτὲ μὲν αὐτῶν ἐκείνων ἐφαπτόμενοι τῇ ἐννοίᾳ, ποτὲ δὲ δυνάμεις τινὰς, ὧν οἱ θεοὶ δωτηῆρες εἰσὶ καὶ καθηγεμόνες, ὁμωνύμως προσαγορεύοντες.* It is very profitable and necessary, if we would receive good from the writings of the poets, and not hurt, that we should understand how they use the names of the gods in different senses. Wherefore the poets sometimes use the names of the gods properly, as intending to signify thereby the gods themselves, and sometimes again they use them improperly and equivocally, for those powers which the gods are the givers and dispensers of, or the things which they preside over.—

<sup>a</sup> De audiendis Poetis, p. 22. tom. ii. oper.

As for example, Vulcan is sometimes used by the poets for that god or divine power which presides over fire, and the arts that operate by fire, and sometimes again the word is taken by them for fire itself. So Mars, in like manner, is sometimes used for the god which presides over military affairs, and sometimes again it signifies nothing else but war. An instance whereof is there given by Plutarch out of Sophocles :

Τυφλὸς γὰρ, ἃ γυναῖκες, οὐδ' ὄρν' Ἄρης  
 Σὺνδ' προσώπων πάντα τυφλάζει κακὰ.

Mars (O Muliercs) cæcus hirsuto suis  
 Velut ore frendens, cuncta commiscet mala.

And we might give this other instance of the same from Virgil,

———— Furit toto Mars impius orbe.

For the God of war, that is, the divine providence that presides over military affairs, could not be called impious or wicked, but it is war itself that is there so styled.

Indeed, we shall afterward make it appear, that the first original of this business proceeded from a certain philosophic opinion amongst the Pagans, that God was diffused throughout the whole world, and was himself in a manner all things, and therefore ought to be worshipped in all things: but the poets were principally the men, who carried it on thus far, by personating the several inanimate parts of the world and things of nature, to make such a multitude of distinct gods and goddesses of them. Which humour, though it were chiefly indulged by them, ψυχᾶγωγίας ἕνεκεν, only for the delight and pleasure of the reader—

besides gratifying their own poetic fancies; yet was it a matter of dangerous consequence, as the same Plutarch gravely and soberly advises, in his book *De Iside*, it begetting in some gross and irrational superstition (that is, in our Christian language, idolatry), and carrying others on to downright impiety and Atheism. But this will be afterward also again insisted on.

Wherefore, in the next place, we shall observe, that the poets did also otherwise deprave the theology of the Pagans, so as to make it look somewhat more aristocratically, and this principally two manner of ways; first, by their speaking so much of the gods in general and without distinction, and attributing the government of the whole world to them in common, so as if it were managed and carried on, *communi consilio deorum*, by a common council and republic of gods,—wherein all things were determined by a majority of votes, and as if their Jupiter, or supreme god, were no more amongst them, than a speaker of a house of lords or commons, or the chairman of a committee. In which they did indeed attribute more to their inferior deities, than, according to their own principles, they ought.

And secondly (which is the last depravation of the Pagan theology by these poets), by their making those, that were really nothing else but several names and notions of one and the same supreme Deity, according to its several powers manifested in the world, or the different effects produced by it, to be so many really distinct persons and gods; insomuch as sometimes to be at odds and variance with one another, and even with Jupiter himself. This St. Basil seems to

take notice of, in his oration, How young men may be profited by the writings of the Greeks? πάντων δὲ ἤκιστα περὶ Θεῶν τι διαλεγόμενοις (ποιηταῖς) προσέξομεν, καὶ μάλιστα ὅταν ὡς περὶ πολλῶν τε αὐτῶν διεξιῶσι, καὶ τούτων οὐδὲ ὁμοροούντων. But least of all will we give credit to the poets, where they discourse concerning the gods, and speak of them as many (distinct and independent) persons, and that not agreeing amongst themselves neither, but siding several ways, and perpetually quarrelling with one another.—

Notwithstanding all which extravagances and miscarriages of the poets, we shall now make it plainly to appear, that they really asserted, not a multitude of self-existent and independent deities, but one only unmade Deity, and all the other, generated or created gods. This hath been already proved concerning Orpheus, from such fragments of the Orphic poems, as have been owned and attested by Pagan writers: but it would be further evident, might we give credit to any of those other Orphic verses, that are found cited by Christians and Jews only (and we cannot reasonably conclude all these to be counterfeit and supposititious), amongst which we have this for one,<sup>a</sup>

Εἰς ἓν αὐτογενὲς, ἐνὸς ἑκγόνου πάντα γίνονται,

There is one only unmade God, and all other gods and things are the offspring of this one.—Moreover, when God, in the same Orphic fragments, is styled Μητρο-πάτωρ, both father and mother of

<sup>a</sup> P. 16. Edit. Oxon. Joh. Potteri.

<sup>b</sup> Apud Clement. Alexandr. in Cohortat. ad Gentes, cap. vii. p. 64. Vide etiam Euseb. Præpar. Evangel. lib. xiii. cap. xii. et Theodoret. de ourandis Græcorum affect. serm. i. tom. ii. oper. p. 475.

all things—(accordingly as it was observed before) that both the Orphic and Egyptian theology made the supreme Deity especially to be ἀρρήνóθηλον, hermaphroditical, or male and female together; this, as Clemens Alexandrinus<sup>a</sup> rightly interprets the meaning of it, was to signify τὴν ἐκ μη ὄντων γένεσιν, the production of things out of nothing,—or from the Deity alone, without any præ-existent self-existent matter.

But we shall pass from Orpheus to Homer. Now it is certain, that Homer's gods were not all eternal, unmade, and self-existent, he plainly declaring the contrary concerning the gods in general; that they had a genesis, that is, a temporary production, as in that forecited verse of his,<sup>b</sup>

Ὠκεανόν τι θεῶν γένεσιν, &c.

The ocean from whence the gods were generated;—where, by gods are meant all the animated parts of the world superior to men, but principally (as Eustathius observes) the stars, θεῶν ἀντὶ ἀστέρων, gods (saith he) are here put for stars.—And, as the same philologer further adds, the gods or stars do by a synecdoche signify all things, or the whole world, ἀντὶ τοῦ πάντων ὡς ἀπὸ μέρους, a part being put for the whole;—accordingly as the same poet elsewhere<sup>c</sup> declares his sense, speaking likewise of the ocean,

Ὅς γένεσις πάντεσσι τίττεται,

Which was the original of all things—or from whence (not only the gods, but also) all other things were generated. Wherefore the full-mean-

<sup>a</sup> Stromatum, lib. v. p. 724.

<sup>b</sup> Ibid. z. ver. 201, 202.

<sup>c</sup> Ibid. ver. 246.



ing of Homer was this: that the gods or stars, together with this whole visible world, had a temporary production, and were at first made out of the ocean, that is, out of the watery chaos. So that Homer's theogonia, as well as Hesiod's, was one and the same thing with the cosmogonia; his generation of gods the same with the generation or creation of the world; both of them having, in all probability, derived it from the Mosaic *cabala*, or tradition. And Eustathius tells us, that, according to the ancients, Homer's *ἀσπιδοποιία*, described Il. σ. was *αἰνίγμα τῆς κοσμογενείας*, an obscure signification of the cosmogonia,—or cosmogonia.

Nevertheless, though *οἱ θεοὶ* or the gods in general be by Homer thus generated from the ocean or watery chaos, yet this is to be understood only of the inferior gods, and he is supposed to be distinguished from them, who in the same poet is frequently called, *ὁ θεὸς κατ' ἐξοχὴν*, God, by way of eminency (to whom he plainly ascribes omnipotence), and *Ζεὺς*, or Jupiter, whom he styleth *κάρτιστον ἀπάντων*, the most powerful of all, and *πρῶτα θεῶν*, the first and chiefest of the gods, and *ὑπάτον θεῶν* and *κρείοντων*, the highest of gods and governors, and whom he affirmeth infinitely to transcend the gods, Il. θ.

*Τόσσον ἰγὼ περὶ τ' εἶμι θεῶν, περὶ τ' εἶμι ἀνθρώπων.*

And to reign as well over gods as men, Il. α.<sup>b</sup>

— *ὅς τε θεῶσι καὶ ἀνθρώποισιν ἀνάσσει.*

Lastly, whom he maketh to be *πατέρα θεῶν*, the father of the gods as well as men—that is, nothing

<sup>a</sup> Ver. 27.

<sup>b</sup> Ver. 281.

less than the creator of them and the whole world. He, therefore, who thus produced the gods and stars out of the ocean or watery chaos, must needs be excluded out of that number of gods, so as not to have been himself generated or made out of it. Thus have we before observed, that  $\text{οι θεοι}$ , or the gods in general, are frequently taken, both by Homer and other Greek writers, in way of distinction from  $\text{ο θεος}$ , or Jupiter, that is, for the inferior gods only.

It is true, indeed, that others of the Pagan gods, besides Jupiter, were by the Latins in their solemn rites and prayers styled *patres*, fathers; and as Jupiter is nothing else but Jovis pater, contracted into one word, so was Mars called by them Marspiter, and Saturnus, Janus, Neptunus, and Liber had the like addition also made to their names, Saturnuspater, Januspater, Neptunuspater, Liberpater: and not only so, but even their very heroes also (as for example, Quirinus) had this honourable title of father bestowed on them; all which appeareth from those verses of Lucilius,\*

Ut nemo sit nostrum, quin aut pater optimus divum,  
Aut Neptunus pater, Liber, Saturnus pater, Mars,  
Janus, Quirinus pater nomen dicatur ad unum.

Notwithstanding which, here is a great difference to be observed, that though those other gods were called fathers, yet none of them was ever called, either by the Greeks  $\text{πατηρ θεων}$ , or by the Latins, *pater optimus divum*, save only  $\text{Ζευς}$  or Jupiter, the supreme Deity.

And that Homer was thus generally understood by the Pagans themselves to have asserted

\* Apud Lactant. Divin. Instit. lib. iv. cap. iii. p. 408.

a Divine monarchy, or one supreme Deity ruling over all, may further appear from these following citations. Plutarch, in his Platonic questions,\* καὶ Ξενοκράτης Δία Ὑπατον καλεῖ, πρότερον δὲ Ὅμηρος τὸν τῶν ἀρχόντων ἀρχοντα θεῖον, ὑπατον κρειόντων προσεῖπε. Zeno-  
 crates called Jupiter, Hypaton, or the highest; but before him Homer styled that God, who is the prince of all princes, ὑπατόν κρειόντων, the highest of

P. 371.

rulers or governors.—Again, the same Plutarch, de Iside et Osiride, τὸν δὲ Ὅσιρι αὐτὸν πάλιν ὀφθαλμῷ καὶ σκήπτρῳ γράφουσι, ὧν τὸ μὲν τὴν πρόνοιαν ἐμφαίνει, τὸ δὲ τὴν δύναμιν ὡς Ὅμηρος τὸν ἀρχοντα καὶ βασιλεύοντα πάντων Ζῆν ὑπατον καὶ μῆστωρα καλῶν, ἔοικε τῷ μὲν ὑπάτῳ τὸ κρατὸς αὐτοῦ, τῷ δὲ μῆστωρι τὴν εὐβουλίαν καὶ τὴν φρόνησιν σημαίνειν. The Egyptians, when they described Osiris by those hieroglyphics of an eye and a sceptre, did by the former of them signify providence, and by the latter power; as Homer, when he calls that Ζεὺς, or Jupiter, who ruleth and reigneth over all things ὑπατον and μῆστωρα, seems by the word ὑπατον to denote his power and sovereignty, but by μῆστωρα his wisdom and knowledge.

P. 96. [lib. ii. in Timæum Platon.]

—To Plutarch may be added Proclus, who, upon Plato's Timæus, having proved that, according to that philosopher, there was τοῦ κόσμου παντὸς εἷς καὶ ἕλος δημιουργός, one only maker of the whole world—affirms the same likewise of that divine poet Homer (as he there styles him), ὃς καὶ διὰ πάσης ποιήσεως ὑπατον κρειόντων καὶ πατέρα ἀνδρῶν καὶ θεῶν αὐτὸν ἀνύμνει, καὶ πᾶσιν εὐφημῆ τοῖς δημιουργοῦσιν νοήμασιν. That he also throughout all his poesy praises Jupiter as the highest of all rulers,

and the father both of gods and men, and attributes all demiurgical notions to him.—Whereupon he concludes in this manner: οὕτω τοίνυν σύμπασαν τὴν Ἑλληνικὴν θεολογίαν ἀπεφώνημεν, τῷ Δᾷ τὴν ἄλλην δημιουργίαν ἀπονέμουσαν. And thus we have made it manifest, that all the Greekish theology universally ascribes to Ζεὺς, or Jupiter, the maker of all things.—Lastly, Aristotle himself confirmeth the same with his testimony, where he writes of the paternal authority after this manner: ἡ τῶν τέκνων ἀρχὴ βασιλική· διὸ καλῶς Ὅμηρος τὸν Δία προσηγόρευσεν εἰπῶν,

De Rep. l. i.  
c. xii. [p. 412.  
tom. iii. oper.]

———— Πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε,

τὸν βασιλέα τούτων· φύσει γὰρ τὸν βασιλέα διαφέρειν μὲν δεῖ, τῷ γενεῖ δ' εἶναι τὸν αὐτόν· ὅπερ πέπονθε τὸ πρεσβύτερον πρὸς τὸ νεώτερον, καὶ ὁ γεννήσας πρὸς τὸ τέκνον. The paternal power or authority over children is a kingly authority: wherefore Homer, when he intended to set forth Jupiter's kingly power over all, very well called him the father of men and gods. For he, that is king by nature, ought both to differ from those that he reigneth over, and also to be of the same kind with them; as the senior is to the junior, and he that begetteth to his offspring.—Where Aristotle's sense seems to be this, that Jupiter had therefore a natural and not acquired kingly power over all the gods, because they were all his offspring and begotten by him, as well as men. In which passage therefore Aristotle plainly acquits and frees Homer from all suspicion of Atheism.

As for Hesiod, if we had not already sufficiently proved from his Theogonia, that all his gods (that is, his inferior deities) were generated

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and made, as well as men, it might be made unquestionably evident from this verse of his in his Opera,\*

*Ὡς ὁμόθεν γαγάσσι θεῶν ἑπιτοί τ' ἀνθρώποι.*

When the gods and mortal men, were both together, alike made or generated.—Where the word *ὁμόθεν* is thus interpreted by the Greek scholiasts, *ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς ρίζης* and *ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ γένους*, i. e. the gods and men were both alike made from the same root or stock.—And though it followeth immediately after,

*Χρῖστον μὲν πρότιστα γένος μάρτυρον ἀνθρώπων  
ἄθάνατον ποίησαν, δόλιμπα δόλιματ' ἔχοντες,*

That first of all a golden age of men was made by the immortal gods; yet Moschopulus there notes, *Ἀθάνατοι ποίησαν, ὁ Ζεὺς μόνος ἐποίησεν, ὡς ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων φανερόν γίνεται* λέγει δὲ πάντας τοὺς θεοὺς, τὸ τοῦ ἑνὸς ἔργον ἐπὶ πάντας τοὺς ὁμοειδεῖς ἀναφέρων. The immortal gods made; the true meaning (saith he) is, that Jupiter alone made this first golden age of men; as may be proved from other places in the same poet; and though he speak of the gods in general, yet doth he but transfer that, which was the work of one upon all of the like kind. And there are several other instances of this poet's using *θεοὶ* for *θεός*, gods for god.—But it is possible, that Hesiod's meaning might be the same with Plato's,<sup>b</sup> that though the inferior mundane gods were all made at first by the supreme God, as well as men, yet they being made something

\* Ver. 108, 109, 110.

<sup>b</sup> In *Timæo*, p. 530, oper.

sooner than men, did afterward contribute also to the making of men.

But Hesiod's Theogonia, or generation of gods, is not to be understood universally neither, but only of the inferior gods, that Ζεὺς or Jupiter being to be expected out of the number of them, whom the same Hesiod, as well as Homer, makes to be the father of gods, as also the king of them, in these words :<sup>a</sup>

Αὐτὸς γὰρ πάντων βασιλεὺς καὶ κοίρανος ἐστίν  
Ἄθανάτων.

And attributes the creation of all things to him, as Proclus writeth upon this place,

<sup>b</sup> Ὅν τε διὰ θεοῖσι ἄνθρωποι ἕμμεσ, &c.

By whom all mortal men are, δι' ὃν πάντα, καὶ οὐκ αὐτομάτως· πάντα τῷ Διὶ προσαναπλάττει, by whom all things are, and not by chance; the poet, by a synecdoche, here ascribing the making of all to Jupiter.—Wherefore Hesiod's Theogonia is to be understood of the inferior gods only, and not of Ζεὺς or Jupiter, who was the father and maker of them (though out of a watery chaos) and himself therefore αὐτοφυνής, self-existent or unmade.

In like manner, that Pindar's gods were not eternal, but made or generated, is plainly declared by him in these words;

Ἐν ἀνδρῶν, ἐν θεῶν, γένος ἐκ  
Μιᾶς δὲ πνέομεν  
Ματρὸς ἀμφοτέρω.

Nem. Od. vi.  
[p. 120. edit.  
Schmidii.]

Unum Hominum, unum Deorum genus,  
Et ex una spiramus  
Matre utrique.

<sup>a</sup> Apud Clement. Alexandr. in Cohortat. ad Gentes, cap. vii. p. 63. tom. i. edit. Potteri.

<sup>b</sup> Hesiodi Opera et Dies, ver. 3.

There is one kind both of gods and men, and we both breathe from the same mother, or spring from the same original.—Where by the common mother both of gods and men, the scholiast understands the earth and chaos, taking the gods here for the inferior deities only, and principally the stars.\*

This of Pindar's therefore is to be understood of all the other gods, that they were made as well as men out of the earth or chaos, but not of that supreme Deity, whom the same Pindar elsewhere calls *θεῶν κράτιστον*, the most powerful of the gods—and *τὸν πάντων κύριον*, the Lord of all things—and *παντὶ αἴτιον*, the Cause of every thing—and *ἀριστοτέχνην θεὸν*, that God who is the best artificer, or was the framer of the whole world—and as Clemens Alexandrinus tells us,<sup>b</sup> *τὸ πᾶν*, or the universe.—Which God also, according to Pindar, Chiron instructed Achilles to worship principally, above all the other gods.

Pyth. Od. vi.  
[p. 260.]

——— *μάλιστα μὲν Κροῦδαν,  
βαρυῶσαν στεροπᾶν κεραυνῶν τε πύργον,  
θεῶν σίβεισθαι.*

The sense of which words is thus declared by the scholiast, *ἔξαιρέτως τὸν μεγαλόφωνον καὶ ἀστραπῶν καὶ κεραυνῶν δεσπότην Δία παρὰ τοὺς ἄλλους θεοὺς τιμᾶν καὶ σίβεισθαι*. That he should honour and worship the loud-sounding Jupiter, the lord of thunder and lightning, transcendently above all the other gods.—Which by the way confutes the opinion of those, who contend, that the supreme God, as such, was not at all worshipped by the Pagans.

\* Vide Clement. Alexand. Stromat. lib. v. p. 710.

<sup>b</sup> Ibid. p. 726.

However, this is certain concerning these three, Homer, Hesiod, and Pindar, that they must of necessity either have been all absolute Atheists, in acknowledging no eternal Deity at all, but making senseless Chaos, Night and the Ocean, the original of all their gods without exception, and therefore of Jupiter himself too, that king and father of them; or else assert one only eternal unmade self-existent Deity, so as that all the other gods were generated or created by that one. Which latter doubtless was their genuine sense; and the only reason, why Aristotle and Plato might possibly sometime have a suspicion of the contrary, seems to have been this—their not understanding that Mosaic cabala, which both Hesiod and Homer followed, of the world's, that is, both heaven and earth's, being made at first out of a watery chaos; for thus is the tradition declared by St. Peter, Ep. ii. ch. iii.

There might be several remarkable passages to the same purpose, produced out of those two tragic poets, Æschylus and Sophocles; which yet, because they have been already cited by Justin Martyr, Clemens Alexandrinus, and others; to avoid unnecessary tediousness, we shall here pass by. Only we think fit to observe concerning that one famous passage of Sophocles,\*

Εἰς ταῖς ἀληθείαισιν, εἰς ἴστω θεός,  
 Ὅς οὐρανὸν τ' ἔτευξε καὶ γαῖαν μακρὰν,  
 Πόντου τε χαροπὸν οὐδμα, κρήμων βίαν, &c.

Unus profecto, unus est tantum Deus,  
 Coeli solique machinam qui condidit,  
 Vadumque ponti coerulum, et vim spiritus, &c.

\* Ex Stoboei Eclog. apud Hugon. Grot. in Excerpt. veter. Comicor. et Tragic. p. 148.



There is in truth one only God, who made heaven and earth, the sea, air, and winds, &c.—After which followeth also something against image worship; that though this be such as might well become a Christian, and be no where now to be found in those extant tragedies of this poet (many whereof have been lost) yet the sincerity thereof cannot reasonably be at all suspected by us, it having been cited by so many of the ancient fathers in their writings against the Pagans, as particularly Athenagoras, Clemens Alexandrinus, Justin Martyr, Eusebius, Cyril and Theodoret; of which number Clemens tells us,<sup>a</sup> that it was attested likewise by that ancient Pagan historiographer Hecatæus. But there are so many places to our purpose in Euripides, that we cannot omit them all in his Supplices we have this, wherein all men's absolute dependence upon Jupiter, or one supreme Deity, is fully acknowledged.<sup>b</sup>

ὦ Ζεῦ, τί ἤτα τοὺς ταλαιπώρους Βροτοὺς  
 φρονεῖν λέγουσι; σοῦ γὰρ ἐξηγήματα.  
 Δρῶμέν τι τοιαῦθ', ἂν σὺ τυγχάνης θέλων.

Miseros quid homines, O deum rex et pater,  
 Sapere arbitramur? Pendet e nutu tuo  
 Res nostra, facimusque illa quæ visum tibi.

We have also this excellent prayer to the supreme Governor of heaven and earth, cited out of the same tragedian :<sup>c</sup>

Σοί, τῷ πάντων μεδίοντι, χοῦν  
 Πέλαγον τι φέρω Ζεὺς ἔντ' Ἀΐδης  
 Ὀνομαζόμενος στίργεις·——  
 Σὺ γὰρ ἐν τῇ θεοῖς τοῖς οὐρανίαις,

<sup>a</sup> Stromat. lib. v. p. 717.

<sup>b</sup> Ver. 734, 735, 736.

<sup>c</sup> Apud Clement. Alexand. Stromat. lib. v. p. 688. Vide Hug. Grotii Excerpta, p. 431.

Σηΰστρον τὸ Διὸς μεταχειρίζου,  
 Χθόνιον δ' Ἄλθ' ἀντάχουσ' ἀρχαίς·  
 Πίμψον μὲν φῶς ψυχαῖς, ἀνίρων  
 τοῖς βουλομένοις ἄθλους περιμαθεῖν,  
 Πόθον ἰβλαστον, τίς βίζα κακῶν,  
 Τίνα δὲ μακάροισιν εὖ δυσσαμένους  
 Εἰρεῖν μύχθων ἀνάπαυλαν.

Tibi (cunctorum domino) vinum,  
 Salsamque molam fero, seu Ditis,  
 Tu sive Jovis nomine gaudes:  
 Tu namque deos superos inter  
 Sceptrum tractas sublime Jovis;  
 Idem regnum terrestre tenes.  
 Te lucem animis infunde virum,  
 Qui scire volunt, quo sata mentis  
 Lucta sit ortu, quæ causa mali;  
 Cui coelicolum rite litando  
 Requiem sit habere laborum.

Where we may observe that Ζεύς and Ἄδης, Jupiter and Pluto, are both of them supposed to be names equally belonging to one and the same supreme God. And the sum of the prayer is this, That God would infuse light into the souls of men, whereby they might be enabled to know, what is the root, from whence all their evils spring, and by what means they may avoid them.—

Lastly, There is another devotional passage, cited out of Euripides,\* which contains also a clear acknowledgment of one self-existent Being that comprehends and governs the whole world:

Σὺ τὸν αὐτοφῶν, τὸν ἐν αἰθέρι  
 ῥύμβω πάντων φύσιν ἐμπλήξανθ',  
 Ὅν περὶ μὲν φῶς, περὶ δ' ὄρφνια  
 Νύξ αἰολόχρωσ, ἀπειτίς τ' ἀστέρων  
 Ὅχλος ἐνδοτεχνῶς ἀμφιχορηεῖ.

Thou self-sprung Being, that dost all enfold,  
 And in thine arms heaven's whirling fabric hold!

\* Apud Clement. Alexand. ubi supra, p. 717.

Who art encircled with resplendent light,  
 And yet ly'st mantled o'er in shady night!  
 About whom, the exultant starry fires  
 Dance nimbly round in everlasting gyres.

For this sense of the third and fourth verses, which we think the words will bear, and which agrees with that Orphic passage,

Παρά γὰρ τίφος ἰστίμενται,

That God being in himself a most bright and dazzling light, is respectively to us, and, by reason of the weakness of our understanding, covered over with a thick cloud; as also with that in the Scripture, "clouds and darkness are round about him:" I say, this sense we chose rather to follow, as more rich and august, than that other vulgar one, though grammatically and poetically good also: That successive day and night, together with a numberless multitude of stars, perpetually dance round about the Deity.

Aristophanes in the very beginning of his *Plutus* distinguisheth betwixt Ζεύς and θεοί, Jupiter and the gods;

Ὡς ἀρχαίσι πρῶτον ἴσσι δ' Ζεῦ καὶ θεοῖ, &c.

And we have this clear testimony of Terpander, cited by Clemens Alexandrinus,<sup>a</sup> Ζεῦ πάντων ἀρχά, Ζεῦ πάντων ἀγήτωρ, Thou Jupiter, who art the original of all things; thou Jupiter, who art the governor of all.—And these following verses are attributed to Menander:<sup>b</sup>

<sup>a</sup> Stromat. lib. vi. p. 784.

<sup>b</sup> Apud Euseb. Justinum Martyr. et Clement. Alexan. Which last ascribes them to Diphilus,

Τὸν ὄντα πάντων κίριον γενεκάτατος  
 Καὶ πατέρα, τοῦτον διατίθει τιμῶν μόνου,  
 Ἀγαθῶν τειούτων εὐρετὴν καὶ κτιστοῦρα.

Rerum universarum imperatorem et patrem,  
 Solum perpetuo colere suppliciter decet,  
 Artificem tantæ et largitorem copiarum.

Where men are exhorted to worship the supreme God only, as the sole author of all good, or at least transcendently above all the other gods. There are also two remarkable testimonies, one of Hermesianax, an ancient Greek poet, and another of Aratus, to the same purpose; which shall both be reserved for other places.

Wherefore we pass from the Greek to the Latin poets, where Ennius first appears, deriving the gods in general (who were all the inferior deities) from Erebus and Night, as supposing them all to have been made or generated out of Chaos, nevertheless acknowledging one, who was

——Divumque hominumque pater, rex,

both Father and King of gods and men—that is, the maker or creator of the whole world, who therefore made those gods together with the world out of chaos, himself being unmade.

Plautus in like manner sometimes distinguisheth betwixt Jupiter and the gods, and plainly acknowledgeth one omiscient Deity, Cap. Act. ii. Sc. 2.

Est profecto Deus, qui quæ nos gerimus, auditque et videt.

Which passage very much resembles that of Manlius Torquatus in Livy, “ Est cœleste numen, es magne Jupiter;” a strong asseveration of one supreme and universal Deity. And the same Plau-

tus in his *Rudens* clearly asserts one supreme Monarch and Emperor over all, whom the inferior gods are subservient to ;

Qui gentes omnes mariaque et terras movet,  
Ejus sum civis civitate coelitum ;  
Qui est imperator divum atque hominum Jupiter,  
Is nos per gentes alium alia disparat,  
Hominum qui facta, mores, pietatem et fidem  
Noscamus.—  
Qui falsas lites falsis testimoniis  
Petunt, quique in jure abjurant pecuniam,  
Eorum referimus nomina exscripta ad Jovem.  
Cotidie Ille scit, quis hic quærat malum.  
Iterum Ille eam rem judicatam judicat.  
Bonos in aliiq̄ tabulis exscriptos habet.  
Atque hoc scelesti illi in animum inducunt suum  
Jovem se placare posse donis, hostiis ;  
Sed operam et sumptum perdunt, quia  
Nihil Ei acceptum est a perjuris supplicii.

Where Jupiter, the supreme monarch of gods and men, is said to appoint other inferior gods under him, over all the parts of the earth, to observe the actions, manners and behaviours of men every where; and to return the names both of bad and good to him. Which Jupiter judges over again all unjust judgments, rendering a righteous retribution to all. And though wicked men conceit, that he may be bribed with sacrifices, yet no worship is acceptable to him from the perjurious.— Notwithstanding which, this poet afterward jumbles the supreme and inferior gods all together, after the usual manner, under that one general name of gods, because they are all supposed to be co-governors of the world ;

Facilius, siqui pius est, a Diis supplicans,  
Quam qui scelestus est, inveniet veniam sibi.

*Pœn. Act. v.* Again the same poet elsewhere brings in  
*Sc. 4.* Hanno the Carthaginian with this form

of prayer addressing himself to Jupiter or the supreme God ;

Jupiter, qui genus colis alisque hominum, per quem vivimus  
Vitale ævum ; quem penes spes vitæque sunt hominum omnium,  
Da diem hunc sospitem, quæso, rebus meis agundis.

In the next place, we have these verses of Valerius Soranus, an ancient and eminent poet, full to the purpose, recorded by Varro :<sup>a</sup>

Jupiter omnipotens, regum rex ipse deumque,  
Progenitor genitrixque deum, Deus UNUS et OMNIS.

To this sense : Omnipotent Jupiter, the King of kings and gods, and the progenitor and genitrix, the both father and mother of those gods ; one God and all gods.—Where the supreme and omnipotent Deity is styled “progenitor et genitrix deorum,” after the same manner as he was called in the Orphic theology *μητροπάτωρ* and *ἀρρενόθηλος*, that expression denoting the gods and all other things to have been produced from him alone, and without any pre-existent matter. Moreover, according to the tenor of this Ethnic theology, that one God was all gods and every god, the Pagans supposed, that whenever any inferior deity was worshipped by them, the supreme was therein also at once worshipped and honoured.

Though the sense of Ovid hath been sufficiently declared before, yet we cannot well omit some other passages of his, as that grateful and sensible acknowledgment,

Quod loquor et spiro, cœlumque et lumina solis  
Aspicio. (possumne ingratus et immemor esse?)  
Ipse dedit.<sup>b</sup>

<sup>a</sup> De Lingua Latina, p. 71. edit. 1581, in 8vo.

<sup>b</sup> Metamorph. lib. xiv. ver. 172.

And this in the third of his *Metamorph.*

Ille pater rectorque deum, cui dextra trisulcis  
Ignibus armata est, qui nutu concutit orbem.

Virgil's theology also may sufficiently appear from his frequent acknowledgment of an omnipotent Deity, and from those verses of his before cited out of *Æn.* 6. wherein he plainly asserts one God to be the original of all things, at least as a soul of the world; Servius Honoratus there paraphrasing thus: "Deus est quidam divinus spiritus, qui per quatuor fusus elementa gignit universa;" God is a certain spirit, which, infused through the four elements, begetteth all things.—Nevertheless, we shall add from him this also of Venus's prayer to Jupiter, *Æn.* 1.

———O qui res hominumque deumque  
Æternis regis imperiis, et fulmine terres!

Which Venus again, *Æn.* 10. bespeaks the same Jupiter after this manner:

O pater, O hominum divumque æterna potestas!

Where we have this annotation of Servius: "divumque æterna potestas, propter aliorum numinum discretionem;" Jupiter is here called the eternal power of the gods, to distinguish him from all the other gods—that were not eternal, but made or generated from him.

Neither ought Horace to be left out, in whom we read to the same purpose, *lib. i. od. xii.*

Quid prius dicam solitis parentis  
Laudibus? qui res hominum et deorum,  
Qui mare et terras, variisque mundum  
Temperat horis.

Unde nil majus generatur ipso,  
Nec viget quicquam simile aut secundum:  
Proximos illi tamen occupavit  
Pallas honores.

And again, lib. iii. od. iv.

Qui terram inertem, qui mare temperat  
 Ventosum, et urbes, regnaque tristia ;  
 Divosque, mortalesque turmas,  
 Imperio regit UNUS æquo.

Where from those words of Horace, "solitis parentis laudibus," it appears, that the one supreme-Deity, the parent and maker of all things, was then wont to be celebrated by the Pagans as such above all the other gods. And whereas those Pagans vulgarly ascribed the government of the seas particularly to Neptune, of the earth and Hades or Inferi (which are here called tristia Regna) to Pluto, these being here attributed by Horace to one and the same supreme and universal Deity; it may well be concluded from thence, that Jupiter, Neptune and Pluto, were but three several names or notions of one supreme Numen, whose sovereignty notwithstanding was chiefly signified by Jupiter. Which same is to be said of Pallas or Minerva too, that signifying the eternal Wisdom, that it was but another name of God also, though looked upon as inferior to that of Jupiter, and next in dignity to it; unless we should conclude it to be a second Divine hypostasis, according to the doctrine of the Pythagoreans and Platonists (probably not unknown to Horace) as also to that Scripture cabala, "I was set up from everlasting, or ever the earth was; when there were no depths, I was brought forth," &c. But of this more afterward.

Lastly, We shall conclude with Manilius, who lived in the same Augustean age, and was a zealous opposer of that Atheistical hypothesis of Epi-



curus and Lucretius, as appears from these verses of his ;

*\* Quis credat tantas operum sine numine moles,  
Ex minimis cæcoque creatum federe mundum ?*

Wherefore he also plainly asserts one supreme Deity, the framer and governor of the whole world, in this manner, lib. ii.

*• Namque canam tacita naturam mente potentem  
Infusumque Deum cælo, terrisque, fretoque,  
Ingentem æquali moderantem federe molem,  
Totumque alterno consensu vivere mundum,  
Et rationis agi motu ; quum SPIRITUS UNUS  
Per cunctas habitet partes, atque irriget orbem,  
Omnia pervolitans, corpusque animale figuret, &c.*

And again,

*Hoc opus immensi constructum corpore mundi  
Vis animæ divina regit, sacroque meatu  
Conspirat Deus et tacita ratione gubernat.*

And lib. iv. °

——— *Faciem cæli non invidet orbi  
Ipse Deus, vultusque suos, corpusque recludit,  
Semper volvendo, seque ipsum inculcat et offert ;  
Ut bene cognosci possit, monstrètque videndo,  
Qualis eat, doceatque suas attendere leges.  
Ipse vocat nostros animos ad sydera mundus,  
Neò patitur, quia non condit, sua jura latere.*

Where notwithstanding we confess, that the whole animated world, or rather the Soul thereof, is, according to the Stoical doctrine, made by Manilius to be the supreme Numen.

xx. We now pass from the poets of the Pagans to their philosophers. A modern writer<sup>d</sup> concerning the religion of the Gentiles, affirmeth this to have been the opinion of very eminent philosophers, That even all the minor gods of the Pa-

<sup>a</sup> Lib. i. ver. 492, 493.    <sup>b</sup> Ver. 61, &c.    <sup>c</sup> Ver. 915.

<sup>d</sup> Sir Edward Herbert, *De Religione Gentilium*, cap. xiv. p. 228.

gans did exist of themselves from eternity unmade, they giving many reasons for the same. But how far from truth this is, will (as we conceive) appear sufficiently from the sequel of this discourse. And we cannot conclude otherwise, but that this learned writer did mistake that opinion of Aristotle and the latter Platonists, concerning the eternity of the world and gods, as if they had therefore asserted the self-existence of them; the contrary whereunto hath been already manifested. Wherefore we shall now make it unquestionably evident, by a particular enumeration, that the generality of the Pagan philosophers, who were Theists, however they acknowledged a multiplicity of gods, yet asserted one only self-existent Deity, or a universal Numen, by whom the world and all those other gods were made. There being only some few Ditheists to be excepted, (such as Plutarch and Atticus,) who, out of a certain softness and tenderness of nature, that they might free the one good God from the imputation of evils, would needs set up, besides him, an evil soul or demon also in the world self-existent, to bear all the blame of them.

And indeed Epicurus is the only person that we can find amongst the reputed philosophers, who, though pretending to acknowledge gods, yet professedly opposed monarchy, and verbally asserted a multitude of eternal, unmade, self-existent deities; but such as had nothing at all to do, either with the making or governing of the world. The reason whereof was, because he would by no means admit the world to have been made by any mind or understanding. Wherefore he concluded,

*Naturam rerum, haud divina mente coortam;*

*Lucret. l. iii.  
[ver. 150.]*

That there was no God the δημιουργός or framer of the world.—But nevertheless, that he might decline the odium of being accounted an Atheist, he pretended to assert a multitude of gods unmade and incorruptible, such as were unconcerned in the fabric of the world. Wherein first it is evident, that he was not serious and sincere, because he really admitting no other principles of things in his philosophy, besides atoms and vacuum, agreeably thereunto could acknowledge no other gods than such as were compounded out of atoms, and therefore corruptible. And thus does Origen declare the doctrine of Epicurus, not indeed as he pretended to hold it, but as, according to the tenor of his principles; he must have held it, had he really

asserted any gods at all, οἱ τοῦ Ἐπικούρου  
Lib. iv. cont.  
 Cels. p. 169. θεοὶ, σύνθετοι ἐξ ἀτόμων τυγχάνοντες, καὶ τὸ ὄσον  
 ἐπὶ τῇ συστάσει ἀναλυτοὶ, πραγματεύονται τὰς φθο-  
 ροποιοῦς ἀτόμους ἀποσεῖσθαι; Epicurus's gods being  
 compounded of atoms, and therefore by their very  
 constitution corruptible, are in continual labour  
 and toil, struggling with their corruptive princi-  
 ples.—Nevertheless if Epicurus had in good earn-  
 est asserted such a commonwealth of gods, as  
 were neither made out of atoms, nor yet corrup-  
 tible; so long as he denied the world to have been  
 made by any mind or wisdom (as we have already  
 declared) he ought not to be reckoned amongst  
 the Theists, but Atheists.

Thales the Milesian was one of the most an-  
 cient Greek philosophers, and that he admitted  
 a plurality of gods in some sense, is evident from  
 that saying of his cited by Aristotle,\* πάντα θεῶν

\* De Anima, lib. i. cap. viii. p. 17. tom. ii. oper.

πλήρη, all things are full of gods. But that notwithstanding he asserted one supreme and only unmade or self-existent Deity, is also manifest from that other apothegm of his in Laertius,<sup>a</sup> *πρεσβύτατον πάντων ὁ θεός, ἀγέννητον γάρ*. God is the oldest of all things, because he is unmade. From whence it may be concluded, that all Thales's other gods were generated, and the offspring of one sole unmade Deity.

Pherecydes Syrus was Thales's contemporary, of whom Aristotle in his *Metaphysics*<sup>b</sup> hath recorded, that he affirmed *τὸ γεννήσαν πρώτον ἄριστον*, that the first principle, from whence all other things were generated, was the best or an absolutely perfect being; so as that in the scale of nature, things did not ascend upwards from the most imperfect to the more perfect beings, but, on the contrary, descend downwards from the most perfect to the less perfect. Moreover, Laertius informs us,<sup>c</sup> that this was the beginning of one of Pherecydes's books, *Ζεὺς μὲν καὶ χρόνος εἰς αἰεὶ, καὶ χθὼν ἦν*. Jupiter, and time, and the earth always were.—Where, notwithstanding, in the following words, he makes the earth to be dependent upon Jupiter; though some reading *κρόνος* here instead of *χρόνος*, seem to understand him thus, that Jupiter and Saturn, really one and the same Numen, was always from eternity. However, there is in these words an acknowledgment of one single and eternal Deity.

Pythagoras was the most eminent of all the ancient philosophers, who, that he was a Polytheist

<sup>a</sup> Lib. i. segm. xxxv. p. 21.

<sup>b</sup> Lib. xii. cap. iv. p. 446. tom. iv. oper.

<sup>c</sup> Lib. i. segm. cxix. p. 76.

as well as the other Pagans, may be concluded from that beginning of the Golden Verses (though not written by him,)

*\*Αθανάτους μὲν πρῶτα Διὸς τίμα, ὡς δαίαινας,  
Τίμα, καὶ σίβου ἕκαστ' ἥρωας ἀγαυούς·  
Τοῖς τε καταχθονίαις σίβη δαίμονας, ἴσημα μέζον.*

Wherein men are exhorted in the first to worship the immortal gods, and that accordingly as they were appointed by law; after them the heroes, and last of all the terrestrial demons. And accordingly Laertius<sup>a</sup> gives this account of Pythagoras's piety; *τιμὰς θεοῖς δεῖν νομίζειν καὶ ἥρωσιν, μὴ τὰς ἴσας.* That he conceived men ought to worship both the gods and the heroes, though not with equal honour.—And who these gods of Pythagoras were, the same writer also declareth,<sup>b</sup> *ἡλίῳ τε καὶ σελήνῃ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀστέρας εἶναι θεοῖς.* That they were, in part at least, the sun, and moon, and stars.

Notwithstanding which, that Pythagoras acknowledged one supreme and universal Numen, which therefore was the original of all those other gods, may partly appear from that prayer in the Golden Verses, which, whether written by Philolaus or Lysis, or some other follower of Pythagoras, were undoubtedly ancient and agreeable to his doctrine.

Salmas. Præf. Ζεῦ πάντε, ἢ πολλῶν τε κακῶν λύστικε ἀπαντασ  
in Tab. Ceb. Εἰ πᾶσιν διέξαις οἶμι τῶ δαίμονι χερῶνται·  
Arab.

Jupiter alme, malis jubeas vel solvier omnes:  
Omnibus utantur vel quonam dæmone monstra.

Upon which Hierocles<sup>c</sup> thus writeth: τὸν ποιητῆν

<sup>a</sup> Lib. viii. segm. xxxiii. p. 514. Vide etiam segm. xxiii. p. 506.

<sup>b</sup> Segm. xxvii. p. 509.

<sup>c</sup> *Comment. in Aurea Carmina Pythag.* p. 200. edit. Needhami.

καὶ πατέρα τοῦδε τοῦ παντός· ἔθος ἦν τοῖς Πυθαγορείοις τῷ τοῦ Διός, καὶ Ζητός, ὀνόματι σέμινόναν· δι' ὃν γὰρ τὸ εἶναι, καὶ τὸ ζῆν, τοῖς πᾶσιν ὑπάσχει, τούτων δίκαιον ἀπὸ τῆς ἐνεργείας ὀνομάζεσθαι. It was the manner of the Pythagoreans to honour the Maker and Father of this whole universe with the name of Dis and Zen, it being just, that he, who giveth being and life to all, should be denominated from thence.—And again afterward: τὸ τῷ Διὶ ὄνομα σύμβολόν ἐστι, καὶ εἰκὼν ἐν φωνῇ δημιουργικῆς οὐσίας, τῷ τοῖς πρώτοις θεμένους τοῖς πράγμασι τὰ ὀνόματα διὰ σοφίας ὑπερβολῆν, ὡσπέρ τινες ἀγαματοποιούς ἀρίστους, διὰ τῶν ὀνομάτων, ὡς δὲ εἰκόνων, ἐμφανίσαι αὐτῶν τὰς δυνάμεις. This very name Zeus is a convenient symbol or image of the demiurgical nature. And they, who first gave names to things, were by reason of a certain wonderful wisdom of theirs a kind of excellent statuaries; they by those several names, as images, lively representing the natures of things. Moreover, that this Pythagoric prayer was directed to the supreme Numen and King of gods, Jamblichus thus declares in his *Protreptics*,<sup>a</sup> ἐν δὴ τούτοις μία μὲν ἀρίστη παράκλησις εἰς τὴν θείαν εὐδαιμονίαν ἢ μεμιγμένη ταῖς εὐχαῖς καὶ ἀνακλήσει τῶν θεῶν, καὶ μάλιστα τοῦ βασιλέως αὐτῶν Διός. Here is an excellent exhortation of these Golden Verses to the pursuit of Divine felicity, mingled together with prayers and the invocation of the gods, but especially of that Jupiter, who is the King of them.—Moreover, the same might further appear from those Pythagoric fragments,<sup>b</sup> that are still extant; as that of Ocellus Lucanus, and others, who were moralists,

<sup>a</sup> Cap. iii. p. 10. edit. Arcerii.

<sup>b</sup> These are published by Dr. Thomas Gale in his *Opuscula Veter. Moral et Mytholog.* Amsterd. 1688. in 8vo.

in which as gods are sometimes spoken of plurally, so also is God often singularly used for that supreme Deity, which containeth the whole.

But this will be most of all manifest from what hath been recorded concerning the Pythagoric philosophy, and its making a monad the first principle. It is true, indeed, that the writer *De Placitis Philosophorum* doth affirm Pythagoras to have asserted two substantial principles self-existent, a monad and a dyad; by the former of which, as God is confessed to have been meant, so the latter of them is declared with some uncertainty, it being in one place interpreted to be a demon, or a principle of evil;\* *Πυθαγόρας τῶν ἀρχῶν τὴν μὲν μονάδα θεόν, καὶ ἀγαθόν, ἥτις ἐστὶν ἡ τοῦ ἐνὸς φύσις, αὐτὸς ὁ νοῦς· τὴν δ' ἀόριστον δυάδα δαίμονα, καὶ τὸ κακόν, &c.* Pythagoras's first principle is God and Good, which is the nature of unity, and a perfect mind; but his other principle of duality is a demon or evil.—But in another place expounded to be

matter: *πάλιν τὴν μονάδα καὶ τὴν ἀόριστον*  
Lib. i. cap. liii.  
 [p. 876. tom. ii. oper.] *δυάδα ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς· σπεύδει δὲ αὐτῶ τῶν*

*ἀρχῶν ἢ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ ποιητικὸν αἴτιον καὶ εἰδικόν, (ὅπερ ἐστὶ νοῦς ὁ θεός) ἢ δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ παθητικόν τε καὶ ὑλικόν (ὅπερ ἐστὶν ὁ ὄρατός κόσμος)* Pythagoras's principles were a monad and infinite duality: the former of them an active principle, Mind or God; the latter passive and matter. And Plutarch, in some other writings of his, declares that the first matter did not exist alone by itself dead and inanimate, but acted with an irrational soul; and that both these together made up that wicked demon of his. And, doubtless, this book *De Placitis Philosophorum* was either writ-

\* *De Placit. Philos. lib. i. cap. vii. p. 881.*

ten by Plutarch himself, or else by some disciple and follower of his according to his principles. Wherefore this account, which is therein given of the Pythagoric doctrine, was probably infected with that private conceit of Plutarch's, that God and a wicked demon, or else matter, together with an irrational soul, self-existent, were the first principles of the universe. Though we do acknowledge that others also, besides Plutarch, have supposed Pythagoras to have made two self-existent principles, God and matter, but not animate, nor informed, as Plutarch supposed, with any irrational or wicked soul.

Notwithstanding which, it may well be made a question, whether Pythagoras by his dyad meant matter or no; because Malchus or Porphyrius, in the life of Pythagoras, thus interprets those two Pythagoric principles of unity and duality;

τὸ αἰῖον τῆς συμπνοίας καὶ τῆς συμπαθείας, καὶ τῆς σωτηρίας τῶν ὅλων τοῦ κατὰ ταῦτα καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντος, ἐν προσηγόρευσαν, καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ μέρος ἐν τοιοῦτον ὑπάρχει, ἠνωμένον τοῖς μέρεσι καὶ συμπνοῦν, κατὰ μετουσίαν τοῦ πρώτου αἰτίου· τὸν δὲ τῆς ἐτερότητος καὶ ἀνισότητος καὶ παντός τοῦ μεριστοῦ καὶ ἐν μεταβολῇ καὶ ἄλλοτε ἄλλως ἔχοντος δυοειδῆ λόγον καὶ δυάδα προσηγόρευσαν. Pl. 203.

The cause of that sympathy, harmony, and agreement, which is in things, and of the conservation of the whole, which is always the same and like itself, was by Pythagoras called unity or a monad (that unity, which is in the things themselves, being but a participation of the first cause): but the reason of alterity, inequality and unconstant irregularity in things, was by him called a dyad.—Thus, according to Porphyrius, by the Pythagoric dyad is not so much



meant matter, as the infinite and indeterminate nature, and the passive capability of things. So that the monad and dyad of Pythagoras seem to have been the same with Plato's *πέρας* and *ἄπειρον*, his finite and infinite in his *Philebus*; the former of which two only is substantial, that first most simple being, the cause of all unity, and the measure of all things.

However, if Pythagoras's dyad be to be understood of a substantial matter, it will not therefore follow, that he supposed matter to be self-existent and independent upon the Deity, since, according to the best and most ancient writers, his dyad was no primary but a secondary thing only, and derived from his Monad, the sole original of all things. Thus Diogenes Laertius tells us,<sup>a</sup> that Alexander, who wrote the successions of philosophers, affirmed he had found in the Pythagoric Commentaries, *ἀρχὴν μὲν τῶν ἀπάντων, μονάδα ἐκ δὲ τῆς μονάδος ἀόριστον δυάδα; ὡς ἀν' ἕλην τῇ μονάδι αἰτίῳ ὄντι ὑποσπῆσαι*, that a Monad was the principle of all things, but that from this Monad was derived infinite duality, as matter for the Monad to work upon, as the active cause.—With which agreeth Hermias,<sup>b</sup> affirming this to be one of the greatest of all the Pythagoric mysteries, that a Monad was the sole principle of all things. Accordingly whereunto, Clemens Alexandrinus cites this passage<sup>c</sup> out of Thearidas, an ancient Pythagorean, in his book concerning nature, *Ἄρχα τῶν ὄντων, ἀρχὰ μὲν ὄντως ἀληθινὰ, μία*

<sup>a</sup> Lib. viii. segm. xxv. p. 507.

<sup>b</sup> Irrisione Philos. Gentilis, sec. xvi. p. 225.

<sup>c</sup> Dr. Cudworth does not cite this passage as it is in Clemens Alexandr. but as it is given by Euseb. Præparat. Evangel. lib. v. cap. xxiv.

Κείνα γὰρ ἐν ἀρχῇ τέ ἐστιν ἐν καὶ μόνον, the true principle of all things was only one; for this was in the beginning one alone.—Which words also seem to imply the world to have had a novelty of existence or beginning of duration. And, indeed, however Ocellus Lucanus writes, yet that Pythagoras himself did not hold the eternity of the world, may be concluded from what Porphyrius\* records of him, where he gives an account of that his superstitious abstinence from beans; *ὅτι τῆς πρώτης ἀρχῆς καὶ γενέσεως ταρρατομένης, καὶ πολλῶν ἅμα συνηνεγμένων καὶ συσπειρομένων καὶ συσσηπομένων ἐν τῇ γῆ, κατ' ὀλίγον γένεσις καὶ διάκρισις συνέστη, ζώων τε ὁμοῦ γενομένων, καὶ φυτῶν ἀναδιδομένων, τότε δὴ ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς σηπεδόνος, ἀνθρώπους συστήναι καὶ κνάμους βλαστήναι.* That at the beginning things being confounded and mingled together, the generation and secretion of them afterward proceeded by degrees, animals and plants appearing; at which time, also, from the same putrefied matter, sprung up both men and beans.—

Pythagoras is generally reported to have held a trinity of Divine hypostases: and, therefore, when St. Cyril<sup>b</sup> affirmeth Pythagoras to have called God *ψύχωσιν τῶν ὅλων κύκλων, καὶ πάντων κίνησιν*, the animation of the whole heavens, and the motion of all things—adding, that God was not, as some supposed, *ἐκτὸς τῆς διακοσμήσεως, ἀλλ' ἐν αὐτῷ ὅλος ἐν ὅλῳ*, without the fabric of the world, but whole in the whole—this seems properly to be understood of that third Divine hypostasis of the Pythagoric trinity, namely, the eternal Psyche.

\* In vita Pythag. p. 43. edit. Kusteri.

<sup>b</sup> Contra Julian. lib. i. p. 30.

Again, when God is called in Plutarch, <sup>a</sup> according to Pythagoras, *αὐτὸς ὁ νοῦς*, mind itself—this seems to be meant properly of his second hypostasis; the supreme Deity, according to him, being something above mind or intellect. In like manner, when in Cicero, <sup>b</sup> Pythagoras's opinion concerning the Deity is thus represented: “*Deum esse animum per naturam rerum omnium intentum et comitantem, ex quo animi nostri carperentur;*” that God was a mind passing through the whole nature of things, from whom our souls were, as it were, decerped or cut out—and again, “*ex universa mente divina delibato esse animos nostros;*” this in all probability was to be understood also either of the third or second Divine hypostasis, and not of the first, which was properly called by him *τὸ ἐν* and *μόνας*, a unity and monad; and also, as Plutarch <sup>c</sup> tells us, *τὸ ἀγαθόν*, goodness itself.—Aristotle plainly affirmeth, that some of the ancient theologers amongst the Pagans made *ἔρωτα*, or Love, to be the first principle of all things, that is, the supreme Deity; and we have already shewed, that Orpheus was one of these. For when *ἔρωσ πολυτερεπής* and *πολύμητις*, delightful Love, and that, which is not blind, but full of wisdom and counsel—is made by him to be *ἀντοτελής* and *πρεσβύτατον*, self-perfect and the oldest of all things—it is plain, that he supposed it to be nothing less than the supreme Deity. Wherefore, since Pythagoras is generally affirmed to have followed the Orphic principles, we may from hence pre-

<sup>a</sup> De Placit. Philosoph. lib. i. cap. vii. p. 881.

<sup>b</sup> De Natur. Deor. lib. i. cap. xi. p. 2895. tom. ix. oper.

<sup>c</sup> De Placit. Philos. lib. i. cap. vi. p. 881.

sume, that he did it in this also. Though it be very true, that Plato, who called the supreme Deity *τάγαθόν*, as well as Pythagoras, did dissent from the Orphic theology in this, and would not acknowledge Love for a name of the supreme Deity; as when in his Symposium in the person of Agatho he speaks thus: *Φαίδρω πολλά ἄλλα ὁμολογῶν, τοῦτο οὐχ ὁμολογῶ, ὡς Ἔρως Κρόνου καὶ Ἰαπετοῦ ἀρχαιότερος ἐστίν· ἀλλὰ φημι νεώτατον αὐτὸν εἶναι θεῶν, καὶ αἰεὶ νέον*. Though I should readily grant to Phædrus many other things, yet I cannot consent to him in this, that Love was older than Saturn and Iapet; but, on the contrary, I do affirm him to be the youngest of the gods, as he is always youthful. They, who made Love older than Saturn as well as Iapet, supposed it to be the supreme Deity: wherefore Plato here, on the contrary, affirms Love not to be the supreme Deity or Creator of all, but a creature; a certain junior god; or, indeed, as he afterward adds, not so much a god as a demon, it being a thing which plainly implies imperfection in it. “Love (saith he) is a philosopher, whereas *θεῶν οὐδεὶς φιλοσοφεῖ, οὐδ’ ἐπιθυμεῖ σοφὸς γενέσθαι, ἔστι γὰρ*, no god philosophizeth, nor desires to be made wise, because he is so already.—Agreeably with which doctrine of his, Plotinus\* determines, that Love is peculiar to that middle rank of beings called souls; *πᾶσα ψυχὴ, ἀφροδίτη, καὶ τοῦτο αἰνίττεται καὶ τὰ τῆς ἀφροδίτης γενέθλια, καὶ ὁ ἔρως ὁ μετ’ αὐτῆς γενόμενος· ἐρᾷ οὖν κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσα ψυχὴ θεοῦ, ἐνωθῆναι θέλουσα, ὡσπερ παρθένος καλὴ πρὸς καλὸν ἄνδρα· ὅταν δὲ εἰς γένεσιν ἐλθοῦσα, οἷον μνηστείαις ἀπατηθῆ, ἄλλον ἀρξάμενη θνητὸν ἔρωτα, ἐρημίᾳ πατρὸς ὑβρίζεται, &c.* Every soul is a Venus, which is also intimated by Venus’s

\* Libro de Bono vel Uno, Enncad. vi. lib. ix. cap. xii. p. 768.

nativity, and Love's being begotten with, her : wherefore the soul being in its right natural state loves God, desiring to be united with him, which is a pure, heavenly and virgin love ; but when it descends to generation, being courted with these amorous allurements here below, and deceived by them, it changeth that its Divine and heavenly love for another mortal one : but if it again shake off these lascivious and wanton loves, and keep itself chaste from them, returning back to its own father and original, it will be rightly affected as it ought.—But the reason of this difference betwixt the Orpheists and Plato, that the former made Love to be the oldest of all the gods, but the latter to be a junior god or demon, proceeded only from an equivocation in the word love. For Plato's Love was the daughter of Penia, that is, poverty and indigency, together with a mixture of Πόρος, or riches ; and being so as it were compounded of plenty and poverty, was in plain language no other than the love of desire, which, as Aristotle affirmeth, is μετὰ λύπης, accompanied with grief and pain. But that Orphic and Pythagoric love was nothing else but πόρος and εὐπορία, infinite riches and plenty, a love of redundancy and overflowing fulness, delighting to communicate itself, which was therefore said to be the oldest of all things and the most perfect, that is, the supreme Deity ; according to which notion also, in the Scripture itself, God seems to be called love, though the word be not there ἔρω, but ἀγάπη. But, to say the truth, Parmenides's love (however made a principle somewhere by Aristotle<sup>a</sup>) seems to be neither exactly

<sup>a</sup> Physicor. lib. i. cap. ii. iii. p. 446. tom. i. oper. Adde Metaph. lib. i. cap. v. p. 269.

the same with the Orphic, nor yet with the Platonic love, it being not the supreme Deity, and yet the first of the created gods; which appears from Simplicius's<sup>a</sup> connecting these two verses of his together in this manner:

Ἐν δὲ μέσῳ τούτων δαίμων ὁ πάντα κυβερνῶ,

ταύτην καὶ θεῶν αἰτίαν ἰθαὶ φησι, λέγων,

Πρότιστον μὲν ἔρωτα θεῶν μάλιστα αὐτῶν

In the midst of these elements is that God, which governeth all things, and whom Parmenides affirmeth to be the cause of gods, writing thus: God first of all created Love, before the other gods.—Wherefore by this Love of Parmenides is understood nothing else, but the lower soul of the world, together with a plastic nature, which though it be the original of motion and activity in this corporeal world, yet is it but a secondary or created god; before whose production, necessity is said by those Ethnic theologers to have reigned: the true meaning whereof seems to be this, that before that Divine Spirit moved upon the waters, and brought things into an orderly system, there was nothing but the necessity of material motions, unguided by any orderly wisdom or method for good (that is, by Love) in that confused and floating chaos.

But Pythagoras, it seemeth, did not only call the supreme Deity a monad, but also a tetrad or tetractys; for, it is generally affirmed, that Pythagoras himself was wont to swear hereby: though Porphyrius and Jamblichus and others write, that the disciples of Pythagoras swore by Pythagoras, who had delivered to them the doctrine or cabala of this Tetractys. Which Te-

<sup>a</sup> Commentar. in Aristot. Phys. p. 152. edit. Græc. Aldin.

tractys also in the Golden Verses is called *πηγή αεινάου φύσεως*; the fountain of the eternal nature, an expression, that cannot properly belong to any thing but the supreme Deity. And thus Hierocles,\* *οὐκ ἔστιν εἰπεῖν ὃ μὴ τῆς τετρακτύος, ὡς ρίζης, καὶ ἀρχῆς ἤσθηται. ἔστι γὰρ, ὡς ἔφαμεν, δημιουργὸς τῶν ὄλων, καὶ αἰτία ἡ Τέτρας, Θεὸς νοητὸς, αἴτιος τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, καὶ αἰσθητοῦ Θεοῦ.* There is nothing in the whole world, which doth not depend upon the Tetractys, as its root and principle. For the Tetrad is, as we have already said, the Maker of all things; the intelligible God, the cause of the heavenly and sensible god, that is, of the animated world or heaven.—Now the latter Pythagoreans and Platonists endeavour to give reasons, why God should be called Tetras or Tetractys, from certain mysteries in that number four, as for example; first, because the tetrad is *δύναμις δεκάδος*, the power of the decad—it virtually containing the whole decad in it, which is all numbers or beings; but the bottom of this mystery is no more than this, that one, two, three, four, added all together, make up ten. Again, because the tetrad is an arithmetical mediety betwixt the monad and the hebdomad; which monad and hebdomad are said to agree in this, that as the monad is ingenit or unmade, it being the original and fountain of all numbers, so is the hebdomad said to be, not only *παρθένος*, but *ἀμήτωρ*, a motherless, as well as virgin number.—Wherefore the tetrad lying in the middle betwixt the ingenit monad, and the motherless virgin hebdomad; and it being both begotten and begetting, say they, must needs be a very mys-

\* Comment. in Aurea Carmina Pythag. p.170, 171.

terious number, and fitly represent the Deity. Whereas, indeed, it was therefore unfit to represent the Deity, because it is begotten by the multiplication of another number; as the hebdomad therefore doth not very fitly symbolize with it neither, because it is barren or begets nothing at all within the decad, for which cause it is called a virgin. Again, it is further added, that the tetrad fitly resembles that, which is solid, because, as a point answers to a monad, and a line to a dyad, and a superficies to a triad, (the first and most simple figure being a triangle;) so the tetrad properly represents the solid, the first pyramid being found in it. But, upon this consideration, the tetrad could not be so fit a symbol of the incorporeal Deity, neither as of the corporeal world. Wherefore these things being all so trifling, slight and fantastical, and it being really absurd for Pythagoras to call his Monad a Terad; the late conjecture of some learned men amongst us\* seems to be much more probable, that Pythagoras's Tetractys was really nothing else but the Tetragrammaton, or that proper name of the supreme God amongst the Hebrews, consisting of four letters or consonants. Neither ought it to be wondered at, that Pythagoras (who besides his travelling into Egypt, Persia and Chaldea, and his sojourning at Sidon, is affirmed by Josephus, Porphyrius and others, to have conversed with the Hebrews also) should be so well acquainted with the Hebrew Tetragrammaton, since it was not unknown to the Hetrurians and Latins, their Jove being certainly

\* Selden de Diis Syris Syntagm. ii. cap. i. p. 209, 210. et Theophilus Gale in his Court of the Gentiles, part ii. lib. ii. cap. viii. p. 147. edit. Oxon. 1672. in quarto.



nothing else. And, indeed, it is the opinion of some philologers, that even in the Golden Verses themselves, notwithstanding the seeming repugnancy of the syntax, it is not Pythagoras, that is sworn by, but this Tetractys or Tetragrammaton; that is, Jovā or Jehovah, the name of God, being put for God himself, according to that received doctrine of the Hebrews יהוה יהוה יהוה יהוה that God and his name were all one—as if the meaning of those words,

Ναὶ μὲν τὸν ἀμείψιμα ψυχᾷ παραδόντα Τετρακτὺν  
Παγὰν ἀειδαίου φύσεως.——

were this: By the Tetragrammaton or Jovah, who hath communicated [himself or] the fountain of the eternal nature to our human souls; for these, according to the Pythagoric doctrine, were said to be *ex mente divina carptæ et delibata*, i. e. nothing but derivative streams from that first fountain of the Divine mind:

Wherefore we shall now sum up all concerning Pythagoras in this conclusion of St. Cyril's: ἰδοὺ Con. Jel. l. i. δὴ σαφῶς, ἓνα τε εἶναι λέγει τὸν τῶν ὅλων Θεόν, [p. 30.] καὶ πάντων ἀρχὴν ἐργατὴν τε τῶν αὐτοῦ δυνάμεων, φωστῆρα καὶ ψυχῶσιν, ἧτοι ζωοποιήσιν τῶν ὅλων καὶ κύκλων πάντων κίνησιν· παρῆκται δὲ τὰ πάντα παρ' αὐτοῦ καὶ τῆν ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος εἰς τὸ εἶναι κίνησιν λαχόντα φαίνεται. Behold we see clearly, that Pythagoras held there was one God of the whole universe, the principle and cause of all things, the illuminator, animator, and quickener of the whole, and original of motion; from whom all things were derived, and brought out of non-entity into being.

Next to Pythagoras, in order of time, was Xenophanes the Colophonian, the head of the Eleatic sect of philosophers, who, that he was

\* Cicer. de Natur. Deor. lib. i. cap. xi. p. 285. oper.

an assertor both of many gods and one God, sufficiently appears from that verse of his before cited, and attested both by Clemens Alexandrinus,\* and Sextus the philosopher ;

*Εἷς θεός ἐν τε θεοῖσι καὶ ἀνθρώποισι μέγιστος*

There is one God, the greatest both amongst gods and men.—Concerning which greatest God, this other verse of Xenophanes is also vouched ;

*Καὶ ἀπάνευθε ποιεῖ νόου, φρονὶ πάντα κραδαίνει*

That he moveth the whole world without any labour or toil, merely by mind.—Besides which, Cicero<sup>b</sup> and others tell us, that this Xenophanes philosophizing concerning the supreme Deity, was wont to call it ἐν καὶ πᾶν, one and all—as being one most simple being, that virtually containeth all things. But Xenophanes's Theosophy, or Divine philosophy, is most fully declared by Simplicius out of Theophrastus in this man-

ner : *Μίαν δὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν, ἥτοι ἐν τὸ ὄν καὶ πᾶν,* In Aristot. Phys. p. 5, 6.  
*καὶ οὔτε πεπερασμένον οὔτε ἄπειρον, οὔτε κινούμενον οὔτε ἡρεμοῦν, Ξενοφάνην τὸν Κολοφώνιον τὸν Παρμενίδου διδάσκαλον ὑποτίθεσθαι φησιν ὁ Θεόφραστος ὁμολογῶν ἑτέρας εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ τῆς περὶ φύσεως ιστορίας, τὴν μνήμην τῆς τούτου δόξης. τὸ γὰρ ἐν τούτῳ καὶ πᾶν τὸν Θεὸν ἔλεγεν ὁ Ξενοφάνης ὄν ἕνα μὲν δείκνυσιν ἐκ τοῦ πάντων κράτιστον εἶναι· πλείωνων γὰρ φησιν ὄντων, ὁμοίως ἀνάγκη ὑπάρχειν πᾶσι τὸ κρατεῖν· τὸ δὲ πάντων κράτιστον καὶ ἄριστον, Θεός· ἀγένητον δὲ ἐδείκνυεν ——— καὶ οὔτε δι᾽ ἄπειρον οὔτε πεπερασμένον εἶναι· διότι ἄπειρον μὲν τὸ μὴ ὄν, ὡς οὔτε ἀρχὴν ἔχον μῆτε μέσον μῆτε τέλος· περαίνειν δὲ πρὸς ἄλλα τα πλείω· παραπλησίως δὲ καὶ τὴν κίνησιν ἀφαιρεῖ καὶ τὴν*

\* Stromat. lib. v. p. 714.

<sup>b</sup> In Acad. Quæst. lib. iv. cap. xxxvii. p. 2315. tom. viii. opus.

ἡρεμίαν ἀκίνητον μὲν, &c. Theophrastus affirmeth, that Xenophanes the Colophonian, Parmenides's master, made one principle of all things; he calling it one and all, and determining it to be neither finite nor infinite (in a certain sense) and neither moving nor resting. Which Theophrastus also declares, that Xenophanes in this did not write as a natural philosopher or physiologer, but as a metaphysician or theologer only; Xenophanes's one and all being nothing else but God. Whom he proved to be one solitary being from hence, because God is the best and most powerful of all things; and there being many degrees of entity, there must needs be something supreme to rule over all. Which best and most powerful Being can be but one. He also did demonstrate it to be unmade, as likewise to be neither finite nor infinite (in a certain sense;) as he removed both motion and rest from God. Wherefore, when he saith, that God always remaineth or resteth the same, he understands not this of that rest which is opposite to motion, and which belongs to such things as may be moved; but of a certain other rest, which is both above that motion and its contrary.—From whence it is evident, that Xenophanes supposed (as Sextus the philosopher also affirmeth) God to be incorporeal, a being unlike to all other things, and therefore ὃς which no image could be made. And now we understand, that Aristotle\* dealt not ingenuously with Xenophanes, when from that expression of his, that God was σφαιροειδής, or sphery-form—he would infer, that Xenophanes made God to be a body, and nothing else but the

\* Vid. libr. de Xenophane, Zenone et Gorgia, cap. iv. p. 843, 844.

round corporeal world animated; which yet was repugnant also to another physical hypothesis of this same Xenophanes, ἀπειρῶνς ἡλίους εἶναι καὶ σελήνας, that there were infinite suns and moons;—by which moons he understood planets, affirming them to be all habitable earths, as Cicero tells us.<sup>a</sup> Wherefore, as Simplicius resolves, God was said to be σφαιροειδής, or spheriform—by Xenophanes only in this sense, as being πανταχόθεν ὁμοίος, every way like and uniform.—However, it is plain, that Xenophanes asserting one God, who was all, or the universe, could not acknowledge a multitude of partial, self-existent deities.

Heraclitus was no clear, but a confounded philosopher (he being neither a good naturalist nor metaphysician) and therefore it is very hard, or rather impossible, to reconcile his several opinions with one another. Which is a thing the less to be wondered at, because, amongst the rest of his opinions, this also is said to have been one, that contradictories may be true: and his writings were accordingly, as Plato intimates, stuffed with unintelligible, mysterious nonsense. For, first, he is affirmed to have acknowledged no other substance besides body, and to have maintained,<sup>b</sup> that all things did flow, and nothing stand, or remain the same; and yet in his epistles (according to the common opinion of philosophers at that time) doth he suppose the pre- and post-existence of human souls in these words:<sup>d</sup> τάρχα

<sup>a</sup> Vid. Acad. Quæst. lib. iv. cap. xxxix. p. 2319. tom. viii. oper.

<sup>b</sup> Vide sext. Empiric. Hypotypos. lib. i. cap. xxix. p. 53.

<sup>c</sup> Vide Platon. in Convivio, p. 321.

<sup>d</sup> Vide Epistol. Græcas ab Eilhardo Lubino editas. Heidelberg. 1601. in octavo. p. 54, 55.

καὶ ψυχὴ μαντεύεται ἀπόλυσιν ἑαυτῆς ἤδη ποτὲ ἐκ τοῦ δεσμοτηρίου τούτου· καὶ σιομένου τοῦ σώματος ἐκκύπτουσα, ἀναμνησκέται τὰ πάτρια χωρία, ἔνθεν κατελθοῦσα περιβάλλετο ῥέον σῶμα τεθνειὸς τούτο, ὃ δοκεῖ, &c. My soul seemeth to vaticinate and presage its approaching dismissal and freedom from this its prison; and looking out, as it were, through the cracks and crannies of this body, to remember those its native regions or countries, from whence descending it was clothed with this flowing mortal body; which is made up and constipated of phlegm, cholera, serum, blood, nerves, bones and flesh.—And, not only so, but he also there acknowledgeth the soul's immortality, which Stoics, allowing its permanency after death, for some time at least, and to the next conflagration, did deny; δύσεται τὸ σῶμα εἰς τὸ εἰμαρμένον, ἀλλὰ οὐ ψυχὴ δύσεται· ἀλλὰ ἀθάνατον οὔσα χοῦμα, εἰς οὐρανὸν ἀναπτήσεται μετάρσιος· δέξονται δέ με αἰθέριοι δόμοι, καὶ πολιτεύσομαι οὐκ ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀλλ' ἐν θεοῖς. This body shall be fatally changed to something else; but my soul shall not die or perish, but, being an immortal thing, shall fly away mounting upwards to heaven; those etherial houses shall receive me, and I shall no longer converse with men, but gods.—Again, though Heraclitus asserted the fatal necessity of all things, yet notwithstanding was he a strict moralist, and upon this account highly esteemed by the Stoics, who followed him in this and other things; and he makes no small pretence to it himself in his epistle to Hermodorus,<sup>a</sup> καὶ ἔμοιγε πολλοὶ καὶ δυσχερέστατοι ἄθλοι κατάρθωνται· νενίκηκα ἡδονάς, νενίκηκα χρήματα, νενίκηκα φιλοτιμίαν, κατεπάλαισα δειλίαν, κατεπάλαισα κολακειάν·

<sup>a</sup> Apud Lubinum, ubi supra, p. 50.

οὐκ ἀντιλέγει μοι φόβος, οὐκ ἀντιλέγει μοι μέθη· φοβεῖται με λύπη, φοβεῖται με ὀργή· κατὰ τούτων αὐτῶν καὶ αὐτὸς ἐστὲ φάνωμαι, ἔμαντῶ ἐπιτάττων, οὐχ ὑπ' Εὐρυσθέως· I have also had my difficult labours and conflicts as well as Hercules; I have conquered ambition; I have subdued cowardice and flattery; neither fear nor intemperance can controul me; grief and anger are afraid of me, and fly away from me. These are the victories, for which I am crowned, not by Eurystheus, but as being made master of myself.—Lastly, though Heraclitus made fire to be the first principle of all things, and had some odd passages imputed to him, yet notwithstanding was he a devout religionist, he supposing, that fiery matter of the whole universe *animantem esse et Deum*, to be an animal and God.—And as he acknowledged many gods, according to that which Aristotle<sup>a</sup> recordeth of him, that when some passing by had espied him sitting in a smoky cottage, he bespake them after this manner, *Introite, nam et hic dii sunt*, Come in, I pray, for here there are gods also;—he supposing all places to be full of gods, demons and souls: so was he an undoubted assertor of one supreme Numen, that governs all things, and that such as could neither be represented by images, nor confined to temples. For after he had been accused of impiety by Euthycles, he writes to Hermodorus in this manner: <sup>b</sup> ἀλλ', ὧ ἀμαθεῖς ἄνθρωποι, διδάξατε πρῶτον ἡμᾶς τί ἐστὶν ὁ θεός; πού δ' ἐστὶν ὁ θεός; ἐν τοῖς ναοῖς ἀποκεκλεισμένος; εὐσεβεῖς γε, οἳ ἐν σκότει τὸν θεὸν ἰδόντες——ἀπαιδεύτοι, οὐκ ἴστε ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι

<sup>a</sup> De Partib. Animal. lib. i. cap. v. p. 481. tom. ii. oper.

<sup>b</sup> Apud Lubin. ubi supra, p. 50.

θεὸς χερσὶ κρητός· οὐδὲ ἐξ ἀρχῆς βάσιν ἔχει οὐδὲ ἔχει ἐν περιβόλῳ· ἀλλ' ὅλος ὁ κόσμος αὐτῷ ναός ἐστι, ζώεις καὶ φυτοὶ καὶ ἄστροις πεποικιλμένος· But O you unwise and unlearned! teach us first what God is, that so you may be believed in accusing me of impiety: tell us where God is. Is he shut up within the walls of temples? is this your piety to place God in the dark, or to make him a stony God? O you unskilful! know ye not, that God is not made with hands, and hath no basis or fulcrum to stand upon, nor can be inclosed within the walls of any temple; the whole world, variegated with plants, animals and stars being his temple?— And again, ἀρ' οὐκ εἰμὶ εὐσεβής, Εὐθύκλεις; ὅς μόνος οἶδα θεόν; εἰάν δὲ μὴ ἰδρυθῆ θεῶν βωμός, οὐκ ἔστι θεός; εἰάν δὲ ἰδρυθῆ μὴ θεῶν, θεός ἐστιν; ὥστε λίθοι θεῶν μάρτυρες· ἔργα δὲ μαρτυρεῖν, οἷα ἡλίου· νύξ αὐτῷ καὶ ἡμέρα μαρτυροῦσιν· ὄρα αὐτῷ μάρτυρες, γῆ ὅλη καρποφοροῦσα; μάρτυς· σελήνης ὁ κύκλος, ἐκείνου ἔργον, οὐράνιος μαρτυρία. Am I impious, O Euthycles, who alone know what God is? is there no God without altars? or are stones the only witnesses of him? No, his own works give testimony to him, and principally the sun; night and day bear witness of him; the earth bringing forth fruits, declares him; the circle of the moon, that was made by him, is a heavenly testimony of him.

In the next place, Anaxagoras, the Clazomenian philosopher, comes to be considered, whose predecessors of the Ionic order (after Thales) as Anaximander, Anaximenes and Hippo, were (as hath been already observed) Materialists and Atheists; they acknowledging no other substance besides body, and resolving all things into the

motions, passions, and affections of it. Whence was that cautious advice given by Jam-  
 blichus, *προτίμα τὴν Ἰταλικὴν φιλοσοφίαν τὴν τὰ ἀσώματα καθ' αὐτὰ θεωροῦσαν, τῆς Ἴονικῆς τῆς τὰ σώματα προηγουμένης ἐπισκοπομένης* Symb. xxvii. p. 159. [positus in Orat. pro-trept. ad philosoph. p. 159 edit. Arætil.]  
 Prefer the Italic philosophy, which contemplates incorporeal substances by themselves, before the Ionic, which principally considers bodies.—And Anaxagoras was the first of these Ionics, who went out of that road; for seeing a necessity of some other cause, besides the material (matter being not able so much as to move itself, and much less if it could, by fortuitous motion, to bring itself into an orderly system and compages;) he therefore introduced mind into the *Cosmopœia*, as the principal cause of the universe; which mind is the same with God. Orat. xv. [p. 317. edit. Harduini.]  
 Thus Themistius, speaking of Anaxagoras, *νοῦν καὶ θεὸν πρῶτος ἐπαγαγόμενος τῇ κοσμοποιᾷ, καὶ οὐ πάντα ἀνάγκης τῆς φύσεως τῶν σωμάτων*. He was the first (that is, amongst the Ionic philosophers) who brought in mind and God to the *Cosmopœia*; and did not derive all things from senseless bodies. And to the same purpose Plutarch, in the life of Pericles, *τοῖς ὅλοις πρῶτος οὐ τύχην οὐδ' ἀνάγκην, διακοσμήσεως ἀρχὴν, ἀλλὰ νοῦν ἐπέστησε καθαρὸν καὶ ἄκρατον*. The other Ionic philosophers before Anaxagoras made fortune and blind necessity, that is, the fortuitous and necessary motions of the matter, to be the only Original of the world; but Anaxagoras was the first, who affirmed a pure and sincere mind to preside over all. Anaxagoras therefore supposed two substantial self-exist-



ent principles of the universe, one an infinite Mind or God, the other an infinite Homoiomery of matter, or infinite atoms; not unqualified, such as those of Empedocles and Democritus, which was the most ancient and genuine atomology; but similar, such as were severally endued with all manner of qualities and forms, which physiology of his therefore was a spurious kind of Atomism. Anaxagoras indeed did not suppose God to have created matter out of nothing, but that he was *κινήσεως ἀρχή*, the principle of its motion, and also *τοῦ εὖ καὶ καλῶς αἰτία*, the regulator of this motion for good—and consequently the cause of all the order, pulchritude, and harmony of the world; for which reason this Divine principle was called also by him, not only mind, but good; it being that, which acts for the sake of good. Wherefore according to Anaxagoras, first, the world was not eternal, but had a beginning in time; and before the world was made, there was from eternity an infinite congeries of similar and qualified atoms, self-existent, without either order or motion: secondly, the world was not afterward made by chance, but by Mind or God, first moving the matter, and then directing the motion of it so, as to bring it into this orderly system and compages. So that *νοῦς* was *κοσμοποιῶς*, Mind, the first maker of the world, and *νοῦς βασιλεὺς οὐρανοῦ τε καὶ γῆς*, Mind, that which still governs the same, the king and sovereign monarch of heaven and earth. Thirdly, Anaxagoras's Mind and God was purely incorporeal; to which purpose his words record-

In Arist. Phys.  
I. i. fol. 33.  
c. ii.

ed by Simplicius are very remarkable;

*Νοῦς μέμικται οὐδενὶ χρήματι ἀλλὰ μόνος αὐτὸς ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἐστίν, εἰ μὴ γὰρ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἦν, ἀλλὰ*

τέφ ἐμίχκτο ἄλλω, μετεῖχεν δὲ ἀπάντων χρημάτων; εἰ ἐμίχκτο τέφ' ἐν παντί γὰρ παντός μοῖρα ἐνεστίν· ὥστερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐμοὶ λέλεκται· καὶ ἀνεκώλυεν αὐτὸν τὰ συμμιγμένα, ὥστε μηδενὸς χρημάτος κρατεῖν ὁμοίως, ὡς καὶ μόνον εἶντα ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ· ἐστὶ γὰρ λεπτότατόν τε πάντων χρημάτων, καὶ καθαρώτατον· καὶ γνώμην γε περὶ παντός πᾶσαν ἰσχύει· καὶ ἰσχύει μέγιστόν· Mind is mingled with nothing, but is alone by itself and separate; for if it were not by itself secreté from matter, but mingled therewith, it would then partake of all things, because there is something of all in every thing; which things mingled together with it, would hinder it, so that it could not master or conquer any thing, as if alone by itself: for mind is the most subtile of all things, and the most pure, and has the knowledge of all things, together with an absolute power over all.—Lastly, Anaxagoras did not suppose a multitude of unmade minds, coexistent from eternity, as so many partial causes and governors of the world, but only one infinite Mind or God, ruling over all.

Indeed, it may well be made a question, whether or no, besides this supreme and universal Deity, Anaxagoras did acknowledge any of those other inferior gods, then worshipped by the Pagans? because it is certain, that though he asserted infinite Mind to be the maker and governor of the whole world, yet he was accused by the Athenians for Atheism, and besides a mulct imposed upon him, banished for the same; the true ground whereof was no other than this, because he affirmed the sun to be nothing but a mass of fire, and the moon and earth, having mountains and valleys, cities and houses in it; and probably con-

cluded the same of all the other stars and planets, that they were either fires, as the sun, or habitable earths, as the moon; wherein, supposing them not to be animated, he did consequently deny them to be gods. Which his ungodding of the sun, moon and stars, was then looked upon by the vulgar as nothing less than absolute Atheism; they being very prone to think, that if there were not many understanding beings superior to men, and if the sun, moon, and stars were not such, and therefore in their language gods, there was no God at all. Neither was it the vulgar only, who condemned Anaxagoras for this, but even those two grave philosophers, Socrates and Plato, did the like; the first<sup>a</sup> in his apology made to the Athenians, where he calls this opinion of Anaxagoras absurd; the second in his book of Laws, where he complains of this doctrine as a great inlet into

Atheism, in this manner: ἐμὸν καὶ σοῦ, ὅταν

De Leg. l. x.  
p. 886.

τεκμήρια λέγωμεν ὡς εἰσὶ θεοὶ, ταῦτα αὐτὰ προσφέροντες, ἡλιὸν τε καὶ σελήνην καὶ ἄστρα καὶ γῆν, ὡς θεοὺς καὶ θεῖα ὄντα, ὑπὸ τῶν σοφῶν τούτων ἀναπεπισμένοι ἂν λέγοιεν, ὡς γῆν τε καὶ λίθους ὄντα αὐτὰ, καὶ οὐδὲν τῶν ἀνθρωπείων πραγμάτων φροντίζειν δυνάμενα. When you and I, endeavouring by arguments to prove, that there are gods, speak of the sun and moon, stars and earth, as gods and Divine things, our young men presently, being principled by these new philosophers, will reply; That these are nothing but earth and stones (senseless and inanimate bodies) which therefore cannot mind nor take notice of any human affairs.—Where we may observe these two things; first, that nothing was

<sup>a</sup> Or rather Plato, p. 362.

accounted truly and properly a god amongst the Pagans, but only what was endued with life and understanding. Secondly, that the taking away of those inferior gods of the Pagans, the sun, moon, and stars, by denying them to be animated, or to have life and understanding in them, was, according to Plato's judgment, then the most ready and effectual way to introduce absolute Atheism.

Moreover, it is true, that though this Anaxagoras were a professed Theist, he asserting an infinite self-existent Mind to be the maker of the whole world, yet he was severely taxed also by Aristotle and Plato, as one not thorough-paced in Theism, and who did not so fully, as he ought, adhere to his own principles. For whereas, to assert Mind to be the maker of the world, is really all one as to assert final causality for things in nature, as also that they were made after the best manner; Anaxagoras, when he was to give his particular account of the phenomena, did commonly betake himself to material causes only, and hardly ever make use of the mental or final cause, but when he was to seek and at a loss; then only bringing in God upon the stage. Socrates's discourse concerning this in Plato's *Phædo* is very well worth our taking <sup>P. 97. Steph.</sup> notice of: "Hearing one sometime read (saith he) out of a book of Anaxagoras, *ὡς νοῦς ἐστὶν ὁ διακοσμοῦν τε καὶ πάντων αἴτιος*, that Mind was the order and cause of all things, I was exceedingly pleased herewith, concluding, that it must needs follow from thence, that all things were ordered and disposed of as they should, and after the best manner possible; and therefore the causes even of the

things in nature (or at least the grand strokes of them) ought to be fetched from the τὰ βέλτιστα that which is absolutely the best. But when, afterward I took Anaxagoras's book into my hand, greedily reading it over, I was exceedingly disappointed of my expectation, finding therein no other causes assigned, but only from airs, and ethers, and waters, and such-like physical and material things. And he seemed to me to deal, just as if one having affirmed, that Socrates did all by mind, reason and understanding, afterward undertaking to declare the causes of all my actions, as particularly of my sitting here at this time, should render it after this manner; because, forsooth, my body is compounded of bones and nerves, which bones, being solid, have joints in them at certain distances, and nerves of such a nature, as that they are capable of being both intended and remitted: wherefore, my bones being lifted up in the joints, and my nerves some of them intended and some remitted, was the cause of the bending of my body, and of my sitting down in this place. He in the mean time neglecting the true and proper cause hereof, which was no other than this; because it seemed good to the Athenians to condemn me to die, as also to myself most just, rather to submit to their censure, and undergo their punishment, than by flight to escape it; for certainly otherwise these nerves and bones of mine would not have been here now in this posture, but amongst the Megarensians and Bœotians, carried thither ὑπὸ δόξης τοῦ βελτίστου, by the opinion of the best; had I not thought it better to submit to the sentence of the city, than to escape the same by flight. Which kind of phi,

losophers (saith he) do not seem to me, to distinguish betwixt the true and proper cause of things, and the cause *sine qua non*, that without which they could not have been effected. And such are they, who devise many odd physical reasons for the firm settlement of the earth, without any regard to that Power, which orders all things for the best, (as having *δαμονίαν ἰσχύον*, a Divine force in it); but thinking to find out an Atlas far more strong and immortal, and which can better hold all things together; *τὸ γὰρ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ δέον, οὐδὲν ἔννδειν καὶ ἔννέχειν* Good and fit, being not able, in their opinions, to hold, or bind any thing."

From which passage of Plato's we may conclude, that though Anaxagoras was so far convinced of Theism, as in profession to make one infinite Mind the cause of all things, matter only excepted; yet he had notwithstanding too great a tang of that old material and atheistical philosophy of his predecessors, still hanging about him, who resolved all the phenomena of nature into physical, and nothing into mental or final causes. And we have the rather told this long story of him, because it is so exact a parallel with the philosophic humour of some in this present age, who pretending to assert a God, do notwithstanding discard all mental and final causality from having any thing to do with the fabric of the world; and resolve all into material necessity and mechanism, into vortices, globuli and striate particles, and the like. Of which Christian philosophers we must needs pronounce, that they are not near so good Theists as Anaxagoras himself was, though so much condemned by Plato and Aristotle; forasmuch as he did not only as-

sert God to be the cause of motion, but also the governor, regulator and methodizer of the same; for the production of this harmonious system of the world, and therefore *τοῦ εὖ καὶ καλῶς αἰτίαν*, the cause of well and fit.—Whereas these utterly reject the latter, and only admitting the former, will needs suppose heaven and earth, plants and animals, and all things whatsoever in this orderly compages of the world, to have resulted merely from a certain quantity of motion, or agitation, at first impressed upon the matter, and determined to vortex.

xxxI. The chronology of the old philosophers having some uncertainty in it, we shall not scrupulously concern ourselves therein, but in the next place consider Parmenides, Xenophanes's auditor, and a philosophic poet likewise, but who, conversing much with two Pythagoreans, Aménias and Diochætes, was therefore looked upon as one, that was not a little addicted to the Pythagoric sect. That this Parmenides acknowledged many gods, is evident from what has been already cited out of him; notwithstanding which, he plainly asserted also one Supreme, making him, as Simplicius tells us, *αἰτίαν θεῶν*, the cause of all those other gods—of which Love is said to have been first produced. Which supreme Deity Parmenides, as well as Xenophanes, called *ἐν τῷ πᾶν*, one that was all—or the universe; but adding thereunto of his own, that it was also *ἀκίνητον*, immoveable.

Now, though it be true, that Parmenides's writings being not without obscurity, some of the ancients, who were less acquainted with metaphysical speculations, understood him physically,

as if he had asserted the whole corporeal universe to be all but one thing, and that immoveable, thereby destroying, together with the diversity of things, all motion, mutation and action; which was plainly to make Parmenides not to have been a philosopher, but a madman: yet Simplicius, a man well acquainted with the opinions of ancient philosophers, and who had by him a copy of Parmenides's poems, (then scarce, but since lost) assures us, that Parmenides dreamt of no such matter, and that he wrote *οὐ περὶ τοῦ φυσικοῦ στοιχείου, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ ὄντως ὄντος, ὅτι περὶ τῆς θείας ὑπεροχῆς*, not concerning a physical element or principle, but concerning the true Ens, or the Divine transcendency—adding, that though some of those ancient philosophers did not distinguish *τὰ φυσικά ἀπὸ τῶν ὑπὲρ φύσιν*, natural things from supernatural—yet the Pythagoreans, and Xenophanes, and Parmenides, and Empedocles, and Anaxagoras, did all *διακρίνειν*, handle these two distinctly—*καίπερ τῇ ἀσαφείᾳ λανθάνοντες τοὺς πολλοὺς*, however, by reason of their obscurity, it was not perceived by many—for which cause they have been most of them misrepresented, not only by Pagans, but also by Christian writers. For, as the same Simplicius informs us, Parmenides propounded two several doctrines, one after another; the first concerning theological and metaphysical things, called by him *ἀλήθειαν*, truth;—the second concerning physical and corporeal things, which he called *δόξαν*, opinion.—The transition betwixt which was contained in these verses of his;

*Ἐν τῷ σοι πάσαι πιστὸν λόγῳ ἠδὲ νόημα*

*Ἄμφις ἀληθείας δόξας δ' ἀπὸ τοῦδε βροτείου.*

*Μάθαν· κόσμον ἡμῶν ἰστίων ἀπατηλῶν ἀμύων.*



In the former of which doctrines, Parmenides asserted one immoveable principle; but in the latter, two moveable ones, fire and earth. He speaking of souls also as a certain middle or vinculum betwixt the incorporeal and the corporeal world, and affirming, that God did τὰς ψυχὰς πέμπειν ποτὲ μὲν ἐκ τοῦ ἐμφανοῦς εἰς τὸ ἀείδεις, ποτὲ δὲ ἀνάπαλιν, sometimes send and translate souls from the visible to the invisible regions, and sometimes again, on the contrary, from the invisible to the visible.—From whence it is plain, that when Parmenides asserted his one and all immoveable, he spake not as a physiologer, but as a metaphysician and theologer only. Which indeed was a thing so evident, that Aristotle<sup>a</sup> himself, though he had a mind to obscure Parmenides's sense, that he might have a fling at him in his *Physics*, yet could not altogether dissemble it. For when he thus begins, “There must of necessity be either one principle or many; and if there be but one, then must it either be immoveable, as Parmenides and Melissus affirm, or else moveable, ὡπερ οἱ φυσικοὶ, as the naturalists or physiologers;” he therein intimates, that when Parmenides and Melissus made one immoveable the principle of all things, they did not write this as physiologers. And afterward he confesses, that this controversy, whether there were one immoveable principle, does not belong to natural philosophy, but to some other science. But this is more plainly declared by him elsewhere,<sup>b</sup> writing concerning Parmenides and Melissus after this manner: εἰ καὶ τ' ἄλλα λέγουσι καλῶς, ἀλλ' οὐ φυσικῶς γε

<sup>a</sup> *Physicæ Auscultat. lib. i. cap. ii. p. 446. tom. i. oper.*

<sup>b</sup> *De Cælo, lib. iii. cap. i. p. 668.*

δεῖ νομίζειν λέγειν, τὸ γὰρ εἶναι ἅτα τῶν ὄντων ἀκίνητα καὶ ὅλως ἀκίνητα, μᾶλλον ἐστὶν ἑτέρας καὶ προτέρας, ἢ τῆς φυσικῆς ἐπισκέψεως. Though it be granted, that Parmenides and Melissus otherwise said well, yet we must not imagine them to have spoken physically. For this, that there is something unmade and immoveable, does not so properly belong to physics, as to a certain other science, which is before it.

Wherefore Parmenides, as well as Xenophanes's master, by his one and all, meant nothing else but the supreme Deity, he calling it also immoveable. For the supreme Deity was by these ancient philosophers styled, first τὸ ἐν and μονάς, a unity and monad—because they conceived, that the first and most perfect being, and the beginning of all things, must needs be the most simple. Thus Eudorus in Simplicius<sup>a</sup> declares their sense; ἀρχὴν ἔφασαν εἶναι τῶν πάντων τὸ ἐν, ὡς καὶ τῆς ὕλης καὶ τῶν ὄντων πάντων, ἐξ αὐτοῦ γεγενημένων, τοῦτο δὲ εἶναι τὸν ὑπεράνω θεόν. These ancients affirmed, that the one, or unity, was the first Principle of all; matter itself, as well as other things, being derived from it; they meaning by this one that highest or supreme God, who is over all.—And Syrianus to the same purpose,<sup>b</sup> οἱ θεῖοι ἑκάστοι ἀνδρες, τὸ ἐν θεὸν ἔλεγον, ὡς ἐνώσεως τοῖς ὅλοις αἰτίον, καὶ παντὸς τοῦ ὄντος καὶ πάσης ζωῆς. Those Divine men called God the One, as being the cause of unity to all things, as likewise he was of being and life. And Simplicius concludes, that Parmenides's ἐν ὄν, one Ens, was a certain Divine principle, superior to

<sup>a</sup> Comment in Physic. Aristot. p. 39. edit. Græc. Aldin.

<sup>b</sup> Ex MS. Commen in libr. aliquot. Metaphysic. Aristotel.

mind or intellect, and more simple. λέγεται οὖν τὸ νοητὸν πάντων αἰτίον, δι' ὃ καὶ ὁ νοῦς ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ νοεῖν, ἐν ᾧ πάντα κατὰ μίαν ἔνωσιν συνηρημένως κατείληπται, καὶ ἡνωμένως, τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ Παρμενίδειον ἐν ὄν. It remaineth, therefore, that that Intelligible, which is the cause of all things, and therefore of mind and understanding too, in which all things are contained and comprehended compactly, and in a way of unity; I say, that this was Parmenides' one Ens or Being.

In the next place, Parmenides, with the others of those ancients, called also his ἐν ὄν, τὸ πᾶν, his one Ens or first most simple Being, all, or the universe—because it virtually contained all things, and, as Simplicius writes, πάντα διακεκρυμένως ἐμφαίνεται ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, all things are from this one, distinctly displayed.—For which cause, in Plato's Parmenides, this one is said to be ἐπὶ πάντα πολλὰ ὄντα νενεμημένον, distributed into all things, that are many.—But that Parmenides by his ἐν τὸ πᾶν, one and all—or the universe, did not understand the corporeal world, is evident from

In Phys. f. 17. 2. hence, because he called it ἀδιαίρετον, or indivisible—and, as Simplicius observes, supposed it to have no magnitude; because that, which is perfectly one, can have no parts.

Wherefore it may be here observed, that this expression of ἐν τὸ πᾶν, one being all—hath been used in very different senses: for as Parmenides and Xenophanes understood it of the supreme Deity, that one most perfect and most simple Being was the original of all things; so others of them meant it atheistically, concerning the most imperfect and lowest of all beings, matter or body, they affirming all things to be nothing but

one and the same matter diversely modified. Thus much we learn from that place of Aristotle in his *Metaphysics*: ὅσοι μὲν οὖν ἐν τε τὸ πᾶν καὶ μίαν εἶναι τινα φύσιν ὡς ὕλην τιθέασι, καὶ ταύτην σωματικὴν καὶ μέγεθος ἔχουσαν, δῆλον ὅτι πολ- λαχῶς ἀμαρτάνουσι. L. i. c. vii. [p. 274. tom. iv. oper.] They who affirm one to be all in this sense, as if all things were nothing but one and the same matter, and that corporeal and endued with magnitude, it is manifest, that they err sundry ways.—But here is a great difference betwixt these two to be observed, in that the atheistical assertors of one and all (whether they meant water or air by it, or something else) did none of them suppose their one and all to be immoveable, but moveable: but they, whose principle was one and all immoveable (as Parmenides, Melissus and Zeno) could not possibly mean any thing else thereby, but the Deity; that there was one most simple, perfect and immutable Being incorporeal, which virtually contained all things, and from which all things were derived. But Heraclitus, who is one of those, who are said to have affirmed ἐν εἶναι τὸ πᾶν, that one was all, or that the universe was but one thing—might possibly have taken both those senses together (which will also agree in the Stoical hypothesis) that all things were both from one God, and from one fire; they being both alike corporeal Theists, who supposed an intellectual fire to be the first Principle of all things.

And though Aristotle in his *Physics* quarrels very much with Parmenides and Melissus, for making one immoveable Principle; yet in his *Metaphysics* himself doth plainly close with it, and own it as very good divinity, that there is one in-

corporeal and immoveable Principle of all things, and that the supreme Deity is an immoveable nature:

*εἴπερ ὑπάρχει τὰ οὐσία τοιαύτη, λέγω δὲ χωριστὴ καὶ ἀκίνητος, ἧπερ πειράσομαι δεικνύσαι, ἐνταῦθα ἂν εἴη πρὸς καὶ τὸ θεῖον, καὶ αὐτὴ ἂν εἴη πρώτη καὶ κυριώτατη ἀρχή.* If there be any such substance as this, that is separate (from matter, or incorporeal) and immoveable (as we shall afterwards endeavour to shew that there is), then the Divinity ought to be placed here, and this must be acknowledged to be the first and most proper principle of all.—But lest any should suspect, that Aristotle, if not Parmenides also, might, for all that, hold many such immoveable principles, or many eternal, uncreated and self-existent beings, as so many partial causes of the world,\*

Simplicius assures us, *μη γέγονενα δόξαν πολλὰς καὶ ἀκινήτους τὰς ἀρχὰς λέγουσαν, i. e.* that though divers of the ancient philosophers asserted a plurality of moveable principles (and some indeed an infinity), yet there never was any opinion entertained amongst philosophers, of many, or more than one, immoveable principles.—From whence it may be concluded, that no philosopher ever asserted a multitude of unmade, self-existent minds, or independent deities, as co-ordinate principles of the world.

Indeed, Plotinus seems to think, that Parmenides in his writings, by his *τὸ ὄν*, or *Ens*, did frequently mean a perfect mind or intellect, there being no true entity (according to him) below that which understands; (which mind, though incorporeal, was likened by him to a sphere, because it comprehends all within itself, and because in-

\* In Phys. Aristotel. fol. xvii.

tellection is not from without, but from within); but that when again he called his On or Ens one, he gave occasion thereby to some to quarrel with him, as making the same both one and many; intellect being that, which contains the ideas of all things in it. Wherefore Parmenides's whole philosophy (saith he) was better digested and more exactly and distinctly set down in Plato's Parmenides, where he acknowledgeth three unities subordinate, or a trinity of Divine hypostases; *ὁ παρὰ Πλάτωνι Παρμενίδης, ἀκριβέστερον λέγων, διαμὰ αὐτ' ἑλλήλων, τὸ πρῶτον ἐν, ὁ κυριώτερον ἐν. καὶ δεύτερον ἐν πολλὰ λέγων· καὶ τρίτον ἐν καὶ πολλὰ· καὶ σύμφωνος οὗτος καὶ αὐτός ἐστι ταῖς Τρισίν·* Parmenides, in Plato, speaking more exactly, distinguishes three Divine unities subordinate; the first of that which is perfectly and most properly one; the second of that, which was called by him one-many; the third of that, which is thus expressed, one and many. So that Parmenides did also agree in this acknowledgment of a trinity of Divine or archical hypostases.—Which observation of Plotinus is, by the way, the best key, that we know of, for that obscure book of Plato's Parmenides. Wherefore Parmenides thus asserting a trinity of Divine hypostases, it was the first of those hypostases that was properly called by him *ἐν τὸ πᾶν*, one the universe or all: that is, one most simple Being, the fountain and original of all. And the second of them (which is a perfect intellect) was, it seems, by him called, in way of distinction, *ἐν πολλὰ* or *πάντα*, one-many or one all things—by which all things are meant the intelligible ideas of things, that are all contained together in one perfect Mind. And of those was Parmenides to be

understood also, when he affirmed, that all things did stand, and nothing flow; not of singular and sensible things, which, as the Heraclitics rightly affirmed, do indeed all flow; but of the immediate objects of the mind, which are eternal and immutable: Aristotle himself acknowledging, that no generation nor corruption belongeth to them, since there could be no immutable and certain science, unless there were some immutable, necessary and eternal objects of it. Wherefore, as the same Aristotle also declares, the true mean-

Met. l. iv. c. v.  
[p. 298. tom.  
iv. oper.] ing of that controversy betwixt the Heraclitics and Parmenideans, Whether all things did flow, or some things stand?

was the same with this, Whether there were any other objects of the mind, besides singular sensibles, that were immutable? and, consequently, whether there were any such thing as science or knowledge which had a firmitude and stability in it? For those Heraclitics, who contended, that the only objects of the mind were singular and sensible things, did with good reason consequently thereupon deny, that there was any certain and constant knowledge, since there can neither be any definition of singular sensibles, (as Aristotle writes) nor any demonstration concerning them. But the Parmenideans, on the contrary, who maintained the firmitude and stability of science, did as reasonably conclude thereupon, that besides singular sensibles, there were other objects of the mind, universal, eternal and immutable, which they called the intelligible ideas, all originally contained in one archetypal mind or understanding, and from thence participated by infe-

\* Metaph. lib. i. cap. vi. p. 272. tom. iv. oper.

rior minds and souls. But it must be here acknowledged, that Parmenides and the Pythagoreans went yet a step further, and did not only suppose those intelligible ideas to be the eternal and immutable objects of all science; but also, as they are contained in the Divine intellect, to be the principles and causes of all other things. For thus Aristotle declares their sense; *αἰτία τὰ εἶδη τοῖς ἄλλοις*; and again, *τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι* Met. i. i. c. vi. ἐκάστῳ τῶν ἄλλων τὰ εἶδη παρέχονται, τοῖς δὲ [p. 273. tom. iv. oper.] εἶδει τὸ εἶν. The ideas are the causes of

all other things; and the essence of all other things below is imparted to them from the ideas, as the ideas themselves derive their essence from the first unity: those ideas in the Divine understanding being looked upon by these philosophers, as the paradigms and patterns of all created things. Now these ideas being frequently called by the Pythagoreans Numbers, we may from hence clearly understand the meaning of that seemingly-monstrous paradox or puzzling Griphus of theirs, that Numbers were the causes and principles of all things, or that all things were made out of Numbers; it signifying indeed no more than this, that all things were made from the ideas of the Divine intellect, called Numbers; which themselves also were derived from a monad or unity: Aristotle somewhere<sup>b</sup> intimating this very account of that assertion, *τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς αἰτίους εἶναι τοῖς ἄλλοις τῆς οὐσίας*, that Numbers were the causes of the essence of other things—namely, because *τὰ εἶδη ἀριθμοί*, the ideas were numbers. Though we are not ignorant, how the Pythagoreans made also

<sup>a</sup> Aristot. *Metaphys.* lib. i. cap. vi. p. 272.

<sup>b</sup> *Ibid.*



all the numbers within the decad, to be symbols of things. But besides these two Divine hypostases already mentioned, Parmenides seems to have asserted also a third, which, because it had yet more alterity, for distinction's sake was called by him, neither ἐν τῷ πᾶν, one the universe or all—nor ἐν πάντα, one-all things—but ἐν καὶ πάντα, one and all things:—and this is taken by Plotinus to be the eternal Psyche, that actively produceth all things, in this lower world, according to those Divine ideas.

In Arist. Phys. But that Parmenides, by his one-all  
 fol. vii. xvii. immoveable, really understood nothing  
 xxxi. else but the supreme Deity, is further unquestionably evident from those verses of his cited by Simplicius, but not taken notice of by Stephanus in his Poesis Philosophica, of which we shall only set down some few here.

— ὡς ἀγέννητον εἶναι καὶ ἀσώφραστον ἔστιν,  
 οὐδέ τιθεν' ἐν, οὐδ' ἔσται, ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἰμοῦ πᾶν  
 "Ἐν σπουδαίῳ· τίνα γὰρ γέννη διζήμεν αὐτοῦ;  
 Αὐτὰρ ἀλείπτει μέγιστον ἐν σείρασι δεσμοῖν,  
 ταυτὲν εἶ ἐν ταυτέῳ τε μέντοι, καθ' ἑαυτὸν τε κείναι· ἔτα.

In which, together with those that follow, the supreme Deity is plainly described as one single, solitary, and most simple being, unmade or self-existent, and necessarily existing, incorporeal and devoid of magnitude, altogether immutable or unchangeable, whose duration therefore was very different from that of ours, and not in a way of flux or temporary succession, but a constant eternity, without either past or future. From whence it may be observed, that this opinion of a standing eternity, different from that flowing succes-

sion of time, is not so novel a thing as some would persuade, nor was first excogitated by Christian writers, schoolmen or fathers, it being at least as old as Parmenides; from whom it was also afterward received and entertained by the best of the other Pagan philosophers; however it hath been of late so much decried, not only by atheistical writers, but other precocious and conceited wits also, as nonsense and impossibility. It is well known, that Melissus held forth the very same doctrine with Parmenides, of one Immoveable, that was all, which he plainly affirmed to be incorporeal likewise, as Parmenides did; *καὶ ὁ Μελισσός ἐν ἑὸν φησι, δεῖν αὐτὸ αἶμα μὴ ἔχειν, εἰ δὲ ἔχει πάχος, ἔχει ἐν μόρῃ.* Melissus also declared, that his one *Eus* must needs be devoid of body, because if it had any Simplia. Ar. Phys. f. 49. crassities in it, it would have parts.—But the only difference that was between them was this, that Parmenides called this one immoveable that was all *πεπερισμένον*, finite or determined,—but Melissus *ἄπειρον*, infinite—which difference notwithstanding was in words only, there being none at all as to the reality of their sense: whilst each of them endeavoured, in a different way, to set forth the greatest perfection of the Deity; there being an equivocation in those words finite and infinite, and both of them signifying in one sense perfection, but in another imperfection. And the disagreeing agreement of these two philosophers with one another, Parmenides and Melissus, as also of Xenophanes with them both concerning the Deity, is well declared by Simplicius after this manner; *οὐδὲν δὲ ἴσως χεῖρον ὀλίγον* Ar. Phys. f. 7. *παρεβάντα, τοῖς φιλομαθεστέροις ἐπιδεικναι, πῶς*

καίτοι διαφέρειν δοκούντες οἱ παλαιοὶ περὶ τὰς τῶν ἀρχῶν δόξας, ἐναρμονίως ὁμως συμφέρονται. Καὶ γὰρ οἱ μὲν περὶ τῆς νοητῆς καὶ πρώτης ἀρχῆς διελέχθησαν, ὡς Ξενοφάνης καὶ Παρμενίδης καὶ Μελισσος· ὁ μὲν Παρμενίδης ἐν λέγων καὶ πεπερασμένον· ἀνάγκη γὰρ τὸ ἐν τοῦ πλήθους προὔπαρχειν, καὶ τὸ πᾶσιν ὄρον καὶ πέρατος αἴτιον, κατὰ τὸ πέρασ μᾶλλον ἢ περὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀπειρίαν ἀφορίζεσθαι, καὶ τὸ πάντη τε τέλειον τὸ τέλος τὸ οἰκείον ἀπειληφός, πεπερασμένον εἶναι, μᾶλλον δὲ τέλος τῶν πάντων ὡς ἀρχή· τὸ γὰρ ἀτελὲς ἐνδῆες ὄν, οὐπω πέρασ ἀπειληφε· Μελισσος δὲ τὸ μὲν ἀμετάβλητον ὁμοίως καὶ αὐτὸς ἐθεάσατο, κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἀνέκλειπτον τῆς οὐσίας, καὶ τὸ ἀπειρον τῆς δυνάμεως, ἀπειρον αὐτὸ ἀπεφήνατο, ὡσπερ καὶ ἀγέννητον· πλὴν ὁ μὲν Ξενοφάνης ὡς πάντων αἴτιον, καὶ πάντων ὑπερανέχον, καὶ κινήσεως αὐτὸ καὶ ἡρεμίας καὶ πάσης ἀντιστοιχείας ἐπέκεινα τίθησιν, ὡσπερ καὶ ὁ Πλάτων ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ ὑποθέσει· ὁ δὲ Παρμενίδης, τὸ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχον αὐτοῦ, καὶ πάσης μεταβολῆς, τάχα δὲ καὶ ἐνεργείας καὶ δυνάμεως ἐπέκεινα, θεασάμενος, ἀκίνητον αὐτὸ ἀννυμεῖ. Perhaps it will not be improper for us to digress a little here, and to gratify the studious and inquisitive reader, by shewing, how those ancient philosophers, though seeming to dissent in their opinions concerning the principles, did notwithstanding harmoniously agree together. As, first of all, they who discoursed concerning the intelligible and first principle of all, Xenophanes, Parmenides and Melissus; of whom Parmenides called it one finite and determined; because as unity must needs exist before multitude, so that, which is to all things the cause of measure, bound and determination, ought rather to be described by measure and finitude than infinity; as also that which is every way perfect, and hath attained its own end, or rather is the end of all things (as it was the beginning) must needs be of a determi-

nate nature; for that which is imperfect and therefore indigent, hath not yet attained its term or measure. But Melissus, though considering the immutability of the Deity, likewise yet, attending to the inexhaustible perfection of its essence, the unlimitedness and unboundedness of its power, declareth it to be infinite, as well as ingenit or unmade. Moreover, Xenophanes looking upon the Deity, as the cause of all things, and above all things, placed above motion and rest, and all those antitheses of inferior beings, as Plato likewise doth in the first hypothesis of his Parmenides; whereas Parmenides and Melissus, attending to its stability and constant immutability, and its being perhaps above energy and power, praised it as immoveable.—From which of Simplicius it is plain, that Parmenides, when he called God *πεπερασμένον*, finite and determined—was far from meaning any such thing thereby, as if he were a corporeal Being of finite dimensions, as some have ignorantly supposed; or as if he were any way limited as to power and perfection; but he understood it in that sense, in which *πέρας* is taken by Plato, as opposite to *ἀπειρία*, and for the greatest perfection; and as God is said to be *πέρας καὶ μέτρον πάντων*, the term and measure of all things.—But Melissus calling God *ἄπειρον*, infinite—in the sense before declared, as thereby to signify his inexhaustible power and perfection, his eternity and incorruptibility, doth therein more agree with our present theology, and the now received manner of speaking. We have the rather produced all this, to shew how curious the ancient philosophers were in their inquiries after God, and how exact in their descriptions of him.

Wherefore however Anaximander's Infinite were nothing but eternal senseless matter (though called by him the τὸ θεῖον, the divinest thing of all) yet Melissus's ἀκίνητον, or Infinite, was the true Deity.

With Parmenides and Melissus fully agreed Zeno Eleates also, Parmenides's scholar, that one immoveable was all, or the original of all things; he meaning thereby nothing else but the supreme Deity. For though it be true, that this Zeno did excogitate certain arguments against the local motion of bodies, proceeding upon the hypothesis of the infinite divisibility of body, one of which was famously known by that name of Achilles, because it pretended to prove, that it was impossible (upon the hypothesis) for the swift-footed Achilles ever to overtake the creeping snail; (which arguments of his, whether or no they are well answered by Aristotle,<sup>a</sup> is not here to our purpose to inquire) yet all this was nothing else but *lusus ingenii*, a sportful exercise of Zeno's wit, he being a subtile logician and disputant, or perhaps an endeavour also to shew, how puzzling and perplexing to human understanding, the conception even of the most vulgar and confessed phenomena of nature may be. For that Zeno Eleates, by his one Immoveable that was all, meant not the corporeal world, no more than Melissus, Parmenides, and Xenophanes, is evident from Aristotle writing thus concerning him; τὸ τοιοῦτος ἐν ᾧ τὸν θεὸν λέγει, οὔτε κινεῖσθαι, οὔτε κινητὸν εἶναι, Zeno by his one Ens, which neither was moved, nor moveable, meaneth God. Moreover the same Aristotle informs us, that this Zeno endeavoured

<sup>a</sup> Physic. lib. vi. cap. xiv. p. 359. tom. i. oper.

to demonstrate, that there was but one God, from that idea, which all men have of him, as that which is the best, the supreme and most powerful of all, or as an absolutely perfect Being: *εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ὁ θεὸς ἀπάντων κράτιστος, ἕνα φησὶ προσήκειν αὐτόν* If God be the best of all things, then he must needs be one.—

De Xenoph.  
Ze. et Gor.  
[cap. iii. p.  
340. tom. i.  
oper.]

Which argument was thus pursued by him; *τοῦτο θεὸς καὶ θεοῦ δύναμις κρατεῖν ἀλλὰ μὴ κρατεῖσθαι ὥστε καθὸ μὴ κρείττον, κατὰ τοσοῦτον οὐκ εἶναι θεῶν πλειόνων οὐδ' ὄντων, εἰ μὲν εἶεν τὰ μὲν ἀλλήλων κρείττους, τὰ δὲ ἥττους, οὐκ ἂν εἶναι θεούς· πεφυκέναι γὰρ θεὸν μὴ κρατεῖσθαι ἴσων δὲ ὄντων, οὐκ ἂν ἔχεν θεὸν φύσει δῶν εἶναι κράτιστον τὸ δὲ ἴσον, οὔτε βέλτιον οὔτε χεῖρον εἶναι τῷ ἴσῳ ὥστ' εἴπερ εἴη τε, καὶ τοιοῦτον εἴη θεός, ἕνα μόνον εἶναι τὸν θεὸν οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδὲ πάντα δύνασθαι ἂν βούλοιο*. This is God, and the power of God, to prevail, conquer, and rule over all. Wherefore, by how much any thing falls short of the best, by so much does it fall short of being God. Now if there be supposed more such beings, whereof some are better, some worse, those could not be all gods, because it is essential to God not to be transcended by any; but if they be conceived to be so many equal gods, then would it not be the nature of God to be the best, one, equal being, neither better nor worse than another: wherefore if there be a God, and this be the nature of him, then can there be but one. And indeed otherwise he could not be able to do whatever he would.

Empedocles is said to have been an emulator of Parmenides also, which must be understood of his metaphysics, because in his physiology (which was atomical) he seems to have trans-

cended him. Now that Empedocles acknowledged one supreme and universal Numen, and that incorporeal too, may be concluded from what

P. 26. hath been already cited out of his philosophic poems. Besides which the writer De Mundo\* (who, though not Aristotle, yet was a Pagan of good antiquity) clearly affirmeth, that Empedocles derived all things whatsoever from one supreme Deity; τὰ γὰρ δι' ἀέρος ἄπαντα, καὶ ἐπὶ γῆς, καὶ τὰ ἐν ὕδατι, θεοῦ λέγοντ' ἀν' ὄντως ἔργα εἶναι, τοῦ τὸν κόσμον ἐπέχοντος· ἐξ οὗ κατὰ τὸν φυσικὸν Ἐμπεδοκλέα,

πάνθ' ὅσα τ' ἦν, ὅσα τ' ἔστιν, ἢ ὅσα τι ἴσται ἰεῖσθαι, &c.

All the things, that are upon the earth, and in the air and water, may truly be called the works of God, who ruleth over the world. Out of whom, according to the physical Empedocles, proceed all things that were, are, and shall be, viz. plants, men, beasts and gods. Which notwithstanding we conceive to be rather true as to Empedocles' sense than his words; he affirming, as it seems, in that cited place, that all these things were made, not immediately out of God, but out of contention and friendship; because Simplicius, who was furnished with a copy of Empedocles's poems, twice brings in that cited passage of his in this connexion:

Ἐν δὲ κότῳ διέμορφα καὶ ἀνδρα πάντα κίλονται,  
 Σὺν δ' ἴβη ἐν φιλότῳ καὶ ἀλλήλοισι ποθεῖται,  
 Ἐκ τῶν γὰρ πάνθ' ὅσα τ' ἦν, ὅσα τ' ἔστι, καὶ ἴσται,  
 Δένδρα τε βεβλήστικα, καὶ ἄνδρες ἠδὲ γυναῖκες,  
 Θῆρες τ', οἰσὶν τε, καὶ ἰδατοθρίμμισσι ἰχθύε,  
 Καὶ τι θεοὶ δουλοχαιώτες τιμῆαι φέρονται.

\* Cap. vi. p. 863. tom. i. oper. Aristot.

Things are divided and segregated by contention, but joined together by friendship; from which two (contention and friendship) all that was, is, and shall be, proceeds; as trees, men and women, beasts, birds and fishes; and, last of all, the long-lived and honourable gods.—Wherefore the sense of Empedocles's words here was this; that the whole created world, together with all things belonging to it, viz. plants, beasts, men and gods, was made from contention and friendship. Nevertheless, since, according to Empedocles, contention and friendship did themselves depend also upon one supreme Deity, which he with Parmenides and Xenophanes called *Τὸ ἓν*, or the very one—the writer, *De Mundo*, might well conclude, that, according to Empedocles, all things whatsoever, and not only men, but gods, were derived from one supreme Deity. And that this was indeed Empedocles's sense, appears plainly from Aristotle in his *Metaphysics*, *Τίθησι μὲν γὰρ [Ἐμπεδοκλῆς] ἀρχὴν τινα τῆς φθορᾶς τὸ νεῖκος, δόξειε δ' ἂν οὐθὲν ἦττον καὶ τοῦτο γενεῶν ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ Ἐνός.* *Ἀπαντα γὰρ ἐκ τούτου τ' ἄλλα ἐστὶ πλὴν ὁ Θεός· λέγει γοῦν,*

*Ἐξ ἑνὸς πάνθ' ὄσα τ' ἦν, ὄσα τ' ἰσθ', ὄσα τ' ἰστραὶ ἰσίστου, &c.*

Empedocles makes contention to be a certain principle of corruption and generation: nevertheless, he seems to generate this contention itself also from the very one (that is, from the supreme Deity). For all things, according to him, are from this contention, God only excepted; he writing after this manner, from which (that is, contention and friendship) all the things that have

L. iii. s. iv.  
[p. 295. tom.  
iv. oper.]



been, are, and shall be (plants, beasts, men and gods) derived their original.—For Empedocles it seems supposed, that were it not for *νεῖκος*, discord or contention, all things would be one: so that, according to him, all things whatsoever proceeded from contention or discord, together with a mixture of friendship, save only the supreme God, who hath therefore no contention at all in him, because he is essentially τὸ ἐν, unity itself and friendship.—From whence Aristotle takes occasion to quarrel with Empedocles, as if it would follow from his principles, that the supreme and most happy God was the least wise of all, as being not able to know any thing besides himself, or in

the world without him; διὸ καὶ συμβαίνει  
Met. I. iii. c. iv. [p. 295. tom. iv. oper.] αὐτῷ, τὸν εὐδαιμονέστατον θεὸν ἧττον φρονίμον  
 εἶναι τῶν ἄλλων, οὐ γὰρ γνωρίζει τὰ στοιχεῖα  
 πάντα, τὸ γὰρ νεῖκος οὐκ ἔχει ἢ δὲ γνώσει τοῦ ὁμοίου τῷ  
 ὁμοίῳ.

*Γαῖη μὲν γὰρ (φῶς) γαῖαν ἐπέσκαμαν, ὕδατι δ' ὕδαρ, &c.*

This therefore happens to Empedocles, that, according to his principles, the most happy God is the least wise of all other things, for he cannot know the elements, because he hath no contention in him; all knowledge being by that, which is like; himself writing thus: We know earth by earth, water by water, air by air, and fire by fire; friendship by friendship, and contention by contention.—But to let this pass; Empedocles here making the gods themselves to be derived from contention and friendship, the supreme Deity, or most happy God, only excepted, (who hath no contention in him, and from whom contention and friendship themselves were derived) plainly acknowledged both one unmade Deity, the

original of all things under the name of τὸ ἕν, the very one—and many other inferior gods, generated or produced by him; they being juniors to contention, or discord, as this was also junior to unity, the first and supreme Deity. Which gods of Empedocles, that were begotten from contention (as well as men and other things) were doubtless the stars and demons.

Moreover, we may here observe, that, according to Empedocles's doctrine, the true original of all the evil, both of human souls and demons (which he supposed alike lapsable) was derived from that *νεῖκος*, discord and contention, that is necessarily contained in the nature of them, together with the ill use of their liberty, both in this present and their pre-existent state. So that Empedocles here trod in the footsteps of Pythagoras, whose praises he thus loudly sang forth in his poems;

Ἦν δὲ τις ἐν κείνοις ἀπὸ περιόσια εἰδὼς,  
 \*Ὅς δὲ μέγιστον κραδίῳ ἐπέσαστο πλούτῳ,  
 Παιδείῃ τε μέγιστ' ἐσφῶσεν ἰστίαν ἔργῳ, &c.

Porphyr. de  
 Vit. Pyth. p.  
 194. [ed.  
 Cantab. p. 35.  
 ed. Kusteri.]

Horum de numero quidam præstantia norat  
 Plurima, mentis opes amplas sub pectore servans,  
 Omnia vestigans sapientum docta reperta, &c.

XXII. Before we come to Socrates and Plato, we shall here take notice of some other Pythagoreans, and eminent philosophers, who clearly asserted one supreme and universal Numen, though doubtless acknowledging withal other inferior gods. Philo in his book *De Mundi Opificio*, writing of the hebdomad or septenary number, and observing, that, according to the Pythagoreans, it was called both a motherless and a virgin number, because

it was the only number within the decad, which was neither generated, nor did itself generate, tells us, that therefore it was made by them a symbol of the supreme Deity, οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι τὸν ἀριθμὸν τοῦτον ἐξομοιοῦσι τῷ ἡγεμόνι τῶν συμπάντων. The Pythagoreans likened this number to the Prince and Governor of all things, or the supreme Monarch of the universe—as thinking it to bear a resemblance of his immutability: which fancy of theirs was taken notice of by us. However, Philo hereupon occasionally cites this remarkable testimony of Philolaus the Pythagorean; Ἔστι γὰρ, φησὶν, ἡγεμὼν καὶ ἀρχὼν ἀπάντων ὁ Θεός, εἰς αἰὲ ὦν, μόνιμος, ἀκίνητος, αὐτὸς αὐτῷ ὅμοιος, ἕτερος τῶν ἄλλων. God (saith he) is the Prince and Ruler over all, always one, stable, immoveable, like to himself, but unlike to every thing else.—To which may be added what in Stobæus is further recorded out of the same Philolaus; ἦν ὁδε ὁ κόσμος ἐξ αἰῶνος, καὶ εἰς αἰῶνα διαμενεῖ, εἰς ὑπὸ ἐνός

Eocl. Phys. τῷ συγγενέῳ καὶ κρατίστῳ κυβερνώμενος. This  
P. 4. world was from eternity, and will remain to eternity, one governed by one, which is cognate and the best.—Where notwithstanding he seemeth, with Ocellus, to maintain the world's pre-eternity. And again, διὸ καὶ καλῶς ἔχειν ἔλεγε, κόσμον ἡμεν ἐνέργειαν αἰδίων θεῶ τε καὶ γενέσιον. Wherefore, said Philolaus, the world might well be called the eternal energy or effect of God, and of successive generation.

Jamblichus, in his Protreptics, cites a passage out of Archytas, another Pythagorean, to the same purpose; ὅστις ἀναλύσαι οἷός τε ἐστὶ πάντα τὰ γένηα ὑπὸ μίαν τε καὶ αὐτὴν ἀρχάν, οὗτος δοκεῖ μοι καλὰν σκοπιὰν εὐρηκέναι, ἀφ' οὗ δυνατὸς ἐσσεῖται τὸν

C. iv. p. 20.

Θεὸν κατοφείσθαι, &c. Whosoever is able to reduce all kinds of things under one and the same principle, this man seems to me to have found out an excellent specula, or high station, from whence he may be able to take a large view and prospect of God, and of all other things; and he shall clearly perceive, that God is the beginning and end, and middle of all things, that are performed according to justice and right reason.—Upon which words of Archytas, Jamblichus thus glosseth: “Archytas here declares the end of all theological speculation to be this, not to rest in many principles, but to reduce all things under one and the same head.” Adding, *τοιαντή ἐπιτήμη τοῦ ἐνός, τέλος ἐστὶ πάσης θεωρίας*, that this knowledge of the first Unity, the Original of all things, is the end of all contemplation.—Moreover, Stobæus cites this out of Archytas’s book of principles, viz. That besides matter and form, *ἀναγκαιο- Ecol. Ph. p.82. τέραν τινὰ εἶμεν αἰτίαν, τὰν κινάσουσιν ἐνεστώτων πραγμάτων ἐπὶ τὰν μορφῶ, ταῦτα δὲ τὰν πρώταν δυνάμει, καὶ καθηπερτάταν εἶμεν, ὀνομάζεσθαι δὲ Θεόν, &c.* There is another more necessary cause, which moving, brings the form to the matter; and that this is the first and most powerful cause, which is fitly called God. So that there are three principles, God, matter, and form; God the artificer and mover, and matter that which is moved, and form the art introduced into the matter.—In which same Stobean excerption it also follows afterward, *δεῖ νόψ τι κρέσσον εἶναι, νόψ δὲ κρέσσον ἐστὶ ὅπερ ὀνομάζομεν Θεόν*. That there must be something better than mind; and that this thing better than mind is that which we (properly) call God.

Ocellus also in the same Stobæus thus writeth:

P. 32. [lib. i. συνέχει τὰ μὲν σκάνεα ζωᾶ, ταύτας δ' αἴτιον  
cap. xvi.] ψυχὰ τὸν δὲ κόσμον ἁρμονία, ταύτας δ' αἴτιον  
ὁ Θεός· τοὺς δ' οἴκως καὶ τὰς πόλιας ὁμόνοια, ταύτας δ'  
αἴτιος νόμος. Life contains the bodies of animals,

the cause of which life is the soul; concord contains houses and cities, the cause of which concord is law; and harmony contains the whole world, the cause of which mundane har-

mony is God.—And to the same purpose Aristæus, ὡς ὁ τεχνίτας ποτὶ τὰν τέχ-  
ναν, οὕτως Θεός ποθ' ἁρμονίαν, as the artificer is to art, so is God to the harmony of the world.—

There is also this passage in the same Stobæus cited out of an anonymous Pythagorean: Θεός μὲν

P. 8. ἔστιν ἀρχὴ καὶ πρῶτον, θεῖος δὲ ὁ κόσμος, God is the principle, and the first thing; and the world (though it be not the supreme God) yet is it Divine.

Timæus Locrus, a Pythagorean senior to Plato, in his book concerning Nature, or the Soul of the world (upon which Plato's Timæus was but a kind of commentary), plainly acknowledgeth both one supreme God, the maker and governor of the whole world, and also many other gods, his creatures and subordinate ministers; in the close thereof,<sup>a</sup> writing thus concerning the punishment of wicked men after this life: ἅπαντα δὲ ταῦτα ἐν δευτέρᾳ περιόδῳ ἡ Νέμεσις συνδιέκρινε, σὺν δαίμοσι παλαμαίοις χθονίοις τε, τοῖς ἐπόπταις τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων· οἷς ὁ πάντων ἀγμῶν Θεός ἐπέτρεψε διοίκησιν κόσμῳ συμπεπληρωμένῳ ἐκ θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων, τῶν τε ἄλλων ζώων, ὅσα δεδαμούρηται ποτ' εἰκόνα τὰν ἀρίστην εἶδος ἀγενάτω καὶ

<sup>a</sup> Timæus de Anima Mundi, p. 506. inter Scriptor. mythologic.  
a Tho. Gale editos.

αἰωνίου. All these things hath Nemesis decreed to be executed in the second circuit by the ministry of vindictive terrestrial demons, that are overseers of human affairs; to which demons that supreme God, the ruler over all, hath committed the government and administration of the world. Which world is completed and made up of gods, men, and other animals, all created according to the best pattern of the eternal and unmade idea.— In which words of Timæus there are these three several points of the Pagan theology contained; first, that there is one supreme God, eternal and unmade, the creator and governor of the whole world, and who made it according to the best pattern or exemplar of his own ideas and eternal wisdom. Secondly, that this world created by God is compounded and made up of other inferior gods, men, and brute animals. Thirdly, that the supreme God hath committed the administration of our human affairs to demons and inferior gods, who are constant inspectors over us, some of which he also makes use of for the punishment of wicked men after this life. Moreover, in this book of Timæus Locrus the supreme God is often called ὁ Θεός, and sometimes ὁ δαίμων, God in way of eminency;—sometimes Νόος mind—sometimes τὸ ἀγαθόν, the very Good—sometimes ἀρχὴ τῶν ἀρίστων, the Principle of the best things—sometimes δαμιουργός τοῦ βελτιότερου, the Maker of the better—(evil being supposed not to proceed from him;) sometimes κράτιστον αἰτίον, the best and most powerful Cause—sometimes ἀρχαγός καὶ γενέτωρ πάντων, the Prince and Parent of all things.—Which God, according to him, is not the soul of the world neither, but the creator

thereof, he having made the world an animal, and a secondary generated god;\* *δηλούμενος ὡς ἄριστον γέναμα ποιεῖν, τοῦτον ἐποίησεν θεὸν γενατὸν, οὐποκα φθαρησόμενον ὑπ' ἄλλω αἰτίῳ, ἔξω τῷ αὐτὸν συντεταγμένῳ θεῷ; εἴποκα δῆλετο αὐτὸν διαλύειν.* God willing to make the world the best that it was capable of, made it a generated god, such as should never be destroyed by any other cause, but only by that God himself, who framed it, if he should ever will to dissolve it. But since it is not the part of that which is good to destroy the best of works, the world will doubtless ever remain incorruptible and happy, the best of all generated things, made by the best cause, looking not at patterns artificially framed without him, but the idea and intelligible essence, as the paradigms, which whatsoever is made conformable to, must needs be the best, and such as shall never need to be mended.—Moreover, he plainly declares, that this generated god of his, the world, was produced in time, so as to have a beginning, *πρὶν ὠρανὸν γενέσθαι, λόγῳ ἦσθην ἰδέα τε καὶ ὕλα, καὶ ὁ θεὸς δαμιουργὸς τοῦ βελτίονος,* before the heaven was made, existed the idea, matter, and God the opifex of the best.—Wherefore, whatever Ocellus and Philolaus might do, yet this Timæus held not the world's eternity; wherein he followed not only Pythagoras himself (as we have already shewed) but also the generality of the first Pythagoreans, of whom Aristotle pro-

Met. l. i. c. vii.  
[p. 276. tom.  
iv. oper.]

nounces without exception, *γενῶσι γὰρ τὸν κόσμον,* that they generated the world.—

Timæus indeed in this book seems to assert the

pre-eternity of the matter, as if it were a self-existent principle together with God; and yet Clemens Alexandrinus cites a passage out of him looking another way, *ἀλλ' ἀντικρὺς καὶ μίαν ἀρχὴν καὶ παρ' Ἑλλήνων ἀκοῦσαι ποθεῖς; Τιμαῖος ὁ Λοκρός ἐν τῷ φυσικῷ συγγράμματι κατὰ λέξιν ὡδέ μοι μαρτυρήσει. Μία ἀρχὴ πάντων ἐστὶν ἀγέννητος, εἰ γὰρ ἐγένετο, οὐκ ἂν ἦν ἐτι ἀρχά, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνα ἀρχά, ἐξ ἧς ἐγένετο.* Would you hear of one only principle of all things amongst the Greeks? Timæus Locrus, in his book of Nature, will bear no witness thereof; he there in express words writing thus: There is one principle of all things unmade; for if it were made, it would not be a principle, but that would be the principle, from whence it was made.—Thus we see, that Timæus Locrus asserted one eternal and unmade God, the maker of the whole world, and besides this, another generated god, the world itself animated, with its several parts; the difference betwixt both which gods is thus declared by him: \* Θεὸν δὲ, τὸν μὲν αἰῶνιον νόος ὁρῆ μόνος, τῶν ἀπάντων ἀρχαγὸν καὶ γενέτορα τουτέων, τὸν δὲ γενατὸν ὄψει ὁρέομες, κόσμον δὲ τόνδε, καὶ τὰ μέρα αὐτῷ ὀκόσα ὠράνια ἐντί. That eternal God, who is the prince, original, and parent of all these things, is seen only by the mind; but the other generated god is visible to our eyes, viz. this world, and those parts of it which are heavenly;—that is, the stars, as so many particular gods contained in it. But here it is to be observed, that the eternal God is not only so called by Timæus, as being without beginning, but also as having a distinct



kind of duration from that of time, which is properly called *Æon*, or *Eternity*, he therein following *Parmenides*, εἰκὼν δὲ ἴστί τῷ ἀγενάτῳ χρόνῳ, ὃν αἰῶνα ποταγορασίμεσ· ὡς γάρ ποτ' αἰδίων παράδειγμα τὸν ἰδανικὸν κόσμον ὅδε ὠρανός· ἐγενάθη, οὕτως ὡς πρὸς παράδειγμα τὸν αἰῶνα ὅδε χρόνος σὺν κόσμῳ ἰδαμιουργήθη· Time is but an image of that unmade duration, which we call eternity: wherefore, as this sensible world was made according to that exemplar or pattern of the intelligible world, so was time made together with the world, as an imitation of eternity.

It hath been already observed, that

P. 233.

*Onatus*, another *Pythagorean*, took notice of an opinion of some in his time, that there was one only God, who comprehended the whole world, and no other gods besides, or at least, none such as was to be religiously worshipped; himself in the mean time asserting, that there was both one God and many gods; or, besides one supreme and universal Numen, many other inferior and particular deities, to whom also men ought to pay religious worship. Now his further account of both these assertions is contained

in these following words: τοὶ δὲ λέγοντες  
*Stob. Eccl. Phys. p. 5.* ἓνα θεὸν εἶμεν, ἀλλὰ μὴ πολλῶς ἀμαρτάνοντι· τὸ γὰρ μέγιστον ἀξίωμα τῆς θείας ὑπεροχῆς οὐ συνθεοροῦντι· λέγω δὲ τὸ ἄρχεν καὶ καθηγεσθαιτῶν ὁμοίων, καὶ κράτιστον καὶ καθσπερτερον εἶμεν τῶν ἄλλων· τοὶ δ' ἄλλοι θεοὶ ποτὶ τὸν προτὸν καὶ νοητὸν οὕτως ἔχοντι ὡσπερ χορευτὰ ποτὶ κορυφαῖον, καὶ στρατῶντα ποτὶ στραταγόν, καὶ λοχιτά, καὶ ἐνταταγμένοι ποτὶ ταξίαρχαν καὶ λοχαγέταν, ἔχοντε φύσιν, ἔπεσθαι καὶ ἐπακολουθεῖν τῷ καλῶς καθηγομένῳ· κοινὸν μὲν τῶν αὐτῶν τὸ ἔργον ἐστὶ, καὶ τῷ ἄρχοντι, καὶ τῶν ἀρχομένων, ἀλλ' οὐκέτι δύναπτο συντεράχθαι τοὶ ἀρχόμενοι

ποτὶ τὸ ἔργον, ἀπολειφθέντες ἀγεμόνος· ὥσπερ οὐδὲ χορευ-  
 ται ποτὶ συναϊδίαν, οὐδὲ στρατιῶται ποτὶ στρατηγίαν, ἀπο-  
 λειφθέντες ἀγεμόνος, τοὶ μὲν στραταγῶ, τοὶ δὲ κορυφαίω·  
 They who maintain, that there is only one God,  
 and not many gods, are very much mistaken, as  
 not considering aright, what the dignity and  
 majesty of the Divine transcendency chiefly con-  
 sisteth in, namely, in ruling and governing those  
 which are like to it (that is, gods) and in excel-  
 ling or surmounting others, and being superior to  
 them. But all those other gods which we con-  
 tend for, are to that first and intelligible God but  
 as the dancers to the Coryphæus or Choragus,  
 and as the inferior common soldiers to the captain  
 or general; to whom it properly belongeth, to fol-  
 low and comply with their leader and command-  
 er. The work indeed is common, or the same  
 to them both, to the ruler, and them that are  
 ruled; but they that are ruled could not orderly  
 conspire and agree together into one work, were  
 they destitute of a leader; as the singers and  
 dancers could not conspire together into one  
 dance and harmony, were they destitute of a Co-  
 rypheus; nor soldiers make up one orderly army,  
 were they without a captain or commander.

And as the supreme God is here called by Onatus  
 the Coryphæus of the gods, so is he in like manner  
 by the writer De Mundo\* styled the Coryphæus of  
 the world, or the Præcentor and Præsultor of it,  
 in these words: καθάπερ ἐν χορῶ, κορυφαίου κατὰρξάντος,  
 συνεπιχεῖ πᾶς ὁ χορὸς ἀνδρῶν, ἔσθ' ὅτι καὶ γυναικῶν, ἐν  
 διαφόροις φωναῖς ὀξεύτεραις καὶ βαρυντέραις, μίαν ἀρμονίαν  
 ἑμμελῆ κεραννύστων· οὕτως ἔχει καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ τὸ σύμπαν

\* Cap. vi. p. 861, 862. tom. i. oper. Aristotel.

διέποντος θεοῦ· κατὰ γὰρ τὸ ἄνωθεν ἐνδόσιμον ὑπὸ τοῦ  
 φερωνύμως ἂν κορυφαίου προσαγορευθέντος, κινεῖται μὲν  
 τὰ ἄστρα αἰεὶ καὶ ὁ σύμπας οὐρανός· As in a cho-  
 rus, when the Coryphæus or Præcentor hath  
 begun, the whole choir compounded of men, and  
 sometimes of women too, followeth, singing every  
 one their part, some in higher and some in lower  
 notes, but all mingling together into one complete  
 harmony; so in the world God, as the Cory-  
 phæus, the Præcentor and Præsultor, beginning  
 the dance and music, the stars and heavens move  
 round after him, according to those numbers and  
 measures which he prescribes them, altogether  
 making up one most excellent harmony.

It was also before observed, that Ecphantus  
 the Pythagorean, and Archelaus the successor of

P. 26. Anaxagoras (who were both of them

Atomists in their physiology) did assert  
 the world to have been made at first, and still to be  
 governed by one Divine mind; which is more than  
 some Atomists of ours in this present age, who  
 notwithstanding pretend to be very good Theists,  
 will acknowledge. We shall, in the next place,  
 mention Euclides Megarensis, the head of that  
 sect called Megaric, and who is said to have been  
 Plato's master for some time after Socrates's  
 death; whose doctrine is thus set down by Laer-  
 tius: <sup>b</sup> οὗτος ἐν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἀπεφαίνετο, πολλοῖς ὀνόμασι κα-  
 λούμενον· ὅτε μὲν γὰρ Φρόνησιν, ὅτε δὲ Θεόν, καὶ ἄλλοτε  
 Νοῦν, καὶ τὰ λοιπά· τὰ δὲ ἀντικείμενα τῷ Ἀγαθῷ ἀνήρει, μὴ  
 εἶναι φάσκων· Which we understand thus: That Eu-  
 clides (who followed Xenophanes and Parmeni-  
 des) made the first principle of all things to be one

<sup>a</sup> Cap. i. §. xxvi.

<sup>b</sup> Lib. ii. segm. cvi. p. 142.

the very Good, called sometimes Wisdom, sometimes God, sometimes Mind, and sometimes by other names; but that he took away all that is opposite to good, denying it to have any real entity—that is, he maintained, that there was no positive nature of evil, or that evil was no principle. And thus do we also understand that of Cicero,\* when he represents the doctrine of the Megarics after this manner, “*Id bonum solum esse, quod esset Unum, et Simile, et Idem, et Semper;*” to wit, that they spake this concerning God, That good or goodness itself is a name properly belonging to him, who is also one, and like, and the same, and always; and that the true good of man consisteth in a participation of, and conformity with this first Good. Which doctrine Plato seems to have derived from him, he in like manner calling the supreme Deity by those two names, τὸ ἓν and τὸ ἀγαθόν, the One and the Good, and concluding true human felicity to consist in a participation of the first Good, or of the Divine Nature.

In the next place we shall take notice of Antisthenes, who was the founder also of another sect, to wit, the Cynic; for he, in a certain physiological treatise, is said to have affirmed, “*Esse populares deos multos, sed naturalem unum;*” That though there were many popular gods, yet there was but one natural God—or, as it is expressed in Lactantius, “*Unum esse naturalem Deum, quamvis gentes et urbes suos habeant populares;*” That there was but one natural God, though nations and cities had their several popular

Cic. De N.  
D. l. i. [cap.  
xiii.]

De Ira D. c. xi.

\* Academ. Quæst. lib. iv. cap. xlii. p. 2325. tom. viii. oper.

ones.—Wherefore Velleius the Epicurean in Cicero<sup>a</sup> quarrels with this Antisthenes, as one, who destroyed the nature of the gods, because he denied a multitude of independent deities, such as Epicurus pretended to assert. For this of Antisthenes is not so to be understood, as if he had therein designed to take away all the inferior gods of the Pagans, which had he at all attempted, he would doubtless have been accounted an Atheist, as well as Anaxagoras was; but his meaning was, only to interpret the theology of the Pagans concerning those other gods of theirs, that were or might be looked upon as absolute and independent; that these, though many popular gods, yet indeed were but one and the same natural God, called by several names. As for example, when the Greeks worshipped Zeus, the Latins Jovis, the Egyptians Hammon, the Babylonians Bel, the Scythians Pappæus; these were indeed many popular gods, and yet nevertheless all but one and the same natural God. So again, when in the self-same Pagan cities and countries, the respective laws thereof made mention of several gods, as supreme and absolute in their several territories, as Jupiter in the heavens, Juno in the air, Neptune in the sea; or as being chief in several kind of functions, as Minerva for learning, Bellona for war, &c. (for this Aristotle takes notice of in his book against Zeno,<sup>b</sup> *κατὰ τὸν νόμον, πολλὰ κρείττους ἀλλήλων οἱ θεοὶ*, That according to the laws of cities and countries, one god was best for one thing, and another for another)—

<sup>a</sup> De Natur. Deor. lib. i. cap. xiii. p. 2898. tom. ix. oper.

<sup>b</sup> Cap. iv. p. 782. tom. ii. oper.

Antisthenes here declared concerning these also, that they were indeed many popular, or civil gods, but all really one and the same natural God.

To Antisthenes might be added Diogenes Sinopensis, of whom it is recorded by Laertius,<sup>a</sup> that observing a woman too superstitiously worshipping the statue or image of a god, endeavouring to abate her superstition, he thus bespake her; οὐκ εὐλαβῆ, ὦ γύναι, μή ποτε Θεοῦ ὀπισθεν ἐστῶτος (πάντα γάρ ἐστιν αὐτοῦ πλήρη) ἀσχημονήσης; Take you not care, O woman, of not behaving yourself unseemly in the sight of that God who stands behind you; for all things are full of him—thereby giving her occasion, more to mind and regard that supreme and universal Numen, that filleth the whole world and is every where.

XXIII. It hath been frequently affirmed, that Socrates died a martyr for one only God, in opposition to those many gods of the Pagans: and Tertullian,<sup>b</sup> for one, writeth thus of him, “Propterea damnatus est Socrates, quia deos destruebat;” Socrates was therefore condemned to die, because he destroyed the gods.—And, indeed, that Socrates asserted one supreme God, the maker and governor of the whole world, is a thing not at all to be doubted. In his discourse with Aristodemus, in Xenophon’s first book of Memoirs,<sup>c</sup> he convinced him, that the things of this world were not made by chance, but by mind and counsel; οὕτω γε σκοπούμενῳ πάνυ ἔοικε ταῦτα

<sup>a</sup> Lib. vi. segm. xxxvii. p. 333.

<sup>b</sup> In Apologet. cap. xiv. p. 144. edit. Havercamp.

<sup>c</sup> P. 573. oper. These words are not Socrates’s to Aristodemus, but Aristodemus’s to Socrates.

σοφοῦ τινος δημιουργοῦ, καὶ φιλοζώου τεχνήματι, I am now convinced from what you say, that the things of this world were the workmanship of some wise artificer, who also was a lover of animals.— And so he endeavoured to persuade him, that that mind and understanding, which is in us, was derived from some mind and understanding in the universe, as well as that earth and water, which is in us, from the earth and water of the universe: \* σὺ δὲ σεαυτὸν φρόνιμον τι δοκεῖς ἔχειν, ἄλλοθι δὲ οὐδαμοῦ οὐδὲν φρόνιμον εἶναι, εἰδὼς ὅτι γῆς τε μικρὸν μέρος ἐν τῷ σώματι πολλῆς οὐσης ἔχεις, καὶ ὑγροῦ βραχὺ, πολλοῦ ὄντος, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων δήπου μεγάλων ὄντων ἐκάστον μικρὸν μέρος λαβόντι τὸ συνήρμοσταί σοι; νουν δὲ μόνον ἄρα οὐδαμοῦ ὄντα σε εὐτυχῶς πως δοκεῖς συναρπάσαι; Do you think that you only have wisdom in yourself, and that there is none any where else in the whole world without you? though you know that you have but a small part in your body of that vast quantity of earth which is without you; and but little of that water and fire, and so of every other thing, that your body is compounded of, in respect of that great mass and magazine of them, which is in the world. Is mind and understanding therefore the only thing, which you fancy you have, some way or other, luckily got and snatched unto yourself, whilst there is no such thing any where in the world without you; all those infinite things thereof being thus orderly disposed by chance?—And when Aristodemus afterward objected, that he could not see any artificer that made the world, as he could those artificers which made all other human things,

Socrates thus replies : οὐδὲ γὰρ τὴν σεαυτοῦ σύγῃ ψυχὴν ὁρᾷς, ἢ τοῦ σώματος κυρία ἐστίν· ὥστε κατὰ γε τοῦτο ἔξεστί σοι λέγειν, ὅτι οὐδὲ γνώμη ἀλλὰ τύχη πάντα πράττεις· Neither do you see your own soul, which rules over your body ; so that you might for the same reason conclude yourself to do nothing by mind and understanding neither, but all by chance, as well as that all things in the world are done by chance.—Again, when he further disputed in this manner against the necessity of worshipping the Deity ; οὐχ ὑπερορῶ τὸ δαιμόνιον, ὧ Σώκρατες, ἀλλ' ἐκείνον μεγαλοπρεπέστερον ἡγοῦμαι, ἢ ὡς τῆς ἐμῆς θεραπείας προσδεῖσθαι· I despise not the Deity, O Socrates, but think him to be a more magnificent Being than that he should stand in need of my worship of him :—Socrates again answers, ὅσῃ μεγαλοπρεπέστερον ἀξιοῖ σε θεραπεύειν, τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον τιμητέον αὐτό· How much the more magnificent and illustrious that Being is, which takes care of you, so much the more, in all reason, ought it to be honoured by you.—Lastly, Aristodemus discovering his disbelief of Providence, as a thing, which seemed to him incredible, if not impossible, that one and the same Deity should be able to mind all things at once, Socrates endeavours to cure this disbelief of his in this manner :\* ὦ ἀγαθὲ, κατάμαθε, ὅτι καὶ ὁ σὸς νοῦς ἐνὼν τὸ σὸν σῶμα ὅπως βούλεται μεταχειρίζεται· οἶσθαι οὖν χρὴ καὶ τὴν ἐν παντὶ φρόνησιν τὰ πάντα ὅπως ἂν αὐτῇ ἡδὺ ἢ οὕτω τίθεσθαι· καὶ μὴ τὸ σὸν μὲν ὄμμα δύνασθαι, ἐπὶ πολλὰ στάδια ἐξικνεῖσθαι, τὸν δὲ τοῦ Θεοῦ ὀφθαλμὸν ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἅμα πάντα ὁρᾶν. Consider, friend, I pray you, if that mind, which is in your body, does order and dispose it every



way as it pleases; why should not that wisdom, which is in the universe, be able to order all things therein also, as seemeth best to it? And if your eye can discern things several miles distant from it, why should it be thought impossible for the eye of God to behold all things at once? Lastly, if your soul can mind things both here and in Egypt, and in Sicily; why may not the great mind or wisdom of God be able to take care of all things, in all places?—And then he concludes, that if Aristodemus would diligently apply himself to the worship of God, he should at length be convinced, *ὅτι τοσοῦτον καὶ τοιοῦτόν ἐστι τὸ θεῖον, ὥσθ' ἅμα πάντα ὄραν, καὶ πάντα ἀκούειν, καὶ πανταχοῦ παρεῖναι, καὶ ἅμα πάντων ἐπιμελείσθαι*. That God is such and so great a Being, as that he can, at once, see all things, and hear all things, and be present every where, and take care of all affairs.—Moreover, Socrates, in his discourse with Euthydemus, in Xenophon's fourth book, speaks thus concerning that invisible Deity, which governs the whole world; \* *οἱ γὰρ ἄλλοι θεοὶ ἡμῖν τὰ ἀγαθὰ δίδόντες, οὐδὲν τούτων εἰς τὸ ἐμφανὲς ἰόντες διδάσκειν, καὶ ὁ τὸν ὅλον κόσμον συντάττων τε καὶ συνέχων, ἐν ᾧ πάντα καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ ἐστὶ, &c. οὗτος τὰ μέγιστα μὲν πράττων ὁράται, τὸδε οἰκονομῶν ἀόρατος ἡμῖν ἐστίν· ἐννοεῖ δὲ καὶ ὁ πᾶσι φανερός δοκῶν εἶναι ἥλιος, οὐκ ἐπιτρέπει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐαυτὸν ἀκριβῶς ὄραν, ἀλλ' ἐάν τις αὐτὸν ἀναιδῶς ἐγχειρῇ θεᾶσθαι, τὴν ὄψιν ἀφαιρεῖται*. The other gods giving us good things, do it without visibly appearing to us; and that God, who framed and containeth the whole world (in which are all good and excellent things) and who con-

tinually supplieth us with them, he, though he be seen to do the greatest things of all, yet notwithstanding is himself invisible and unseen. Which ought the less to be wondered at by us, because the sun, who seemeth manifest to all, yet will not suffer himself to be exactly and distinctly viewed, but if any one boldly and impudently gaze upon him, will deprive him of his sight : as also because the soul of man, which most of all things in him partaketh of the Deity, though it be that which manifestly rules and reigns in us, yet is it never seen: ἂ χρεὶ κατονοοῦντα μὴ καταφρονεῖν τῶν ἀοράτων, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν γινομένων τὴν δύναμιν αὐτοῦ καταμανθάνοντα, τιμᾶν τὸ δαιμόνιον. Which particulars he that considers, ought not to despise invisible things, but to honour the supreme Deity, taking notice of his power from his effects. Where we have τὸ δαιμόνιον, as also before τὸ Θεῖον, plainly put for the supreme Deity. And we did the rather set down these passages of Socrates here, concerning God and Providence, that we might shame those, who, in these latter days of ours, are so atheistically inclined, if at least they have any pudor or shame left in them.

But, notwithstanding Socrates's thus clear acknowledging one supreme and universal Numen, it doth not therefore follow, that he rejected all those other inferior gods of the Pagans, as is commonly conceived. But the contrary thereunto appeareth from these very passages of his now cited, wherein there is mention made of other gods besides the supreme. And how conformable Socrates was to the Pagan religion and worship, may appear from those last dying words of his,

(when he should be most serious,) after he had drunk the poison, wherein he required his friends to offer a votive cock for him to Æsculapius: for which Origen thus perstringeth him, *Cont. Cels.* l. ix. p. 277. *καὶ τηλικαῦτα φιλοσοφήσαντες περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τὴν διαγωγὴν τῆς καλῶς βεβιωκίας διεξελθόντες, καταλιπόντες τὸ μέγεθος ὧν αὐτοῖς ὁ Θεὸς ἐφάνερωσεν, εὐτελεῖ φρονούσαι καὶ σμικρὰ, ἀλεκτρούνα τῷ Ἀσκληπιῷ ἀποδιδόντες.* And they, who had philosophised so excellently concerning the soul, and discoursed concerning the happiness of the future state to those who live well, do afterward sink down from these great, high, and noble things, to a superstitious regard of little, small, and trifling matters, such as the paying of a cock to Æsculapius.—Where, notwithstanding, Origen doth not charge Socrates with such gross and downright idolatry, as he does elsewhere,\* for his sacrificing to the Pythian Apollo, who was but an inferior demon. And perhaps some may excuse Socrates here, as thinking, that he looked upon Æsculapius no otherwise than as the supreme Deity, called by that name, as exercising his providence over the sickness and health or recovery of men, and that therefore he would have an eucharistic sacrifice offered to him in his behalf, as having now cured him, at once, of all diseases by death. However Plato<sup>b</sup> informs us, that Socrates, immediately before he drank his poison, did εὐχεσθαι τοῖς θεοῖς, τὴν μετοίκησιν τὴν ἐνθένδε ἐκείσε εὐτυχῆ εἶναι pray (not to God, but to the gods, that is, to the supreme and inferior gods both together, as in

\* Vide Orig. advers. Celsum, lib. vii. p. 335.

<sup>b</sup> In Phædone, p. 402. oper.

Plato's Phædrus he did to Pan, and the other tutelar gods of that place) that his translation from hence into the other world might be happy to him. And Xenophon, in his Memoirs,\* informs us, that Socrates did, both in his words and practice, approve of that doctrine of the Pythian Apollo, That the rule of piety and religion ought to be the law of every particular city and country, he affirming it to be a vanity for any man to be singular herein. Lastly, in his own apology, as written by Plato, he professes to acknowledge the sun, moon and stars for gods; condemning the contrary doctrine of Anaxagoras, as irrational and absurd. Wherefore we may well conclude this opinion, of Socrates's being condemned for denying the many gods of the Pagans, or of his being a martyr for one only God, to be nothing but a vulgar error.

But if you therefore demand, what that accusation of impiety really was, which he was charged with, Socrates himself, in Plato's Euthyphro, will inform you, that it was for his free and open condemning those traditions concerning the gods, wherein wicked, dishonest and unjust actions were imputed to them. For when Euthyphro, having accused his own father as guilty of murder (merely for committing a homicide into prison, who happened to die there) would justify himself from the examples of the gods, namely Jupiter and Saturn, because Jupiter, the best and justest of the gods, had committed his father Saturn to prison for devouring his sons, as Saturn himself also had castrated his father Cælius

\* Lib. iv. p. 634. oper.

† P. 49.

for some miscarriages of his, Socrates thus bespeaks him ; \* Ἀράγε, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, τοῦτ' ἐστὶν οὐ ἕνεκα τὴν γραφὴν φεύγω, ὅτι τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐπειδὴν τις περὶ τῶν θεῶν λέγει, δύσχερῶς πῶς ἀποδέχομαι, &c. Is not this the very thing, O Euthyphro, for which I am accused? namely, because when I hear any one affirming such matters as these concerning the gods, I am very loath to believe them, and stick not publicly to declare my dislike of them? And can you, O Euthyphro, in good earnest think, that there are indeed wars and contentions among the gods, and that those other things were also done by them, which poets and painters commonly impute to them? such as the peplum or veil of Minerva, which in the Panathenaics is with great pomp and ceremony brought into the acropolis, is embroidered all over with?—Thus we see, that Socrates, though he asserted one supreme Deity, yet he acknowledged, notwithstanding, other inferior created gods, together with the rest of the Pagans, honouring and worshipping them; only he disliked those poetic fables concerning them (believed at that time by the vulgar,) in which all manner of unjust and immoral actions were fathered on them; which, together with the envy of many, was the only true reason, why he was then accused of impiety and Atheism.

It hath been also affirmed by many, that Plato really asserted one only God and no more, and that therefore, whensoever he speaks of gods plurally, he must be understood to have done this, not according to his own judgment, but only

in a way of politic compliance with the Athenians, and for fear of being made to drink poison in like manner as Socrates was. In confirmation of which opinion, there is also a passage cited out of that thirteenth epistle of Plato's to Dionysius, wherein he gives this as a mark, whereby his serious epistles, and such as were written according to the true sense of his own mind, might by his friends be distinguished from those which were otherwise; τῆς μὲν γὰρ σπουδαίας ἐπιστολῆς Θεὸς ἄρχεται θεοὶ δὲ τῆς ἥττον. When I begin my epistles with God, then may you conclude I write seriously; but not so when I begin with gods.—And this place seems to be therefore the more authentic, because it was long since produced by Eusebius to this very purpose, namely, to prove, that Plato acknowledged one only God; δῆλος δὲ ἐστὶν ἓνα Θεὸν εἰδώς, εἰ καὶ συνήθως Ἕλλησι, πῆ τῶν πλείονων εἰσθεὶ χρῆσθαι προσηγορίᾳ, καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς πρὸς Διονύσιον ἐπιστολῆς, ἐν ᾗ σύμβολα διδούς, τῶν τε δεῖσθαι σπουδῆς ἀντὶ γραφομένων, καὶ τῶν ἄλλως ἀπερριμμένων. It is manifest, that Plato really acknowledged one only God, however, in compliance with the language of the Greeks, he often spake of gods plurally, from that epistle of his to Dionysius, wherein he gives this symbol or mark, whereby he might be known to write seriously, namely, when he began his epistles with God, and not with gods.

Notwithstanding which, we have already manifested, out of Plato's Timæus, that he did, in good earnest assert a plurality of gods; by which gods of his are to be understood animated or intellectual beings superior to men, to whom there is an honour and worship from men due; he therein

Pr. 40. Ser. declaring, not only the sun and stars, but also the earth itself (as animated) to be a god or goddess. For though it be now read in our copies *πρεσβυτάτην σωμάτων*, that the earth was the oldest of all the bodies within the heavens;—yet it is certain, that anciently it was read otherwise, *πρεσβυτάτην θεῶν*, the oldest of the gods—not only from Proclus and Cicero, but also from Laertius\* writing thus: *γῆν δὲ πρεσβυτάτην μὲν εἶναι τῶν ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ θεῶν, γενέσθαι δὲ δημιουργημα, ὡς νύκτα καὶ ἡμέραν ποιεῖν, οὐσαν δ' ἐπὶ τοῦ μέσου, κινεῖσθαι περὶ τὸ μέσον*. Though Plato's gods were for the most part fiery yet did he suppose the earth to be a god or goddess too, affirming it to be the oldest of all the gods within the heavens, made or created to distinguish day and night, by its diurnal circumgyration upon its own axis, in the middle or centre of the world.—For Plato, when he wrote his *Timæus*, acknowledged only the diurnal motion of the earth, though afterwards he is said to have admitted its annual too. And the same might be further evinced from all his other writings, but especially his book of *Laws* (together with his *Epinomis*) said to have been written by him in his old age, in which he much insists upon the godships of the sun, moon and stars; and complains, that the young gentlemen of Athens were then so much infected with that Anaxagorean doctrine, which made them to be nothing but inanimate stones and earth; as also he approves of that then vulgarly-received custom of worshipping the rising and setting sun and moon, as gods, to which, in all probability, he conformed himself: *Ἀναγέλ-*

\* III. segm. 75. p. 211.

Λουτός τε ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης, καὶ πρὸς δυσμάς  
 ἰόντων, προσκυλίσεις ἅμα καὶ προσκνήσεις Ἑλ- De Leg. x.  
[p. 664. op.]  
 λήνων τε καὶ Βαρβάρων πάντων, ἐν συμφοραῖς

παντοίαις ἐχομένων καὶ ἐν ἐπιπραγίαις, ὡς ὅτι μάλιστα  
 ὄντων, καὶ οὐδαμῇ ὑποψίαν ἐνδιδόντων ὡς οὐκ εἰσι θεοί.

The prostrations and adorations, that are used both by the Greeks and all Barbarians, towards the rising and setting sun and moon (as well in their prosperities as adversities), declare them to be unquestionably esteemed gods.—Wherefore we cannot otherwise conclude, but that this thirteenth epistle of Plato to Dionysius, though extant, it seems, before Eusebius's time, yet was supposititious and counterfeit by some zealous but ignorant Christian: as there is accordingly a *Νοθεύεται*, or brand of bastardy, prefixed to it in all the editions of Plato's works.

However, though Plato acknowledged and worshipped many gods, yet is it undeniably evident, that he was no Polyarchist, but a Monarchist, an assertor of one supreme God, the only *αὐτοφυής*, or self-originated Being—the maker of the heaven and earth, and of all those other gods. For, first, it is plain, that, according to Plato, the soul of the whole world was not itself eternal, much less self-existent, but made or produced by God in time, though indeed before its body, the world, from these words of his; *τὴν ψυχὴν*

*οὐχ ὡς νῦν ὑστέραν ἐπιχειροῦμεν λέγειν, οὕτως* Plat. Tim. p.  
34. [p. 528.  
oper.]  
*ἔμψυχον καὶ ὁ Θεὸς νεωτέραν, ὁ δὲ καὶ*

*γενέσει καὶ ἀρετῇ προτέραν καὶ πρεσβυτέραν ψυχὴν σώματος,*  
*ὡς δεσπότην καὶ ἀρξουσάν ἀρξομένου συνεστήσατο.* God did not fabricate or make the soul of the world, in the same order that we now treat concern-



ing it, that is, after it, as junior to it; but that, which was to rule over the world, as its body, being more excellent, he made it first, and senior to the same.—Upon which account Aristotle quarrels with Plato as contradicting himself, in that he affirmed the soul to be a principle, and yet supposed it not to be eternal, but made toge-

ther with the heaven: ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ Πλά-  
Arist. Met. l. xlv. c. vi. (P. τῶν γε οἷόν τε λέγειν, ἢν οἴεται ἀρχὴν εἶναι ἐνίοτε 478. tom. iv. oper.) αὐτὸ ἐαυτὸ κινεῖν, ὕστερον γὰρ καὶ ἅμα τῷ σῶ-  
ρανῶ ἢ ψυχῇ.

Neither is it possible for Plato here to extricate himself, who sometimes declares the soul to be a principle, as that which moves itself, and yet affirms it again not to be eternal, but made together with the heaven.—For which cause some Platonists conclude, that Plato asserted a double Psyche, one the third hypostasis of his trinity, and eternal; the other created in time, together with the world, which seems to be a probable opinion. Wherefore, since, according to Plato, the soul of the world, which is the chief of all his inferior gods, was not self-existent, but made or produced by God in time, all those other gods of his, which were but parts of the world, as the sun, moon, stars and demons, must needs be so too. But, lest any should suspect, that Plato might, for all that, suppose the world and its gods not to have been made by one only unmade God, but by a multitude of co-ordinate, self-existent principles, or deities conspiring; we shall observe, that the contrary hereunto is plainly declared by him, in way of answer to that query, whether or no there were many and infinite worlds, (as some philosophers had maintained,)

or only one? he resolving it thus, *πότερον οὖν ὀρθῶς ἓνα οὐρανὸν προειρήκαμεν, ἢ πολλοὺς καὶ ἀπείρους*. Tim. p. 31. λέγειν ἢν ὀρθότερον; ἓνα, εἶπερ κατὰ τὸ παρά [p. 547. edit. Ficini.] *δειγμα δεδημιουργημένος ἔσται· τὸ γὰρ περιέχον πάντα ὅποσα νοητὰ ζῶα, μετ' ἑτέρου δεύτερου οὐκ ἂν ποτ' εἴη, &c. ἵνα οὖν τόδε κατὰ τὴν μόνωσιν, ὁμοιον ᾗ τῷ παντελεῖ ζῶῳ, διὰ ταῦτα οὔτε δύο, οὔτ' ἀπείρους ἐποίησεν ὁ ποιῶν κόσμους, ἀλλ' εἰς ὁδε μονογενῆς οὐρανὸς γεγενῆσθε, ἔστι τε καὶ ἔσται.* Whether have we rightly affirmed, that there is only one heaven, (or world) or is it more agreeable to reason, to hold many or infinite? We say there is but one, if it be made agreeable to its intellectual paradigm, containing the ideas of all animals and other things in it; for there can be but one archetypal animal, which is the paradigm of all created beings: wherefore, that the world may agree with its paradigms in this respect of solitude or oneliness, therefore is it not two, nor infinite, but one only begotten.—His meaning is, that there is but one archetypal Mind, the Demiurgus, or maker of all things that were produced, and therefore but one world.

And this one God, which, according to Plato, was the maker of the whole world, is frequently called by him, in his *Timæus* and elsewhere, ὁ Θεός, God, or the God—by way of excellency; sometimes ὁ Δημιουργός, the Architect or Artificer of the world;—sometimes ὁ Ποιητὴς καὶ Πατὴρ τοῦδε τοῦ παντός, the Maker and Father of this universe—whom it is hard to find out, but impossible to declare to the vulgar: again, ὁ ἐπὶ πᾶσι Θεός, the God over all;—τῆς Φύσεως κτιστῆς, the Creator of nature—τοῦ παντός Ἀρχή, the sole Principle of the universe—πάντων Αἰτίον, the Cause of all things—Νοῦς πάντων βασιλεὺς, Mind, the King of all things—

Νόος ἀνοκράτωρ, πάντα κοσμών, διὰ πάντων ἰών, that sovereign Mind, which orders all things, and passes through all things—τοῦ παντός Κυβερνήτης, the Governor of the whole—τὸ ὄν ἀεί, γένεσιν δὲ οὐκ ἔχον, that which always is, and was never made—ὁ πρῶτος Θεός, the first God—ὁ μέγιστος Δαίμων, and ὁ μέγιστος θεῶν, the greatest God, and the greatest of the gods—ὁ ἥλιον γενήσας, he that generated or produced the sun—ὁ γῆν, οὐρανὸν, καὶ θεοὺς, [p. 511.] καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐν οὐρανῷ καὶ τὰ ἐν ᾄδου, καὶ ὑπὸ γῆς ἅπαντα ἐργάζεται, he that makes earth, and heaven, and the gods; and doth all things, both in heaven and hell, and under the earth—again, he by whose efficiency the things of the world ὑστερον ἐγένετο, πρότερον οὐκ ὄντα, were afterwards [p. 166.] made when they were not before; or from an antecedent non-existence brought forth into being.—This philosopher somewhere intimating, that it was as easy for God to produce those real things, the sun, moon, stars and earth, &c. from himself, as it is for us to produce the images of ourselves and whatsoever else we please, only by interposing a looking-glass. Lastly, he is called D. Rep. l. x. ὃς πάντα τὰ τε ἄλλα ἐργάζεται, καὶ ἑαυτὸν, he that [p. 561.] causeth or produceth both all other things, and even himself—the meaning whereof is this: he, that is αὐτοφύης; (as the same Plato also calls him), a self-originated Being, and from no other cause besides himself, but the cause of all other things.—Neither doth Lactantius Firmianus \* himself refuse to speak of God after this very manner; *se ipsum fecit*, and that he was “*ex se ipso procreatus, et propterea talis, qualem*

\* Instit. Divin. lib. i. cap. vii. p. 53. et lib. ii. cap. viii. p. 214.

se esse voluit; that he made himself—and that being procreated from himself, he therefore was every way such as he willed himself to be. Which unusual and bold strain of theology is very much insisted upon by Plotinus, in his book *Περὶ τοῦ θελήματος τοῦ ἑνός*, concerning the will of the first One, or unity; he there writing thus of the supreme God, *αἴτιον ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ παρ' αὐτοῦ, καὶ δι' αὐτὸν αὐτός*; He is the cause of himself, and he is from himself, and himself is for himself.—And again, *αὐτός ἐστιν οὗτος ὁ ποιεῖν ἑαυτὸν, καὶ κύριος ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ οὐχ ὡς τις ἕτερος ἐθέλησε γενόμενος, ἀλλ' ὡς θέλει αὐτός*. This is he, who is the maker of himself, and is lord over himself; (in a certain sense) for he was not made that, which another willed him to be, but he is that, which he willetth himself to be.—Moreover, *αὐτός ὢν τοῦτο ὅσπερ ἠγάπησε, τοῦτο δὲ ἐστὶν ὑποστήσας αὐτὸν, εἶπερ ἐνέργεια μένουσα ὥστε ἐνέργημα αὐτός, ἀλλὰ ἄλλου μὲν οὐδενός, ἑαυτοῦ ἄρα ἐνέργημα αὐτός, οὐκ ἄρα ὡς συμβέβηκέν ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐνεργεῖ αὐτός καὶ ὡς αὐτός ἐθέλει, &c.* The Supreme Deity loving himself as a pure light, is himself what he loved; thus, as it were, begetting and giving subsistence to himself, he being a standing energy. Wherefore, since God is a work or energy, and yet he is not the work or energy of any other being, he must needs be (in some sense) his own work or energy; so that God is not that, which he happened to be, but that which he willetth himself to be. Thus also a little before, *ανακτίων εἰς ἐν τῇ βούλῃσιν καὶ τῇ οὐσίαν· τὸ δὲ θέλειν παρ' αὐτοῦ, ἀνάγκη ἄρα τὸ εἶναι παρ' αὐτοῦ, ὥστε αὐτὸν πεποιηκέναι αὐτὸν, ὁ λόγος ἀνεῦρεν· εἰ γὰρ ἡ βούλησις παρ' αὐτοῦ, καὶ οἶον ἔργον αὐτοῦ, αὕτη δὲ ταυτὸν τῇ ὑποστάσει*

En. vi. l. viii.  
p. 749. [cap.  
xiv. p. 750.]

P. 751.

P. 748.

αὐτῷ αὐτός ἂν οὕτως ὑποστήσας ἂν εἴη αὐτὸν, ὥστε οὐχ ὡςπερ ἔτυχεν ἔστιν, ἀλλ' ὡςπερ ἐβουλήθη αὐτός. We must of necessity make will and essence the same in the first Being. Wherefore, since his willing is from himself, his being must needs be from himself too; the consequence of which ratiocination is this, that He made himself. For if his volition be from himself, and his own work, and this be the same with his hypostasis or substance; he may be then said to have given subsistence to himself. Wherefore he is not what he happened to be, but what he willed himself to be. But, because this is so unusual a notion, we shall here set down yet one or two passages more of this philosopher's

P. 747. concerning it; οὐκ ἔξω τῆς βουλήσεως αὐτοῦ ἢ οὐσία, ἀλλὰ συνέσθιν αὐτοῦ τῆ οἴου οὐσίᾳ ἢ θέλησις καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτὸν λαβεῖν, ἄνευ τοῦ θέλειν ἑαυτῷ, ὅπερ ἔστι· καὶ σύνδρομος αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ, θέλων αὐτὸς εἶναι, καὶ τοῦτο ὧν ὅπερ θέλει· καὶ ἡ θέλησις καὶ αὐτὸς ἓν· καὶ τοῦτω οὐχ ἤττον, ὅτι μὴ ἄλλο αὐτὸς ὡςπερ ἔτυχεν, ἕλλο δὲ τὸ ὡς ἐβουλήθη ἂν· τί γὰρ ἂν καὶ ἠθέλησε, ἢ τοῦτο ὃ ἔστι· καὶ γὰρ εἰ ὑποβόιμεθα ἐλέσθαι αὐτῷ ὅτι θέλοι γενέσθαι, καὶ ἐξεῖναι αὐτῷ ἀλλάξασθαι τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν εἰς ἄλλο, μήτε ἂν ἄλλο τι γενέσθαι βουληθῆναι, μήτ' ἂν ἑαυτῷ τι μέμφασθαι, ὡς ὑπὸ ἀνάγκης τοῦτο ὅν ὃ ἔστι, τῷ αὐτὸν εἶναι, ὅπερ αὐτὸς αἰεὶ ἠθέλησε καὶ θέλει· ἔστι γὰρ ὄντως ἡ ἀγαθοῦ φύσις, θέλησις αὐτοῦ· The essence of the supreme God is not without his will, but his will and essence are the same; so that God concurreth with himself, himself being willing to be as he is, and being that which he willeth; and his will and himself being one and the same. For himself is not one thing (as happening to be that which he is) and that he would will to be another: for what could God will to be, but that which he is? And if we should sup-

pose, that it were in his own choice to be what he would, and that he had liberty to change his nature into whatsoever else he pleased, it is certain that he would neither will to be any thing else besides what he is, nor complain of himself as being now that which he is out of necessity, he being indeed no other but that, which himself hath willed, and doth always will to be. For his will is his essential goodness; so that his will doth not follow his nature, but concur with it; in the very essence of this good there being contained his choice, and willing of himself to be such. Lastly,

*Πάν ἄρα βούλησις, καὶ οὐκ ἔτι τὸ μὴ βουλόμενον, οὐδὲ τὸ πρὸ βουλήσεως ἄρα· πρῶτον ἄρα ἢ βούλησις αὐτὸς, καὶ τὸ ὡς ἐβούλετο ἄρα καὶ ὅλον ἐβούλετο, καὶ τὸ τῇ βουλήσει ἐπόμενον ἢ τῆς τοιαύτης βούλησις ἐγέννα· ἐγέννα δὲ οὐδὲν ἔτι ἐν αὐτῷ* P. 755.

God is all will, nor is there any thing in him which he doth not will, nor is his being before his will, but his will is himself, or he himself the first will. So that he is as he would himself, and such as he would, and yet his will did not generate or produce any thing that was not before.—

And now we may in all probability conclude, that Lactantius derived this doctrine from Plato and Plotinus; which, how far it is to be either allowed of or excused, we leave others to judge; only we shall observe, that, as the word *αὐτογενής*, frequently attributed to God by Christians as well as Pagans,\* seems to imply as much; so the scope and drift of Plotinus, in all this, was plainly no other, than partly to set forth the self-existence of the supreme Deity after a more lively

\* Vide Dionys. Patav. Dogmat. Theolog. de Trinitate, lib. v. cap. v. §. xiv. p. 204. tom. ii.

manner, and partly to confute that odd conceit, which some might possibly entertain of God, as if he either happened, by chance, to be what he is, or else were such by a certain necessity of nature, and had his being imposed upon him: whereas, he is as much every way what he would will and choose to be, as if he had made himself by his own will and choice. Neither have we set down all this, only to give an account of that one expression of Plato's, that God causeth himself and all things—but also to shew how punctually precise, curious and accurate some of these Pagans were in their speculations concerning the Deity.

To return therefore to Plato: though some have suspected that trinity, which is commonly called Platonic, to have been nothing but a mere figment and invention of some later Platonists; yet the contrary hereunto seems to be unquestionably evident, that Plato himself really asserted such a trinity of universal and Divine hypostases, which have the nature of principles. For, first, whereas, in his tenth book of Laws, he professedly opposing Atheists, undertakes to prove the existence of a Deity, he does notwithstanding there ascend no higher than to the Psyche, or universal mundane soul, as a self-moving principle, and the immediate, or proper cause of all that motion, which is in the world. And this is all the god that there he undertakes to prove. But in other places of his writings he frequently asserts, above the self-moving Psyche, an immoveable and standing Nous or intellect, which was properly the Demiurgus, or architectonic framer of the whole world. And, lastly, above this multiform Intel-

lect, he plainly asserts yet a higher hypostasis; one most simple and most absolutely perfect Being; which he calls τὸ ἐν, in opposition to that multiplicity, which speaks something of imperfection in it, and τ'ἀγαθόν, goodness itself, as being above mind and understanding; the first intelligible, and an infinite fecundity together with overflowing benignity. And accordingly in his second epistle to Dionysius does he mention a trinity of Divine hypostases all together. Now the words ὁ θεός; and τὸ θεῖον, God and the Divinity—in Plato, seem sometimes to comprehend this whole trinity of Divine hypostases, as they are again sometimes severally applied to each of them, accordingly as we have already observed, that Zeus or Jupiter in Plato is not always taken for the first and highest hypostasis in his trinity, but sometimes the second hypostasis of mind or intellect is meant thereby, and sometimes again his third hypostasis of the universal and eternal Psyche; nevertheless the first of these three hypostases is that, which is properly called by the Platonists πηγὴ τῆς θεότητος, the fountain of the Godhead, and by Plato himself ὁ πάντων βασιλεύς, περὶ ὃν πάντα ἐστὶ, οὗ ἕνεκα πάντα, καὶ ὁ αἰτιὸν πάντων τῶν καλῶν. The King of all things, about whom are all things, and for whose sake are all things, and the cause of all good and excellent things.

And this first Divine hypostasis, which in Plato's theology is properly ἀπόθεος, the original Deity—is largely insisted upon by that philosopher in the sixth of his Politics, under the name

\* Epist. ii. ad Dionys. p. 707. oper.



and title of τ' ἀγαθόν, the Good—but principally there illustrated by that resemblance of the sun, called by that philosopher also, a heavenly god, and said to be the offspring of this highest Good, and something analogous to it in the corporeal world, ὁ, τί περ αὐτὸ ἐν τῷ νοητῷ τόπῳ, πρὸς τε νοῦν καὶ τὰ νοούμενα, τοῦτο τοῦτον ἐν τῷ ὁρατῷ πρὸς τε ὄψιν καὶ τὰ ὁρώμενα. This is the same in the intelligible world to intellect (or knowledge) and intelligibles, that the sun is in the sensible world to sight and visibles. For, as the sun is not sight, but only the cause of it; nor is that light, by which we see, the same with the sun itself, but only ἡλιοειδές, a sun-like thing; so neither is the supreme and highest Good (properly) knowledge, but the cause of knowledge; nor is intellect (precisely considered as such) the best and most perfect being, but only ἀγαθοειδές, a boniform thing. Again, As the sun gives to things not only their visibility, but also their generation; so does that highest Good, not only cause the cognoscibility of things, but also their very essences and beings.—Οὐκ οὐσίας ὄντος τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἀλλ' ἐπι ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας, πρεσβεία καὶ δυνάμει ὑπερέχοντος, this highest Good being not itself properly essence, but above essence, transcending the same, both in respect of dignity and power.—Which language and conceit of Plato's some of the Greek fathers seem to have entertained, yet so as to apply it to the whole Trinity, when they call God ὑπερούσιον, or superessential.—But the meaning of that philosopher was, as we conceive, no other than this, that this highest Good hath no particular characteristic upon it, limiting and determining of it, it being *the hidden and incomprehensible source of all*

things. In the last place, we shall observe, that this first Divine hypostasis of the Platonic trinity is by that philosopher called *τοῦτε ἡγεμόνος καὶ αἰτίου πάντων πατήρ*, the Father of the prince, and cause of all things.—Wherein we cannot but take notice of an admirable correspondency betwixt the Platonic philosophy and Christianity, in that the second hypostasis of both their trinities (called also sometimes *Λόγος* by the Platonists as well as *Νοῦς*) is said to be the immediate cause of all things; and the Demiurgus, the architect, maker or artificer of the whole world.

Now to Plato we might here join Xenophon, because he was his equal, and a Socratic too, (though it seems there was not so good correspondence betwixt them;) which Xenophon, however in sundry places of his writings he acknowledge a plurality of gods, yet doth he give plain testimony also of one supreme and universal Numen; as this particularly,\* *ὁ πάντα σείων καὶ ἀρχειζων, ὡς μὲν μέγας τις, καὶ δυνατὸς φανερός, ὑπόσιος δ' ἐστὶ μορφήν ἀφανής*. He that both agitates all things, and establisheth the frame of the whole world, though he be manifest to be great and powerful, yet is he, as to his form, inconspicuous.

xxiv. In the next place we come to Aristotle: who, that he acknowledged more gods than one (as well as the other Pagans) appears from his using the word so often plurally. As particularly in this passage of his Nicomachian Ethics; *ἡ δὲ τελεία εὐδαιμονία, ὅτι θεωρητικὴ τις ἐστὶν ἐνέργεια,* L. x. c. viii.  
*καὶ ἐντεύθεν ἂν φανεῖη· τοὺς γὰρ μάλιστα ὑπείλη-* [p. 193.  
*φαμεν μακαρίους καὶ εὐδαιμονοὺς εἶναι· πράξεις δὲ* tom. iii. oper.]

\* Vide Clement. Alexandria. in Cohort. ad Gentes, cap. vi. p. 61, et Stromat. lib. v. p. 417.

ποιᾶς ἀποιεῖμαί χρεῶν αὐτοῖς; πότῃ τὰς δικαίας; ἢ γελῶσι φανούνηται συναλλάττοντες καὶ παρακαταθήκας ἀποδιδόντες, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα; ἀλλὰ τὰς ἀνδρείους; ὑπομένοντας τὰ φοβερά καὶ κινδονεύοντας, ὅτι καλόν· ἢ τὰς ἐλευθερίους; τίη δὲ δώσουσι; ἀτοκον δ' εἰ καὶ ἔσται αὐτοῖς νόμισμα, ἢ τι τοιοῦτον· εἰ δὲ σώφρονες τί ἂν εἴεν; ἢ φορτικὸς ὁ ἔπαινος, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχουσι φάλας ἐπιθυμίας· διεξιούσι δὲ πάντα φαίνοισ' ἂν τὰ περὶ τὰς πράξεις μικρὰ καὶ ἀνάξια θεῶν· ἀλλὰ μὴν ζῆν τε πάντες ὑπελήφασιν αὐτούς· καὶ ἐνεργεῖν ἄρα, σὺ γὰρ τὸ καθεύδειν, ὥσπερ τὸν Ἐνδυμῖωνα· τῷ δὲ ζῶντι τὸ πράττειν ἀφρημένῳ, ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον τὸ ποιεῖν, τί λείπεται πλὴν θεωρίας· That perfect happiness is a speculative or contemplative energy, may be made manifest from hence, because we account the gods most of all happy. Now what moral actions can we attribute to them? Whether those of justice amongst one another; as if it were not ridiculous to suppose the gods, to make contracts and bargains among themselves and the like. Or else those of fortitude and magnanimity; as if the gods had their fears, dangers and difficulties to encounter withal. Or those of liberality; as if the gods had some such thing as money too, and there were among them indigent to receive alms. Or, lastly, shall we attribute to them the actions of temperance? But would not this be a reproachful commendation of the gods, to say, that they conquer and master their vicious lusts and appetites? Thus running through all the actions of moral virtue, we find them to be small, and mean, and unworthy of the gods. And yet we all believe the gods to live, and consequently to act; unless we should suppose them perpetually to sleep, as Endymion did. Wherefore if all moral actions, and therefore much more *mechanical* operations, be taken away from that

which lives and understands, what is there left to it besides contemplation? To which he there adds a further argument also of the same thing: Because other animals, who are deprived of contemplation, partake not of happiness. For to the gods all their life is happy; to men so far forth, as it approacheth to contemplation; but brute animals, that do not at all contemplate, partake not at all of happiness.—Where Aristotle plainly acknowledges a plurality of gods, and that there is a certain higher rank of beings above men. And by the way we may here observe, how from those words of his, *ζῆν τε πάντες ὑπελήφασι θεούς*, all men suppose the gods to live—and from what follows in him, that opinion of some late writers may be confuted, that the Pagans generally worshipped the inanimate parts of the world as true and proper gods: Aristotle here telling us, that they universally agreed in this, that the gods were animals, living and understanding beings, and such as are therefore capable of contemplation. Moreover, Aristotle in his Politics, writing of the means to conserve a tyranny, as he calls it, sets down this for one amongst the rest; *ἔτι δὲ τὰ πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς φαίνεσθαι ἀεὶ σπουδάζοντα διαφερόντως, ἥτιόν τε γὰρ φοβοῦνται, τὸ παθεῖν τι παράνομον ὑπὸ τῶν τοιοῦτων, ἢ δὲ δεισιδαίμονα νομίζουσιν εἶναι τὸν ἄρχοντα καὶ φροντίζειν τῶν θεῶν καὶ ἐπιβουλευοσιν ἥτιον, ὡς συμμάχους ἔχοντι καὶ τοὺς θεούς*. For a prince or monarch to seem to be always more than ordinarily sedulous about the worship of the gods: because men are less afraid of suffering any injustice from such kings or princes, as they think to be religiously disposed; and devoutly affected towards the gods. Neither will

they be so apt to make conspiracies against such, they supposing, that the gods will be their abettors and assistants.—Where the word *δεισιδαίμων* seems to be taken in a good sense, and in way of commendation for a religious person; though we must confess, that Aristotle himself does not here write so much like a *δεισιδαίμων*, as a mere politician. Likewise in his first book *De Cælo*, he writeth thus; πάντες ἄνθρωποι περὶ θεῶν ἔχουσιν ὑπόλη-  
C. iii. [p. 615. ψιν, καὶ πάντες τὸν ἀνωτάτω τῷ θεῷ τόπον ἀπο-  
tom. i. oper.] διδάσσει, καὶ Βάρβαροι καὶ Ἕλληνες, ὡς τῷ ἀθάνατῳ  
τὸ ἀθάνατον συνηρημένον, εἴπερ οὖν ἐστὶ τι θεῖον, ὥσπερ  
καὶ ἔστι, &c. All men have an opinion or persuasion that there are gods. And they, who think so, as well barbarians as Greeks, attribute the highest place to that which is Divine, as supposing the immortal heavens to be most accommodate to immortal gods. Wherefore, if there be any Divinity, as unquestionably there is, the body of the heavens must be acknowledged to be of a different kind from that of the elements.—And in the following book he tells us again, That it is most agreeable τῇ μαντείᾳ περὶ τῶν θεῶν, to that vaticination, which all men have in their minds concerning the gods, to suppose the heaven to be a quintessence distinct from the elements, and therefore incorruptible.—Where Aristotle affirmeth, that men have generally μαντείαν, a vaticination in their minds concerning gods; to wit, that themselves are not the highest beings, but that there is a rank of intellectual beings, superior to men; the chief of which is the supreme Deity; concerning whom there is indeed the greatest μαντεία, or vaticination of all.

We acknowledge it to be very true, that Aristotle does not so much insist upon demons, as

Plato and the generality of Pagans in that age did; and probably he had not so great a belief of their existence; though he doth make mention of them also, as when in his *Metaphysics*,\* speaking of bodies compounded of the elements, he instanceth in ζῶα τε καὶ δαίμονα, animals and demons—and elsewhere he insinuates them to have airy bodies, in these words; ἐκλήρησαι γὰρ ἄν τις, καὶ διὰ τίνα αἰρίαν, ἢ ἐν πῶ αἴρι ψυχὴ, τῆς ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις βελτίων ἐστὶ, καὶ ἀθανατοτέρα, some perhaps would demand a reason, why the soul that is in the air, is better and more immortal than that in animals.—However, whether Aristotle believed these lower demon gods or no, it is certain, that he acknowledged a higher kind of gods, namely, the intelligences of all the several spheres, if not also the souls of them and the stars; which spheres being, according to the astronomy then received, forty-seven in number, he must needs acknowledge at least so many gods. Besides which, Aristotle seems also to suppose another sort of incorporeal gods, without the heavens, where, according to him, there is neither body, nor place, nor vacuum, nor time; in these words; οὐτ' ἐν τόπῳ γὰρ κεῖ πέφυκεν, οὔτε χρόνος αὐτὰ ποιεῖ γηράσκειν, οὐδ' ἐστὶν οὐδενός οὐδεμία μεταβολή, τῶν ὑπὲρ τὴν ἕξωτάτω τετραγώνων φορᾶν, ἀλλ' ἀναλλοίωτα καὶ ἀπαθῆ, τὴν ἀρίστην ἔχοντα ζῶην καὶ ἀνταρκειοτάτην διατελεῖ τὸν ἅπαντα αἰῶνα. They, who exist there, are such as are neither apt to be in a place, nor to wax old with time, nor is there any change at all in those things above the highest sphere; but they being impassible and unalterable, lead the best and

De An. l. i.  
[cap. viii. p.  
17. tom. ii.  
oper.]

De Cael. l. i.  
c. ix. [p. 631.  
tom. i. oper.]

\* Lib. v. cap. viii. p. 329. tom. vi. oper.

most self-sufficient life, throughout all eternity.—  
But this passage is not without suspicion of  
being supposititious.

Notwithstanding all which, that Aristotle did  
assert one supreme and universal Numen, is a  
thing also unquestionable. For though it be  
granted, that he useth the singular θεός, as like-  
wise τὸ θεῖον and τὸ δαμόνιον, many times inde-  
finitely, for a god in general, or any Divine  
being; and that such places as these have been  
oftentimes mistaken by Christian writers, as if  
Aristotle had meant the supreme God in them;  
yet it is nevertheless certain, that he often useth  
those words also emphatically, for one only su-  
preme God. As in that of his *Metaphysics*, ὁ, τε

γὰρ θεός δοκεῖ τὸ αἴτιον πᾶσιν εἶναι καὶ ἀρχή  
L. i. [cap. ii. τας. God seemeth to be a cause and  
p. 263. tom. iv. oper.] l. i.  
c. iii. certain principle to all things.—And  
[p. 10. tom. ii. oper.] also in this *De Anima*, where he speaks  
of the soul of the heavens, and its cir-  
cular motion: ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ὅτι βέλτιον λέγεται γ'  
ἐχρῆν τὸν θεὸν διὰ τοῦτο κύκλῳ ποιεῖν φέρεσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν,  
ὅτι βέλτιον αὐτῇ τὸ κινεῖσθαι τοῦ μένειν, κινεῖσθαι δὲ οὕτως  
ἢ ἄλλως. Neither is that a good cause of the  
circular motion of the heavens, which they (that  
is, the Platonists) call the τὸ βέλτιον, because it is  
better that it should be so than otherwise; as if  
God therefore ought to have made the soul of the  
world such, as to move the heaven circularly,  
because it was better for it to move so than other-  
wise: but this being a speculation that properly  
belongs to some other science, we shall no further  
pursue it in this place.—Thus afterwards again,  
in the same book,\* συμβαίνει δὲ Ἐμπεδοκλεῖ γε καὶ

\* Lib. i. cap. vii. p. 16. tom. ii. oper.

ἀφρονέστατον εἶναι τὸν θεόν, μόνος γὰρ τῶν στοιχείων ἐν οὐ γνωρίζει, τὸ Νεῖκος, τὰ δὲ θνητὰ πάντα, ἐκ πάντων γὰρ ἕκαστον. It follows from Empedocles's principles, that God must needs be the most unwise of all, he alone being ignorant of that (out of which all other things are compounded) νεῖκος, or contention—(because himself is nothing but φιλία, unity and friendship)—whereas mortal animals may know or conceive all things, they being compounded of all. Which same passage we have again also, in his Metaphysics,\* from whence it was before cited to another purpose. To these might be added another place out of his book of Generation and Corruption,<sup>b</sup> τὸ ὅλον συνεπλήρωσεν ὁ θεός, ἐντελεχῆ ποιήσας γένεσιν. God hath filled up the whole, or universe, and constantly supplies the same, having made a continual successive generation.—Lastly, τὸ δαιμόνιον is sometimes plainly used by Aristotle also, not for the Divinity in general, or any thing that is Divine, but for that one supreme Deity, the governor of the whole world. Thus in that passage of his Rhetoric to Alexander, τοῦτό ἐστιν ᾧ Cap. i. p. 609, [p. 833. tom. iii. oper.] διαφέρομεν τῶν λοιπῶν ζώων, ἡμεῖς οἱ μεγίστης τιμῆς ὑπὸ τοῦ δαιμονίου τετυχηκότες. This is that, wherein we men differ from other animals, having received the greatest honour from God, that though they be endued with appetite and anger and other passions, as well as we, yet we alone are furnished with speech and reason.

Over and besides which, Aristotle in his Metaphysics (as hath been already Lib. xiv. c. x, Par. [p. 484. tom. iv.] observed) professedly opposeth that im-

\* Lib. iii. cap. iv. p. 295. tom. iv. oper.

<sup>b</sup> Lib. ii. cap. x. p. 741. tom. i. oper.



aginary opinion of many independent principles of the universe; that is, of many unmade self-existent deities; he confuting the same from the phenomena, because *ἅπαντα πρὸς ἓν συντέτακται*, all things are plainly co-ordered to one—the whole world conspiring into one agreeing harmony; whereas if there were many principles or independent deities, the system of the world must needs have been *ἐπισποδιώδης*, incoherent and in-conspiring—like an ill-agreeing drama, botched up of many impertinent insertions. Whereupon Aristotle concludes after this manner, *τὰ δὲ ὄντα οὐ βούλεται κακῶς πολιτεύεσθαι*.

*Οὐκ ἀγαθὴ Πολυκοιρανίς, Ἐἰς Κόλατος*

But things will not be ill administered—(which was then it seems a kind of proverbial speech) and according to Homer, the government of many is not good, (nor could the affairs of the world be evenly carried on under it) wherefore there is one prince or monarch over all. From which passage of Aristotle's it is evident, that though he asserted *Πολυθεΐαν*, a multiplicity of gods—in the vulgar sense, as hath been already declared, yet he absolutely denied *Πολυκοιρανίην* and *Πολυαρχίαν*, a polyarchy or mundane aristocracy—that is, a multiplicity of first principles and independent deities. Wherefore though Aristotle doated much upon that whimsy of his, of as many intelligibles, or eternal and immoveable minds (now commonly called intelligences) as there are moveable spheres of all kinds in the heavens (which he sticks not also sometimes to call principles); yet must he of necessity be interpreted to have de-

rived all these from one supreme universal Deity, which, as Simplicius expresseth it, is Ἀρχὴ ἀρχῶν, the principle of principles;—and which comprehends and contains those inferior deities under it, after the same manner as the *primum mobile*, or highest sphere, contains all the lesser spheres within it: because otherwise there would not be εἰς Κόσμον, one prince or monarch over the whole; but the government of the world would be a polykæra-ny or aristocracy of gods, concluded to be an ill government. Moreover, as Plotinus represents Aristotle's sense, it is not conceivable, that so many independent principles should thus constantly conspire,

Enn. 5. 1. i.  
c. vii. [cap. ix.  
p. 490, 491.]

πρὸς ἓν ἔργον τὴν τοῦ παντός οὐρανῶς συμφωνίαν, into one work, that agreeable symphony and harmony of the whole heaven.—As there could not be any reason neither, why there should be just so many of these intelligences as there are spheres, and no more; and it is absurd to suppose, κατὰ συντυχίαν τὰς ἀρχὰς εἶναι, that the first principles of the universe happened by chance.

Now this highest principle, as it is ἀκίνητος οὐσία, an immoveable essence—is by Aristotle in the first place supposed to be ἀρχὴ κινήσεως, the principle of motion in the universe—or at least of that chiefest motion of the *primum mobile* or highest sphere (which according to the astronomy of those times seems to have been the sphere of fixed stars), by whose rapid circumgyration, all the other spheres and heavens were imagined to be carried round, from east to west. And accordingly the supreme Deity is by Aristotle called τὸ πρῶτον κινῶν ἀκίνητον, the first immoveable mover—or the mover of the *pri-*

Met. 1. xiv.  
c. viii p. 1003.  
[p. 431. tom.]

iv. oper.]Met. *num mobile*, and whole heaven. Which  
 l. xiv. c. viii. first mover being concluded by him to  
 [p. 483. tom. be but one, he doth from thence infer  
 iv. oper.] the singularity of the heaven or world, *ἐν μὲν ἄρα  
 τῷ λόγῳ καὶ ἀριθμῷ, τὸ πρῶτον κινῶν ἀκίνητον ὄν· καὶ τὸ  
 κινούμενον ἄρα αἰεὶ καὶ συνεχῶς ἐν μόνον. εἰς ἄρα οὐρανὸς  
 μόνος*. There is one numerically first immoveable  
 mover and no more; and therefore there is but  
 one moveable neither, that is, but one heaven or  
 world.—In which doctrine of Aristotle's, there  
 seems to be a great difference betwixt his philo-  
 sophy and that of Plato's; in that Plato makes  
 the principle of motion in the heavens and whole  
 world to be a self-moving soul, but Aristotle sup-  
 poseth it to be an immoveable mind or intellect.  
 Nevertheless, according to Aristotle's explication  
 of himself, the difference betwixt them is not  
 great, if any at all; Aristotle's immoveable mover  
 being understood by him, not to move the hea-  
 vens efficiently, but only objectively and finally,  
*ὡς ἐρώμενον*, as being loved.—Which conceit of  
 his Proclus upon Plato's *Timæus* perstringeth  
 P. 167. after this manner; *τῶν παλαιῶν οἱ μὲν τὸν  
 κόσμον ἐπιστρέψαντες ἐπὶ τὸν νοῦν, καὶ διὰ τοῦ  
 ἔρωτος, τοῦ περὶ τὸ πρῶτον ὄρεκτὸν, δόντες αὐτῷ τὴν κίνησιν,  
 οὐδὲν ἔφασαν ἀπὸ τοῦ νοῦ καθήκειν εἰς αὐτὸν, ἐν ἴσῳ προσ-  
 τάζαντες αὐτὸν τοῖς ἐρασμίῳις μὲν τῶν αἰσθητῶν, μηδὲν δὲ  
 γεννητικὸν ἔχουσιν ἐν τῇ ἑαυτῶν φύσει*. Some of the  
 ancients converting the world to mind (or intel-  
 lect) and making it move only by love of that  
 first desirable, acknowledged nothing at all to  
 descend down from Mind (or God) upon the  
 world; but equalized the same with other ami-  
 able things, amongst sensibles, that have nothing  
 generative in their nature.—Where Proclus seems

to suppose Aristotle to have attributed to God no efficiency at all upon the world; the contrary whereunto shall be evidently proved afterwards. In the mean time it is certain, that Aristotle, besides his immoveable mover of the heavens, which moveth only finally, or as being loved, must needs suppose another immediate mover of them, or efficient cause of that motion; which could be nothing but a soul, that, enamoured with this supreme Mind, did, as it were in imitation of it, continually turn round the heavens. Which seems to be nothing but Plato's doctrine disguised; that philosopher affirming, likewise, the circular motions of the heavens, caused efficiently by a soul of the world in his *Timæus*,<sup>a</sup> to be *τὴν περι νοῦν καὶ φρόνησιν μάλιστα οὔσαν*, a motion, that is most agreeable to that of mind or wisdom:—And again, in his *Laws*,<sup>b</sup> *τὴν τοῦ νοῦ περιόδω πάντως ὡς δυνατὸν, οἰκειοτάτην καὶ ὁμοίαν*, that which of all corporeal motions only resembles the circuit of intellect.—Which Platonic conceit found entertainment with Boetius, who writing of the soul of the world, represents it thus;

*Quæ cum secta duos motum glomeravit in orbes,  
In semet reditura meat, mentemque profundam  
Circuit, et simili convertit imagine cœlum.*

Wherefore, as well according to Plato's hypothesis, as Aristotle's, it may be affirmed of the supreme Deity in the same Boetius's language, that,

——— *Stabilisque manens dat cuncta moveri.*

Being itself immoveable, it causeth all other things to move.—The immediate efficient cause of which motion also, no less according to Aristotle than

<sup>a</sup> Cap. xvii. p. 241. edit. Fabricii.

<sup>b</sup> Lib. x. p. 669.

Plato, seems to have been a mundane soul; however, Aristotle thought not so fit to make this soul a principle; in all probability, because he was not so well assured of the incorporeity of souls, as of minds or intellects.

Nevertheless this is not the only thing, which Aristotle imputed to his first and highest immovable principle, or the supreme Deity, its turning round of the *primum mobile*, and that no otherwise than as being loved, or as the final cause thereof, as Proclus supposed; but he, as well as

Met. l. xiv. c. vii. p. εὖ καὶ καλῶς αἰτίαν, the cause of well and fit—or τὸ οὐδ' ἄνευ τοῦ εὖ, that without which there could be no such thing as well—that is, no order no aptitude, proportion and harmony in the universe: he declaring excellently, that εἰ μὴ ἔσται παρὰ τὰ αἰσθητὰ ἄλλα, οὐκ ἔσται ἀρχὴ καὶ τάξις, ἀλλ' αἰετῆς ἀρχῆς ἀρχή, unless there were something else in the world besides sensibles, there could be neither beginning nor order in it, but one thing would be the principle of another infinitely, or without end.

—And again, in another place already cited,\* τὸν εὖ καὶ καλῶς, ἴσως οὔτε πῦρ οὔτε γῆν, &c. οὐδ' αὐτῷ αὐτομάτῳ καὶ τύχῃ τοσοῦτον ἐπιτρέψαι πρᾶγμα καλῶς ἔχει, it is not at all likely, that either fire or earth, or any such body, should be the cause of that well and fit that is in the world; nor can so noble an effect as this be reasonably imputed to chance or fortune.—Wherefore himself, agreeably with Anaxagoras, concludes, that it is Νοῦς or Mind, which is properly αἴτιον τοῦ καλῶς καὶ ὀρθῶς, the cause of well and right—and accordingly does he frequently

\* Ibid. lib. vii. cap. iii. p. 266. tom. ii. oper.

call the supreme Deity by that name. He affirming, likewise,\* that the order, pulchritude and harmony of the whole world dependeth upon that one highest and supreme Being in it, after the same manner as the order of an army dependeth upon the general or emperor, who is not for the order, but the order for him. Which highest Being of the universe is therefore called by him also, conformably to Plato, τὸ ἀγαθὸν κεχωρισμένον, the separate good of the world—in way of distinction from that intrinsic or inherent good of it, which is the order and harmony itself: Ἐπισκεπτέον δὲ καὶ ποτέως Met. i. xiv. ἔχει ἢ τοῦ ὅλου φύσις τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἀριστον; cap. x. πότερον κεχωρισμένον τι, καὶ αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό; ἢ [P. 484. tom. iv. oper.] τὴν τάξιν; ἢ ἀμφοτέρως ὡσπερ στρατεύμα; καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῇ τάξει τὸ εἶ καὶ ὁ στρατηγός, καὶ μᾶλλον οὗτος, οὐ γὰρ αὐτός διὰ τὴν τάξιν, ἀλλ' ἐκείνη διὰ τοῦτόν ἐστιν πάντα γὰρ συντάκται πως. It is to be considered also, what is the good and best of the universe; whether its own order only? or something separate and existing by itself? or rather both of them together? As the good of an army consisteth both in its order, and likewise in its general or emperor, but principally in this latter, because the emperor is not for the order of the army, but the order of the army is for him; for all things are co-ordered together with God, and respectively to him.—Wherefore since Aristotle's supreme Deity, by what name soever called, whether mind or good, is the proper efficient cause of all that well and fit, that is in the universe, of all the order, pulchritude, and harmony thereof; it must needs be granted, that besides its being the final cause of

\* Ibid. lib. xiv. cap. x. p. 484, 485. tom. vi. oper.

motion, or its turning round the heavens by being loved, it was also the efficient cause of the whole frame of nature and system of the world. And thus does he plainly declare his sense, where he applauds Anaxagoras for maintaining

Met. I. i. c. iii. [p. 266. tom. iv. oper.] *Νοῦν εἶναι καὶ τοῦ κόσμου καὶ τῆς τάξεως πάσης αἰτίον*, that mind is the cause not only of all order, but also of the whole world:—

Met. I. xiv. c. vii. [p. 479. tom. iv. oper.] and when himself positively affirms, *ἐκ τριάντης ἀρχῆς ἤρτηται ὁ οὐρανός καὶ ἡ φύσις*, that from such a principle as this depends the heaven, and nature.—Where by heaven is meant the whole world, and by nature that artificial nature of his before insisted on, which doth nothing in vain, but always acteth for ends regularly, and is the instrument of the

Divine mind. He also somewhere affirmeth, that if the heavens or world were generated, that is, made in time, so as to have had a beginning, then it was certainly made, not by chance and fortune, but by such an artificial nature as is the instrument of a perfect mind. And in his *Physics*, where he contends for the world's ante-eternity, he concludes, nevertheless,

Lib. ii. c. vi. [p. 474. tom. i. oper.] *ἀνάγκη νοῦν αἰτίον καὶ φύσιν εἶναι τοῦδε παντός*, that mind together with nature must of

necessity be the cause of this whole universe.—For though the world were never so much coeternal with mind, yet was it in order of nature after it, and junior to it as the effect thereof, himself thus generously resolving, *εὐλογώτατον*

Ar. de An. I. i. c. vii. [p. 16. tom. ii. oper.] *εἶναι νοῦν προγενέστατον, καὶ κύριον κατὰ φύσιν· τὰ δὲ στοιχεῖά φασι πρῶτα τῶν ὄντων εἶναι*, that

though some (that is, the Atheists) affirm the elements to have been the first beings,

yet it was the most reasonable thing of all to conclude, that mind was the oldest of all things, and senior to the world and elements; and that, according to nature, it had a princely and sovereign dominion over all.—Wherefore, we think it now sufficiently evident, that Aristotle's supreme Deity does not only move the heavens as being loved, or is the final cause of motion, but also was the efficient cause of this whole mundane system, framed according to the best wisdom, and after the best manner possible.

For perhaps it may not be amiss here to observe, that God was not called Mind by Aristotle, and those other ancient philosophers, according to that vulgar sense of many in these days of ours; as if he were indeed an understanding or perceptive Being, and that perfectly omniscient, but yet nevertheless such, as acted all things arbitrarily, being not determined by any rule or nature of goodness, but only by his own fortuitous will. For, according to those ancient philosophers, that, which acts without respect to good, would not be so much accounted *mens* as *dementia*, mind, as madness or folly; and to impute the frame of nature or system of the world, together with the government of the same, to such a principle as this, would have been judged by them all one, as to impute them to chance or fortune. But Aristotle and those other philosophers who called the supreme God *Νῶς* or Mind, understood thereby that, which of all things in the whole world is most opposite to chance, fortune, and temerity; that which is regulated by the *τὸ εὖ καὶ καλῶς*, the well and fit—of every thing, if it be not rather the very rule, measure and essence



of fitness itself; that which acteth all for ends and good, and doth every thing after the best manner, in order to the whole. Thus Socrates in that place before cited out of Plato's *Phædo*, interprets the meaning of that opinion, That mind made the world, and was the cause of all things: *ἡγησάμην, εἰ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, τὸν νοῦν πάντα κοσμεῖν, καὶ ἕκαστον τιθεῖναι ταύτῃ ὅπῃ αὐτὸν βέλτιστα ἔχει*. That therefore every thing might be concluded to have been disposed of after the best manner possible.—And accordingly Theophrastus, Aristotle's scholar and successor, describeth God after this manner, *τὸ πρῶτον καὶ θεϊότατον, πάντα τὰ ἄριστα βουλόμενος*, that first and divinest Being of all, which willeth all the best things.—Whether of these two hypotheses concerning God, one of the ancient Pagan philosophers, that God is as essentially goodness as wisdom, or, as Plotinus after Plato calls him, decency and fitness itself; the other, of some late professors of Christianity, that he is nothing but arbitrary will, omnipotent and omniscient; I say, whether of these two is more agreeable to piety and true Christianity, we shall leave it to be considered.

Lastly, it is not without probability, that Aristotle did, besides the frame of nature, and fabric of the world, impute even the very substance of things themselves also to the Divine efficiency (nor indeed can there well be any doubt of any thing, save only the matter); partly from his affirming God to be a cause and principle to all things, and partly from his commending this doctrine of Anaxagoras, *ἅμα τῷ καλῶς, αἰτίαν*

Met. l. i. c. iii. [p. 266. tom. iv oper.] *καὶ ἀρχὴν εἶναι τῶν ὄντων νοῦν*, that mind was, together with well and fit, the cause and principle of things themselves.—However,

that Aristotle's inferior gods, at least, and therefore his intelligences of the lesser spheres, which were incorporeal substances, were all of them produced or created by one Supreme, may be further confirmed from this definition of his in his rhetoric, τὸ δαιμόμιον οὐδὲν ἔστιν, ἀλλ' ἢ θεός, L. ii. c. xxiii. [p. 785. tom. iii. oper.] ἢ θεοῦ ἔργον, the Divinity is nothing but either God or the work of God.—Where θεός is unquestionably used in way of eminency for the supreme Deity, as in those other places of Aristotle's before cited, to which sundry more might be added; as, πάντα ἔχει τὰ γὰρ ὁ θεός, καὶ ἔστιν ἀνάρκης, Mag. Mor. l. ii. c. xv. [p. 255. tom. iii. oper.] God possesseth all good things, and is self-sufficient:—and again where he speaks of things, that are more than praise-worthy, τοιοῦτον δὲ εἶναι τὸν θεόν, καὶ τὰ γὰρ, Eth. Nic. l. i. c. xii. [p. 18. tom. iii. oper.] πρὸς ταῦτα γὰρ καὶ τ' ἄλλα ἀναφύροσθαι, such are God and Good, for to these are all other things referred.—But here Aristotle affirming, That there is nothing Divine, but either God himself, or the work and effect of God, plainly implies, that there was no multitude of self-existent deities, and that those intelligences of the lesser stars or spheres, however eternal, were themselves also produced or caused by one supreme Deity.

Furthermore, Aristotle declares, that this speculation concerning the Deity Met. l. vi. c. i. [p. 346. tom. iv. oper.] does constitute a particular science by itself, distinct from those other speculative sciences of physiology, and the pure mathematics; so that there are in all three speculative sciences, distinguished by their several objects, physiology, the pure mathematics, and theology, or metaphysics: the former of these, that is, physiology, being con-

versant *περὶ ἀχώριστα μὲν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀκίνητα*, about things both inseparable from matter, and moveable;—the second (viz. geometry, or the pure mathematics) *περὶ ἀκίνητα μὲν, ἀλλ' οὐ χωριστά, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐν ὕλῃ*, about things immoveable, indeed, but not really separable from matter, so as to exist alone by themselves;—but the third and last, *περὶ χωριστὰ καὶ ἀκίνητα*, concerning things both immoveable and separable from matter—that is, incorporeal substances immoveable: this philosopher there adding, *εἰ μὴ ἐστὶ τις ἕτερα οὐσία παρὰ τὰς φύσει συνεστηκυίας, ἢ φυσικῇ ἂν εἴη πρώτη ἐπιστήμη, εἰ δὲ ἐστὶ τις οὐσία ἀκίνητος, αὕτη προτέρα, καὶ φιλοσοφία πρώτη*: that if there were no other substance besides these natural things, which are material and moveable, then would physiology be the first science; but if there be any immoveable substance, the philosophy thereof must needs in order of nature be before the other.—Lastly, he concludes, that as the speculative sciences in general are more noble and excellent than the other, so is theology or metaphysics the most honourable of all the speculatives. Now the chief points of the Aristotelic theology, or metaphysical doctrine concerning God, seem to be these four following. First, that though all things be not ingent or unmade, according to that in his book

Met. l. xiv. o. *ἀρ' ἀνάγκη ἀγέννητα*  
 vi. [p. 477. *πάντα εἶναι, ἢ οὐδὲν κωλύει γεγονέναι ἕτερα ἐξ*  
 tom. iv. oper.] *ἐτέρων* there is no necessity, that all things should be unmade, for what hinders but that some things may be generated from other things?—Yet there must needs be something eternal and unmade, as likewise incorruptible, be-

<sup>a</sup> De Xenophane, Zenone, et Georgia, cap. ii. p. 836. tom. ii. oper.

cause *ἢ πᾶσαι οὐσίαι φθαρταί, πάντα φθαρτά*. If all substances were corruptible, then all might come to nothing.—Which eternal, unmade (or self-existent) and incorruptible substance, according to Aristotle, is not senseless matter, but a perfect mind. Secondly, that God is also an incorporeal substance, *κεχωρισμένη τῶν αἰσθητῶν*, separate from sensibles—and not only so, Met. l. xiv. c. vii. [p. 180. tom. iv. oper.] but, according to Aristotle's judgment likewise, *ἀδιαίρετος*, and *ἀμέρης*, and *ἀμεγέθης*, indivisible, and devoid of parts, and magnitude.—Nor can it be denied, but that besides Aristotle, the generality of those other ancients, who asserted incorporeal substance, did suppose it likewise to be unextended, they dividing substances (as we learn from Philo) into *διαστηματικαί, καὶ ἀδιάστατοι οὐσίαι*, distant and indistant, or extended and unextended substances.—Which doctrine, whether true or no, is not here to be discussed. Thirdly, *τὸ αὐτὸν νοῦς καὶ νοητὸν*, that in God intellect is really the same thing with the intelligibles.—Met. lib. xiv. c. vii. & c. ix. Because the Divine Mind being (at least in order of nature) senior to all things, and architectonal of the world, could not look abroad for its objects, or find them any where without itself, and therefore must needs contain them all within itself. Which determination of Aristotle's is no less agreeable to Theism than to Platonism; whereas, on the contrary, the Atheists, who assert mind and understanding as such, to be in order of nature junior to matter and the world, do therefore, agreeably to their own hypothesis, suppose all intellection to be by way of passion from corporeal things without, and no mind or intellect to contain its intelligibles, or immediate objects

within itself. Lastly, that God being an immove-  
Met. lib. xiv.  
c. vi. able substance, his οὐσία is ἐνέργεια, his  
 essence and act or operation the same; *δεῖ ἄρα εἶναι οὐσίαν τοιαύτην ἧς ἡ οὐσία ἐνέργεια*, there  
 must therefore needs be some such principle as  
 this; whose essence is act or energy.—From which  
 theorem Aristotle indeed endeavours to establish  
 the eternity of the world, that it was not made ἐκ  
*νυκτός, καὶ ὁμοῦ πάντων, καὶ ἐκ μὴ ὄντος*, from night,  
 and a confused chaos of things, and from nothing;  
 —that is, from an antecedent non-existence,  
 brought forth into being; because God, who is  
 an immoveable nature, and whose essence is act  
 or energy, cannot be supposed to have rested or  
 slept from eternity, doing nothing at all, and then,  
 after infinite ages, to have begun to move the mat-  
 ter, or make the world. Which argumentation  
 of Aristotle's, perhaps, would not be inconsider-  
 able, were the world, motion, and time, capable of  
 existing from eternity, or without beginning. Of  
 which more elsewhere. However, from hence it  
 is undeniably evident, that Aristotle, though as-  
 serting the world's eternity, nevertheless derived  
 the same from God, because he would prove this  
 eternity of the world from the essential energy  
 and immutability of the Deity.

We shall now conclude all concerning Aristotle  
 with this short summary, which himself gives us  
 of his own creed and religion, agreeably to the  
 tradition of his Pagan ancestors: παρα-  
Met. lib. xiv.  
c. viii. [p.  
483.] δέδοται ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχαίων καὶ παλαιῶν, ὅτι θεοὶ  
 τε εἰσιν οὗτοι, καὶ περιέχει τὸ θεῖον τὴν ὅλην φύ-  
 σιν· τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ μυθικῶς ἤδη προσήχθαι πρὸς τὴν πειθῶ τῶν  
 πολλῶν, καὶ τὴν εἰς τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὸ συμφέρον χρῆσιν  
 ἀνθρωποειδῆς τε γὰρ τούτους καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων ὁμοίους

ταῖς λέγουσι, καὶ τοῦτοις ἕτερα ἀκόλουθα καὶ παραπλήσια·  
 It hath been delivered down to us from very ancient times, that the stars are gods also ; besides that supreme Deity, which contains the whole nature. But all the other things were fabulously added hereunto, for the better persuasion of the multitude, and for utility of human life and political ends, to keep men in obedience to civil laws. As, for example, that these gods are of human form, or like to other animals ; with such other things as are consequent hereupon.—In which words of Aristotle these three things may be taken notice of. First, that this was the general persuasion of the civilized Pagans from all known antiquity downwards, that there is one τὸ θεῖον, which comprehends the whole nature. Where τὸ θεῖον, is by Aristotle plainly taken for the supreme Deity. And his own sense concerning this particular is elsewhere thus declared after the same manner, where he speaks of order, harmony, and proportion ; *θείας γὰρ δὴ τοῦτο* In Polit.  
*δυνάμειος ἔργον, ἥτις καὶ τόδε συνέχει τὸ πᾶν,*  
 this is the work of Divine power, which also contains this universe.—Which Divinity containing and comprehending the whole nature and universe, must needs be a single and solitary Being, according to that expression of Horace before cited :

*Nec viget quicquam simile aut secundum,*

That, which hath nothing like it, nor second to it.—The next thing is, that, according to the Pagan tradition, besides this universal Numen, there were certain other particular and inferior deities also, that is, understanding beings superior to

men; namely, the animated stars or spheres, according to the vulgar apprehension, though Aristotle's philosophy would interpret this chiefly of their immoveable minds or intelligences. Lastly, that all the rest of the Pagan religion and theology, those two things only excepted, were fabulous and fictitious; invented for the better persuasion of the vulgar to piety, and the conserving of them in obedience to civil laws; amongst which this may be reckoned for one, that those gods are all like men or other animals; and therefore to be worshipped in images and statues of those several forms; with all that other fabulous farrago, which dependeth hereupon. Which being separated from the rest, the *πᾶρμος δόξα*, or ancient tradition of their Pagan progenitors—would remain comprised within those two particulars above-mentioned; namely, that there is one supreme Deity, that contains the whole universe, and that, besides it, the animated stars or their minds are certain inferior gods also.

To Aristotle may be here subjoined Speusippus and Xenocrates, his equals and corrivals, they being Plato's successors; together with Theophrastus, his own scholar and successor. Concerning the former of which it is recorded in Cicero, that agreeably with Plato, he asserted "vim quandam, qua omnia regantur, eamque animalem," one animal and intellectual force, by which all things are governed;—by reason whereof, Velleius the Epicurean complains of him, as thereby endeavouring "evellere ex animis cognitionem deorum," to pluck out of the minds of men the notion of gods;—as indeed both he and Plato did destroy those

De N. D. lib. i. c. 1. zero, that agreeably with Plato, he asserted "vim quandam, qua omnia regantur, eamque animalem," one animal and intellectual force, by which all things are governed;—by reason whereof, Velleius the Epicurean complains of him, as thereby endeavouring "evellere ex animis cognitionem deorum," to pluck out of the minds of men the notion of gods;—as indeed both he and Plato did destroy those

Epicurean gods, which were all supposed to be independent, and to have no sway or influence at all upon the government of the world; whereas neither of them denied a plurality of subordinate and dependent deities, generated or created by one Supreme, and by him employed as his ministers in the economy of the universe: for had they done any such thing as this, they would certainly have been then condemned for Atheists. And Xenocrates's theology is thus represented in Sto-bæus: τὴν Μονάδα καὶ τὴν Δνάδα θεούς, τὴν Ed. Phys. lib. i. c. iii. [p. 17.] μὲν ὡς ἄρρενα πατὸς ἔχουσαν τάξιν, ἥντινα προσ-  
 αγορεύει καὶ Ζῆνα, καὶ Περιπτόν, καὶ Νοῦν, ὅστις ἐστὶν αὐτῷ πρῶτος θεός· τὴν δὲ θήλειαν μὲν πρὸς θεῶν δίκην, τῆς ὑπὸ τὸν οὐρανὸν λήξεως ἡγουμένην, ἥτις ἐστὶν αὐτῷ ψυχὴ τοῦ παντός, &c. That both a monad and dyad were gods, the one masculine, having the order of a father, which he calleth Zen and Mind, and which is also to him the first God; the other feminine, as it were the mother of the gods, which is to him the Soul of the universe:—besides which he acknowledgeth the heaven to be Divine, that is, animated with a particular soul of its own, and the fiery stars to be celestial gods, as he asserted also certain sublunary gods, viz. the invisible demons. Where, instead of the Platonic trinity, Xenocrates seems to have acknowledged only a duality of Divine hypostases; the first called a Monad and Mind, the second a Dyad and Soul of the universe. And, lastly, we have this testimony of Theophrastus, besides others, cited out of his Metaphysics; *θεία γὰρ πάντων ἀρχή, δι' ἧς ἅπαντα καὶ ἐστὶ καὶ διαμένει*, there is one Divine Principle of all things, by or from which all things subsist and remain.



xxv. The Stoics and their chief doctors, Zeno, Cleanthes and Chrysippus, were no better naturalists and metaphysicians than Heraclitus, in whose footsteps they trode; they in like manner admitting no other substance besides body, according to the true and proper notion thereof, as that which is not only διαστατόν, distant and extended—but also ἀντίκτυπον, resisting and impenetrable.—So that, according to these Stoics, the souls not only of other animals, but of men also, were properly corporeal, that is, substances impenetrably extended; and which differed from that other part of theirs, commonly called their body, no otherwise than that they were \* σώμα ἁραιότερον καὶ λεπτομερέστερον, a more thin and subtile body—and πνεῦμα ἔνθερμον, a hot and fiery spirit—it being supposed by these philosophers, that cogitation, reason, and understanding, are lodged only in the fiery matter of the universe. And though the generality of these Stoics acknowledged human souls to have a certain permanency after death, and some of them till the next conflagration, (unless perhaps they should be crushed and broken all to pieces, in their passage out of the body, by the downfall of some tower, steeple, or the like upon them) yet did they all conclude against their immortality, there being nothing at all immortal with them (as shall be afterwards declared) save only Jupiter, or the one supreme Deity. And as for the punishment of the wicked souls after death, though some of them seem to have utterly exploded the same, as a mere figment of poets,

\* These are the words of Chrysippus, preserved by Plutarch, Libro de Repugnantibus Stoicorum, p. 1052. tom. ii. oper.

(insomuch, that Epictetus \* himself denies there was any Acheron, Cocytus, or Phlegethon) yet others granted, that as the better souls after death did mount up to the stars, their first original, so the wicked wandered up and down here in certain dark and miry subterraneous places, till at length they were quite extinct. Nevertheless, they seem to have been all of this persuasion, that the frightening of men with punishments after death was no proper nor accommodate means to promote virtue, because that ought to be pursued after for its own sake, or the good of honesty, as vice to be avoided for that evil of turpitude which is in it, and not for any other external evil consequent thereupon. Wherefore Chrysippus reprehended Plato for subjoining to his republic such affrightful stories of punishments after death:

φησὶν οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἀποτρέπειν τῷ ἀπὸ τῶν θεῶν φόβῳ, τῆς ἀδικίας, τὸν Κέφαλον· εὐδιάβλητον ἔϊναι καὶ πρὸς τὸνναντίον ἐξάγοντα πολλοὺς περισπασμοὺς καὶ πιθανότητας ἀντιπιπτούσας, τὸν περὶ τῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ κολάσεω λόγον, ὡς οὐδὲν διαφέροντα τῆς Ἀκκοῦς καὶ τῆς Ἀλφίτους, δι' ὧν τὰ παιδάρια τοῦ κακοσχολεῖν αἱ γυναῖκες ἀνείρουσι· Chrysippus affirmeth, that Plato (in the person of Cephalus) does not rightly deter men from injustice by the fear of Divine punishment and vengeance after death; since this opinion (of torments after death) is liable to much exception, and the contrary is not without probabilities; so that it seems to be but like to women's frightening of children from doing unhappy tricks, with those huggears of Acco and Alphito.—But how fondly these Stoics doated upon that hypothesis, that all

Plat. de  
Stoic. Rep.  
p. 1040.

\* Arrian. in Epictet. lib. iii. cap. xiii. p. 293.

was body, may appear from hence, that they maintained even accidents and qualities themselves to be bodies; for voice and sound, night and day, evening and morning, summer and winter, nay, calends and nones, months and years, were bodies with them. And, not only so, but also the qualities of the mind itself, as virtue and vice, together with the motions and affections of it, as anger and envy, grief and joy; according to that passage in Seneca, <sup>a</sup> “Corporis bona sunt corpora; corpora ergo sunt et quæ animi, nam et hic corpus est:” The goods of a body are bodies; now the mind is a body, and therefore the goods of the mind are bodies too.—And with as good logic as this did they further infer, that all the actions, passions, and qualities of the mind, were not only bodies, but also animals likewise: <sup>b</sup> “Animam constat animal esse, cum ipsa efficiat, ut simus animalia; virtus autem nihil aliud est quam animus taliter se habens, ergo animal est:” It is manifest, that the soul is an animal, because it is that, by which we are made animals; now virtue and vice are nothing else but the soul so and so affected or modified, and therefore these are animals too.—Thus we see what fine conclusions these doaters upon body (though accounted great masters of logic) made; and how they were befooled in their ratiocinations and philosophy.

Nevertheless, though these Stoics were such sottish Corporealists, yet were they not for all that Atheists; they resolving, that mind or understanding, though always lodged in corporeal substance,

<sup>a</sup> Epist. cvi. p. 399. tom. ii. oper.

<sup>b</sup> Seneca, Epist. cxiii. p. 422. tom. ii. oper.

yet was not first of all begotten out of senseless matter, so or so modified, but was an eternal unmade thing, and the maker of the whole mundane system. And, therefore, as to that controversy so much agitated amongst the ancients, whether the world were made by chance, or by the necessity of material motions, or by mind, reason and understanding; they avowedly maintained, that it was neither by chance nor by material necessity, but *Divina Mente*, by a Divine and eternal Mind every way perfect. From which one eternal Mind they also affirmed human souls to have been derived, and not from senseless matter; “Prudentiam et mentem a diis ad homines pervenisse,”<sup>a</sup> that mind and wisdom descended down to men from the Deity.—And that “Ratio nihil aliud est, quam in corpus humanum pars divini spiritus mersa;”<sup>b</sup> Reason is nothing else but part of the Divine spirit merged into a human body:—so that these human souls were to them no other than *μέρια θεῶν καὶ ἀποσπάσματα*,<sup>c</sup> certain parts of God, or decerptions and avulsions from him.—Neither were the reasons, by which these Stoics would prove the world to have had a Divine original, at all contemptible, or much inferior to those which have been used in these latter days; they being such as these: first, that it is no more likely this orderly system of the world should have been made by chance, than that Ennius’s Annals or Homer’s Iliads might have resulted from the fortuitous projection or tumbling out of so many

<sup>a</sup> Cicero de Nat. Deor. lib. ii. cap. xxxi. p. 3000. tom. ix. oper.

<sup>b</sup> Senec. Epist. lxxvi. p. 168. tom. ii. oper.

<sup>c</sup> Arrian. in Epict. lib. i. cap. xiv. p. 123.

forms of letters, confounded all together; there being as much continued and coherent sense, and as many several combinations in this real poem of the world, as there is in any fantastic poem made by men. And since we see no houses or cities, no books or libraries any where made by the fortuitous motions of matter, it is a madness to think, that this admirable compages of the whole world should first have resulted from thence. Again, there could not possibly be such an agreeing and conspiring cognation of things, and such a universal harmony throughout the whole world, as now there is, “nisi ea uno divino et continuato spiritu continerentur,” were they not all contained by one and the same Divine spirit:—which is the most obvious argument for the unity or oneliness of the Deity. They reasoned also from the scale of nature, or the gradual perfection of things in the universe, one above another; that therefore there must be something absolutely perfect, and that either the world itself, or something presiding over it, was a *principio sapiens*,\* wise from the beginning,—or rather without beginning, and from eternity. For as in the growth of plants and animals, “Natura suo quodam itinere ad ultimum pervenit,” nature by a continual progress, and journeying forwards, arrives at length to the greatest perfection, which those things are respectively capable of;—and as those arts of picture and architecture aim at perfection; “ita in omni natura necesse est absolvi aliquid et perfici,” so in the nature of the whole universe there must needs be something absolutely perfect

\* Cicero de Nat. Deor. lib. ii. cap. xiii. p. 2973. tom. ix. oper.

reached unto.—“*Necesse est præstantem aliquam esse naturam, qua nihil est melius;*” since there is such a gradual ascent and scale of perfections in nature, one above another, there must needs be some most excellent and perfect Being, than which nothing can be better—at the top of all, as the head thereof. Moreover, they disputed Socratically, after this manner; \* “*Unde arripuit homo vitam, mentem et rationem?*” Whence did man snatch life, reason, or understanding? Or from what was it kindled in him? For is it not plain, that we derive the moisture and fluidity of our bodies from the water that is in the universe, their consistency and solidity from the earth, their heat and activity from the fire, and their spirituality from the air? “*Illud autem, quod vincit hæc omnia, rationem, mentem et consilium, &c. ubi invenimus? unde sustulimus? An cætera mundus habebit omnia? Hoc unum quod plurimi est non habebit?*” But that which far transcendeth all these things, our reason, mind and understanding, where did we find it? or from whence did we derive it? Hath the universe all those other things of ours in it, and in a far greater proportion? and hath it nothing at all of that, which is the most excellent thing in us? “*Nihil quod animi, quodque rationis est expers, id generare ex se potest animantes compotesque rationis, mundus autem generat animantes compotes rationis:*” Nothing that is devoid of mind and reason, can generate things animant and rational; but the world generateth such, and therefore itself (or that which contains it, and presides over it) must needs be animant and rational, or intellectual.—Which argumentation is further

\* Id. *ibid.* cap. vi. vii. viii. ix.

set home by such similitudes as these; "Si ex oliva modulate canentes tibiæ nascerentur, non dubitares, quin esset in oliva tibicinis quædam scientia. Quid si platani fidiculas ferrent numerose sonantes, idem scilicet censeret in platanis inesse musicam. Cur igitur mundus non animans sapiensque judicetur, cum ex se procreet animantes atque sapientes?" If from the olive-tree should be produced pipes sounding harmoniously, or from the plane-tree fiddles, playing of their own accord musically, it would not at all be doubted, but that there was some musical, either skill or nature, in those trees themselves: why therefore should not the world be concluded to be both animant and wise (or to have something in it which is so) since it produceth such beings from itself?—And though perhaps some may think that of Cotta's here to have been a smart and witty repartee,\* "Quærit Socrates, unde animam arripuerimus, si nulla fuerit in mundo? Et ego quæro, unde orationem? unde numeros? unde cantus? nisi vero loqui solem cum luna putemus, cum propius accesserit: aut ad harmoniam canere mundum, ut Pythagoras existimat." Socrates demandeth, whence we snatched soul, life, and reason, if there were none in the world? and I demand (saith he) whence did we snatch speech, music, and numbers? Unless perhaps you will suppose the sun to confabulate with the moon, when he approaches near her in the Syzygiæ; or the world to sound harmonically, as Pythagoras conceited.—Yet this, how smart soever it may seem, was really but an empty flash of academic wit, without any solidity at all in it, as shall be manifested afterward.

\* Id. *ibid.* lib. iii. cap. xi. p. 3064. tom. ix. oper.

Lastly, the Stoics endeavoured to prove the existence of a God after this manner: “*Ut nulla pars corporis nostri est, quæ non sit minor quam nosmetipsi sumus, sic mundum universum pluris esse necesse est quam partem aliquam universi:*” As there is no part of our body, which is not inferior in perfection to ourselves, so must the whole universe needs be supposed to be better and more perfect than any of the parts thereof.—Wherefore since it is better to be endued with life and understanding, than to be devoid thereof, and these are pure perfections; they being in some measure in the parts, must needs be much more in the whole. “*Nullius sensu carentis pars potest esse sentiens;*” no part of that, which is utterly dead and stupid, can have life and understanding in it.—And it is a madness for any man to suppose “*Nihil in omni mundo melius esse quam se,*” that there is nothing in the whole world better than himself, or than mankind—which is but a part thereof. Now Cotta here again exercises his jeering academic wit after the same manner as before; “*Hoc si placet, jam efficies, ut mandus optime librum legere videatur, &c. Isto modo etiam disertus, mathematicus, musicus, omni denique doctrina refertus, postremo philosophus erit mundus.*” By this same argument you might as well prove, that the world is also book-learned, an orator, a mathematician, a musician, and last of all a philosopher.—But neither this objection of his nor that former have any firmitude at all in them: because though an effect cannot be better or more perfect than its cause, nor a part than the whole; and, therefore, whatsoever there is of pure perfection in any effect, it must needs be more in the cause; yet as to those



things there mentioned by Cotta (which have all a plain mixture of imperfection in them) as they could not therefore formally exist in that which is absolutely perfect, so is it sufficient, that they are all eminently and virtually contained therein.

By such argumentations as these (besides that taken from the topic of prescience and divination) did the ancient Stoics endeavour to demonstrate the existence of a God, or a universal Numen, the maker and governor of the whole world; and that such a one, as was not a mere plastic or methodical and senseless, but a conscious and perfectly intellectual nature. So that the world to them was neither a mere heap and congeries of dead and stupid matter fortuitously compacted together; nor yet a huge plant or vegetable, that is, endued with a spermatic principle only; but an animal informed and enlivened by an intellectual soul. And though, being Corporealists, they sometimes called the whole world itself or mundane animal, God; and sometimes the fiery principle in it, as intellectual, and the hegemonic of the mundane soul; yet was the God of the Stoics properly, not the very matter itself, but that great soul, mind and understanding, or in Seneca's language, that *ratio incorporalis*, that rules the matter of the whole world. Which stoical God was also called as well *Τάγαθόν* as *Νοῦς*, good as mind—as that which is a most moral, benign, and beneficent being; according to that excellent Cleanthean description of him, in Clemens Alexandrinus.\*

Τάγαθόν ἑστίν ἡ μὲν ὅλη ἐστὶ ἡ κοινὴ δι,  
 Τεταγμένον, ἄτακτον, ἕρπον, εὐσεβὲς,  
 Κρατῶν ἑαυτοῦ, χρησίμων, καλὸν, δίκαιον, &c.

\* In *Protreptico*, cap. vi. p. 61. and *Stromat. lib. v. p. 715.*

But this maker and governor of the whole world was most commonly named by the Stoics Zeus and Zen, or Jupiter; some of them concluding, that therefore there was but one Zeus or independent Deity, because the whole world was but one animal governed by one soul; and others of them endeavouring, on the contrary, to prove the unity and singularity of the world from the oneliness of this Zeus, or the supreme Deity, supposed and taken for granted, and because there is but one fate and providence. Which latter consequence Plutarch would by no means allow of, he writing thus concerning it, where he pleads for a plurality of worlds; *καὶ μὴν τάγε* D. Def. Or. *ἄλλα τῶν Στωϊκῶν τίς ἂν φοβηθείη, πυνθανομέ-* p. 425.

*νων πῶς Εἰμαρμένη μία μένει καὶ Πρόνοια, καὶ ὀυπολλοὶ Δίεσ καὶ Ζῆνεσ ἔσονται, πλείονων ὄντων κόσμων; τίς γὰρ ἀνάγκη πολλοῖσ εἶναι Δίεσ, ἂν πλείονεσ ὄσι κόσμοι, καὶ μὴ καθ' ἕκαστον ἄρχοντα πρῶτον καὶ ἡγεμόνα τοῦ ὄλου θεῶσ, οἶοσ ὁ παρ' ἡμῖν κύριοσ ἀπάντων καὶ πατήρ ἐπονομαζόμενοσ, &c.* Neither is it at all considerable, what the Stoics here object against a plurality of worlds, they demanding, how there could be but one Fate, and one Providence, and one Jove, (or independent Deity) were there many worlds? For what necessity is there; that there must be more Zeuses or Joves than one, if there were more worlds? and why might not that one and the same God of this universe, called by us the Lord and Father of all, be the first prince, and highest governor in all those worlds? Or what hinders, but that a multitude of worlds might be all subject to the fate and providence of one Jupiter, or supreme God, himself inspecting and ordering them every one; and imparting principles and spermatic

reasons to them, according to which all things in them might be governed and disposed? For can many distinct persons in an army or chorus be reduced into one body or polity? and could not ten or fifty, or a hundred worlds in the universe, be all governed by one reason, and be ordered together in reference to one principle?—In which place these two things are plainly contained; first, that the Stoics unquestionably asserted one supreme Deity, or universal monarch over the whole world; and, secondly, that Plutarch was so far from giving any entertainment to the contrary opinion, that he concluded, though there were ten or fifty, or a hundred worlds, yet they were all subject to one supreme, solitary, and independent Deity.

But, however, though these Stoics thus unquestionably asserted one sole independent and universal Numen, the monarch over the whole world; yet did they, notwithstanding, together with the other Pagans, acknowledge a plurality of gods; they concluding *πάντα μεστὰ εἶναι θεῶν καὶ δαιμόνων*, that all things were full of gods and demons.—And so far were they from falling short of the other Pagans, as to this Polytheism or multiplicity of gods, that they seem rather to have surpassed and outstripped them therein. Plutarch making mention of their *τοσοῦτον πλῆθος θεῶν*, their so great multitude of gods;—and affirming them, *ἐμπεπληκέναι τῷ λόγῳ θεῶν τὸν οὐρανὸν, τὴν γῆν, τὸν αἴρα, τὴν θάλατταν*, to have filled the whole heaven, earth, air, and sea with gods.—Nevertheless, they plainly declare, that all this their multiplicity of gods (one only excepted) was generated or created in

\* De Repugnant, Stoicor. p. 1075. tom. ii. oper.

time by that one, called Zeus or Jupiter, who was not only the spermatic reason, but also the soul and mind of the whole universe; and who from himself produced the world, and those gods, out of non-existence into being. And, not only so, but that also in the successive conflagrations they are all again resolved and swallowed up into that one. Thus Plutarch, in his defect of oracles, writing of the mortality of de-  
P. 420.  
 mons, τοὺς Στωϊκοὺς γινώσκωμεν, οὐ μόνον κατὰ δαιμόνων ἦν λέγω δόξαν ἔχοντας, ἀλλὰ καὶ θεῶν, ὄντων τοσοῦτον τὸ πλήθος· ἐνὶ χρωμένους αἰδίῳ καὶ ἀφθάρτῳ, τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους καὶ γεγονέναι καὶ φθαρήσεσθαι νομίζοντας. We know the Stoics to maintain this opinion, not only concerning demons, but also the gods themselves, that they are mortal. For though they own such a multitude of gods, yet do they acknowledge only one of them eternal and incorruptible; affirming concerning all the rest, that as they were made in time, so they shall be again corrupted and destroyed.—Plutarch himself there defends the mortality of demons, but this only as to their corporeal part, that they die to their present bodies, and transmigrate into others, their souls in the mean time remaining immortal and incorruptible; but the Stoics maintained the same as well concerning gods as demons; and that in such a manner, as that their very souls, lives, and personalities, should be utterly extinguished and destroyed. To the same purpose Plutarch again writeth, in his book of Common Notions against the Stoics, Χρόσιππος καὶ Κλεάνθης ἐμπεπληκότες (ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν) τῷ λόγῳ θεῶν, τὸν οὐρανόν, τὴν γῆν, τὸν ἀέρα, τὴν θάλατταν, οὐδένα τῶν τοσοῦτων ἀφθάρτον, οὐδὲ αἰδίον ἀπολελοίπασιν, πλὴν πόνου τῶν Διός· εἰς δὲ  
P. 1075.

πάντας καταναλίσκουσι τοὺς ἄλλους, &c. ταῦτα δὲ οὐχ ὡς ἄλλα πολλὰ τῶν ἀτόπων συλλογιζόμενα ἔχει τὰς ὑποθέσεις αὐτῶν, καὶ τοῖς δόγμασιν ἔπεται, ἀλλὰ αὐτοὶ μέγα βουῶντες ἐν τοῖς περὶ θεῶν, καὶ προνοίας, εἰμαρμένης τε καὶ φύσεως γράμμασι, διαρρήδην λέγουσι, τοὺς θεοὺς ἅπαντας εἶναι γεγονότας καὶ φθαροσσομένους ὑπὸ πυρὸς, τηκτοὺς κατὰ αὐτοὺς, ὥσπερ κηρίνους ἢ καττερίνους ὄντας. Chrysippus and Cleanthes, having filled the whole heaven, earth, air and sea with gods, leave not one of these their so many gods incorruptible nor eternal, save Jupiter only, into whom they consume all the rest; thereby making him to be a helluo and devourer of gods; which is as bad as if they should affirm him to be corruptible; it arguing as much imperfection for one to be nourished and preserved by the consumption of other things into him, as for himself to die. Now this is not only gathered by way of consequence from the other principles of the Stoics, but it is a thing, which they expressly assert, and with a loud voice proclaim in all their writings concerning the gods, providence, fate and nature; that all the gods were generated, (or made in time) and that they shall be all destroyed by fire; they supposing them to be meltable, as if they were waxen or leaden things.—This indeed is essential to the stoical doctrine, and from their principles inseparable and unavoidable; forasmuch as they held all to be body, and that in the successive conflagrations all corporeal systems and compages shall be dissolved by fire; so that no other deity can then possibly remain safe and untouched, save Jupiter alone, the fiery principle of the universe, animated or intellectual. Here therefore there is a considerable difference to be observed betwixt these Stoics and other Pagan

Theists; that whereas the others for the most part acknowledged their gods to have been made in time by one supreme universal Numen, but yet nevertheless to be immortal, and to continue to eternity; the stoical Pagans maintained, that all their other gods, save Jupiter alone, were not only γεγονότες, but also φθαρσόμενοι, such as should be as well corrupted as they were generated, and this so also, as that their very personalities should be utterly abolished and annihilated; all the stoical gods in the conflagration being as it were melted and confounded into one.

Wherefore during the intervals of the successive conflagrations, the Stoics all agreed, that there is no more than one God (Zeus or Jupiter) left alone, (there being then indeed nothing else besides himself) who afterwards produceth the whole mundane system, together with all the gods, out of himself again. Chrysippus in Plutarch affirmeth, *εοικέναι τῷ μὲν ἀνθρώπῳ τὸν Δία καὶ τὸν κόσμον, τῇ δὲ ψυχῇ τῇ Πρόνοιαν*, P. 1077. [De Repugn. Stoicor.] *ὅταν οὖν ἐκπύρωσις γένηται μόνον ἀφθαρτον ὄντα τὸν Δία τῶν θεῶν, ἀναχωρεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν πρόνοιαν, εἶτα ὁμοῦ γενομένους, ἐπὶ μίας τῆς τοῦ αἰθέρος οὐσίας διατελεῖν ἀμφοτέρους*, that as Jupiter and the world may be resembled to a man, so may providence be to the soul: when therefore there shall be a conflagration, Jupiter of all the gods being alone incorruptible and then remaining, will retire and withdraw himself into providence; and so both together remain in that same ethereal substance.—Where notwithstanding Jupiter and Providence are really but one and the same thing. And Seneca writeth thus concerning the life of a wise man

in solitude: "Qualis futura est vita sapientis, si sine amicis relinquatur, in custodiam coniectus, aut in desertum latus ejectus? Qualis est Jovis, cum resoluta mundo, et DIIS IN UNUM CONFUSIS, paulisper cessante natura, acquiescit sibi, cogitationibus suis traditus:"

If you ask, What would be the life of a wise man either in a prison or desert? I answer, the same with that of Jupiter, when the world being resolved, and the GODS all CONFOUNDED into ONE, and the course of nature ceasing, he resteth in himself, conversing with his own cogitations.—

Arrianus's Epictetus, likewise, speaking of the same thing, ironically introduces Jupiter, bemoaning himself in the conflagration, as now left quite alone, after this manner; *Τάλας ἔγωγ, οὔτε τὴν Ἥραν ἔχω, οὔτε τὴν Ἀθηναίαν, οὔτε τὸν Ἀπόλλωνα, οὔτε ὄλωσ ἢ ἀδελφόν, ἢ υἱόν, ἢ συγγενῆ* Alas! I am now left all alone; I have neither Juno, nor Minerva, nor Apollo with me; neither brother nor son, nor nephew, nor kinsman (neither God nor goddess) to keep me company.—He adding also, according to the sense of the Stoics, that in all these successive conflagrations, *ὁ Ζεὺς αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ σύνεστι, καὶ ἡσυχάζει ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ ἐννοεῖ τὴν διοίκησιν ἑαυτοῦ, οἷα ἐστὶ, καὶ ἐν ἐπινοίαις γίνεται πρεπούσαις ἑαυτῷ*, Jupiter, being left alone, converseth only with himself, and resteth in himself, considering his own government, and being entertained with thoughts becoming himself.—And thus have we made it unquestionably evident, that the Stoics acknowledged only one independent and self-existent Deity, one universal Numen, which was not only the creator of all the other gods, but also, in certain alternate vicissitudes of time, the decreator of

them; he then swallowing them up, and devouring them all into himself, as he had before produced them together with the world out of himself.

It is granted, that these Stoics as well as the other Pagans did religiously worship more gods than one, that is, more understanding beings superior to men. For it was Epictetus's<sup>a</sup> own exhortation, εὐχου θεοῖς, Pray to the gods.—And the same philosopher<sup>b</sup> thus describeth the disposition of a person rightly affected; θέλω εἰδέναι τί μοι καθήκον πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς, I would willingly know, what is my duty, first to the gods, and then to my parents, and other relations.—And they are M. Antoninus's precepts,<sup>c</sup> Αἰδοῦ θεοὺς, revere the gods, and<sup>d</sup> ἐν ἅπασιν θεοῖς ἐπικαλοῦ, in every thing implore the aid and assistance of the gods.—And accordingly in that close of his first book,<sup>e</sup> himself does thankfully ascribe many particular benefits to the gods in common; παρὰ τῶν θεῶν τὸ ἀγαθὸς πάππους, &c. I owe to the gods, that I had good progenitors and parents, &c.—Where, amongst the rest, he reckons up this for one, that he never was any great proficient, either in poetry or rhetoric; because these would probably (had he succeeded in his pursuit of them) have hindered him from the attainment of far better things. And after all his enumeration, he concludeth thus: πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα θεῶν βοηθῶν καὶ τύχης δεῖται, for all these things need the assistance of the gods and fortune, viz. because they are not in our own power.

<sup>a</sup> Apud Arrian, lib. i. Dissert. i. p. 84.

<sup>b</sup> Ibid. lib. iii. cap. xvii. p. 222.

<sup>c</sup> Lib. vi. §. 30. p. 190.

<sup>d</sup> Lib. vi. §. 23. p. 183.

<sup>e</sup> Lib. i. §. 17. p. 30.



Neither can it be denied, but that they did often derogate from the honour of the supreme God, by attributing such things to the gods in common, (as the donors of them,) which plainly belong to the supreme God only. As when Epictetus

L. iii. c. xxiv. makes reason in men to be a gift of the  
[apud Arrian. gods; ἡμῖν ὄντι λόγος ἐπὶ ἀτυχίᾳ καὶ κακοδαμονίᾳ  
p. 329.] δέδοται ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν; is reason therefore

given us by the gods merely to make us miserable and unhappy?—And when he again imputes virtue to them; hast thou overcome thy lust, thine

L. iv. c. iii. intemperance, thine anger? πόσῳ μείζων  
[p. 388.] αἷρα θυσίας, ἢ ὑπατείας ἢ ὑπαρχίας, ταῦτα ἐκ σοῦ

αὐτοῦ γίνεσθαι καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν θεῶν; how much greater cause then hast thou of offering sacrifice, than if thou hadst got a consulship or prætorship? for those things come only from thyself and from the gods.—Though the reason of these speeches of theirs seems to have been no other than this, because they took it for granted, that those understanding beings, superior to men, called by them gods, were all of them the instruments and ministers of the supreme God in the government of the world; and had therefore some kind of stroke or influence, more or less, upon all the concerns of mankind. Whence it came to pass also, that they often used those words God and gods promiscuously and indifferently: as one and the same celebrated speech of Socrates is sometimes expressed singularly, εἰ ταύτη τῷ θεῷ φίλον, if God will have it so, let it be so, (Arr. Epict. l. i. c. xxix. l. iv. c. iv.) and sometimes again plurally, εἰ ταύτη φίλον τοῖς θεοῖς, if the gods will have it so.

Wherefore, notwithstanding the many gods of those Stoics, they worshipped for all that one Su-

preme, that is, one universal Numen, that contains and comprehends the whole world, who was variously described by them, sometimes as the nature and reason of the whole world; Anton. l. ix. ἡ τῶν ὅλων φύσις πρᾶξιβάτη θεῶν, the nature [§. 1. p. 262.] of the whole, the oldest of all the gods—and ἡ τὰ ὅλα διοικοῦσα φύσις, that nature which governs all things—ὁ τὴν τῶν ὅλων οὐσίαν διοικῶν λόγος, Ant. l. vii. §. 18. [p. 213.] that reason which governs the substance of all—ὁ διὰ τῆς οὐσίας δῆκων λόγος, καὶ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ αἰῶνος κατὰ περιόδου τεταγμένας οἰκονομῶν τὸ πᾶν, Ant. l. vi. §. 1. [p. 170.] that reason which passes through the substance of the universe, and through all eternity orders and dispenses all according to appointed periods.—Sometimes is he called ἡ τῶν ὅλων αἰτία, the cause of all things—Ant. l. v. §. 24. sometimes τὸ τοῦ κόσμου ἡγεμονικόν, the hegemonic and ruling principle of the whole world—and ὁ ἡγεμῶν τοῦ κόσμου, the prince of the world.—Again, ὁ διοικῶν τὰ ὅλα, Ant. l. vii. §. 47. [sect. 75. p. 256.] the governor of the whole—as in this of Epictetus; ὁ καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς τὴν αὐτοῦ γνώμην ὑποτέταχεν τῷ διοικοῦντι τὰ ὅλα, καθάπερ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ πολῖται νόμῳ τῆς πόλεως; a good man submits his mind to the Governor of the whole universe, as good citizens do theirs to the law of the city.—Also ὁ διατάσων, the orderer of all—in this other religious passage of the same philosophers, τὸ παιδεύεσθαι, τουτέστι; μὴ θάνατον ἕκαστα οὕτω θελεῖν ὡς γίνεταί πῶς δὲ γίνεταί; ὡς διέταξεν αὐτὰ ὁ διατάσων; to be instructed is to will things to be as they are made; and how are they made? as that great Disposer of all hath appointed.—Again, the supreme God is sometimes called by them τὸ περιέχον τὰ ὅλα νοερόν,

Anton. l. ix.

L. i. c. xii. [apud Arrian. p. 118.]

Ep. p. 119. Cant.

that intellectual principle, which contains the whole, as in this instruction of M. Antoninus ;

L. viii. §. 45. *μη μόνον συμπνεῖν τῷ περιέχοντι ἀέρι, ἀλλὰ καὶ συμφρονεῖν τῷ περιέχοντι πάντα νοεῶν.* that, as  
[sect. 54. p. 258.]

our bodies breathe the common air, so should our souls suck and draw in vital breath from that great Mind, that comprehends the universe, becoming as it were one spirit with the same.—He

Anton. p. 125. *ὁ τοῦ ὅλου νοῦς καὶ*  
[lib. v. §. 30. p. 164.] *διάνοια*, the mind and understanding of

the whole world, *μία πάντων πηγή νοερά*, one intellectual fountain of all things ; and, lastly,

Ant. p. 257. *θεὸς εἷς διὰ πάντων, καὶ οὐσία μία, καὶ νόμος εἷς*, one God through all, one substance, and one law.—Which supreme God

Anton. l. vii. *was commonly called also by the Stoics,*  
§. 7. [sect. 9. p. 210.] *together with the generality of the other*

Pagans, *ὁ Θεός*, or God—emphatically,

and in way of eminency, as in this of Epictetus, *μηδὲν ἄλλο θέλει, ἢ ἃ ὁ Θεὸς θέλει, καὶ τίς σε κωλύσει :* will nothing but what God willeth, and then who can be able to hinder thee ?—And, again, *θέλησον*

L. ii. c. xviii. *καλὸς φανῆναι τῷ Θεῷ, ἐπιθύμησον καθαρὸς μετὰ*  
[p. 225.] *καθαροῦ σεαυτοῦ γενέσθαι καὶ μετὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ,*

affect to seem fair to God, desire to be pure with thy pure self, and with God.—Also where<sup>b</sup> he speaks of the regular course of things in nature, *τεταγμένως, καθάπερ ἐκ προστάγματος Θεοῦ, ὅταν ἐκείνος εἴπῃ τοῖς φυτοῖς ἀνθεῖν ἀνθεῖ, ὅταν εἴπῃ βλαστάνειν βλαστάνει* that it proceedeth orderly, every thing as it were obeying the command of God : when he bids the plants to blossom, they blossom ; and when to

<sup>a</sup> Apud Arrian. lib. ii. cap. xxvii. p. 221.

<sup>b</sup> Apud Arrian. lib. i. cap. xiv. p. 122, 123.

bring forth fruit, they bring forth fruit.—To which innumerable other instances might be added. And Zeus or Jupiter was the proper name of this supreme God Epiot. p. 251. [apud Arrian. lib. ii. c. xxiii.] amongst the Stoics also; whence the government of the whole world is called by them *Διὸς διοίκησις*, the government or economy of Jupiter.—Lastly, this supreme God is sometimes distinguished by them from the other gods, expressly and by name; as in this of Epiotetus, *ἐγὼ δ' ἔχω τίνι ὑποτετάχθαι, τίνι πείθεσθαι, τῷ θεῷ καὶ τοῖς μετ' ἐκείνων*, L. iv. c. xii. [p. 426.] I have, whom I ought to be subject to, whom to obey, God and those, who are next after him—that is, the supreme and inferior gods. So, likewise, when he exhorteth not to desire things out of our own power: *ἀλλὰ τῷ Διὶ χάρισαι αὐτὰ, καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις θεοῖς, ἐκείνοις παράδος, ἐκείνοι κυβερνάωσαν*. L. ii. c. xvii. [p. 221.] Let Jupiter alone with these things, and the other gods, deliver them up to be ordered and governed by them.—And so again, where he personates one, that places his happiness in those things without him: *κάθημαι καὶ στένω, καὶ ὄν δύναμαι λοιδορῶ, τὸν Δία καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς ἄλλους*; I then shall sit lamenting, and speaking evil of every one, even Jupiter himself and the other gods.

And it must in reason be supposed, that this Jupiter, or universal Numen of the world, was honoured by these Stoics far above all their other particular gods; he being acknowledged by them to have been the maker or creator of them as well as the whole world, and the only eternal and immortal God: all those other gods, as hath been already declared, being as well corruptible, mor-

tal, and annihilable, as they were generated or created. For though Cicero's Lucilius Balbus, where he pretends to represent the doctrine of the Stoics, attribute the very first original of the world to a plurality of gods, in these words: "Dico igitur providentia deorum mundum et omnes mundi partes, et initio constitutas esse, et omni tempore administrari;" yet unquestionably Cicero forgot himself herein, and rather spake the language of some other Pagans, who, together with the generation of the world; held indeed a plurality of eternal (though not independent) deities, than of the Stoics, who asserted one only eternal God; and supposed, in the reiterated conflagrations, all the gods to be melted and confounded into one; so that Jupiter being then left alone, must needs make up the world again; as also all those other gods out of himself. And thus does Zeno in Laertius \* describe the *Cosmopœia*, τὸν θεὸν κατ' ἀρχὰς, καθ' αὐτὸν ὄντα, that God at first being alone by himself, converted the fiery substance of the world by degrees into water, that is, into a crasser chaos; out of which water, himself afterwards, as the spermatic reason of the world, formed the elements and whole mundane system. And Cicero himself elsewhere, in his *De Legibus*, † attributes the first original of mankind cautiously, not to the gods in common, but to the supreme God only; "Hoc animal providum, &c. quem vocamus hominem, præclara quadam conditione generatum esse, a SUMMO DEO;" and this, rather

\* Lib. vii. segm. 136. p. 450.

† Lib. ii. cap. viii. p. 136. tom. ix. oper.

according to the sense of the Stoics, than of the Platonists, whose inferior generated gods also (being first made) were supposed to have had a stroke in the fabrication of mankind, and other animals. Thus Epictetus plainly ascribes the making of the whole world to God, or the one supreme Deity, where he mentions the Galileans, that is, the Christians, their contempt of death, though imputing it only to custom in them, and not to right knowledge; (as M. Antoninus likewise ascribes the same to ψιλὴ παράταξις, L. xi. §. [p. mere obstinacy of mind) ἐπὶ μάστιγι μὲν 349.]

δύναται τις οὕτω διαρθεῖναι, καὶ ὑπὲρ ἔθους οἱ Γαλιλαῖοι, ἐπὶ λόγου δὲ καὶ ἀποδείξεως οὐδεὶς δύναται μαθεῖν, ὅτι ὁ Θεὸς πάντα πεποίηκε τὰ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ, καὶ αὐτὸν τὸν κόσμον.

Can some be so affected out of madness, L. iv. c. vii. and the Galileans out of custom? and [p. 300.]

can none attain thereunto by reason and true knowledge, namely, because God made all things in the world, and the whole world itself perfect and unhinderable; but the parts thereof for the use of the whole, so that the parts ought therefore to yield and give place to the whole. Thus does he again elsewhere demand, τὸν ἥλιον τίς πεποίηκε, καρποὺς δὲ τίς, &c. Who made the sun? Who the fruits of the earth? Who the seasons of the year? Who the agreeable fitness of things? Wherefore thou having received all from another, even thy very self, dost thou murmur and complain against the donor of them, if he take away any one thing from thee? Did he not bring thee into the world? shew thee the light? bestow sense and reason upon thee?—Now the sun was the chief of the inferior Stoical gods, and therefore he being made by another, all the rest of their gods

must needs be so too. And thus is it plainly ex-

L. i. c. iii. [p. 90. vide etiam  
lib. i. cap. xiv. p. 124.] *τῷ δόγματι τούτῳ συμπαθῆσαι κατ' ἀξίαν δύναίτο, ὅτι γεγόναμεν ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ πάντες προηγουμένως*

*καὶ ὁ Θεὸς πατὴρ ἴσθι τῶν τ' ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῶν θεῶν, οὐδὲν ἀγενές, οὐδὲ ταπεινὸν ἐνθυμηθήσεται περὶ ἑαυτοῦ.* If any one could be thoroughly sensible of this, that we are all made by God, and that as principal parts of the world, and that God is the father both of men and gods, he would never think meanly of himself, knowing that he is the son of Jupiter also.—Where Θεός is plainly put for the supreme God, and Θεοὶ for the inferior gods only. Again, he thus attributes the making of man and government of the whole world to God, or Jupiter only.

L. iii. c. xxiv. [p. 329.] *Ὁ Θεὸς πάντας ἀνθρώπους ἐπὶ τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἐποίησε, &c. τὴν δὲ οὐσίαν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τοῦ*

*κακοῦ, ὡσπερ ἀξίον τὸν κηδόμενον ἡμῶν, καὶ πατρικῶς προϊστάμενόν ἐν τοῖς ἰδίοις.* God made also men to this end, that they might be happy, and as became him, who had a fatherly care of us, he placed our good and evil in those things, which are in

L. iii. c. xxiv. [p. 331.] *our own power. καὶ τῷ ὄντι κακῶς δια-*

*κεῖται τὰ ὅλα, εἰ μὴ ἐπιμελεῖται ὁ Ζεὺς τῶν ἑαυτοῦ πολιτῶν, ἵν' ὦσιν ὅμοιοι αὐτῷ εὐδαιμόνες,* things would not be well governed, if Jupiter took no care of his own citizens, that they also might be happy like himself.

And that these Stoics did indeed religiously worship and honour the supreme God above all their other gods, may appear from sundry instances. As first, from their acknowledging him to be the sovereign legislator, and professing subjection and obedience to his laws, accounting this to be their greatest liberty. Thus Epictetus,

εἰς ἐμὲ οὐδεὶς ἐξουσίαν ἔχει, ἡλευθέρωμαι ὑπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ, ἔγνωκα αὐτοῦ τὰς ἐντολάς, οὐκέτι οὐδεὶς δουλαγωγῆσαί με δύναται. No man hath power over me, I am made free by God, (by becoming his subject) I know his commandments, and no man can bring me under bondage to himself.— And again, ταῦτα ἐπιτηδεύων θέλω εὐρεθῆναι, ἰν' εἰπὴν δύναμαι τῷ Θεῷ, μήτι παρέβην σοῦ τὰς ἐντολάς, &c. These things would I be found employing myself about, that I may be able to say to God, Have I transgressed any of thy commandments? Have I used my faculties and anticipations (or common notions) otherwise than thou requirest?

Again, from their acknowledging him to be the supreme governor of the whole world, and the orderer of all things in it by his fate and providence, and their professing to submit their wills to his will in every thing; Epictetus somewhere\* thus bespeaks the supreme God: μήτι ἐμειψάμην σοῦ τὴν διοίκησιν; ἐνόησα ὅτι ἠθέλησας, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι, ἀλλ' ἐγὼ ἐκὼν. πένης ἐγεγόνην σοῦ θελοντος ἀλλὰ χαίρων· οὐκ ἤρξα, ὅτι σὺ οὐκ ἠθέλησας, οὐδέ ποτ' ἐπιθύμησα ἀρχῆς· μήτι με τούτου ἕνεκα στυγνότερον εἶδες; μὴ οὐ προσῆλθόν σοι φαιδρᾷ τῷ προσώπῳ, ἔτοιμος εἶμι ἐπιτάσσεις, εἶμι σημαίνεις; νῦν με θέλεις ἀπελθεῖν ἐκ τῆς πανηγύρεως; ἄπειμι· χάριν σοι ἔχω πᾶσαν, ὅτι ἠξίωσάς με συμπανηγυρίζαι σοι, καὶ ἰδεῖν ἔργα τὰ σὰ, καὶ τῇ διοικήσει σοῦ συμπαρακολουθῆσαι· ταῦτά με ἐνδυμούμενον, ταῦτα γράφοντα, ταῦτα ἀναγινώσκοντα καταλάβοι ἂν θάνατος· Did I ever complain of thy government? I was sick when thou wouldest have me to be, and so are others, but I was so willingly. I was poor also at thy appointment, but rejoicing; I never bore any magistracy, or had any dignity, because

\* Apud Arrian. lib. iii. cap. v. p. 274.



thou wouldest not have me, and I never desired it. Didst thou ever see me the more dejected or melancholy for this? Have I appeared before thee at any time with a discontented countenance? Was I not always prepared and ready for whatsoever thou requirest? Wilt thou now have me to depart out of this festival solemnity? I am ready to go; and I render thee all thanks for that thou hast honoured me so far as to let me keep the feast with thee, and behold thy works, and observe thy economy of the world. Let death seize upon me no otherwise employed, than thus thinking and writing of such things.—He likewise exhorts

L. ii. c. xvi. [p. 217.] *βλέψας πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν εἰπέν, ὅτι χρῶμαι λοκπὸν εἰς ὃ ἂν θέλῃς, ὁμογνωμονῶ σοι, ἴσος εἰμί· οὐδὲν παραισῶμαι τῶν σοι δοκούντων, ὅπου θέλῃς ἄγε, ἢν θέλῃς ἐσθῆρα περιδῆς, ἄρχην με θέλῃς, ἰδιωτεύειν, μένειν, φεύγειν, πένεσθαι, πλουτεῖν; ἐγὼ σοι ὑπὲρ πάντων τούτων πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἀπολογήσομαι, δείξω τὴν ἐκάστου φύσιν ὅσα ἐστίν.* Dare to lift up thine eyes to God and say, Use me hereafter to whatsoever thou pleaseth. I agree, and am of the same mind with thee, indifferent to all things. I refuse nothing that shall seem good to thee. Lead me whither thou pleasest. Let me act what part thou wilt, either of a public or private person, of a rich man or a beggar. I will apologise for thee as to all these things before men. And I will also shew the nature of every one of them.

The same is likewise manifest from their pretensions to look to God, and refer all to him; expecting aid and assistance from him, and placing their confidence in him. Thus also Epictetus,

Καθὼ μὲν ἔχω ταύτην ἐπιβολὴν ἀποτελέσαι ὑμᾶς L. ii. c. xix.  
ἐλευθέρους, εὐδαιμονοῦντας, εἰς τὸν θεὸν ἀφορῶν- [p. 231.]

τας, ἐν παντὶ μικρῷ καὶ μεγάλῳ. My design is this, to render you free and undisturbed, always looking at God, as well in every small as greater matter.—

Again the same Stoic concludes, οὐκ ἔστιν L. ii. c. xvi.  
ἄλλως ἐκβαλεῖν λύπην, φόβον, ἐπιθυμίαν, &c. [p. 218.]

εἰ μὴ πρὸς μόνον τὸν θεὸν ἀποβλέποντα, ἐκείνῳ μόνῳ προσ-  
πεπονθότα, τοῖς ἐκείνου προστάγμασι καθωσισαμένον. A

man will never be able otherwise to expel grief, fear, desire, envy, &c. than by looking to God alone, and being devoted to him, and the observance of his commandments.—And he affirmeth of

Hercules, that this great piece of piety was so long since observed by him, τὸν Δία αὐτοῦ L. iii. c. xxix.  
πατέρα ἐκάλει, καὶ πρὸς ἐκείνον ἀφορῶν ἔπραττεν [p. 330.]

ἃ ἔπραττε that as he called Jupiter, or the supreme God, his father, so did he whatsoever he did, looking at him.—Thus M. Antoninus speaketh of a double relation that we all have; one πρὸς τοὺς συμβιοῦντας, to those that live with us;—

and another, πρὸς τὴν θεῖαν αἰτίαν ἀφ' ἧς συμβ- L. viii. §. 23.  
βαίνει πᾶσιν πάντα, to that Divine cause, [sec. 27.  
p. 247.]

As likewise he affirmeth, οὐκ ἀνθρώπινόν τι L. iii. §. 11.  
ἔνευ τῆς ἐπὶ τὰ θεῖα συναναφορᾶς εὐπράξις, [sec. 13.  
p. 87.]

that no human thing is well done with-  
out a reference to God.—And he excellently ex-

horteth men, ἐνὶ τέρπου, καὶ προσαναπαύου, L. vi. §. 5.  
τῇ ἀπὸ πράξεως κοινωνικῆς μεταβαίνειν ἐπὶ [sec. 7.  
p. 172.]

πραξίν κοινωνικὴν σὺν μνήμῃ τοῦ Θεοῦ. To be delighted and satisfied with this one thing; in doing one action after another, tending to a common good, or the good of human society; together with the remembrance of God.—Lastly, he

declareth his own confidence in the supreme

Deity in these words; *θαρήν τῷ διοικοῦντι,*  
L. vi. §. 8. I trust and rely upon the governor of  
[sec. 10. the whole world.  
p. 174.]

This may be concluded also from their thank-  
 ing one supreme God for all, as the author of all  
 good, and delightfully celebrating his praises.  
 Epictetus declares it to be the duty of a good  
 man, *χάριν ἔχειν ὑπὲρ πάντων τῷ θεῷ* to thank God  
 for all things.—And elsewhere he speaketh thus:

*εἰ νοῦν εἶχομεν, ἀλλά τι ἔδει ἡμᾶς ποιεῖν, καὶ κοινῇ*  
L. iv. c. vii. *καὶ ἰδίᾳ, ἢ ὑμνεῖν τὸ θεῖον, καὶ εὐφημεῖν; καὶ ἐπε-*  
[p. 401.] *ξέρχεσθαι τὰς χάριτας; οὐκ ἔδει καὶ σκάπτοντας,*  
L. i. c. xvi. *καὶ ἀροῦντας, καὶ ἐσθίουσας, ἄδειν τὸν ὕμνον τὸν*  
[p. 127.]

*εἰς θεῶν; μέγας ὁ θεὸς ὅτι ἡμῖν παρέσχευ ἄργανα ταῦτα, δι' ὧν*  
*τὴν γῆν ἐργασόμεθα· μέγας ὁ θεὸς ὅτι χεῖρας ἔδωκεν, &c.*  
*ὅτι αὐξέσθαι λεληθότως, ὅτι καθεύδοντας ἀναπνεῖν ταῦτα ἐφ'*  
*ἐκάστου εὐφημεῖν ἔδει, καὶ τὸν μέγιστον καὶ θεϊότατον ὕμνον*  
*ἐφθυμεῖν, ὅτι τὴν δύναμιν ἔδωκε τὴν παρακολουθητικὴν ταύ-*  
*των τί οὐδ'; &c. εἰ γοῦν ἀηδῶν ἤμην, ἐποιοῦν τὰ τῆς ἀηδόνος,*  
*εἰ κύκνος, τὰ τοῦ κύκνου, νῦν δὲ λογικός εἰμι, ὑμνεῖν με*  
*δεῖ τὸν θεόν.* Had we understanding, what should  
 we do else but both publicly and privately  
 praise God, bless him, and return thanks to him?  
 Ought not they, who dig, plough, and eat, con-  
 tinually sing such a hymn to God as this; Great  
 is that God, who gave us these organs to cul-  
 tivate the earth withal; great is that God,  
 who gave us hands, &c. who enabled us to grow  
 indiscernibly, to breathe in our sleep. But the  
 greatest and divinest hymn of all is this, to praise  
 God for the faculty of understanding all these  
 things. What then if for the most part men be  
 blinded, ought there not to be some one, who  
 should perform this office, and sing a hymn to

God for all? If I were a nightingale, I would perform the office of a nightingale; or a swan, that of a swan: but now, being a reasonable creature, I ought to celebrate and sing aloud the praises of God, that is, of the supreme Deity.

Lastly, the same is evident from their invoking the supreme God as such, addressing their devotions to him alone without the conjunction of any other gods; and particularly imploring his assistance against the assaults of temptations, L. II. c. xviii. [apud Arrian. p. 226.] called by them fancies. To this purpose is that of Epictetus, *μέγας ὁ ἀγὼν ἐστὶ θεῖον τὸ ἔργον, ὑπὲρ βασιλείας, ὑπὲρ ἐλευθερίας, τοῦ θεοῦ μέμνησο, ἐκείνου ἐπικαλοῦ βοηθὸν καὶ παραστάτην, ὡς τοὺς Διοσκόρους ἐν χειμῶνι οἱ πλείοντες.* This is a great conflict or contention, a Divine enterprise; it is for liberty and for a kingdom. Now remember the supreme God; call upon him as thy helper and assistant, as the mariners do upon Castor and Pollux in a tempest.—He commends also this form of devotional address, or Divine ejaculation, which was part of Cleanthes's litany, to be used frequently upon occasion, \* *Ἄγου δὴ με, ὦ Ζεῦ, καὶ σὺ ἡ πεπρωμένη ὅποι ποθ' (ὑμῖν) εἰμι διατεταγμένος, ὡς εἶφομαι γὰρ ἄοκνος ἦν δέ γε μὴ θέλω, οὐδὲν ἤττον εἶφομαι.* Lead me, O Jupiter, and thou Fate, whithersoever I am by you destined; and I will readily and cheerfully follow; who, though I were never so reluctant, yet must needs follow.—Where Jupiter and Fate are really but one and the same supreme Deity, under two Ep. 106. [cvii. tom. ii. oper. p. 402.] several names. And therefore the sense of this devotional ejaculation was no

\* Vide Arrian. lib. iii. cap. xxvi. p. 366.

less truly and faithfully than elegantly thus rendered by Seneca :

Duc me parens, celsique dominator poli,  
Quocunq; placuit, nulla parendi est mora,  
Assum impiger : fac nolle, comitabor gemens,  
Malusque patiar, quod pati licuit bono.

But because many are so extremely unwilling to believe, that the Pagans ever made any religious address to the supreme God as such, we shall here set down an excellent and devout hymn of the same Cleanthes to him ; the rather, because it hath been but little taken notice of. And, the more to gratify the reader, we shall subjoin an elegant translation thereof into Latin verse, which he must owe to the muse of my learned friend Dr. Duport.

Steph. Poes.  
Philos. p. 49.  
[ex Stoboei  
Eclog. Physio.]

Κύθιστ' ἀθανάτων, σολυδύσιμα, παγκρατὲς αἰεὶ,  
Ζεὺς, φύσιος ἀρχηγὲ, νόμου μέτρα πάντα κυβερνῶν,  
Χαῖρε·—Σὲ γὰρ πᾶσι θέμις θητοῖσι προσεύδαν·  
Ἐκ σοῦ γὰρ γένος ἴσμεν, ἤχου μίμημα λαχόντες  
Μῦθοι, ὅσα ζῴει τε καὶ ἔσται θνητ' ἐπὶ γαίᾳ·  
Τῷ σὲ καδυμνήσω καὶ σὸν κράτος αἰὲν ἀείσω.  
Σὸ δὲ πᾶς ὄθει κόσμος ἰλισσόμενος περὶ γαίαν  
Παίδεται, ἢ κεν ἄγχι, καὶ ἰκὼν ὑπὸ σείο κρατῆται·  
Τοῖσι ἔχεις ὑποεργὸν ἀπικητοῖς ὑπὸ χερσίν  
Ἄμφικη, πυρέντα, ἀειζῶντα κεραυνῷ·  
Τοῦ γὰρ ὑπὸ πλήγης φύσιος πάντ' ἔργισι,  
Ἵτι σὸ κατευδύτης κοπὸν λόγον, ὅς διὰ πάντων  
Φαῖτ' ἢ μιγνόμενος·  
Ἵος τόσσος γαλαῶς ὑπατος βασιλεὺς διὰ παπῆ·  
Οὐδέ τι γίγνεται ἔργον ἐπὶ χερσὶ σοῦ δίχρα, δαίμων,  
Οὔτε κατ' αἰθέριον Διῶν πόλις, οὔτ' ἐπὶ πόντω,  
Πλὴν ὅποσα μέζουσι κακὰ σφετερίσιν ἀνολαίς·  
Καὶ νοσμήεις τὰ ἀποσμα καὶ οὐ φίλα σοὶ φίλα ἴστί·  
Ἵδι γὰρ εἰς ἔν πάντα συνήμεμας ἰσθλὰ κακοῖσιν,  
Ἵσθ' ἔνα γίνεσθαι πάντων λόγον αἰὲν ἰόντων·  
Ἵον φεύγοντες ἴωσι ὅσοι θνητῶν καλοὶ εἰσιν ;  
Δύσμοροι, Ἵττ' ἀγαθῶν μὲν ἀεὶ κτήσιν σποδίσοντες,  
Οὔτ' ἴσορῶσι θεῶν κινῶν νόμον, οὔτε κλύουσιν  
Ἵτι κεν πειθόμενοι σὸν ἢ βίαι ἰσθλὸν ἔχουσιν·

Αὐτοὶ δ' αὖ ἐρηῶσιν ἄνω καλοῦ ἄλλος ἐπ' ἄλλα·  
 Οἱ μὲν ὑπὲρ δόξης σπουδὴν δυσείωστον ἔχουσι,  
 Οἱ δ' ἐπὶ καρδοσύνας τετραμερέθου οὐδὲν κέρμα,  
 Ἄλλα δ' εἰς ἄπειν; καὶ σώματος ἴδια ἔργα,  
 Ἄλλα Ζῆος πάντοσε, κελαινεφίε, ἀρχιερασε,  
 Ἀθρόπως βίου ἀπειροσύνις ἀπὸ λυγρῆς,  
 Ἦν οὐ πάτερ σὺ δασοὶ ψυχῆς ἄνω, θεὸς δὲ κεῖθε αἰ  
 Γνώμης, ἢ πείσινος οὐ δίκης μετὰ πάντα κυβερῆς·  
 Ὅφρ' ἂν τιμηθῆντες ἀμειβώμεσθα σε τιμῆ,  
 Ἐμνούντες τὰ σὰ ἔργα διηκεῖς, ὡς ἐπίοιαι  
 Θυτὸν ἰόντ'· ἰστέλ' ὅτε βροτοῖς γέρας ἄλλοτε μεῖζον,  
 Οὔτε Ζεὺς, ἢ κινὸν δαί νόμοι ἐν δίκῃ ὑμῶν.

Magne pater divum, cui nomina multa, sed una  
 Omnipotens semper virtus, tu Jupiter autor  
 Naturæ, certa qui singula lege gubernas!  
 Rex salve. Te nempe licet mortalibus ægris  
 Cunctis compellare; omnes tua namque propago  
 Nos sumus, æternæ quasi imago vocis et echo  
 Tantum, quotquot humi spirantes repimus; ergo  
 Te cantabo, tuum et robur sine fine celebrans.  
 Quippe tuo hic totus, terram qui circuit, orbis  
 Paret (quoquo agis) imperio, ac obtemperat ultro  
 Invictis telum manibus tibi tale ministrum,  
 Anceps, ignitum, haud moriturum denique fulmen.  
 Ictu etenim illius tota et natura tremiscit;  
 Illo et communem rationem dirigis, et quæ  
 Mundi agitat molem, magno se corpore miscens:  
 Tantus tu rerum dominus, rectorque supremus.  
 Nec sine te factum in terris, Deus, aut opus ullum,  
 Æthere nec dio fit, nec per cærulea ponti,  
 Errore acta suo, nisi quæ gens impia patrat.  
 Confusa in sese tu dirigis ordine certo;  
 Auspice te ingratas et inest sua gratia rebus;  
 Foelice harmonia, tu scilicet, omnia in unum  
 Sic bona mixta malis compingis, ut una resurgat  
 Cunctorum ratio communis et usque perennans:  
 Quam refugit, spernitque hominum mens læva malorum.  
 Heu miseri! bona qui quærun't sibi semper et optant,  
 Divinam tamen hanc communem et denique legem,  
 Nec spectare oculis, nec fando attendere curant:  
 Cui si parerent poterant traducere vitam  
 Cum ratione et mente bonam: nunc sponte feruntur  
 In mala præcipites, trahit et sua quemque voluptas.  
 Hunc agit ambitio, laudisque immensa cupido.  
 Illum et avarities, et amor vesanus habendi,  
 Blanda libido aliam, venerisque licentia dulcis:

Sic alio tendunt alii in diversa ruentes.

At tu, Jupiter alme, tonans in nubibus atris,  
 Da sapere, et mentem miseris mortalibus aufer  
 Insanam, hanc tu pelle pater; da apprehendere posse  
 Consilium, fretus quo tu omnia rite gubernas:  
 Nos ut honorati pariter, tibi demus honorem,  
 Perpetuis tua facta hymnis præclara canentes,  
 Ut fas est homini; nec enim mortalibus ullum,  
 Nec superis, majus poterit contingere donum,  
 Quam canere æterno communem carmine legem.

xxvi. It would be endless now to cite all the testimonies of other philosophers and Pagan writers of latter times, concerning one supreme and universal Numen. Wherefore we shall content ourselves only to instance in some of the most remarkable, beginning with M. Tull. Cicero; whom though some would suspect to have been a sceptic as to Theism, because in his *De Natura Deorum* he brings in Cottà the academic, as well opposing Q. Lucil. Balbus the Stoic, as C. Velleius the Epicurean; yet from sundry other places of his writings, it sufficiently appears, that he was a dogmatic and hearty Theist; as for example, this in his second book *De Divin*:<sup>a</sup> “*Esse præstantem aliquam æternamque naturam, et eam suspiciendam admirandamque hominum generi, pulchritudo mundi, ordoque rerum cœlestium cogit confiteri:*” that there is some most excellent and eternal nature, which is to be admired and honoured by mankind, the pulchritude of the world, and the order of the heavenly bodies compel us to confess.—And this in his oration *De haruspicum responsis*;<sup>b</sup> “*Quis est tam vecors, qui cum suspexerit in cœlum, Deos esse non sentiat, et ea quæ tanta mente fiunt, ut vix quisquam arte*

<sup>a</sup> Cap. lxxii. p. 3255. tom. ix. oper.

<sup>b</sup> Cap. x. p. 2333. tom. v. oper.

ulla, ordinem rerum ac vicissitudinem persequi possit, casu fieri putet?" Who is so mad or stupid, as when he looks up to heaven, is not presently convinced, that there are gods? or can persuade himself, that those things, which are made with so much mind and wisdom, as that no human skill is able to reach and comprehend the artifice and contrivance of them, did all happen by chance?—To which purpose more places will be afterwards cited. However, in his philosophic writings it is certain, that he affected to follow the way of the new academy, set on foot by Carneades; that is, to write sceptically, partly upon prudential accounts, and partly for other reasons intimated by himself in these words: " Qui requirunt quid quaque de re ipsi De N. D. l. i. cap. v. p. 286. sentiamus curiosius id faciunt quam necesse est. Non enim tam authoritatis in disputando quam rationis momenta quærenda sunt. Quinetiam obest plerumque iis, qui discere volunt, auctoritas eorum, qui se docere profitentur. Desinunt enim suum iudicium adhibere, idque habent ratum, quod ab eo, quem probant, iudicatum vident:" they who would needs know, what we ourselves think concerning every thing, are more curious than they ought, because philosophy is not so much a matter of authority as of reason; and the authority of those, who profess to teach, is oftentimes a hinderance to the learners, they neglecting by that means to use their own judgment, securely taking that for granted, which is judged by another whom they value.—Nevertheless, Cicero in the close of this discourse *De Natura Deorum* (as St. Austin<sup>a</sup> also observeth)

<sup>a</sup> De Civitate Dei, lib. iv. cap. xxx. p. 86. tom. vii. oper.



plainly declares himself to be more propense and inclinable to the doctrine of Balbus, than either that of Velleius or Cotta; that is, though he did not assent to the Stoical doctrine or theology in every point (himself being rather a Platonist than a Stoic), yet he did much prefer it before, not only the Epicureism of Velleius, but also the scepticism of Cotta. Wherefore Augustinus Steuchus, and other learned men, quarrel with sundry passages of Cicero's upon another account, not as Atheistical, but as seeming to favour a multitude of independant gods; he sometimes attributing not only the government of the world, and the making of mankind, but also the first constitution and fabric of the whole world, to gods plurally. As when he writeth thus: "Ut perpetuus mundi esset ornatus, magna adhibita cura est a providentia deorum:" for the perpetual adorning of the world, great care hath been taken by the providence of the gods.—And "a diis immortalibus hominibus provisum esse," &c. that the immortal gods have provided for the convenience of mankind, appears from the very fabric and figure of them.—And that place before cited; De N. D. 723. "Dico igitur providentia deorum mundum et omnes mundi partes initio constitutas esse;" I say, that the world and all its parts were at first constituted by the providence of the gods.—And, lastly, where he states the controversy of that book De N. D. thus: "Utrum dii nihil agant, nihil moliantur? An contra ab his et a principio omnia facta, et constituta sint, et ad infinitum tempus regantur atque moventur?" Whether the gods do nothing at all,

De Natur. Deor. lib. iii.

but are void of care and trouble? Or whether all things were at first made and constituted, and ever since are moved and governed, by them?—Notwithstanding which, it is evident, that this learned orator and philosopher plainly acknowledged the monarchy of the whole, or one supreme and universal Numen over all. And that first from his so often using the word God in the singular, emphatically and by way of eminency; as “Ipsi Deo nihil minus gratum, quam 2 Leg. p. 335. non omnibus patere ad se placandum et [cap. x. p. 3352. colendum viam:” Nothing can be less tom. ix. oper.] grateful to God himself, than that there should not be a liberty open to all (by reason of the costliness of sacrifices) to worship and appease him;—and—“Nisi juvante Deo, tales non fuerunt Curius, Fabricius,” &c. Curius and D. N. D. l. ii. Fabricius had never been such men as [cap. lxxvi. p. 3048.] they were, had it not been for the Divine assistance.—Again, “Commoda, quibus Pro S. Ros. utimur, lucemque qua fruimur, spiri- [cap. xlv. p. 449. tom. iii. tumque quem ducimus, a Deo nobis oper.] dari atque impertiri videmus.” We must needs acknowledge, that the benefits of this life, the light which we enjoy, and the spirit which we breathe, are imparted to us from God.—And, to mention no more, in his version of Plato’s Timæus, “Deos alios in terra, alios in luna, alios in reliquis mundi partes spargens Deus quasi serebat;” God distributing gods to all the parts of the world, did as it were sow some gods in the earth, some in the moon, &c.—Moreover, by his making such descriptions of God as plainly imply his oneness and singularity, as in his Orat. pro Mi-

\* Cap. xiii. p. 4034. tom. x. oper.

P. 556. Lamb. lone: "Est, est profecto illa vis; neque  
[cap. xxxij. p.  
3846. tom. iii. oper.]

litate nostra, inest quiddam, quod vigeat et sentiat, et non inest in hoc tanto naturæ tanquæ præclaro motu. Nisi forte idcirco esse non putant, quia non apparet nec cernitur: proinde quasi nostram ipsam mentem, qua sapimus, qua providemus, qua hæc ipsa agimus et dicimus, videre, aut plane qualis et ubi sit, sentire possumus." There is, there is certainly such a Divine force in the world; neither is it reasonable to think, that in these gross and frail bodies of ours there should be something which hath life, sense, and understanding, and yet no such thing in the whole universe; unless men will therefore conclude, that there is none, because they see it not: as if we could see our own mind (whereby we order and dispose all things, and whereby we reason and speak thus), and perceive what kind of thing it is, and where it is lodged.—Where, as there is a strong asseveration of the existence of a God, so is his singularity plainly implied, in that he supposes him to be one mind or soul acting and governing the whole world, as our mind doth our body. Again, in his Tusculan Questions, "Nec vero deus ipse alio modo in-

L. i. p. 126  
[cap. xxvii. p.  
2604. tom.  
viii. oper.]

telligi potest, nisi mens soluta quædam, et libera, segregata ab omni concretionè mortali, omnia sentiens et movens:" Neither can God himself be understood by us otherwise than as a certain loose and free Mind, segregated from all mortal concretion, which both perceives and moves all things.—So

Tusc. Q. L. i.  
p. 126. [cap.  
xxix. p. 2606.]

again in the same book, "Hæc igitur et alia innumerabilia cum cernimus, possumusne dubitare, quin his præsit aliquis

vel effector, si hæc nata sunt ut Platoni videtur; vel si semper fuerint, ut Aristoteli placet, moderator tanti operis et muneris?" When we behold these and other wonderful works of nature, can we at all doubt, but that there presideth over them, either one maker of all, if they had a beginning, as Plato conceiveth; or else, if they always were as Aristotle supposeth, one moderator and governor? And in the third *De Legibus*, "Sine imperio nec domus ulla, nec civitas, nec gens, nec hominum universum genus

P. 343. [cap. i. p. 3389. tom. ix. oper.]

stare, nec rerum natura omnis, nec ipse mundus potest. Nam et hic deo paræt, et huic obediunt maria terræque, et hominum vita jussis supremæ legis obtemperat:" Without government, neither any house, nor city, nor nation, nor mankind in general, nor the whole nature of things, nor the world itself, could subsist. For this also obeyeth God, and the seas and earth are subject to him, and the life of man is disposed of by the commands of the supreme law.—Elsewhere he speaks of "Dominans ille nobis Deus, qui nos vetat hinc injussu suo demigrare," that God, who rules over all mankind, and

Tusc. Q. l. i. [cap. xxx. p. 2609.]

forbids them to depart hence without his leave; of "Deus, cujus numini parent omnia;" that God, whose Divine power all things obey.—We read also in Cicero of "summus" or "supremus Deus," the supreme God—to whom the first making of man is properly imputed by him; of "summi rectoris et domini Numen," the Divine power of the supreme Lord and governor;—of "Deus præpotens," and "rerum omnium præpotens Ju-

De Div. [lib. i. cap. l. iii. p. 3177. tom. ix. oper.]

piter<sup>a</sup>:" the most powerful God, and Jupiter, who hath power over all things;—of <sup>b</sup> "Princeps ille Deus, qui omnem hunc mundum regit, sicut animus humanus id corpus cui præpositus est;" that chief or principal God, who governs the whole world in the same maner as a human soul governeth that body which it is set over.—Wherefore, as for those passages before objected, where the government of the world, as to the concerns of mankind at least, is ascribed by Cicero to gods plurally, this was done by him and other Pagans, upon no other account but only this; because the supreme God was not supposed by them to do all things himself immediately in the government of the world, but to assign certain provinces to other inferior gods, as ministers under him; which therefore sharing in the economy of the world, were looked upon as co-governors thereof with him. Thus when Balbus in Cicero, to excuse some seeming defect of Providence, in the prosperities of wicked and the adversities of good men, pretended, "non animadvertere omnia Deos, ne reges quidem;" that the gods did not attend to all things, as neither do kings;—Cotta amongst other things replied thus: "Fac divinam mentem esse distentam, cælum versantem, terram tuentem, maria moderantem, cur tam multos deos nihil agere et cessare patitur? Cur non rebus humanis aliquos otiosos deos præfecit, qui a te, Balbe, innumerabiles explicati sunt?" Should it be granted, that the Divine Mind (or supreme

Somn. Scip.  
 [cap. iv. p.  
 3977.] de  
 Leg. [lib. i.  
 cap. vii. p.  
 3304.]

De N. D. l. iii.  
 [cap. xxxix.  
 p. 3107. tom.  
 ix. oper.]

<sup>a</sup> De Divinat. lib. ii. cap. xviii. p. 3204. tom. ix. oper.

<sup>b</sup> Vide Somnium Scipion. cap. iii. p. 3973. tom. x. oper.

Deity) were distracted with turning round the heavens, observing the earth, and governing the seas, yet why does he let so many other gods to do nothing at all? Or why does he not appoint some of those idle gods over human affairs, which, according to Balbus and the Stoics, are innumerable?—Again, when the immortal gods are said by Cicero to have provided for the convenience of mankind in their first constitution, this doubtless is to be understood according to the Platonic hypothesis, that the gods and demons being first made by the supreme God, were set at work and employed by him afterward in the making of man and other mortal animals. And, lastly, as to that, which hath the greatest difficulty of all in it, when the whole world is said by Cicero to have been made by the providence of the gods, this must needs be understood also of those eternal gods of Plato's, according to whose likeness or image the world and man are said to have been made; that is, of the trinity of Divine hypostases called by Amelius Plato's three minds and three kings, and by others of the Platonists, the first and second and third god, and the *τὸ πρῶτον αἴτιον*, and *τὸ δεύτερον αἴτιον*, &c. the first and second cause, &c. And, it may be here observed, what we learn from St. Cyril, that some Pagans endeavoured to justify this language and doctrine of theirs, even from the Mosiac writings themselves; Contra Jul. l. i.  
*θεοῖς ἑτέροις ὑποτοπήσαντες τὸν τῶν ὅλων φᾶναι*  
*θεὸν, ποιήσωμεν ἄνθρωπον κατ' εἰκόνα ἡμετέραν καὶ καθ' ὁμοίωσιν*, they suspecting, that the God of the universe, being about to make man, did there bespeak the other gods (*τοῖς μεθ' ἑαυτὸν δευτέροις καὶ ἐν μείοσιν οὔσι*, which were secondary and inferior to him),

after this manner, "Let us make man according to our own image and likeness"—which St. Cyril and other Christian writers understand of the Trinity. Now those eternal gods of Plato, according to whose image the world and man are said by him to have been made, and which (though one of them was properly called the Demiurgus) yet had all an influence and causality upon the making of it, were (as hath been already observed) not so many independant and self-originated deities, but all derived from one first Principle. And therefore Cicero following Plato in this is not to be suspected, upon that account, to have been an assertor of many independent gods, or partial creators of the world; especially since, in so many other places of his writings, he plainly owns a Divine monarchy.

We pass from M. Tullius Cicero to M. Terentius Varro his equal, a man famous for polymathy or multifarious knowledge, and reputed unquestionably (though not the most eloquent, yet) the most learned of all the Romans, at least as to antiquity. He wrote one-and-forty books concerning the antiquities of human and Divine things; wherein he transcended the Roman pontifices themselves, and discovered their ignorance as to many points of their religion. In which books he distinguished three kinds of theology, the first mythical or fabulous, the second physical or natural, and the last civil or popular: the first being most accommodate to the theatre or stage; the second to the world, or the wiser men in it; the third to cities or the generality of the civilized vulgar. Which was agreeable also to the doctrine of Scævola, that learned pontifex, concerning

three sorts of gods, poetical, philosophical, and political. As for the mythical and poetical theology, it was censured after this manner by Varro: "In eo sunt multa contra dignitatem et naturam immortalium ficta. In hoc enim est, ut deus alius ex capite, alius ex femore sit, alius ex guttis sanguinis natus. In hoc ut dii furati sint, ut adulteraverint, ut servierint homini. Denique, in hoc omnia diis attribuuntur, quæ non modo in hominem, sed etiam in contemptissimum hominem cadere possunt." That, according to the literal sense, it contained many things contrary to the dignity and nature of immortal beings; the genealogy of one god being derived from the head, of another from the thigh, of another from drops of blood: some being represented as thieves, others as adulterers, &c. and all things attributed to the gods therein, that are not only incident to men, but even to the most contemptible and flagitious of them.—And as for the second, the natural theology, which is the true, this Varro conceived to be above the capacity of vulgar citizens; and that therefore it was expedient, there should be another theology calculated, more accommodated for them, and of a middle kind betwixt the natural and the fabulous, which is that which is called civil. For he affirmed, "multa esse vera, quæ vulgo scire non sit utile, et quædam, quæ tametsi falsa sint, aliter existimare populis expediat;" that there were many things true in religion, which it was not convenient for the vulgar to know; and again, some things, which, though false, yet it was expedient they should be believed by them.—As Scævola, the

Aug. de Civ.  
D. l. vi. c. v.  
[p. 116. tom.  
vii. oper.]

Aug. Civ. D.  
l. iv. c. xxxi.  
[p. 87.]



Roman pontifex, in like manner, would not have the vulgar to know, that the true God had neither sex, nor age, nor bodily members. "Expedire igitur existimat (saith St. Austin of him)

Civ. D. l. iv. c. xxvii. [p. 84.] falli in religione civitates, quod dicere etiam in libris rerum divinarum ipse Varro non dubitat." Scævola therefore

judgeth it expedient, that cities should be deceived in their religion; which also Varro himself doubteth not to affirm in his books of Divine Things.—Wherefore this Varro, though disapproving the fabulous theology, yet out of a pious design, as he conceived, did he endeavour to assert, as much as he could, the civil theology then received amongst the Romans, and to vindicate the same from contempt: yet nevertheless so, as that "si eam civitatem novam constitueret, ex naturæ

Civ. D. l. iv. c. xxxi. [p. 87.] potius formula, deos et deorum nomina se fuisse dedicaturum, non dubitet confiteri;" if he were to constitute a new

Rome himself, he doubts not to confess, but that he would dedicate gods and the names of gods after another manner, more agreeably to the form of nature or natural theology.—Now what Varro's own sense was concerning God, he freely declared in those books of Divine Things; that he was the great soul and mind of the whole world. Thus

St. Austin, "Hi soli Varroni videntur animadvertisse quid esset deus, qui crederent eum esse animam, motu ac ratione mundum gubernantem:" These alone seem

Civ. D. l. iv. c. ix. [cap. xxxii. p. 87.] to Varro to have understood what God is, who believed him to be a soul, governing the whole world by motion and reason.—So that Varro plainly asserted one supreme and universal Numen, he erring only in this (as St. Austin con-

ceives) that he called him a soul, and not the creator of soul, or a pure and abstract mind. But as Varro acknowledged one universal Numen, the whole animated world, or rather the soul thereof, which also he affirmed to be called by several names, as in the earth, Tellus; in the sea, Neptune, and the like: so did he also admit (together with the rest of the Pagans) other particular gods, which were to him nothing but parts of the world animated with superior souls to men: “*A summo circuitu cœli, usque ad circulum lunæ, æthereas animas esse astra ac stellas, eosque cœlestes deos, non modo intelligi esse, sed etiam videri: inter lunæ vero gyrum et nimborum cacumina aëreas esse animas, sed eas animo non oculis videri; et vocari heroes, et lares, et genios.*” That from the highest circuit of the heavens to the sphere of the moon there are ethereal souls or animals, the stars which are not only understood, but also seen to be celestial gods; and between the sphere of the moon and the middle region of the air, there are aëreal souls or animals, which though not seen by our eyes, yet are discovered by our mind, and called heroes, lares, and genii.—So that, according to Varro, the only true natural gods were, as himself also determined, “*anima mundi, ac partes ejus;*” first, the great Soul and Mind of the whole world, which comprehendeth all; and, secondly, the parts of the world animated superior to men. Which gods also he affirmed to be worshipped *castius*, more purely and chastely, without images, as they were by the Romans for one hundred and seventy years: he concluding “*qui primi simulacra deorum populi posuerunt, eos civitatibus suis et metum dempsisse et*”

Civ. D. l. vii.  
c. vi.  
[p. 129.]

De Civ. D.  
l. iv. c. xxxi.  
[p. 87.]

errorem addidisse; prudenter existimans (saith St. Austin) deos facile posse in simulachroram stoliditate contemni;" that those nations, who first set up images of the gods, did both take away fear from their cities, and add error to them; he wisely judging, that the foppery of images would easily render their gods contemptible.

L. Annæus Seneca, the philosopher, was contemporary with our Saviour Christ and his apostles, who, though frequently acknowledging a plurality of gods, did nevertheless plainly assert one Supreme, he not only speaking of him singularly, and by way of eminency, but also plainly describing him as such; as when he calls him "Formatorem universi; rectorem et arbitrum et

Nat. Q. l. ii.  
c. xlv. [p.  
537. tom. ii.  
oper.]

custodem mundi; ex quo suspensa sunt omnia; animum ac spiritum universi; mundani hujus operis dominum et artificem; cui nomen omne convenit; ex quo nata sunt omnia; cujus spiritu vivimus; totum suis partibus inditum, et se sustentem suavi; cujus consilio huic mundo providetur, ut inconcussus eat, et actus suos explicet; cujus decreto omnia fiunt; divinum spiritum per omnia maxima et minima æquali intentione diffusum;

P. 442. Lips.

deum potentem omnium; deum illum maximum potentissimumque, qui ipse vehit omnia; qui ubique et omnibus præsto est; cæli et deorum omnium deum; a quo ista numina, quæ singula adoramus et colimus, suspensa sunt:" and the like. The framer and former of the universe, the governor, disposer, and keeper thereof; him, upon whom all things depend; the mind and spirit of the world; the artificer and lord of this whole mundane fabric; to whom every name belongeth; from whom all things spring; by whose

spirit we live; who is in all his parts, and sustaineth himself by his own force; by whose counsel the world is provided for, and carried on in its course constantly and uninterruptedly; by whose decree all things are done; the Divine spirit, that is diffused through all things both great and small with equal intention; the God, whose power extends to all things; the greatest and most powerful God, who doth himself support and uphold all things; who is present every where to all things; the God of heaven, and of all the gods, upon whom are suspended all those other Divine powers, which we singly worship and adore.—Moreover, we may here observe from St. Austin, that this Seneca in a book of his Civ. D. l. vi. c. x. [p. 122.] against superstitions (that is now lost) did not only highly extol the natural theology, but also plainly censure and condemn the civil theology then received amongst the Romans, and that with more freedom and vehemency than Varro had done the fabulous or theatrical and poetical theology. Concerning a great part whereof he pronounced, that a wise man would observe such things, “*tanquam legibus jussa, non tanquam diis grata;*” only as commanded by the laws (he therein exercising civil obedience), but not at all as grateful to the gods.

M. Fabius Quintilianus, though no admirer of Seneca, yet fully agreed with him in the same natural theology, and sets down this as the generally-received notion or definition of God: “*Deum esse spiritum omnibus partibus immis-* L. vii. c. iii. *tum,*” that God is a spirit mingled with and diffused through all the parts of the world;—he from thence inferring Epicurus to be an

Atheist, notwithstanding that he verbally asserted gods, because he denied a God according to this generally-received notion, he bestowing upon his gods a circumscribed human form, and placing them between the worlds. And the junior Pliny, though he were a persecutor of the Christians, he concluding, “*qualecunque esset quod faterentur, pervicaciam certe et inflexibilem obstinationem debere puniri;*” that whatsoever their religion were, yet notwithstanding their stubbornness and inflexible obstinacy ought to be punished;—and who compelled many of them to worship the images of the emperor, and to sacrifice and pray to the statues of the Pagan gods, and lastly, to blaspheme Christ; yet himself plainly acknowledged also one supreme universal Numen, as may sufficiently appear from his panegyric oration to Trajan, where he is called “*Deus ille, qui manifestus ac præsens cælum ac sydera insidet;*” that God, who is present with, and in-

\* And *Mundi parens, and Parens hominum deorumque.*

habits the whole heaven and stars.\*—himself making a solemn prayer and supplication to him, both in the beginning and close thereof, and sometimes speaking of him therein singularly and in way of eminency, as in these words: “*Occultat utrorumque semina Deus, et plerumque bonorum malorumque causæ sub diversa specie latent:*” God hideth the seeds of good and evil, so that the causes of each often appear disguised to men.—L. Apuleius also, whose pretended miracles the Pagans endeavoured to confirm their religion by,<sup>a</sup> as well as they did by those of Apollonius, doth in sundry

<sup>a</sup> Vide Augustin. *Epist. cxxxviii. p. 317. tom. ii. oper.*

places of his writings plainly assert one supreme and universal Numen : we shall only here set down one : “ Cum summus deorum De Philos. p. 278. Colo. cuncta hæc non solum cogitationum ratione consideret ; sed prima, media, et ultima obeat ; compertaque intimæ providentiæ ordinationis universitate et constantia regat : ” Since the highest of the gods does not only consider all these things in his mind and cogitation, but also pass through and comprehend within himself the beginning, middle, and end of all things, and constantly govern all by his occult providence. Lastly, Symmachus, who was a zealous stickler for the restitution of Paganism, declared the Pagans to worship one and the same God with the Christians, but in several ways ; he conceiving, that there was no necessity God should be worshipped by all after the same manner. “ *Æquum est, quicquid omnes colunt, UNUM putari : eadem spectamus astra ; commune cælum est ; idem nos mundus involvit ; quid interest, qua quisque prudentia verum requirat ? Uno itinere non potest perveniri ad tam grande secretum.* ” We ought in reason to think, that it is one and the same thing, which all men worship ; as we all behold the same stars have the same common heaven, and are involved within the same world. Why may not men pursue one and the same thing in different ways ? One path is not enough to lead men to so grand a secret.—The scene whereof is thus elegantly expressed by Prudentius :

Uno omnes sub sole siti, vegetamur eodem  
Aëre, communis cunctis viventibus aura.

P. 285. [Contra Symmachum lib. ii. ver. 85.]

*Sed quid sit qualisque deus, diversa secuti  
Quærimus, atque viis longe distantibus unum  
Imus ad occultum; suus est mos cuique genti,  
Per quod iter properans eat ad tam grande profundum.*

P. 308.

[ver. 842.] **And again afterward,**

*Secretum sed grande nequit rationis opertæ  
Quæri aliter, quam si sparsis via multiplicetur  
Tramitibus, et centenos terat orbita calles,  
Quæsitura deum variata indage latentem.*

**And the beginning of Prudentius's confutation is this,**

*Longe aliud verum est. Nam multa ambago viarum  
Anfractus dubios habet, et perplexius errat.  
Sola errore caret simplex via, nescia flecti  
In diverticulum, bivii nec pluribus anceps, &c.*

We shall now instance also in some of the latter Greek writers. Though the author of the book *De Mundo* were not Aristotle, yet that he was a Pagan, plainly appears from some passages thereof; as where he approves of sacrificing to the gods, and of worshipping heroes and dead men: as also because Apuleius would not otherwise have translated so much of that book, and incorporated it into his *De Mundo*. He therefore does not only commend this of Heraclitus, *ἐκ πάντων ἐν, καὶ ἐξ ἐνὸς πάντα*, that there is one harmonious system made out of all things, and that all things are derived from one;—but doth himself also write excellently concerning the supreme God, whom he calleth *τὴν τῶν ὄλων συνεκτικὴν αἰτίαν*, the cause, which containeth all things—and *τὸ τοῦ κόσμου κυριώτατον*, the best and most

C. vi. [p. 858.  
tom. i. oper.  
Aristot.]

excellent part of the world ;—he beginning after this manner: Ἀρχαῖος μὲν ὄν τις λόγος καὶ πατριός ἐστι πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις, ὡς ἐκ θεοῦ τὰ πάντα, καὶ διὰ θεοῦ ἡμῖν συνέστηκε· οὐδεμία δὲ φύσις, αὐτὴ καθ' ἑαυτὴν αὐτάρκης, ἐρημωθείσα τῆς ἐκ τούτου σωτηρίας· It is an ancient opinion or tradition, that hath been conveyed down to all men from their progenitors, that all things are from God, and consist by him ; and that no nature is sufficient to preserve itself, if left alone, and devoid of the Divine assistance and influence.—Where we may observe, that the Apuleian Latin version, altering the sense, renders the words thus : “ Vetus opinio est, atque in cogitationes omnium hominum penitus incidit, Deum esse : originis non habere auctorem ; Deumque esse salutem et perseverantiam earum, quas effecerit, rerum.” So that whereas, in the original Greek, this is said to be the general opinion of all mankind, That all things are from God, and subsist by him, and that nothing at all can conserve itself in-being without him ;—Apuleius, correcting the words, makes the general sense of mankind to run no higher than this ; “ That there is a God, who hath no author of his original, and who is the safety and preservation of all those things, that were made by himself. From whence it may be probably concluded, that Apuleius, who is said to have been of Plutarch's progeny, was infected also with those paradoxical opinions of Plutarch's, and consequently did suppose all things not to have been made by God, nor to have depended on him (as the writer De Mundo affirmeth), but that there was something besides God, as namely the matter and an evil principle, uncreated and self-existent. Afterwards the same writer De Mundo elegantly



illustrates, by similitudes, how God, by one simple motion and energy of his own, without any labour or toil, doth produce and govern all the variety of motions in the universe; and how he doth *συνέχειν τὴν τῶν ὅλων ἀρμονίαν τε καὶ σωτηρίαν*, contain the harmony and safety of the whole.—And, lastly, he

concludes, *ἄπερ ἐν νηὶ κυβερνήτης, ἐν ἄρματι δὲ ἡνίοχος, ἐν χορῷ κορυφαῖος, ἐν πόλει νόμος, ἐν στρατοπέδῳ ἡγεμὼν, τῶντο θεὸς ἐν κόσμῳ*, that what a pilot is to a ship, a charioteer to a chariot, the Coryphæus to a choir, law to a city, and a general to an army; the same is God to the world:—there being only this difference, that whereas the government of some of them is toilsome and solicitous, the Divine government and steerage of the world is most easy and facile; for as this writer adds, “God, being himself immoveable, moveth all things; in the same manner as law, in itself immoveable, by moving the minds of the citizens, orders and disposes all things.”

Plutarchus Chæronensis (as hath been already declared) was unluckily engaged in two false opinions, the first of matter's being ingenite or uncreated, upon this pretence, because nothing could be made out of nothing; the second of a positive substantial evil principle, or an irrational soul and demon self-existent, upon this ground, because *τὴν κακίαν γεγονέναι κατὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ πρόνοιαν, ὥσπερ τὸ φαῦλον ἐπίγραμμα κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ποιητοῦ βούλησιν, πᾶσαν ἐπίνοιαν ἀτοπίας ὑπερβάλλει*: there is no greater absurdity imaginable, than that evil should proceed from the providence of God, as a bad epigram from the will of the poet.—In which respect he was before called by us a Ditheist. Plutarch was

<sup>a</sup> De Fato, p. 572, tom. ii. oper.

also a worshipper of the many Pagan gods, himself being a priest of the Pythian Apollo. Notwithstanding which, he unquestionably asserted one sole Principle of all good, the cause of all things (evil and matter only excepted,) the framer of the whole world, and maker of all the gods in it; who is therefore often called by him, God, in way of eminency, as when he affirmeth <sup>a</sup> *ἀεὶ γεωμετρῆν τὸν θεόν*, that God doth always act the geometrician;—that is, do all things in measure and proportion: and again, <sup>b</sup> *πάντα καθ' ἁρμονίαν ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ κατασκευάζεσθαι*, that all things are made by God, according to harmony;—and that *ὁ θεὸς ἁρμονικὸς καλεῖται καὶ μουσικὸς*, God is called a harmonist and musician:—and he hath these epithets given him, *ὁ μέγας θεός*, the great God—and *ὁ ἀνωτάτῳ θεός*, the highest or uppermost God—and *ὁ πρῶτος θεός*, the first God—and *ὁ ἀγέννητος θεός*, the unmade self-existent God;—all the other Pagan gods, according to him, having been made in time, together with the world. He is likewise styled by Plutarch, *πέλαγος τοῦ καλοῦ*, the sea of pulchritude:—and his standing and permanent duration, without any flux of time, is excellently described by the same writer, in his book concerning the Delphic inscription. Lastly, Plutarch affirmeth, that men generally pray to this supreme God for whatsoever is not in their own power, *ὅσα μὴ παρ' ἡμῖν ἐστίν, εὐχόμεθα τὸν θεόν διδόναι*.

Dio Chrysostomus, a sophist, Plutarch's equal, though an acknowledger of many gods, yet nevertheless asserteth *βασιλεύεσθαι τὸ ὅλον*, that p. 199. the whole world is under a kingly power [Ed. Morell.]

<sup>a</sup> Vide Plutarch. Sympos. lib. viii. Quæst. ii. p. 718. tom. ii. oper.

<sup>b</sup> Vide eund. de Musica, p. 1147. tom. ii. oper.

or monarchy,—he calling the supreme God, some-

P. 210. *τὸν κοινὸν ἀνθρώπων καὶ θεῶν βασιλέα τε καὶ ἄρχοντα, καὶ πρῶταν καὶ πατέρα,* the com-

mon King of gods and men; their governor and father; *τὸν πάντων κρατοῦντα θεόν,* the God that rules

P. 203. *ὁρῶντα πάντα, καὶ μέγιστον θεόν,* the first and greatest God; *τὸν κορυφαῖον προ-*

*ιστώτα τῶν ὄλων, καὶ κατευθύνοντα τὸν ἅπαντα οὐρανὸν καὶ κόσμον, &c.* the chief President over all things; who orders and guides the whole heaven and

P. 446. *τὸν σοφὸν κυβερνήτην τοῦ ζῦμπαντος ἡγεμόνα οὐρανοῦ, καὶ τῆς ὅλης*

*δεσπότην οὐσίας,* the Ruler of the whole heaven, and Lord of the whole essence—and the like. And

P. 201. *περὶ τῆς φύσεως, καὶ μάλιστα τοῦ πάντων ἡγεμόνος, πρῶτον μὲν καὶ ἐν πρώτοις δόξα καὶ ἐπίνοια κοινῆ*

*τοῦ ζῦμπαντος ἀνθρωπίνου γένους· ὁμοίως μὲν Ἑλλήνων; ὁμοίως δὲ Βαρβάρων, ἀναγκαία καὶ ἔμφυτος ἐν παντὶ τῷ λο-*

*γικῷ γιγνομένη κατὰ φύσιν, ἄνευ θνητοῦ διδασκάλου καὶ μν-*

*σταγωγῆς.* Concerning the nature of the gods in general, but especially of that supreme Ruler over

all, there is an opinion in all human kind, as well Barbarians as Greeks, that is naturally implanted

in them as rational beings, and not derived from any mortal teacher.—The meaning whereof is this;

that men are naturally possessed with a persuasion, that there is one God, the supreme Governor

of the whole world, and that there are also below him, but above men, many other intellectual

beings, which these Pagans called gods.

That Galen was no Atheist, and what his religion was, may plainly appear from this one passage out of his third book *De Usu Partium*, to

omit many others : Ἄλλὰ γὰρ ἴσως εἰ ἐπί- P. 402. [cap.  
 πλεον τοιοῦτων μνημονεδοῖμι βοσκημάτων, οἱ x. tom. ii.  
 σωφρονούντες ὀρθῶς ἂν μοι μέμψοιντο, καὶ μαι- oper. edit. Ba-  
 σιλ.]  
 νειν φαῖεν ἱερὸν λόγον, ὃν ἐγὼ τοῦ δημιουργήσαντος ἡμᾶς ἕμ-  
 νον ἀληθινὸν συντίθημι, καὶ νομίζω τοῦτ' εἶναι τὴν ὄντως εὐσέ-  
 βειαν· οὐχὶ εἰ ταύρων ἑκατόμβας αὐτῷ παμπόλλους καταθύ-  
 σαιμι, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα μυρία μύρα θυμάσαιμι καὶ κασίας, ἀλλ' εἰ  
 γνοίην μὲν αὐτὸς πρῶτος, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐξηγησαί-  
 μην, οἷος μὲν ἐστὶ τὴν σοφίαν, οἷος δὲ τὴν δύναμιν, ὁποῖος δὲ  
 τὴν χρηστότητα· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐθέλειν κοσμεῖν ἅπαντα τὸν ἐνδεχό-  
 μενον κόσμον καὶ μηδενὶ φθονεῖν τῶν ἀγαθῶν, τῆς τελευτάτης  
 χρηστότητος ἐγὼ δείγμα τίθεμαι, ταύτη μὲν ὡς ἀγαθὸς ἡμῖν ὑμ-  
 νεῖσθω· τὸ δ' ὡς ἂν μάλιστα κοσμηθεῖη, πᾶν ἐξευρεῖν, ἄκρας  
 σοφίας· τὸ δὲ καὶ δρᾶσαι πάνθ' ὅσα προεἰλετο, δυνάμειος ἀπητή-  
 του. Should I any longer insist upon such brutish  
 persons as those, the wise and sober might justly  
 condemn me, as defiling this holy oration, which  
 I compose as a true hymn to the praise of Him  
 that made us ; I conceiving true piety and reli-  
 gion towards God to consist in this, not that I  
 should sacrifice many hecatombs, or burn much  
 incense to him, but that I should myself first ac-  
 knowledge, and then declare to others, how great  
 his wisdom is, how great his power, and how  
 great his goodness. For that he would adorn the  
 whole world after this manner, envying to nothing  
 that good, which it was capable of, I conclude  
 to be a demonstration of most absolute goodness,  
 and thus let him be praised by us as good. And  
 that he was able to find out, how all things might  
 be adorned after the best manner, is a sign of the  
 greatest wisdom in him. And, lastly, to be able to  
 effect and bring to pass all those things; which he  
 had thus decreed, argues an insuperable power.  
 : Maximus Tyrius, in the close of his first dis-

sertation, gives us this short representation of his own Theology: Βούλομαι δέ σοι δεῖξαι τὸ λεγόμενον σαφεστέρα εἰκότι. Ἐννοεῖ μεγάλην ἀρχὴν καὶ βασιλείαν ἑρρωμένην πρὸς μίαν ψυχὴν βασιλέως τοῦ ἀρίστου καὶ πρεσβυτάτου συμπάντων νενευκότων ἐκόντων· ὅρον δὲ τῆς ἀρχῆς οὐχ Ἄλυν ποταμὸν, οὐδὲ Ἑλλήσποντον, οὐδὲ τὴν Μαιώτιν, οὐδὲ τὰς ἐπὶ τῷ ὠκεανῷ ἥϊονας, ἀλλὰ οὐρανὸν καὶ γῆν τὸν μὲν ἄνω τὴν δ' ἔνερθεν· βασιλέα δὲ αὐτὸν διὰ τὸν μέγαν ἀτρεμοῦντα, ἡσπερ νόμον παρέχοντα τοῖς πειθόμενοις, σωτηρίαν ὑπάρχουσαν αὐτῶν, καὶ κοινωνοὺς τῆς ἀρχῆς, πολλοὺς μὲν ὄρατους θεοὺς, πολλοὺς δὲ ἀφανεῖς· τοὺς μὲν περὶ τὰ πρόθυρα αὐτὰ εἰλουμένους, οἷον εἰσαγγελέας τινὰς καὶ βασιλεῖς συγγενεστέτους, ὁμοτραπέζους αὐτοὺς καὶ συνεστίους· τοὺς δὲ τούτων ὑπηρέτας, τοὺς δὲ ἐπὶ τούτων καταδεεστέρους· διαδοχὴν ὄρατος καὶ τάξιν ἀρχῆς καταβαίνουσαν ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ μέχρι γῆς.

I will now more plainly declare my sense by this similitude: imagine in your mind a great and powerful kingdom or principality, in which all the rest freely and with one consent conspire to direct their actions, agreeably to the will and command of one supreme King, the oldest and the best: and then suppose the bounds and limits of this empire not to be the river Halys, nor the Hellespont; nor the Meotian lake, nor the shores of the ocean; but heaven above, and the earth beneath. Here then let that great king sit immovable, prescribing laws to all his subjects, in which consist their safety and security: the consorts of his empire being many, both visible and invisible gods; some of which, that are nearest to him, and immediately attending on him, are in the highest royal dignity, feasting as it were at the same table with him: others again are their ministers and attendants; and a third sort, inferior to them both. And thus you see, how the

order and chain of this government descend down by steps and degrees, from the supreme God to the earth and men.—In which resemblance, we have a plain acknowledgment of one supreme God, the monarch of the whole world, and three subordinate ranks of inferior gods, as his ministers, in the government of the world; whom that writer also calls θεούς θεοῦ παῖδας καὶ φίλους, gods, the sons and friends of God.

Aristides, the famous Adrianean sophist and orator, in his first oration or hymn vowed to Jupiter, after he had escaped a great tempest, is so full to the purpose, that nothing can be more: he, after his proem, beginning thus: Ζεὺς τὰ πάντα ἐποίησε, καὶ Διὸς ἐστὶν ἔργα ὅσα ἐστὶ πάντα, καὶ ποταμὸς, καὶ γῆ, καὶ θάλαττα, καὶ οὐρανός· καὶ ὅσα τούτων μεταξὺ ἄνω, καὶ ὅσα ὑπὸ ταῦτα· καὶ θεοὶ καὶ ἄνθρωποι, καὶ ὅσα ψυχὴν ἔχει, καὶ ὅσα εἰς ὄψιν ἀφικνέεται, καὶ ὅσα δεῖ νοήσει λαβεῖν. Ἐποίησε δὲ πρῶτος αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν· οὐ Κρήτης ἐν εὐώδεσιν ἀντροῖς τραφεῖς· οὐδ' ἐμέλλησεν αὐτὸν Κρόνος καταπιεῖν· οὐτ' ἀντ' ἐκείνου λίθον κατέπιεν, οὐδ' ἐκινδύνευσεν Ζεὺς, οὐδὲ μήποτε κινδυνεύσει· οὐδ' ἐστὶ πρεσβύτερον οὐδὲν Διὸς· οὐ μᾶλλον γε ἢ υἱεῖς τε πατέρων πρεσβύτεροι γένοιτ' ἂν, καὶ τὰ γιγνόμενα τῶν ποιούντων· ἀλλ' ὅδε ἐστὶ πρῶτός τε καὶ πρεσβύτατος, καὶ ἀρχηγέτης τῶν πάντων· αὐτὸς ἐξ αὐτοῦ γενόμενος· ὅποτε δὲ ἐγένετο, οὐκ ἐστὶν εἰπεῖν ἀλλ' ἦν τε ἄρα ἐξ ἀρχῆς καὶ ἔσται εἰσαεῖ, αὐτοκάτωρ τε καὶ μείζων ἢ ἐξ ἄλλου γεγονέναι. Καὶ ὥσπερ τὴν Ἀθηναίων ἄρα ἐκ τῆς κεφαλῆς ἐψυσε, καὶ γάμου οὐδὲν προσεδείθη εἰς αὐτήν, οὕτως ἐτι πρότερον αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ ἐποίησε, καὶ οὐδὲν προσεδείθη ἐτέρον εἰς τὸ εἶναι· ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τὸναντίον πάντα εἶναι ἀπ' ἐκείνου ἤρξατο, καὶ οὐκ ἐστὶ χρόνον εἰπεῖν· Οὐτε γὰρ χρόνος ἦν πῶ τότε ὅτε μηδὲ ἄλλο μηδὲν δημιουργοῦ γὰρ ἔργον οὐδὲν ἐστὶ πρεσβύτερον· οὕτω δὴ ἀρχὴ μὲν ἀπάντων Ζεὺς καὶ ἐκ Διὸς πάντα, ἅτε δὴ ὦν χρόνου τε κρείττων, καὶ οὐδένα

ἔχων τὸν ἀντικείμενον, αὐτός τε ὁμοῦ καὶ ὁ κόσμος ἦν, οὕτω ταχὺ πάντα ἐποίησε, ἐποίησε δὲ ὧδε, &c. Jupiter made all things, and all things whatsoever exist are the works of Jupiter; rivers, and earth, and sea, and heaven, and what are between these, and gods and men and all animals, whatsoever is perceivable either by sense or by the mind. But Jupiter first of all made himself; for he was not educated in the flowery and odoriferous caves of Crete, neither was Saturn ever about to devour him, nor instead of him did

How God was said to be self-made. See p. 405 and 406.

he swallow down a stone. For Jupiter was never in danger, nor will he be ever in danger of any thing. Neither is there any thing older than Jupiter, no more than there are sons older than their parents, or works than their opificers. But he is the first and the oldest, and the prince of all things, he being made from himself; nor can it be declared when he was made, for he was from the beginning, and ever will be his own father, and greater than to have been begotten from one another. As he produced Minerva from his brain, and needed no wedlock in order thereunto, so before this did he produce himself from himself, needing not the help of any other thing for his being. But, on the contrary, all things began to be from him, and no man can tell the time; since there was not then any time when there was nothing else besides, and no work can be older than the maker of it. Thus was Jupiter the beginning of all things, and all things were from Jupiter, who is better than time, which had its beginning together with the world.—And again: Ὡς δὲ καὶ θεῶν ὅσα φύλα ἀπορροήν τῆς Διὸς τοῦ πάντων πατρὸς δυνάμειω ἕκαστα ἔχει, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς κατὰ τὴν Ὀμήρου, σιεράν, ἅπαντα

εἰς αὐτὸν διήσθηται, καὶ πάντα ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἐξήπται· ἔρωτά τε καὶ ἀνάγκην δύο τούτῳ συναγωγιστάτῳ καὶ ἰσχυροτάτῳ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις ἐγένησεν, ὅπως αὐτῷ τὰ πάντα συνέχουεν, &c. ἵποιοι θεοὺς μὲν, ἀνθρώπων ἐπιμελητὰς, ἀνθρώπους δὲ θεῶν θεραπευτὰς τε καὶ ὑπηρέτας, &c. πάντα δὲ πανταχοῦ Διὸς μιστὰ, καὶ ἀπάντων θεῶν εὐεργεσίαι, Διὸς εἰσιν ἔργον, &c. All the several kinds of gods are but a defluxion and derivation from Jupiter; and, according to Homer's chain, all things are connected with him and depend upon him. He, amongst the first, produced love and necessity, two the most powerful holders of things together, that they might make all things firmly to cohere. He made gods to be the curators of men, and he made men to be the worshippers and servers of those gods. All things are every where full of Jupiter, and the benefits of all the other gods are his work, and to be attributed to him, they being done in compliance with that order, which he had prescribed them.

It is certain, that all the latter philosophers after Christianity, whether Platonists or Peripatetics, though for the most part they asserted the eternity of the world, yet universally agreed in the acknowledgment of one supreme Deity, the cause of the whole world, and of all the other gods. And as Numenius, Plotinus, Amelius, Porphyrius, Proclus, Damascius, and others, held also a trinity of Divine hypostases, so had some of those philosophers excellent speculations concerning the Deity, as particularly Plotinus; who, notwithstanding that he derived matter and all things from one Divine principle, yet was a contender for many gods. Thus in his book in-



En. ii. lib. ix. scribed against the Gnostics: *Χρη̄ ως ἀρισ-*  
*ο. ix. [p. 207.] τον μὲν αὐτὸν πειρᾱσθαι γίνεσθαι, μὴ μόνον δε̄ αὐτὸν*  
*νομίζειν ἀριστον δύνασθαι γενέσθαι, οὕτω γὰρ οὕτω ἀριστος,*  
*ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀνθρώπους ἄλλους ἀρίστους, ἔτι καὶ δαίμονας ἀγα-*  
*θούς εἶναι· πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον θεούς, τοὺς τε ἐν τῷδε ὄντας*  
*κακεῖ βλέποντας· πάντων δὲ μάλιστα τὸν ἡγεμόνα τοῦδε τοῦ*  
*παντός, ψυχὴν μακαριωτάτην· ἐντεῦθεν δὲ ἤδη καὶ τοὺς νοη-*  
*τοὺς ὑμνεῖν θεούς, ὑφ' ἅπασι δὲ ἤδη, τὸν μέγαν τὸν ἐκεῖ βασι-*  
*λέα· καὶ ἐν τῷ πληθεῖ μάλιστα τῶν θεῶν, τὸ μέγα αὐτοῦ ἐν-*  
*δεικνυμένους. Οὐ γὰρ τὸ συστῆλαι εἰς ἓν, ἀλλὰ τὸ δεῖξαι*  
*πολὺ τὸ θεῖον ὅσον ἔδειξεν αὐτός, τουτέστι δύναμιν θεοῦ εἰδο-*  
*των, ὅταν μένων ὅς ἐστι, πολλοὺς ποιῆ, πάντας εἰς αὐτὸν*  
*ἀνηρημένους, καὶ δι' ἐκείνον καὶ παρ' ἐκείνου ὄντας· καὶ ὁ κόσ-*  
*μος ὅδε δι' ἐκείνον ἐστὶ κακεῖ βλέπει, καὶ πᾶς, καὶ θεῶν ἕκαστος.*  
**Every man ought to endeavour, with all his might,**  
**to become as good as may be, but yet not to**  
**think himself to be the only thing that is good,**  
**but that there are also other good men in the**  
**world, and good demons, but much more gods;**  
**who, though inhabiting this inferior world, yet**  
**look up to that superior; and, most of all, the**  
**prince of this universe, that most happy soul.**  
**From whence he ought to ascend yet higher,**  
**and to praise those intelligible gods, but above**  
**all that great King and Monarch; declaring his**  
**greatness and majesty by the multitude of gods**  
**which are under him. For this is not the part**  
**of them, who know the power of God, to contract**  
**all into one, but to shew forth all that Divinity,**  
**which himself hath displayed, who, remaining**  
**one, makes many depending on him; which are**  
**by him and from him. For this whole world is**  
**by him, and looks up perpetually to him, as also**  
**doth every one of the gods in it.—And Themistius,**  
**the Peripatetic (who was so far from being a**

Christian, that, as Petavius probably conjectures, he perstrings our Saviour Christ under the name of Empedocles, for making himself a god), doth not only affirm, that one and the same supreme God was worshipped by Pagans, and the Christians, and all nations, though in different manners; but also, that God was delighted with this variety of religions: Orat. xii. [p. 156. edit. Harduini.]  
*Ταύτη νόμιζε γάνυσσθαι τῇ ποικιλίᾳ τὸν τοῦ παντὸς ἀρχηγέτην· ἄλλως Σύρους ἐθέλει πολιτεύεσθαι, ἄλλως Ἑλληνας, ἄλλως Αἰγυπτίους; καὶ οὐδ' αὐτοὺς Σύρους ὁμοίως, ἀλλ' ἤδη κατακεκερμάτισται εἰς μικρά·* The author and prince of the universe seems to be delighted with this variety of worship; he would have the Syrians worship him one way, the Greeks another, and the Egyptians another; neither do the Syrians (or Christians) themselves all agree, they being subdivided into many sects.

We shall conclude, therefore, with this full testimony of St. Cyril, in his first book against Julian: P. 23.  
*Ἀπασιν ἐναργές, ὅτι καὶ τοῖς τὰ Ἑλλήνων φιλοσοφεῖν εἰωθόσιν, ἓνα μὲν ἐδόκει Θεὸν εἶναι συνωμολογεῖν, τὸν τῶν ὅλων δημιουργόν, καὶ πάντων ἐπέκεινα κατὰ φύσιν αὐτοῖ, νοητοῦς τε καὶ αἰσθητοῦς·* It is manifest to all, that amongst those, who philosophize in the Greek way, it is universally acknowledged that there is one God, the maker of the universe, and who is by nature above all things; but that there have been made by him, and produced into generation, certain other gods (as they call them) both intelligible and sensible.

xxvii. Neither was this the opinion of philosophers and learned men only, amongst the Pagans, but even of the vulgar also. Not that we pretend to give an account of all the most sottish

vulgar amongst them, who as they little considered their religion, so probably did they not understand that mystery of the Pagan theology (hereafter to be declared), that many of their gods were nothing but several names and notions of one supreme Deity, according to its various manifestations and effects ; but because, as we conceive, this tradition of one supreme God did run current amongst the generality of the Greek and Latin Pagans at least, whether learned or unlearned. For we cannot make a better judgment concerning the vulgar and generality of the ancient Pagans, than from the poets and mythologists, who were the chief instructors of them. Thus Aristotle in his Politics, writing of music, judgeth of men's opinions concerning the

gods from the poets : Σκοπεῖν δ' ἔστι τὴν  
L. viii. c. v. [p. 607.] tom. iii. oper.] ὑπόληψιν ἣν ἔχομεν περὶ τῶν θεῶν, οὐ γὰρ ὁ  
 Ζεὺς αὐτὸς ᾄδει καὶ κιθαρίζει τοῖς ποιηταῖς. We

may learn what opinion men have concerning the gods, from hence, because the poets never bring in Jupiter singing or playing upon an instrument. —Now we have already proved from sundry testimonies of the poets, that (however they were de-pravers of the Pagan religion, yet) they kept up this tradition of one supreme Deity, one king and father of gods : to which testimonies many more might have been added, as of Seneca the tragedian, Status, Lucan, Silius Italicus, Persius and Martial, but that we then declined them, to avoid tediousness. Wherefore we shall here content ourselves only to set down this affirmation of Dio Chrysostomus, concerning the theology of the

poets: Οὗτοι δ' οὖν πάντες οἱ ποιηταὶ κατὰ τῶν  
Orat. xxxvi. p. 447. τα, τὸν πρῶτον καὶ μέγιστον θεὸν πατέρα κα-

λοῦσαι συλλήβδην ἅπαντος τοῦ λογικοῦ γένους, καὶ δὴ καὶ βασιλέα· οἷς περὶόμενοι οἱ ἄνθρωποι Διὸς βασιλέως ἰδρύονται βωμούς· καὶ δὴ καὶ πατέρα αὐτὸν οὐκ ὀκνεοῦσι προσαγορεύειν ἐν ταῖς εὐχαῖς· All the poets call the first and greatest God, the father, universally, of all the rational kind; as also the king thereof. Agreeably with which of the poets, do men erect altars to Jupiter king, and stick not to call him father in their devotions.

Moreover, Aristotle himself hath recorded this in his Politics, <sup>a</sup> πάντες λέγουσι θεοὺς βασιλεύεσθαι, that all men affirmed the gods to be under a kingly power; or, that there is one supreme King and Monarch over the gods.—And Maximus Tyrius declareth, that as well the unlearned as the learned, throughout the whole Pagan world, universally agreed in this, that there was one supreme God, the father of all the other gods:

Εἰ συναγαγῶν ἐκκλησίαν τῶν τεχνῶν τούτων, πελεύεις ἅπαντας ἀθρώους διὰ ψηφίσματος ἑνός Diss. i. p. 4, 5.  
ἀποκρίνασθαι περὶ τοῦ θεοῦ, εἴη ἄλλο μὲν ἂν τὴν γραφεὰ εἰπῆεν, ἄλλο δὲ καὶ τὸν ἀγαματοποιὸν, καὶ τὸν ποιητὴν ἄλλο, καὶ τὸν φιλόσοφον ἄλλο; ἄλλ' οὐδὲ μὰ Δία τὸν Σκύθην, οὐδὲ τὸν Ἑλληνα, οὐδὲ τὸν Πέρσην, ἢ τὸν Ὑπερβόρειον· ἀλλὰ ἴδοις ἂν ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἄλλα, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἄλλα, καὶ οὐ ταῦτα ψηφίζομένους τοὺς ἀθρώπους, πάντας δὲ πᾶσι διαφορομένους· οὐ τὸ ἐγαθὸν τὸ αὐτὸ πᾶσιν, οὐ τὸ κακὸν ὁμοιον, οὐ τὸ πιαχρόν, οὐ τὸ καλόν· νόμος μὲν γὰρ δὴ καὶ δίκη ἄνω καὶ κάτω φέρεται διασπώμενα καὶ σπαρασσόμενα· μὴ γὰρ ὅτι γένος γίνεαι ὁμολογεῖ ἐν τούτοις, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ πόλις πόλει, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ οἶκος οἴκῳ, οὐδὲ ἀνὴρ ἀνδρὶ, οὐδὲ αὐτὸς αὐτῷ· ἐν τοσούτῳ δὲ πολέμῳ καὶ στάσει καὶ διαφωνίᾳ, ἕνα ἴδοις ἂν ἐν πᾶσιν γῆ ὁμόφωνον νόμον καὶ λόγον, ὅτι ΘΕΟΣ Εἰς Παντῶν ΒΑΣΙΛΕΥΣ ΚΑΙ ΠΑΤΗΡ, καὶ θεοὶ πολλοὶ θεοῦ παῖδες,

<sup>a</sup> Lib. iv. cap. xv. p. 510. tom. iii. oper.

συνάρχοντες θεῶν· ταῦτα δὲ ὁ Ἕλληρ λέγει καὶ ὁ Βάρβαρος λέγει, καὶ ὁ ἠπειρώτης καὶ ὁ θαλάττιος, καὶ ὁ σοφὸς, καὶ ὁ ἄσοφος· If there were a meeting called of all these several trades and professions, a painter, a statuary, a poet, and a philosopher, and all of them were required to declare their sense concerning God, do you think, that the painter would say one thing, the statuary another, the poet another, and the philosopher another? No, nor the Scythian neither, nor the Greek, nor the Hyperborean. In other things we find men speaking very discordantly to one another, all men as it were differing from all. The same thing is not good to all nor evil, honest nor dishonest. For law and justice itself are different every where; and not only one nation doth not agree with another therein, but also not one city with another city, nor one house with another house, nor one man with another man, nor, lastly, any one man with himself. Nevertheless, in this so great war, contention, and discord, you may find every where throughout the whole world, one agreeing law and opinion, that **THERE IS ONE GOD THE KING AND FATHER OF ALL**, and many gods, the sons of God, co-reigners together with God. These things both the Greek and the Barbarian alike affirm, both the inhabitants of the continent and of the sea-coast, both the wise and the unwise.—Nothing can be more full than this testimony of Maximus Tyrius, that the generality of the Pagan world, as well vulgar and illiterate as wise and learned, did agree in this, that there was one supreme God, the creator and governor of all. And to the same purpose was that other testimony before cited out of Dio Chrysostomus, *περὶ δὲ θεῶν τῆς τε καθόλου φύσεως, καὶ μάλιστα τοῦ*

*Orat. xii. p. 201.*

πάντων ἡγεμόνος, δόξα καὶ ἐπίνοια κοινῇ τοῦ ζύμπαντος ἀνθρωπίνου γένους, ὁμοίως δὲ Ἑλλήνων, ὁμοίως δὲ Βαρβάρων, &c. that concerning the nature of the gods in general, but especially concerning that Prince of all things, there was one agreeing persuasion in the minds of all mankind, as well Barbarians as Greeks.—Where Dio plainly intimates also, that there was a more universal consent of nations in the belief of one God than of many gods.

It hath been already observed, that the several Pagan nations had vulgarly their peculiar proper names for the one supreme God. For as the Greeks called him Zeus or Zen, the Latins Jupiter or Jovis, so did the Egyptians, Africans, and Arabians, Hammon. Which Hammon therefore was called by the Greeks the Zeus of the Africans, and by the Latins their Jupiter. Whence is that in Cicero's *De Natura Deorum*,<sup>a</sup> “*Jovis Capitolini nobis alia species, alia Afris Ammonis Jovis,*” the form of the capitoline Jupiter with us Romans is different from that of Jupiter Ammon with the Africans.”—The name of the Scythian Jupiter also, as Herodotus tells us, was Pappæus or father. The Persians likewise had their Ζεὺς πατρῷος, as Xenophon styles him, their country Zeus or Jupiter (namely Mithras or Oromasdes); who in the same Xenophon is distinguished from the sun, and called in Cyrus's proclamation in the Scripture, “the Lord God of heaven, who had given him all the kingdoms of the earth.” Thus the Babylonian Bel is declared by Berosus (a priest of his) to have been that God, who was the maker of heaven and earth. And learned men conceive; that Baal (which is the same with Bel, and sig-

<sup>a</sup> Lib. i. cap. xxix. p. 2923. tom. ix. oper.

nifies Lord) was first amongst the Phenicians also a name for the supreme God, the creator of heaven and earth, sometimes called Beel samen, the Lord of heaven: as likewise that Molech, which signifies king, was, amongst the Ammonites, the king of their gods; and that Marnas (the chief God of the Gazites, who were Philistines) and signifies the Lord of men, was that from whence the Cretians derived their Jupiter, called the father of gods and men.

Origen\* indeed contended, that it was not lawful for Christians to call the supreme God by any of those Pagan names, and probably for these reasons, because those names were then frequently bestowed upon idols, and because they were contaminated and defiled by absurd and impure fables. Nevertheless, that learned father does acknowledge the Pagans really to have meant τὸν θεὸν ἐνὶ πᾶσιν, the God over all—by those several names: which yet Lactantius Firmianus would by no means allow of as to the Roman Jupiter, worshipped in the capitol, he endeavouring to con-

L. i. c. xi. [p. 76.] fute it after this manner: “Vana est persuasio eorum, qui nomen Jovis summo Deo tribuunt. Solent enim quidam errores suos hac excusatione defendere; qui convicti de uno Deo, cum id negare non possunt, ipsum colere affirmant, verum hoc sibi placere ut Jupiter nominetur, quo quid absurdius? Jupiter enim sine contubernio conjugis filiæque, colinonsolet. Unde quid sit apparet, nec fas est id nomen eo transferri, ubi nec Minerva est ulla nec Juno.” It is a vain persuasion of those, who would give the name of Jupiter to the supreme God. For some

\* Contra Celsum, lib. i. p. 18.

are wont thus to excuse their errors, when they have been convinced of one God, so as that they could not contradict it, by saying, that themselves worshipped him, he being called by them Jupiter : than which what can be more absurd ? since Jupiter is not worshipped without the partnership of his wife and daughter. From whence it plainly appears what this Jupiter is, and that the name ought not to be transferred thither, where there is neither any Minerva nor Juno.—The ground of which argumentation of Lactantius was this, because the great capitoline temple of Jupiter had three sacella or lesser chapels in it, all contained under one roof, Jupiter's in the middle, Minerva's on the right hand, and Juno's on the left ; according to that of the poet ;

*Trina in Tarpeio fulgent consortia templo.*

Which Juno, according to the poetic theology, is said to be the wife of Jupiter, and Minerva his daughter, begotten not upon Juno, but from his own brain. Where it is plain, that there is a certain mixture of the mythical or poetical theology ; together with the natural, as almost every where else there was, to make up that civil theology of the Pagans. But here (according to the more recondite and arcane doctrine of the Pagans) these three capitoline gods, Jupiter, Minerva, and Juno, as well as some others, may be understood to have been nothing else but several names and notions of one supreme Deity, according to its several attributes and manifestations ; Jupiter signifying the Divine power and sovereignty, as it were seated and enthroned in the heavens ; Minerva, the Divine wisdom and understanding ; and Juno the



same deity, acting in these lower parts of the world. Unless we would rather, with Macrobius,<sup>a</sup> physiologize them all three, and make Minerva to be the higher heaven, Jupiter the middle ether, and Juno the lower air and earth, all animated; that is, one God, as acting differently in these three regions of the world. Which yet seems not so congruous, because it would place Minerva above Jupiter.

Nevertheless it may justly be suspected, as G. I. Vossius<sup>b</sup> hath already observed, that there was yet some higher and more sacred mystery in this capitoline trinity aimed at; namely, a trinity of Divine hypostases. For these three Roman or capitoline gods were said to have been first brought into Italy out of Phrygia by the Trojans, but before that into Phrygia by Dardanus, out of the Samothracian island; and that within eight hundred years after the Noachian flood, if we may believe Eusebius. And as these were called by the Latins Dii Penates, which Macrobius thus interprets,<sup>c</sup> “Dii per quos penitus spiramus, per quos habemus corpus, per quos rationem animi possidemus,” that is, the gods, by whom we live, and move, and have our being;—but Varro in Arnobius, “Dii, qui sunt intrinsecus, atque in intimis penentralibus cœli,” the gods, who are in the most inward recesses of heaven;—so were they called by the Samothracians *Κάβειροι*, or Cabiri, that is, as Varro<sup>d</sup> rightly interprets the word, *θεοὶ δυνατοὶ*, or *divi potentes*, the powerful and mighty gods.—Which

<sup>a</sup> Saturnal. lib. iii. cap. iv. p. 391, 392.

<sup>b</sup> De Theolog. Gentili; lib. viii. cap. xii. p. 750, 751.

<sup>c</sup> Saturnal. lib. iii. cap. iv. p. 391.

<sup>d</sup> Advers. Gentes, lib. iii. p. 155.

<sup>e</sup> De Lingua Latin. lib. iv. p. 66.

Cabiri being plainly the Hebrew כַּבִּירִים, gives just occasion to suspect, that this ancient tradition of the three Divine hypostases (unquestionably entertained by Orpheus, Pythagoras, and Plato amongst the Greeks, and probably by the Egyptians and Persians) sprung originally from the Hebrews; the first of these Divine hypostases, called Jove, being the fountain of the godhead; and the second of them, called by the Latins Minerva (which, as Varro \* interprets it, was, that wherein "ideæ et exempla rerum," the ideas and first exemplars or patterns of things were contained), fitly expressing the Divine Logos; and the third Juno, called "amor ac delictum Jovis," well enough answering (as Vossius thinks) to the Divine Spirit.

De Theol.  
Gen. l. viii.  
c. xii.

But Lactantius hath yet another objection against the Roman Jupiter's being the supreme God; "Quid? quod hujus nominis proprietas non divinam vim sed humanam exprimit? Jovem enim Junonem que a Juvando esse dictos Cicero interpretatur. Et Jupiter quasi Juvans pater dicitur. Quod nomen in Deum minime convenit, quia juvare hominis est, &c. Nemo sic deum precatur, ut se adjuvet, sed ut servet, &c. Ergo non imperitus modo, sed etiam impius est, qui nomine Jovis virtutem summæ potestatis imminuit." What if we add, that the propriety of this word Jupiter does not express a Divine, but only a human force? Cicero deriving both Jove and Juno alike *a juvando*, that is, from helping: for *juvans pater*, or a helping father, is not a good description of God; forasmuch as it pro-

P. 63.

\* Apud Augustinum de Civitate Dei, lib. vii. cap. xxviii. p. 141. tom. vii. oper.

perly belongeth to men to help. Neither doth any one pray to God to help him only, but to save him. Nor is a father said to help his son, whom he was the begetter of; &c. Wherefore he is not only unskillful, but impious also, who, by the name of Jove or Jupiter, diminishes the power of the supreme God.—But as this of Lactantius seems otherwise weak enough; so is the foundation of it absolutely ruinous, the true etymon of Jupiter (though Cicero knew not so much) being without peradventure, not *juvans pater*, but *Jovis pater*, Jove, the father of gods and men; which *Jovis* is the very Hebrew Tetragrammaton (however these Romans came by it) only altered by a Latin termination. Wherefore, as there could be no impiety at all in calling the supreme God Jove or Jovis, it being that very name which God himself chose to be called by; so neither is there any reason, why the Latins should not as well mean the supreme God thereby, as the Greeks did unquestionably by *Zeus*, which will be proved afterwards from irrefragable authority.

Especially if we consider, that the Roman vulgar commonly bestowed these two epithets upon that capitoline Jupiter (that is, not the senseless statue, but that God who was there worshipped in a material statue) of *Optimus* and *Maximus*, the best and the greatest; they thereby signifying him to be a Being infinitely good and powerful. Thus Cicero in his *De Nat. Deorum*,<sup>a</sup> “*Jupiter a poetis dicitur divum atque hominum pater, et majoribus autem nostris optimus, maximus.*” That same Jupiter, who is by the poets styled the father of gods and men, is by our ancestors called the best,

<sup>a</sup> Lib. ii. cap. xxv. p. 2092. tom. ix. oper.

the greatest.—And in his *Orat. pro S. Roscio*,<sup>a</sup> “*Jupiter optimos maximus, cujus nutu et arbitrio cœlum, terra, mariaque reguntur;*” Jupiter the best, the greatest, by whose beck and command, the heaven, the earth, and the seas are governed. As also the junior Pliny, in his panegyric oration, “*Parens hominum deorumque, optimi prius, deinde maximi nomine collitur;*” the father of men and gods is worshipped under the name, first of the best, and then of the greatest.—Moreover Servius Honoratus informs us, that the pontifices in their public sacrifices were wont to address themselves to Jupiter in this form of words; “*Omnipotens Jupiter, seu quo alio nomine appellari volueris;*” Omnipotent Jupiter, or by what other name soever thou pleasest to be called.—From whence it is plain, that the Romans, under the name of Jupiter, worshipped the omnipotent God. And, according to Seneca, the ancient Etrurians, who are by him distinguished from philosophers; as a kind of illiterate superstitious persons (in these words, “*Hæc adhuc Etruscis et philosophis communia sunt, in illo dissentiunt*”) had this very same notion answering to the word Jupiter, namely, of the supreme Monarch of the universe. For, first, he sets down their tradition concerning thunderbolts in this manner: “*Fulmina dicunt a Jove mitti, et tres illi manubias dant. Prima (ut aiunt) movet et placata est, et ipsius consilio Jovis mittitur. Secundam quidem mittit Jupiter, sed ex consilii sententia; duodecim enim deos advocat; &c. Tertiam idem Jupiter mittit, sed adhibitis in consilium diis, quos superiores et involutos vo-*

*Nat. Q. i. c. 511.  
[p. 536.  
tom. i. oper.]*

<sup>a</sup> *Cap. xlv. p. 948. tom. iii. oper.*

cant, quæ vastat," &c. The Hetrurians say, that the thunderbolts are sent from Jupiter, and that there are three kinds of them; the first gentle and monitory, and sent by Jupiter alone; the second sent by Jupiter, but not without the counsel and consent of the twelve gods, which thunderbolt doth some good, but not without harm also; the third sent by Jupiter likewise, but not before he hath called a council of all the superior gods: and this utterly wastes and destroys both private and public states.—And then does he make a commentary upon this old Hetrurian doctrine, that it was not to be taken literally, but only so as to impress an awe upon men, and to signify, that Jupiter himself intended nothing but good, he inflicting evil not alone, but in partnership with others, and when the necessity of the case required. Adding, in the last place, "*Ne hoc quidem crediderunt (Etrusci) Jovem qualem in capitolio, et in cæteris ædibus colimus, mittere manu sua fulmina; sed eundem, quem nos, Jovem intelligunt, custodem rectoremque universi, animum ac spiritum, mundani hujus operis dominum et artificem, cui nomen omne convenit.*" Neither did these Hetrurians believe, that such a Jupiter, as we worship in the capitol and in the other temples, did fling thunderbolts with his own hands, but they understood the very same Jupiter, that we now do, the keeper and governor of the universe, the mind and spirit of the whole, the lord and artificer of this mundane fabric, to whom every name belongeth.—And, lastly, that the vulgar Romans afterward, about the beginning of Christianity, had the same notion of Jupiter, as the supreme God, evidently appears from what

Tertullian hath recorded in his book *Ad Scapulam*,<sup>a</sup> that when Marcus Aurelius in his German expedition, by the prayers of the Christian soldiers made to God, had obtained refreshing showers from heaven in a great drought, “*Tunc populus adclamans JOVI DEO DEORUM, QUI SOLUS POTENS EST, in Jovis nomine Deo nostro testimonium reddidit:*” that then the people with one consent crying out, Thanks be to JUPITER THE GOD OF GODS, WHO ALONE IS POWERFUL, did thereby in the name of Jove or Jupiter give testimony to our God.— Where, by the way, we see also, that Tertullian was not so nice as Lactantius, but did freely acknowledge the Pagans by their Jupiter to have meant the true God.

As nothing is more frequent with Pagan writers, than to speak of God singularly, they signifying thereby the one supreme Deity, so that the same was very familiar with the vulgar Pagans also, in their ordinary discourse and common speech, hath been recorded by divers of the fathers. Tertullian in his book *De Testimonio Animæ*,<sup>b</sup> and his *Apologet.*<sup>c</sup> instanceth in several of these forms of speech then vulgarly used by the Pagans; as “*Deus videt, Deo commendo, Deus reddet, Deus inter nos judicabit, Quod Deus vult, Si Deus voverit, Quod Deus dederit, Si Deus dederit,*” and the like. Thus also Minutius Felix:<sup>d</sup> “*Cum ad cœlum manus tendunt, nihil aliud quam Deum dicunt, Et magnus est, et Deus verus est, &c. vulgi iste naturalis sermo, an Christiani confitentis oratio?*” When they stretch out their hands to

<sup>a</sup> Lib. iv.

<sup>b</sup> Cap. ii. p. 35. oper. edit. Venet.

<sup>c</sup> Cap. xvii. p. 175.

<sup>d</sup> In Octavio, cap. xviii. p. 171. edit. Gronov.

heaven, they mention only God ; and these forms of speech, He is great, and God is true ; and, If God grant (which are the natural language of the vulgar), are they not a plain confession of Christianity? And, lastly, Lactantius, \* “ Cum jurant, et cum optant, et cum gratias agunt, non deos multos, sed Deum nominant ; adeo ipsa veritas, cogente natura, etiam ab invitis pectoribus erumpit :” When they swear, and when they wish, and when they give thanks, they name not many gods, but God only ; the truth, by a secret force of nature, thus breaking forth from them, whether they will or no.—And again : “ Ad Deum confugiunt, a Deo petitur auxilium, Deus ut subveniat oratur. Et si quis ad extremam mendicandi necessitatem redactus, victum precibus exposcit, Deum solum obtestatur, et per ejus divinum atque unicum numen hominum sibi misericordiam quærit.” They fly to God, aid is desired of God, they pray that God would help them ; and when any one is reduced to extremest necessity, he begs for God’s sake, and by his Divine power alone implores the mercy of men.—Which same thing is fully confirmed also by Proclus upon Plato’s Timæus ; where he observes, that the one supreme God was more universally believed throughout the world in all ages, than the many inferior gods :

P. 286. τάχα δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ἂν εἶποις, ὅτι δὴ αἱ ψυχὰι τῶν  
 ἑαυταῖς προσεχιστέρων θάττον ἐπιλανθάνονται, τῶν  
 δὲ ὑπερτέρων ἀρχῶν μᾶλλον μνημονεύουσι· Δρῶσι γὰρ μᾶλλον εἰς αὐτοὺς δι’ ὑπεροχὴν δυνάμεως, καὶ δοκοῦσιν αὐταῖς παρεῖναι δι’ ἐνέργειαν· ὃ δὴ καὶ περὶ τὴν ὄψιν γίγνεται τὴν ἡμετέραν· πολλὰ γὰρ τῶν ἐν γῆ κειμένων οὐχ ὁρῶντες, ὁμῶς αὐτὴν ὁρᾶν δοκῶμεν τὴν ἀπλανῆ, καὶ αὐτοὺς τοὺς ἀστέρας, διότι καταλάμ-

\* Institut. Divin. lib. ii. cap. i. p. 150.

ποῦσιν ἡμῶν τὴν ὄψιν τῷ ἑαυτῶν φωτί. Μᾶλλον οὖν καὶ τὸ ὄμμα τῆς ψυχῆς, λήθην ἴσχει καὶ ἀορασίαν τῶν προσεχιστέρων, ἢ τῶν ἀνωτέρων καὶ θειοτέρων ἀρχῶν· οὕτω τὴν πρωτίστην ἀρχὴν πᾶσαι θρησκείαι καὶ αἱρέσεις συγχωροῦσιν εἶναι, καὶ θεὸν πάντες ἀνθρώποι ἐπικαλοῦσι βοηθόν· θεοὺς δὲ εἶναι μετ' αὐτὴν, καὶ πρόνοιαν ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἐν τῷ παντί, οὐ πᾶσαι πιστεύουσι· ἐνυργότερον γὰρ αὐταῖς καταφαίνεται τὸ ἐν τοῦ πλήθους· And perhaps you may affirm, that souls do sooner lose their knowledge of those things, which are lower and nearer to them, but retain a stronger remembrance of those higher principles; because these do act more vigorously upon them, by reason of the transcendency of their power, and by their energy seem to be present with them. And the same thing happens as to our bodily sight; for though there be many things here upon earth, which none of us see, yet every one observes that highest sphere, and takes notice of the fixed stars in it, because these strongly radiate with their light upon our eyes. In like manner does the eye of our soul sooner lose the sight and remembrance of the lower than of the higher and diviner principles. And thus all religions and sects acknowledge that one highest Principle of all, and men every where call upon God for their helper; but that there are gods, after and below that highest Principle, and that there is a certain providence descending down from these upon the universe, all sects do not believe; the reason whereof is, because the one or unity appears more clearly and plainly to them, than the many or a multitude.

Moreover, we learn from Arrianus's Epictetus, that that very form of prayer, which hath been now so long in use in the Christian church, Kyrie Eleeson, "Lord, have mercy upon us," was an-



ciently part of the Pagans' litany to the supreme God, either amongst the Greeks, or the Latins, L. ii. c. vii. [p. 186.] or both, τὸν θεὸν ἐπικαλούμενοι (saith Epic-tetus), δεόμεθα αὐτοῦ, Κύριε ἐλέησον, invoking God, we pray to him after this manner, Lord, have mercy upon us. Now this Epictetus lived in the times of Adrian the emperor; and that this passage of his is to be understood of Pagans, and not of Christians, is undeniably manifest from the context, he there speaking of those, who used *auguria*, or divination by birds. Moreover, in the writings of the Greekish Pagans, the supreme God is often called Κύριος, or Lord. For, not to urge that passage of the τέλειος λόγος, or Asclepian Dialogue, cited by Lactantius, <sup>a</sup> where we read of ὁ Κύριος καὶ πάντων ποιητής, the Lord and maker of all—Menander in Justin Martyr <sup>b</sup> styleth the supreme God τὸν ὄντα πάντων Κύριον γενικώτατον, the most universal Lord of all.—And Osiris in Plutarch is called ἀπάντων Κύριος, the Lord of all things.—And this is also done absolutely, and without any objection, and that not only by the LXX. and Christians, but also by Pagan writers. Thus in Plutarch's de Iside et Osiride, we read of τοῦ πρώτου, καὶ ΚΥΠΙΟΥ, καὶ νοητοῦ γνώσις, the knowledge of the first intelligible, and the Lord—that is, of the supreme God. And Oromasdes is called ὁ Κύριος, the Lord, in Plutarch's life of Alexander; as Νου̅ς De An. l. i. c. vii. [p. 16. tom. ii. oper.] also, Κύριος, by Aristotle, that is, the supreme Ruler over all.—Thus likewise Plato in his sixth epistle ad Hermiam, &c. styles his first Divine hypostasis, or the absolutely supreme Deity, τοῦ ἡγεμόνος καὶ αἰτίου πατέρα Κύριον, the father of the prince, and cause of the

<sup>a</sup> *Instit. Div. lib. ii. cap. vi. p. 419.*

<sup>b</sup> *De Monarch. Dei, p. 108.*

world (that is, of the eternal intellect) the LORD. Again, Jamblichus writeth thus of the supreme God, *Δεῖν ὁμολογεῖται παρὰ τοῦ κυρίου ἀγαθὸν ζητεῖν*, It is confessed, that every good thing ought to be asked of the Lord.— that is, the supreme God; which words are afterwards repeated in him also, p. 129. but depraved in the printed copy thus, *Δεῖν δὲ ὁμολογεῖν περὶ τοῦ κυρίου τ' ἀγαθὸν ἐστὶ*. Lastly, Clemens Alexandrinus\* tells us, that the supreme God was called not by one only name, but by divers diversely, namely, ἢ τὸ Ἐν, ἢ τ' Ἀγαθὸν, ἢ Νοῦν, ἢ αὐτὸ τὸ Ὄν, ἢ Πατέρα, ἢ Θεὸν, ἢ Δημιουργὸν ἢ Κύριον, either the One, or the Good, or Mind, or the very Ens, or the Father, or the Demiurgus, or the Lord.—Wherefore, we conclude, that this Kyrie Eleeson, or Domine Miserere, in Arrianus, was a Pagan litany or supplication to the supreme God. Though from Mauritius the emperor's *Stratagemata* it appears, that in his time a Kyrie Eleeson was wont to be sung also by the Christian armies before battle.

Vit. Pyth. p. 89.  
[cap. xviii. p. 72. ed. Kusteri.]

Rigalt. Gloss.

And that the most sottishly superstitious and idolatrous of all the Pagans, and the worshippers of never so many gods amongst them, did notwithstanding generally acknowledge one supreme Deity over them all, one universal Numen, is positively affirmed, and fully attested by Aurelius Prudentius, in his *Apotheosis*, in these words;

Ver. 254.

Ecquis in Idolio recubans inter sacra mille,  
Ridiculosque deos venerans, sale, cæspite, thure,  
Non putat esse Deum summum, et super omnia solum?  
Quamvis Saturnis, Junonibus, et Cytheræis,

\* *Stromat. lib. v. p. 605.*

Portentisque aliis, fumantes consecret aras;  
 Attamen in coelum quoties suspexit, in uno  
 Constituit jus omne Deo, cui serviat ingens  
 Virtutum ratio, varijs instructa ministris.

We are not ignorant, that Plato in his *Cratylus*<sup>a</sup> where he undertakes to give the etymologies of words, and amongst the rest of the word *θεοί*, writeth in this manner concerning the first and most ancient inhabitants of Greece; “that they seemed to him, like as other Barbarians at that time, to have acknowledged no other gods than such as were visible and sensible, as the sun, and the moon, and the earth, and the stars, and the heaven. Which they perceiving to run round perpetually, therefore called them *θεοὺς*, from *θεω*, that signifies to run. But that when afterward they took notice of other invisible gods also, they bestowed the same name of *θεοί* upon them likewise.” Which passage of Plato’s *Eusebius* somewhere<sup>b</sup> would make use of, to prove, that the Pagans universally acknowledged no other gods but corporeal and inanimate; plainly contrary to that philosopher’s meaning, who as he no where affirms, that any nation ever was so barbarous, as to worship senseless and inanimate bodies, as such, for gods, but the contrary; so doth he there distinguish from those first inhabitants of Greece, and other Barbarians, the afterward civilized Greeks, who took notice of invisible gods also. However, if this of Plato should be true, that some of the ancient Pagans worshipped none but visible and sensible gods (they taking no notice of any incorporeal beings), yet does it not therefore follow, that

<sup>a</sup> P. 263. oper.

<sup>b</sup> *Præparat. Evangel. lib. i. cap. ix. p. 29.*

those Pagans had no notion at all amongst them of one supreme and universal Numen. The contrary thereunto being manifest, that some of those Corporealists looked upon the whole heaven and ether animated as the highest God, according to that of Euripides cited by Cicero,

Vides sublime fusum, immoderatum æthera,  
 Qui tenero terram circumvectu amplectitur;  
 Hunc summum habeto divum, hunc perhibeto  
 Jovem.

De N. D.  
 p. 223. [lib.  
 ii. c. xxv.  
 p. 2993.]

As also that others of them conceived, that subtle fiery substance, which permeates and pervades the whole world (supposed to be intellectual) to be the supreme Deity, which governs all; this opinion having been entertained by philosophers also, as namely, the Heraclitics and Stoics. And, lastly, since Macrobius,<sup>a</sup> in the person of Vettius Prætextatus, refers so many of the Pagan gods to the sun; this renders it not improbable, but that some of these Pagans might adore the animated sun, as the sovereign Numen, and thus perhaps invoke him in that form of prayer there mentioned,<sup>b</sup> Ἡλιε παντοκράτωρ, κόσμον πνεῦμα, O omnipotent sun, the mind and spirit of the whole world, &c.—And even Cleanthes himself, that learned Stoic, and devout religionist, is suspected by some to have been of this persuasion.

Nevertheless, we think it opportune here to observe, that it was not Macrobius's design, in those his Saturnalia, to defend this either as his own opinion, or as the opinion of the generality of Pagans, that the animated sun was absolutely the highest Deity, (as some have conceived) nor

<sup>a</sup> Saturnal. lib. i. cap. xvii. p. 270.

<sup>b</sup> Ibid. cap. xxiii. p. 313.

yet to reduce that multiplicity of Pagan gods, by this device of his, into a seeming monarchy and nearer compliance with Christianity; he there plainly confining his discourse to the “*dii duntaxat, qui sub cælo sunt,*” that is, the lower sort of mundane gods;—and undertaking to shew, not that all of these neither, but only that many of them were reducible to the sun, as polyonymous, and called by several names, according to his several virtues and effects. For, what Macrobius’s own opinion was, concerning the supreme Deity, appeareth plainly from his other writings, particularly this passage of his commentary upon Scipio’s dream, where the highest sphere and starry heaven was called *Summus Deus*, the supreme God—“*Quod hunc extimum globum, summum Deum vocavit, non ita accipiendum est, ut iste prima causa, et Deus ille omnipotentissimus existimetur; cum globus ipse, quod cælum est, animæ sit fabrica, anima ex mente processerit, mens ex Deo, qui vere summus est, procreata sit. Sed summum quidem dixit ad cæterorum ordinem, qui subjecti sunt; Deum vero, quod non modo immortale animal ac divinum sit, plenum inclytæ ex illa purissima menterationis, sed quod et virtutes omnes, quæ illam primæ omnipotentiam summitatis sequantur, aut ipse faciat, aut contineat; ipsum denique Jovem veteres vocaverunt, et apud theologos Jupiter est mundi anima.*” That the outmost sphere is here called the supreme God, is not so to be understood, as if this were thought to be the first Cause, and the most omnipotent God of all: for this starry sphere being but a part of the heaven, was made or produced by soul. Which soul also proceeded from

L. i. c. xvii.

[p. 87.]

a perfect mind or intellect; and again, mind was begotten from that God, who is truly supreme. But the highest sphere is here called the supreme God, only in respect to those lesser spheres or gods, that are contained under it; and it is styled a God, because it is not only an immortal and Divine animal, full of reason derived from that purest Mind, but also because it maketh or containeth within itself all these virtues, which follow that omnipotence of the first summity. Lastly, this was called by the ancients Jupiter, and Jupiter to theologers is the soul of the world.— Wherefore, though Macrobius, as generally the other Pagans, did undoubtedly worship the sun as a great god, and probably would not stick to call him Jupiter, nor παντοκράτωρ neither (in a certain sense) omnipotent, or the governor of all, nor perhaps Deum Summum, as well as the starry heaven was so styled in Scipio's dream, he being the chief moderator in this lower world; yet nevertheless, it is plain, that he was far from thinking the sun to be *primam causam*, or *omnipotentissimum Deum*; the first Cause, or the most omnipotent God of all. He acknowledging above the sun and heaven, first, an eternal Psyche, which was the maker or creator of them both; and then, above this Psyche, a perfect mind or intellect; and, lastly, above that mind a God, who was *vere summus*, truly and properly supreme, the first Cause, and the most omnipotent of all gods. Wherein Macrobius plainly Platonized; asserting a trinity of archical or Divine hypotheses. Which same doctrine is elsewhere also further declared by him after this manner: "Deus,

Somn. Scip.  
l. i. c. xiv.  
[p. 73.]

qui prima causa est, et vocatur unus omnium, quæque sunt, quæque videntur esse, principium et origo est. Hic superabundanti majestatis fœcunditate de se mentem creavit. Hæc mens, quæ Novæ vocatur, qua patrem inspicit, plenam similitudinem servat auctoris, animam vero de se creat posteriora respiciens. Rursus anima partem, quam intuetur, induitur, ac paulatim regrediente respectu in fabricam corporum, in corporea ipsa degenerat:” God, who is, and is called the first Cause, is alone the fountain and original of all things, that are or seem to be; he by his superabundant fecundity produced from himself mind, which mind, as it looks upward towards its father, bears the perfect resemblance of its author, but as it looked downward, produced soul. And this soul again, as to its superior part, resembles that mind, from whence it was begotten; but working downwards, produced the corporeal fabric, and acteth upon body.— Besides which, the same Macrobius tells us,\* that “ Summi et principis omnium Dei nullum simulachrum finxit antiquitas, quia supra animam et naturam est, quo nihil fas est de fabulis pervenire; de diis autem cæteris, et de anima, non frustra se ad fabulosa convertunt:” The Pagan antiquity made no image at all of the highest God, or prince of all things, because he is above soul and nature, where it is not lawful for any fabulosity to be intromitted. But as to the other gods, the soul of the world, and those below it, they thought it not inconvenient here to make use of images, and fiction or fabulosity.—From all

\* Ibid. lib. i. cap. ii. p. 9.

which it plainly appears, that neither Macrobius himself, nor the generality of the ancient Pagans, according to his apprehension, did look upon the animated sun as the absolutely supreme and highest Being.

And perhaps it may not be amiss to suggest here, what hath been already observed, that the Persians themselves also, who of all Pagan nations have been most charged with this, the worshipping of the sun as the supreme Deity, under the name of Mithras, did notwithstanding, if we may believe Eubulus\* (who wrote the history of Mithras at large), acknowledge another invisible Deity superior to it (and which was the maker thereof, and of the whole world), as the true and proper Mithras. Which opinion is also plainly confirmed, not only by Herodotus, distinguishing their Jupiter from the sun, but also by Xenophon in sundry places, as particularly where he speaks of Cyrus's being admonished in a dream of his approaching death, and thereupon addressing his devotion by sacrifices and prayers first to the Ζεὺς πατρῶος, the Persian Jupiter—and then to the sun, and the other gods. Εθνε Cypri. Inst. l. i. N. 131.  
 Δί τε πατρώψ και ἡλίψ και τοίς άλλοίς θεοίς ἐπὶ τῶν ἄκρων, ὡς Πέρσαι θύουσιν, ὠδε ἐπενχάμενος, Ζεῦ πατρώε και ἡλιε και πάντες θεοί, δέχεσθε τάδε χαριστήρια, &c. l. viii. p. 184. He sacrificed to their country (or the Persian) Jupiter, and to the sun, and to the other gods, upon the tops of the mountains, as the custom of the Persians is; praying after this manner: Thou, our country Jupiter (that is, thou Mithras or Ormasdes), and thou sun, and all ye other gods; ac-

\* Apud Porphy. de Antro Nymphar. p. 253, &c.



cept, I pray you, these my eucharistic sacrifices, &c.—And we find also the like prayer used by Darius in Plutarch, *Ζεῦ πατρῷε Περσῶν*, Thou our country Jupiter, or supreme God of the De Fort. Alex. l. ii. Persians.—Moreover, Herodotus and Curtius record, that in the Persian pomp and procession there was wont to be drawn a chariot sacred to Jupiter, distinct from that of the sun. But Cyrus's proclamation, in the book of Esdras, putteth all out of doubt; since that Lord God of heaven, who is there said to have given Cyrus all the kingdoms of the earth, and commanded him to build him a house at Jerusalem, cannot be understood of the sun.

The Ethiopians in Strabo's time may well be looked upon as Barbarians; and yet did they not only acknowledge one supreme Deity, but also such as was distinct from the world, and therefore invisible; he writing thus concerning them:

L. xvii. p. 822. Θεὸν νομίζουσι τὸν μὲν ἀθάνατον, τοῦτον δὲ εἶναι τὸν αἴτιον τῶν πάντων, τὸν δὲ θνητὸν, ἀνώνυμόν τινα, ὡς δ' ἐπιπολὺ τοὺς εὐεργέτας καὶ βασιλικούς θεοὺς νομίζουσι. They believe, that there is one immortal God, and this the cause of all things; and another mortal one, anonymous; but for the most part they account their benefactors and kings gods also.—And though Cæsar affirm of the ancient Germans, “*Deorum numero eos solos ducunt, quos cernunt, et quorum opibus aperte juvantur, Solem, et Vulcanum, et Lunam;*” yet is he contradicted by Tacitus, who coming after him, had better information: and others have recorded,

\* De Bello Gallico, lib. vi. cap. xxi. p. 125. edit. Cellarii.

that they acknowledged one supreme God, under the name of Thau first, and then of Thautes, and Theutates. Lastly, the generality of the Pagans at this very day, as the Indians, Chinese, Siamenses and Guineans, the inhabitants of Peru, Mexico, Virginia, and New England (some of which are sufficiently barbarous), acknowledge one supreme or greatest God; they having their several proper names for him, as Parmiscer, Fetisso, Wiracocha, Pachacamac, Vitziliputzti, &c. though worshipping withal other gods and idols. And we shall conclude this with the testimony of Josephus Acosta: “Hoc commune apud omnes pene Barbaros est, ut Deum quidem omnium rerum supremum et summe bonum fateantur; spirituum vero quorundam perversorum non obscura opinio sit, qui e nostris Barbaris Zupay vocari solent. Igitur et quis ille summus, idemque sempiternus rerum omnium opifex, quem illi ignorantes colunt, per omnia doceri debent; mox quantum ab illo, illiusque fidelibus ministris angelis, absint gens pessima cacodæmonum.”

This is common almost to all the Barbarians, to confess one supreme God over all, who is perfectly good; as also they have a persuasion amongst them of certain evil spirits, which are called by our Barbarians Zupay. Wherefore they ought to be first well instructed, what that supreme and eternal maker of all things is, whom they ignorantly worship; and how great a difference there is betwixt those wicked demons and his faithful ministers, the angels.

xxviii. It hath been already declared, that according to Themistius and Symmachus, two zeal-

See Sched. de

Diis Germ.

[Syngr. i. cap.

xii. p. 291.]

De proc. In-

dor. Sal. l. v.

479.

ous Pagans, one and the same supreme God was worshipped in all the several Pagan religions throughout the world, though after different manners. Which diversity of religions, as in their opinion it was no way inconvenient in itself, so neither was it ungrateful nor unacceptable to Almighty God, it being more for his honour, state, and grandeur, to be worshipped with this variety, than after one only manner. Now, that this was also the opinion of other ancient Pagans before them, may appear from this remarkable testimony of Plutarch's in his book De Iside, where defending the Egyptian worship (which was indeed the main design of that whole book); but withal declaring, that no inanimate thing ought to be looked upon or worshipped as a god, he writeth thus :

P. 377. οὐ γὰρ οὖν οὐδὲ ἄψυχον ἀνθρώποις ὁ θεός, τοὺς δὲ δωρουμένους ἡμῖν καὶ παρέχοντας αἴννας καὶ διαρκῆ, θεοὺς ἐνομίσαμεν, οὐχ ἑτέροισ παρ' ἑτέροισ, οὐδὲ Βαρβάρους καὶ Ἑλληνας, οὐδὲ νοτίους καὶ βορείους· ἀλλὰ ὡσπερ ἥλιος, καὶ σελήνη, καὶ οὐρανός, καὶ γῆ, καὶ θάλασσα, κοινὰ πᾶσιν, ὀνομάζεται δὲ ἄλλως ὑπ' ἄλλων, οὕτως ἘΝΟΣ ΛΟΓΟΥ τοῦ ταῦτα κοσμοῦντος καὶ ΜΙΑΣ ΠΡΟΝΟΙΑΣ ἐπιτροπευούσης, καὶ δυνάμεων ὑπουργῶν ἐπὶ πάντα τεταγμένων, ἕτεροι παρ' ἑτέροις κατὰ νόμον γέγονασι τιμαὶ καὶ προσηγορίαι· καὶ συμβόλοις χρῶνται καθιερωμένοι, οἱ μὲν ἀμυδροῖς, οἱ δὲ τρανωτέροις, ἐπὶ τὰ θεῖα νόησιν ὀδηγοῦντες οὐκ ἀκινδύνως· No inanimate thing ought to be esteemed for a god, but they, who bestow these things upon us, and afford us a continual supply thereof for our use, have been therefore accounted by us gods. Which gods are not different to different nations; as if the Barbarians and the Greeks, the southern and the northern inhabitants of the globe, had not

any the same, but all other different gods. But as the sun, and the moon, and the heaven, and the earth, and the sea, are common to all, though called by several names in several countries; so ONE REASON ordering these things, and ONE PROVIDENCE dispensing all, and the inferior subservient ministers thereof, having had several names and honours bestowed upon them by the laws of several countries, have been every where worshipped throughout the whole world. And there have been also different symbols consecrated to them, the better to conduct and lead on men's understandings to Divine things; though this hath not been without some hazard or danger of casting men upon one or other of these two inconveniences, either superstition or Atheism.—Where Plutarch plainly affirms, that the several religions of the Pagan nations, whether Greeks or Barbarians, and among these the Egyptians also, as well as others, consisted in nothing else, but the worshipping of one and the same supreme Mind, reason, and providence, that orders all things in the world, and of its *ὑπουργοὶ δυνάμεις ἐπὶ πάντα τεταγμέναι*, its subservient powers or ministers, appointed by it over all the several parts of the world; though under different names, rites, and ceremonies, and with different symbols.

Moreover, that Titus Livius was of the very same opinion, that the Pagan gods of several countries, though called by several names, and worshipped with so great diversity of rites and ceremonies, yet were not for all that different, but the same common to all, may be concluded from this passage of his where he writeth of Hannibal: “Nescio L. xxviii. c. xii. an mirabilior fuerit in adversis, quam se- [p. 679.]

cutdisrebus. Quippe qui mistos ex colluvione omnium gentium, quibus alius ritus, alia sacra, alii PROPE dii essent, ita uno vinculo copulaverit, ut nulla seditio exstiterit." I know not whether Hannibal were more admirable in his adversity or prosperity; who having a mixt colluvies of all nations under him, which had different rites, different ceremonies, and almost different gods from one another, did notwithstanding so unite them all together in one common bond, that there happened no sedition at all amongst them.—Where Livy plainly intimates, that though there was as great diversity of religious rites and ceremonies among the Pagans, as if they had worshipped several gods, yet the gods of them all were really the same, namely, one supreme God, and his ministers under him. And the same Livy elsewhere declares this to have been the general opinion of the Romans and Italians likewise at that time; where he tells us how they quarrelled with Q. Fulvius Flaccus, for that when being censor, and building a new temple in Spain, he uncovered another temple dedicated to Juno Lacinia amongst the Brutii, and taking off the marble tiles thereof, sent them into Spain to adorn his new-erected temple withal; and how they accused him thereupon publicly in the senate-house in this manner, "Quod Doc. v. ruinis templorum templa ædificaret, tanquam non iidem ubique dii immortales essent, sed spoliis aliorum alii colendi exornandique." That with the ruins of temples he built up temples; as if there were not every where the same immortal gods; but that some of them might be worshipped and adorned with the spoils of others.\*

\* Lib. xliii. cap. iii. p. 1113.

The Egyptians were doubtless the most singular of all the Pagans, and the most oddly discrepant from the rest in their manner of worship; yet nevertheless, that these also agreed with the rest in those fundamentals of worshipping one supreme and universal Numen, together with his inferior ministers, as Plutarch sets himself industriously to maintain it, in that forementioned book *De Iside*; so was it further cleared and made out (as Damascius informs us) by two famous Egyptian philosophers, Asclepiades and Heraiscus, in certain writings of theirs, that have been since

lost: Αἰγυπτίους δὲ ὁ μὲν Εὐδήμος οὐδὲν ἀκριβῆς Damasc. de Princ. M. S. [Vide Wolfii Anecdota Græca, tom. iii. p. 260.] ιστορεῖ· Οἱ δὲ Αἰγύπτιοι καθ' ἡμᾶς φιλόσοφοι γεγονότες, ἐξήνεγκαν αὐτῶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν κεκρυμμένην; εὐρόντες ἐν Αἰγυπτίῳ δὴ τισι λόγοις, ὡς εἶη κατ' αὐτοὺς ἢ μὲν μία τῶν ὄλων ἀρχή, σκότος ἄγνωστον, &c. ἰστέον δὲ καὶ ἐκεῖνο περὶ τῶν Αἰγυπτίων, ὅτι διαιρετικοί εἰσι πολλαχού, τῶν καθ' ἑνωσιν ὑφεστώτων· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ νοητὸν διηρήκασιν εἰς πολλῶν θεῶν ιδιότηας, ὡς ἔξεστι μαθεῖν τοῖς ἐκείνων συγγράμμασιν ἐντυχοῦσιν τοῖς βουλομένοις· λέγω δὲ τῇ Ἡραΐσκου ἀναγραφῇ, τοῦ Αἰγυπτίου καθόλου λόγου, πρὸς τὸν Πρόκλον γραφείσθαι τὸν φιλόσοφον, καὶ τῇ ἀρξαμένῃ γράφεσθαι συμφωνίᾳ ὑπὸ Ἀσκληπιάδου τῶν Αἰγυπτίων πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους Θεολόγους·

Though Eudemus hath given us no certain account of the Egyptians, yet the Egyptian philosophers of latter times have declared the hidden truth of their theology, having found in some Egyptian monuments, that, according to them, there is one principle of all things, celebrated under the name of the unknown darkness, and this thrice-repeated; &c. Moreover, this is to be observed concerning these Egyptians, that they are wont to divide and multiply things, that are one

and the same. And accordingly have they divided and multiplied the first Intelligible, or the one supreme Deity, into the properties of many gods; as any one may find, that pleases to consult their writings: I mean that of Heraiscus, entitled, the Universal doctrine of the Egyptians, and inscribed to Proclus the philosopher; and that symphony or harmony of the Egyptians with other theologers, begun to be written by Asclepiades, and left imperfect.—Of which work of Asclepiades the Egyptian Suidas also maketh mention upon the word Heraiscus; *ὁ δὲ Ἀσκληπιάδης ἐπὶ πλείον ἐν τοῖς Αἰγυπτίοις βιβλίοις ἀναγραφείς, ἀκριβέστερος ἦν ἀμφὶ θεολογίαν τὴν πατριον, ἀρχὰς τε αὐτῆς καὶ μέσα διεσκεμμένος, ὡς ἕξεστιν εἶδέναι σαφῶς ἀπὸ τῶν ὕμνων, ὧν συγγέγραφεν εἰς τοὺς Αἰγυπτίων θεοὺς, καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς πραγματείας, ἣν ὤρμησε γράφειν περιέχουσαν τῶν θεολογιῶν ἀπασῶν συμφωνίαν.* But Asclepiades having been more conversant with ancient Egyptian writings, was more thoroughly instructed, and exactly skilled in his country theology; he having searched into the principles thereof, and all the consequences resulting from them; as manifestly appeareth from those hymns, which he composed in praise of the Egyptian gods, and from that tractate begun to be written by him (but left unfinished), which containeth the symphony of all theologies.—Now, we say that Asclepiades's symphony of all the Pagan theologers, and therefore of the Egyptian with the rest, was their agreement in those two fundamentals expressed by Plutarch; namely, the worshipping of one supreme and universal Numen, Reason and Providence, governing all things; and then of his subservient ministers (the instruments of providence) appointed by him over

all the parts of the world : which being honoured under several names, and with different rites and ceremonies, according to the laws of the respective countries, caused all that diversity of religions that was amongst them. Both which fundamental points of the Pagan theology were in like manner acknowledged by Symmachus,\* the first of them being thus expressed : “Æquum est quicquid omnes colunt, unum putari;” that all religions agreed in this, the worshipping of one and the same supreme Numen :—and the second thus; “Varios custodes urbibus mens divina distribuit;” that the Divine Mind appointed divers guardian and tutelar spirits under him, unto cities and countries.—He there adding also, that “suus cuique mos est, suum cuique jus,” that every nation had their peculiar modes and manners in worshipping of these;—and that these external differences in religion ought not to be stood upon, but every one to observe the religion of his own country. Or else these two fundamental points of the Pagan theology may be thus expressed; first, that there is one self-originated Deity, who was the δημιουργός, or maker of the whole world;—secondly, that there are besides him other gods also, to be religiously worshipped (that is, intellectual beings superior to men) which were notwithstanding all made or created by that Eol. Phys. c. i one. [lib. i. p. 4.] Stobæus thus declareth their sense : τὸ πλῆθος τῶν θεῶν ἔργον ἐστὶ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ, ἅμα τῷ κόσμῳ γενόμενον, that the multitude of gods is the work of the Demiurgus, made by him, together with the world.

\* Epistolar. lib. x. Epist. lx<sup>i</sup>. p. 442.



XXIX: And that the Pagan theologers did thus generally acknowledge one supreme and universal Numen, appears plainly from hence, because they supposed the whole world to be an animal. Thus the writer De Placitis Philos. and out of him

Plat. l. ii. c.iii. Stobæus, οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι πάντες ἔμφυχον τὸν  
Stob. Ecl. κόσμον καὶ προνοία διοικούμενον· Λεύκιππος  
Phys. c. xxv. δὲ καὶ Δημόκριτος καὶ Ἐπίκουρος, καὶ ὅσοι τὰ

ἄτομα εἰσηγοῦνται καὶ τὸ κενόν, οὔτε ἔμφυχον οὔτε προνοία διοικεῖσθαι, φύσει δέ τι ἀλόγῳ· All others assert the world to be an animal, and governed by providence; only Leucippus, Democritus, and Epicurus, and those, who make atoms and vacuum the principles of all things, dissenting, who neither acknowledge the world to be animated, nor yet to be governed by providence, but by an irrational nature.—Where, by the way, we may observe the fraud and juggling of Gassendus, who takes occasion from hence highly to extol and applaud Epicurus, as one who approached nearer to Christianity than all the other philosophers, in that he denied the world to be an animal; whereas, according to the language and notions of those times, to deny the world's animation, and to be an Atheist or to deny a God, was one and the same thing; because all the Pagans, who then asserted Providence, held the world also to be animated: neither did Epicurus deny the world's animation upon any other account than this, because he denied Providence. And the ground, upon which this opinion of the world's animation was built, was such as might be obvious even to vulgar understandings; and it is thus expressed by Plotinus, according to the sense of the ancients:

ἄτοπον τὸν οὐρανὸ ἀψύχον λέγειν, ἡμῶν; οἱ Ed. iv. l. iii.:  
 μέρος σώματος ἔχομεν τοῦ παντός, ψυχὴν ἔχόν- o. vii. [de Du-  
 των· πῶς γὰρ ἂν τὸ μέρος ἔσχευ, ἀψύχου τοῦ bis animæ,  
 παντός οὗτος; it is absurd to affirm, that the hea- lib. i. p. 576.]  
 ven or world is inanimate, or devoid of life and  
 soul, when we ourselves, who have but a part of  
 the mundane body in us, are endued with soul.  
 For how could a part have life and soul in it, the  
 whole being dead and inanimate?—Now, if the  
 whole world be one animal, then must it needs be  
 governed by one soul, and not by many. Which  
 one soul of the world, and the whole mundane  
 animal, was by some of the Pagan theologers (as  
 namely the Stoics) taken to be the *πρῶτος θεός*, the  
 first and highest God of all.

Nevertheless, others of the Pagan theologers,  
 though asserting the world's animation likewise,  
 yet would by no means allow the mundane soul  
 to be the supreme Deity; they conceiving the  
 first and highest, God to be an abstract and im-  
 moveable mind, and not a soul. Thus the Pane-  
 gyrist, cited also by Gyraldus, invokes the su-  
 preme Deity doubtfully and cautiously, Hist. Deor.  
 as not knowing well what to call him, p. 12.  
 whether soul or mind: “Te, summe rerum sator,  
 cujus tot nomina sunt, quot gentium linguas esse  
 voluisti; quem enim te ipse dici velis, scire non  
 possumus.: sive in te quædam vis mensque divina  
 est, quæ toto infusa mundo omnibus miscearis  
 elementis, et sine ullo extrinsecus accedente vigo-  
 ris impulsu, per te ipse movearis; sive aliqua  
 supra omne cælum potestas es, quæ hoc opus to-  
 tum ex altiore naturæ arce despicias: Te, inquam,  
 oramus,” &c. Thou supreme Original of all things,  
 who hast as many names as thou hast pleased

there should be languages; whether thou beest a certain Divine force and soul, that infused into the whole world art mingled with all the elements, and without any external impulse moved from thyself; or whether thou beest a power elevated above the heavens, which lookest down upon the whole work of nature, as from a higher tower; thee we invoke, &c.—And as the supreme Deity was thus considered only as a perfect mind superior to soul, so was the mundane soul and whole animated world called by these Pagans frequently *δεύτερος θεός*, the second god.—Thus in the Asclepian Dialogue or Perfect Oration, is the Lord and maker of all said to have made a second god visible and sensible, which is the world.

But, for the most part, they who asserted a God, superior to the soul of the world, did maintain a trinity of universal principles, or Divine hypostases subordinate; they conceiving that as there was above the mundane soul a perfect mind or intellect, so that mind and intellect, as such, was not the first principle neither, because there must be *νοητόν* in order of nature before *νοῦς*, an intelligible before Intellect. Which first intelligible was called by them *τὸ ἐν* and *τάγαθόν*, the One and the Good, or unity and goodness itself substantial, the cause of mind and all things. Now as the tagathon, or highest of these three hypostases, was sometimes called by them *ὁ πρῶτος θεός*, the first God—and *νοῦς* or intellect *ὁ δεύτερος θεός*, the second god;—so was the mundane soul and animated world called *τρίτος θεός*, the third god.—Thus Numenius in Proclus upon Plato's

P. 93. *Τιμᾶεος, Νουμήμιος μὲν γὰρ τρεῖς ἀνυμνήσας*

Θεός, πατέρα μὲν καλεῖ τὸν πρῶτον, ποιητὴν δὲ  
 τὸν δεύτερον, ποίημα δὲ τὸν τρίτον· ὁ γὰρ κόσμος P. 93.  
 κατ' αὐτὸν ὁ τρίτος ἐστὶ θεός, ὡς ὁ κατ' αὐτὸν δημιουργός  
 διττός, ὅτε πρῶτος καὶ ὁ δεύτερος θεός, τὰ δὲ δημιουργούμενον,  
 ὁ τρίτος· Numenius praising three gods, calls the  
 father the first God, the maker the second, and  
 the work the third. For the world, according to  
 him, is the third god; as he supposes also two  
 opificers, the first and the second God.—Plotinus  
 in like manner speaks of this also, as very fa-  
 miliar language amongst those Pagans, En. 3. 1. v.  
 καὶ ὁ κόσμος θεός, ὡς περ σύνηθες λέγειν, τρίτος, § 6.  
 and the world, as is commonly said, is [p. 296.]  
 the third god.

But neither they, who held the supreme Deity  
 to be an immoveable mind or intellect, superior  
 to the mundane soul (as Aristotle and Xenocra-  
 tes), did suppose that mundane soul and the  
 whole world to have depended upon many such  
 immoveable intellects self-existent, as their first  
 Cause, but only upon one: nor they, who ad-  
 mitting a trinity of Divine hypostases, made the  
 supreme Deity properly to be a monad above  
 mind or intellect, did conceive that intellect to  
 have depended upon many such monads, as first  
 principles co-ordinate, but upon one only. From  
 whence it plainly appears, that the Pagan theo-  
 logers did always reduce things under a monarchy,  
 and acknowledge not many independent deities,  
 but one universal Numen (whether called soul, or  
 mind, or monad) as the head of all. Though it  
 hath been already declared, that those Pagans,  
 who were trinitarians, especially the Platonists,  
 do often take those their three hypostases sub-  
 ordinate (a monad, mind, and soul) all together,

for the τὸ θεῖον, or one supreme Numen; as supposing an extraordinary kind of unity in that trinity of hypostases, and so as it were a certain latitude and gradation in the Deity.

Where by the way two things may be observed concerning the Pagan theologers: First, that according to them generally the whole corporeal system was not a dead thing, like a machine or automaton artificially made by men, but that life and soul was mingled with and diffused through it all: insomuch that Aristotle himself taxes those, who made the world to consist of nothing but monads or atoms altogether dead and inanimate, as being therefore a kind of Atheists. Secondly, that how much soever some of them supposed the supreme Deity and first Cause to be elevated above the heaven and corporeal world, yet did they not therefore conceive, either the world to be quite cut off from that, or that from the world, so as to have no commerce with it, nor influence upon it; but as all proceeded from this first Cause, so did they suppose that to be closely and intimately united with all those emanations from itself (though without mixture and confusion), and all to subsist in it, and be pervaded by it. Plutarch, in his Platonic Questions, propounds this amongst the rest,

P. 100. par.

Τί δὴ ποτε τὸν ἀνωτάτῳ θεῷ πατέρα πάντων καὶ ποιητὴν προσεῖπεν; Why Plato called the highest God the father and maker of all?—To which he answers in the first place thus; τῶν μὲν θεῶν γεννητῶν καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων πατήρ ἐστι, ποιητὴς δὲ τῶν ἀλόγων καὶ τῶν ἀψύχων. That perhaps he was called the father of all the generated gods, and of men, but the maker of the irrational and inanimate things of the

world.—But afterward he adds, that this highest God might therefore be styled the father of the whole corporeal world also, as well as the maker, because it is no dead and inanimate thing, but endued with life: *ἐμφύχου γὰρ γένησις ἢ γένησις ἐστὶ καὶ ποιητοῦ μὲν, οἷος οἰκοδόμος ἢ ὑφάντης, ἢ λύρας δημιουργὸς ἢ ἀνδριάντος, ἀπήλλακται τὸ γενόμενον ἔργον ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ γεννήσαντος ἀρχῆ καὶ δύναμις ἐγκέκραται τῷ τεκνωθέντι, καὶ συνέχει τὴν φύσιν, ἀπόσπασμα καὶ μόριον οὖσαν τοῦ τικνώσαντος.* Ἐπεὶ τοίνυν οὐ πεπλασμένοις ὁ κόσμος, οὐδὲ συνηρμοσμένοις ποιήμασιν ἔοικεν, ἀλλ' ἐστὶν αὐτῷ μίτρα πολλῆ ζωότητος καὶ θεότητος, ἣν ὁ θεὸς ἐγκατέσπαρεν ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ τῇ ὕλῃ καὶ κατέμιξεν, εἰκότως ἅμα πατήρ τε τοῦ κόσμου ζῶον γεγονότος, καὶ ποιητὴς ἐπονομάζεται. Generation is the making or production of something animate. And the work of an artificer, as an architect or statuary, as soon as it is produced, departeth and is removed from the maker thereof, as having no intrinsic dependance upon him; whereas from him, that begetteth, there is a principle and power infused into that which is begotten, and mingled therewith, that containeth the whole nature thereof, as being a kind of avulsion from the begetter. Wherefore since the world is not like to those works, that are artificially made and compacted by men, but hath a participation of life and divinity, which God hath inserted into it, and mingled with it, God is therefore rightly styled by Plato, not only the maker, but also the father, of the whole world as being an animal.

To the same purpose also Plotinus: *γενόμενος δὴ οἷον οἶκος τις καλὸς καὶ ποικίλος, οὐκ ἀπετμήθη τοῦ πεποιηκότος, οὐδ' αὖ ἐκοίνωσεν αὐτόν· ἔχει γὰρ ψυχὴν κρατούμενος οὐ κρατῶν, καὶ ἐχόμενος ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔχων, καίτοι γὰρ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἀνεχούσῃ αὐτόν, καὶ οὐκ ἅμα.*

πόν ἰστω αὐτῆς, ὡς ἂν ἐν ὕδασι δίκτυον τεγγόμενον ζωῆ.  
**The world being made as a large and stately edifice, was neither cut off and separated from its maker, nor yet mingled and confounded with him. Forasmuch as he still remaineth above, presiding over it; the world being so animated, as rather to be possessed by soul, than to possess it, it lying in that great Psyche, which sustaineth it, as a net in the waters, all moistened with life.— Thus Plotinus, supposing the whole corporeal world to be animated, affirmeth it neither to be cut off from its maker (by which maker he here understands the mundane soul), itself to be immersed into its body, the world, after the same manner as our human souls are into these bodies; but so to preside over it, and act it, as a thing elevated above it. And though, according to him, that second Divine hypostasis of nous or intellect be in like manner elevated above this mundane soul; and again, that first hypostasis or supreme Deity (called by him unity and goodness), above Intellect; yet the corporeal world could not be said to be cut off from these neither; they being all three (monad, mind, and soul) closely and intimately united together.**

**xxx.** The Hebrews were the only nation, who before Christianity for several ages professedly opposed the Polytheism and idolatry of the Pagan world. Wherefore it may be probably concluded, that they had the right notion of this Pagan Polytheism, and understood what it consisted in, *viz.* Whether in worshipping many unmade, self-originated deities, as partial creators of the world; or else in worshipping, besides the supreme God, other created beings superior to men? Now Philo

plainly understood the Pagan Polytheism after this latter way; as may appear from this passage of his in his book concerning the Confusion of Languages, where speaking of the supreme God (the Maker and Lord of the whole world), and of his *δυνάμεις ἀρωγοί*, his innumerable assistant powers—both visible and invisible, he adds, *καταπλαγόν-*

Page 345.

*τες οὖν τινες τὴν ἑκατέρου τῶν κόσμων φύσιν, οὐ μόνον ὅλους ἐξεθείωσαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ κάλλιστα τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς μερῶν, ἥλιον, καὶ σελήνην, καὶ τὸν σύμπαντα οὐρανόν, ἄπερ οὐδὲν αἰδεσθέντες θεοὺς ἐκάλεσαν, ὧν τὴν ἐπίνοιαν κατ' ἰδίαν Μωϋσῆς φησι κύριε κύριε βασιλεῦ τῶν θεῶν, ἐνδαξίνης παρ' ὑπακούους ἀρχόντος διαφορᾶς.* Wherefore some men being struck with admiration of both these worlds, the visible and the invisible, have not only deified the whole of them, but also their several parts, as the sun, and the moon, and the whole heaven, they not scrupling to call these gods. Which notion and language of theirs Moses respected in those words of his, Thou Lord, the king of gods; he thereby declaring the transcendency of the supreme God above all those his subjects called gods.—To the same purpose Philo writeth also in his Commentary upon the Decalogue, *πάναν οὖν τὴν τοιαύτην τροχρεῖαν ἀπισ-*

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*σάμενοι, τοὺς ἀδελφοὺς φύσει μὴ προσκινῶμεν, ἀ καὶ καθαρωτέρας καὶ ἀθανάτωτέρας οὐσίας ἔλαχον, ἀδελφὰ δ' ἀλλήλων τὰ γενόμενα, καθ' ὃ γέγονεν, ἐπεὶ καὶ πατὴρ ἀπάντων ὁ ποιητὴς τῶν ὅλων· καὶ πρῶτον τοῦτο καὶ ἰερώτατον παράγγελμα στηλιτεύσωμεν ἐν αὐτοῖς, ἵνα τὸν ἀνοικτότω τομιζαν τε καὶ τιμῶν θεῶν.* Wherefore removing all such imposture, let us worship no beings, that are by nature brothers and german to us, though endowed with far more pure and immortal essences than we are. For all created things, as such,



have a kind of german and brotherly equality with one another, the Maker of all things being their common father. But let us deeply infix this first and most holy commandment in our breasts, to acknowledge and worship one only highest God.

—And again afterwards, *ὅσοι μὲν ἡλίου, καὶ σελήνης, καὶ τοῦ σύμπαντος οὐρανοῦ τε καὶ κόσμου, καὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς ὀλοσχεροτάτων μερῶν ὡς θεῶν πρόπολοιτε καὶ θεραπεύετε, διαμαρτάνουσι, τοὺς ὑπηκόους τοῦ ἀρχοντος σεμίνοντες.*

They, who worship the sun, and the moon, and the whole heaven and world, and the principal parts of them as gods, err, in that they worship the subjects of the prince; whereas the prince alone ought to be worshipped. Thus, according to Philo, the Pagan Polytheism consisted in giving religious worship, besides the supreme God, to other created understanding beings, and parts of the world, more pure and immortal than men.

Flavius Josephus, in his *Judaic Antiquities*,\* extolling Abraham's wisdom and piety, writeth thus concerning him; *πρῶτος οὖν τολμᾷ θεὸν ἀποφύνασθαι δημιουργόν τῶν ὅλων ἕνα*, which some would understand in this manner, that Abraham was the first, who publicly declared, that there was one God, the Demiurgus or maker of the whole world;—as if all mankind besides, at that time, had supposed the world to have been made not by one, but by many gods. But the true meaning of those words is this; that Abraham was the first, who, in that degenerate age, publicly declared, that the maker of the whole world was the one only God, and alone to be religiously worshipped; accordingly, as it follows afterwards in the same writer, *ὃ κυλῶς ἔχει μόνῳ τὴν τι-*

\* Lib. i. cap. vii. p. xxviii. tom. i. oper. edit. Havercamp.

μὴν καὶ τὴν εὐχαριστίαν ἀπονέμειν, to whom alone men ought to give honour and thanks.—And the reason hereof is there also set down; τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν, εἰ καὶ τι πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν συντελεῖ, κατὰ προσταγὴν τὴν τούτου παρέχειν ἕκαστον καὶ οὐ κατ' οἰκείαν ἰσχύν. Because all those other beings, that were then worshipped as gods, whatsoever any of them contributed to the happiness of mankind, they did it not by their own power, but by his appointment and command;—he instancing in the sun and moon, and earth and sea, which are all made and ordered by a higher Power and Providence, by the force whereof they contribute to our utility. As if he should have said, that no created being ought to be religiously worshipped, but the Creator only. And this agreeth with what we read in Scripture concerning Abraham, that he called upon the name of the Lord, אלהים, the God of the whole world—that is, he worshipped no particular created beings, as the other Pagans at that time did, but only that supreme universal Numen, which made and containeth the whole world. And thus Maimonides interprets that place, יהוה לודיע לעם שׂאן De Idol. c. i. §. 7. (p. 7. edit. Voss.) Abraham began to teach, that none ought to be religiously worshipped, save only the God of the whole world.—Moreover, the same Josephus afterwards in his twelfth book\* brings in Aristæus (who seems to have been a secret proselyted Greek) pleading with Ptolemæus Philadelphus, in behalf of the Jews, and their liberty, after this manner; τὴν βασιλείαν σου διέποντος, τοῦ θεμένου τοὺς νόμους αὐτοῖς. τὸν γὰρ ἅπαντα συστησάμενον θεόν, καὶ οὗτοι

\* Cap. 2, §. 2. p. 586. tom. i. oper.

καὶ ἡμεῖς σεβόμεθα, Ζῆνα καλοῦντες αὐτὸν, ἐτοιμῶς ἀπὸ τοῦ σύμπτασιν ἐμφίκειν τὸ ζῆν, τὴν ἐπίκλησιν αὐτοῦ νοήσαντες.

It would well agree with your goodness and magnanimity, to free the Jews from that miserable captivity, which they are under; since the same God, who governeth your kingdom, gave laws to them, as I have by diligent search found out: For both they and we do alike worship the God, who made all things, we calling him Zene, because he gives life to all. Wherefore, for the honour of that God, whom they worship after a singular manner, please you to indulge them the liberty of returning to their native country.— Where Aristæus also, according to the sense of Pagans, thus concludes; Know, O king, that I intercede not for these Jews, as having any cognation with them, πάντων δὲ ἀνθρώπων δημιουργηματα ὄντων τοῦ θεοῦ, καὶ γινώσκων αὐτὸν ἠδόμενον τοῖς εὐποιούσιν, ἐπὶ τούτῳ καὶ σε παρακαλῶ, but all men being the workmanship of God, and knowing, that he is delighted with beneficence, I therefore thus exhort you.

As for the latter Jewish writers and Rabbins, it is certain, that the generality of them supposed the Pagans to have acknowledged one supreme and universal Numen, and to have worshipped all their other gods only as his ministers, or as mediators between him and them: Maimonides in Halacoth <sup>a</sup> ע"כ"ם describeth the rise of the Pagan Polytheism in the days of Enosh, after this manner: בימי אנוש פגעו בני האדם פעות גדול ונבעדה עצת הכזי אותו חזרו ואנוש עצמו מן הפועים דיה חו היתה פעותם: אמרו הואיל והאל ברא כוכבים אלו ונגלים להנחת את העולם ונתגם במדום חלק להם כבוד והם שמשים המשמשים לפניו

<sup>a</sup> .i. e. De Idololatria, cap.i. §. 1. p. iii.

דאויס הם לשבחם לפאדם ולחלוק להם כבוד ויהי דצון האל בדרך  
 הוא לגל ולכבוד מי שגדלו וכבודו כמו שהמלך דצדק לכבוד  
 דעומדום לפניו ויהי כבודו מל מלך In the days of Enosh,  
 the sons of men grievously erred, and the wise  
 men of that age became brutish (even Enosh  
 himself being in the number of them); and their  
 error was this, that since God had created the  
 stars and spheres to govern the world, and plac-  
 ing them on high, had bestowed this honour up-  
 on them, that they should be his ministers and  
 subservient instruments, men ought therefore to  
 praise them, honour them, and worship them;  
 this being the pleasure of the blessed God, that  
 men should magnify and honour those, whom him-  
 self hath magnified and honoured, as a king will  
 have his ministers to be revered, this honour re-  
 doubling to himself.—Again, the same Maimo-  
 nides in the beginning of the second chapter of  
 that book writeth thus; עיקר הצווי העבודה וזה שלא  
 לעבוד אחד מכל הברואים לא מלאך ולא גלגל ולא כוכב ולא  
 אחד מן דיסדורת ולא אחד מכל והנבראים מהן ואפי עלפי  
 שחעובר יודע שהשם הוא האלהים והוא עובד הנברא הזה  
 על ררך שעבר אנוש ואנשי דודו תולדה דודו זה עבר עבודה וזה  
 The foundation of that commandment against  
 strange worship (now commonly called idolatry)  
 is this, that no man should worship any of the  
 creatures whatsoever, neither angel, nor sphere,  
 nor star, nor any of the four elements, nor any  
 thing made out of them. For though he, that  
 worships these things, knows, that the Lord is  
 God, and superior to them all, and worships those  
 creatures no otherwise than Enosh and the rest  
 of that age did, yet is he nevertheless guilty of  
 strange worship or idolatry.—And that, after the  
 times of Enosh also, in succeeding ages, the Poly-  
 theism of the Pagan nations was no other than

this, the worshipping (besides one supreme God) of other created beings, as the ministers of his providence, and as middles or mediators betwixt him and men, is declared likewise by Maimonides (in his More Nevochim) to have been the universal belief of all the Hebrews or

Jews: ואתה ידוע כי בל מי עובר שעבודם וזה לא יעבדה דעת שאין אלה בלעדיה יח ולאדמה מעלם בלל מן העברים ולא ידמה מן הבאים שהצורה אשר יעשה מן המתכות או מן האבנים והעצים שהצורה הדיא וזה אשר בראה השמים והארץ אבל אמנם ועברוה על צד שהיא דמיון לדבר שהוא אמצעי בינם ובין האלה וזה כמה שלא יחלוק בו אחד מבעלי תורתנו You know, that whosoever committeth idolatry, he doth it not as supposing, that there is no other God besides that, which he worshippeth, for it never came into the minds of any idolaters, nor never will, that that statue, which is made by them of metal, or stone, or wood, is that very God, who created heaven and earth; but they worship those statues and images only as the representation of something, which is a mediator between God and them.—Moses Albelda, the author of the book entitled, עלת תמיד Gnolath Tamid, resolves all the Pagan Polytheism and idolatry into these two principles, one of which respected God, and the other men themselves:

הא פועני לזה מצדו ית ואומדום כי הוא נבזה מעל נבזה ויא להרבק בו רח עי תאמצעוים כמנהג תמלך בו שהרצים לשאול שאלה מה ממנו ישאלוה עי אמצעי ולכן עשים אותה העא כרי להודיד השפע האלתי על ידה: הב פוענין מצד עצמם וזה כי היות האדם נשמו אינו יכול להתבודד מעצמו אם לא ישם נגדו דבר מה מוחש יעדרו ויעדרו להבין מעצמו The idolaters first argued thus in respect of God; that since he was of such transcendent perfection above men, it was not possible for men to be united to, or have com-

munion with him, otherwise than by means of certain middle beings or mediators; as it is the manner of earthly kings, to have petitions conveyed to them by the hands of mediators and intercessors. Secondly, they thus argued also in respect of themselves; that being corporeal, so that they could not apprehend God abstractly, they must needs have something sensible to excite and stir up their devotion and fix their imagination upon.—Joseph Albo, in the book called Ikkarim, concludes that Ahab, and the other idolatrous kings of Israel and Judah worshipped other gods upon those two accounts mentioned by Maimonides and no otherwise, namely, that the supreme God was honoured by worshipping of his ministers, and that there ought to be certain middles and mediators betwixt him and men :

אחאב : P. 3. c. xviii.  
 חותו ממלכי ישראל ויהודה היו שועין אחד הכחות הגלגל ות משתי צדדין שאמדנו וגם שלמה מעה בזה עם היותם מאמינים במציאות השם ואחדתו אם כשהיו חושבים לנגד אח השם בזה ואם כשהיו חושבין לעשות סוסוד ואמצעיים Ahab, and other kings of Israel and Judah, and even Solomon himself, erred in worshipping the stars, upon those two accounts already mentioned out of Maimonides, notwithstanding that they believed the existence of God and his unity; they partly conceiving that they should honour God in worshipping of his ministers, and partly worshipping them as mediators betwixt God and themselves.—And the same writer determines the meaning of that first commandment, (which is to him the second). “Thou shalt have no other gods before my face,” to be this להקים אותם אמצעיים בני ובינך או שתחשוב לדומם אותי בעבודתם Thou shalt not set up other inferior gods

as mediators betwixt me and thyself, or worship, them so, as thinking to honour me thereby.—  
**R. David Kimchi** (upon 2 Kings xvii.) writeth thus concerning that Israelitish priest, who, by the King of Assyria's command, was sent to Samaria to teach the new inhabitants thereof to worship the God of that land (of whom it is afterwards said, that they both feared the Lord, and served their idols;) **אם יאמר להם שלא יהיו עוברים עבודה זרה כלל לא היו מאמינים שהוא דבר שנדלו בו כל האומות מקדם והוא אצלם כמו מושכל דאשין אך אמד להם שהיו עוברים את אלוהיהם כמו שהיו עוברים ובלבד שתהא כיונת האל בלבם כי אלא האלהים לא ורעו ולא יישיבי כי אם ברצון האל אלא שעוברים אותם לדחותם אמצעיים בינם ובין הבורא**  
 If he should have altogether prohibited them their idolatry, they would not have hearkened to him, that being a thing, which all those eastern people were educated in from their very infancy, inso-much that it was a kind of first principle to them. Wherefore he permitted them to worship all their several gods, as before they had done; only he required them to direct the intention of their minds to the God of Israel (as the supreme), for those gods could do them neither good nor hurt, otherwise than according to his will and pleasure: but they worshipped them to this purpose, that they might be **MEDIATORS** betwixt them and the Creator. In the book Nitzachon, all the Polytheism and idolatry of the Pagans is reduced to these three heads; first, **עבוד משרתי תשם לכבודו** When they worshipped the ministers of God, as thinking to honour him thereby;—and, secondly, **עבוד אותם שהיו מליצים בעדם** When they worshipped them as orators and intercessors for them with God;—and, lastly, **עבוד לען ואבן לזכרו** When

they worshipped statues of wood and stone for memorials of him. And though it be true, that **Isaak Abrabanel** (upon 2 Kings xvii.) does enumerate more species of Pagan idolatry, even to the number of ten, yet are they all of them but so many several modes of creature-worship; and there is no such thing amongst them to be found, as the worshipping of many unmade independent deities, as partial creators of the world.

Moreover, those rabbinic writers commonly interpret certain places of the Scripture to this sense, that the Pagan idolaters did notwithstanding acknowledge one supreme Deity, as that (Jeremy x. 7.) "Who is there that will not fear thee, thou King of nations? For amongst all their wise men, and in all their kingdoms, there is none like unto thee; though they are become all together brutish, and their worshipping of stocks is a doctrine of vanity:" for **Maimonides** thus glosseth upon those words: כלומר הכל יודעים שאתה הוא לבודך אבל מעותם וכסלתם שמדמים שזה והחבל דצנור הוא As if he should say, all the Gentiles know, that thou art the only supreme God, but their error and folly consisteth in this, that they think this vanity of worshipping inferior gods, to be a thing agreeable to thy will.—And thus also **Kimchi** in his Commentaries, מי לא יראך אפילו הגוים העובדים האלילים, ראוי להם שיידאוך כי אתה מלך עליהם בכל הבני הנגים ובכל מלכותם אומרים מאין כבוד יאינם עובדים המוכבים אלא לדעותם אמצעים בינך ובינם ואמר חכמי הגוים כי הם יודעים כי הפסל אינו בלום ואם יעברו המוכבים לא יעברו אלא מפני שהם משרתך להותם אמצעים Who will not fear thee? It is fit, that even the nations themselves, who worship idols, should fear thee, for thou art their King; and indeed amongst all the wise men of the



nations, and in all their kingdoms, it is generally acknowledged, that there is none like unto thee. Neither do they worship the stars otherwise than as mediators betwixt thee and them. Their wise men know, that an idol is nothing; and though they worship stars, yet do they worship them as thy ministers, and that they may be intercessors for them. Another place is that, Malachi i. 11. which though we read in the future tense, as a prophecy of the Gentiles, yet the Jews understand it of that present time, when those words were written, "From the rising of the sun to the going down thereof, my name is great among the Gentiles; and in every place incense is offered to my name, and a pure oblation, for my name is great amongst the Gentiles, saith the Lord of Hosts. But you profane it, &c.—Upon which words R. Solomon glosseth thus, מִיֵּשׁ לֹא עָן יָדַע שְׂדוּא אֱלֹהִי, שְׂדוּא עַל כָּלֵם יִבְכַּל מִקֹּמָם מִתְגַּדְּבִים לְשֵׁמִי אֵפֶּה הָאוֹמוֹת The Pagan Polytheists and idolaters know, that there is one God superior to all those other gods and idols worshipped by them; and in every place are there free-will offerings brought to my name, even amongst the Gentiles. And Kimchi agreeth with him herein, אֵפֶּה עַל פִּי שְׂדוּאִים עֹבְדִים לְצַבֵּא הַשָּׁמַיִם, פֹּדִים בִּי שְׂאֵנִי הַסֶּבֶה הָרִאשׁוֹנָה אֵלֶּא שְׂעִבְדִים אוֹתָם שִׁדְדוּ אֲמַצְעִים בֵּינֵי יְבֵנִים Although the Pagans worshipped the host of heaven, yet do they confess me to be the first Cause, they worshipping them only as in their opinion certain mediators betwixt me and them.—Whether either of these two places of Scripture does sufficiently prove what these Jews would have, or no; yet, however, is it evident from their interpretations of them, that themselves supposed the Pagans to have acknowledged one

supreme Deity, and that their other gods were all but his creatures and ministers. Nevertheless, there is another place of Scripture, which seems to sound more to this purpose, and accordingly hath been thus interpreted by Rabbi Solomon and others, Psal. lxxv. 6. where God is called **מבטח כל קצו ארע וים רתקים** The confidence of all the ends of the earth, and of them that are afar off in the sea—that is, even of all the Pagan world.

Thus we see plainly, that the Hebrew doctors and rabbins have been generally of this persuasion, that the Pagan nations anciently, at least the intelligent amongst them, acknowledged one supreme God of the whole world; and that all their other gods were but creatures and inferior ministers; which were worshipped by them upon these two accounts, either as thinking, that the honour done to them redounded to the supreme; or else that they might be **מליצין סודרים** and **אמצעיים** their mediators, and intercessors, orators, and negotiators with him. Which inferior gods of the Pagans were supposed by these Hebrews to be chiefly of two kinds, angels, and stars or spheres. The latter of which the Jews, as well as Pagans, concluded to be animated and intellectual: for thus **Maimonides** expressly; **בל הכוכבים והגלגלים** Jesude Hatto-  
tah c. iii. §. 9. **בולן בעלי נפש ודעה השכל הם והם חיים ועומדים וכמרין את מי שאמר והיה העולם בל אחד ואחד רפי גולו ולפי מעלתו משבחין ומפאדים ליצורם כמו המל. אכים** The stars and spheres are every one of them animated, and endued with life, knowledge and understanding. And they acknowledge him, who commanded and the world was made, every one of them, according to their degree and excellency, praising and honouring him, as the angels do. And this they would

confirm from that place of Scripture, Neh. ix. 6. "Thou, even thou, art Lord alone; thou hast made heaven, the heaven of heavens with all their host, the earth with all things that are therein, the seas and all that is therein, and thou preservest them all; and the host of heaven worshippeth thee:" the host of heaven being commonly put for the stars.

xxxI. But, lastly, this same thing is plainly confirmed from the Scriptures of the New Testament also; that the Gentiles and Pagans, however Polytheists and idolaters, were not unacquainted with the knowledge of the true God, that is, of the one-only self-existent and omnipotent Being, which comprehendeth all things under him: from whence it must needs follow, that their other many gods were all of them supposed to have been derived from this one, and to be dependent on him.

For first, St. Paul, in his Epistle to the Romans,<sup>a</sup> tells us, that these Gentiles or Pagans did *την ἀλήθειαν ἐν ἀδικίᾳ κατέχειν*, hold the truth in unrighteousness, or unjustly detain and imprison the same.—Which is chiefly to be understood of the truth concerning God, as appears from that which follows, and therefore implies the Pagans not to have been unfurnished of such a knowledge of God, as might and ought to have kept them from all kinds of idolatry, however by their default it proved ineffectual to that end; as

v. 28. is afterwards declared; *οὐκ ἔδοκίμασαν τὸν Θεὸν ἔχειν ἐν ἐπιγνώσει*, they liked not to retain God in the agnition, or practical knowledge of him.—Where there is a distinction to be ob-

<sup>a</sup> Cap. i. 25.

served betwixt *γνώσις* and *ἐπίγνωσις*, the knowledge and the agnition of God—the former whereof, in this chapter, is plainly granted to the Pagans, though the latter be here denied them, because they lapsed into Polytheism and idolatry; which is the meaning of these words: *μετήλλαξαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν τοῦ θεοῦ ἐν τῷ ψεύδει*, they <sup>v. 25.</sup> changed the truth of God into a lie.—Again, the same apostle there affirmeth, that the *τὸ γνωστὸν τοῦ θεοῦ φανερόν ἐστιν ἐν αὐτοῖς*, that, which may be known of God, was manifest within them, God himself having shewed it unto them.—There is something of God unknowable and incomprehensible by all mortals, but that of God, which is knowable, his eternal power and Godhead, with the attributes belonging thereunto, is made manifest to all mankind from his works. “The invisible things of him, from the creation of the world, being clearly seen and understood by the things that are made.” Moreover, this apostle expressly declareth the Pagans to have known God, in that censure, which he giveth of <sup>v. 21.</sup> them: *διότι γινόντες τὸν θεόν, οὐχ ὡς θεὸν ἐδόξασαν*, that when they knew God, they glorified him not as God;—because they fell into Polytheism and idolatry. Though the apostle here instanceth only in the latter of those two, their “changing the glory of the incorruptible God into an image made like to corruptible man, and to birds and beasts, and creeping things.” The reason whereof is, because this idolatry of the Pagans, properly so called, that is, their worshipping of stocks and stones, formed into the likeness of man or beast, was generally taken amongst the Jews for the grossest of all their re-

ligious miscarriages. Thus Philo plainly de-

clareth : ὅσοι μὲν ἡλίου, καὶ σελήνης, καὶ τοῦ  
De Decal. p. 753. σύμπαντος οὐρανοῦ τε καὶ κόσμου, καὶ τῶν ἐν αὐ-  
 τοῖς ὀλοσχερεστάτων μερῶν ὡς θεῶν πρόπολοι τε καὶ θερα-  
 πευταὶ, διαμαρτάνουσι μὲν· (πῶς γὰρ οὐ, τοὺς ὑπηκόους τοῦ  
 ἀρχοντος σεμνύνουτες) ἤττον δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ἀδικοῦσι, τῶν  
 ξύλα καὶ λίθους, ἄργυρόν τε καὶ χρύσον, καὶ τὰς παραπλασί-  
 ους ὕλας μορφωσάντων, &c. Whosoever worship the  
 sun, and moon, and the whole heaven, and world,  
 and the chief parts thereof, as gods, do unques-  
 tionably err, (they honouring the subjects of the  
 prince) but they are guilty of the less iniquity and  
 injustice than those, who form wood and stone,  
 gold and silver, and the like matters, into statues,  
 to worship them, &c.—of which assertion he af-  
 terwards gives this account : τὸ γὰρ κάλλιστον ἔρεισμα  
 τῆς ψυχῆς ἐξέκοψαν, τὴν περὶ τοῦ ζῶντος αἰεὶ θεοῦ προσήκου-  
 σαν ὑπόληψιν, because these have cut off the most  
 excellent fulcrum of the soul, the persuasion of  
 the ever-living God, by means whereof, like un-  
 ballasted ships, they are tossed up and down per-  
 petually, nor can be ever able to rest in any safe  
 harbour.—And from hence it came to pass, that  
 the Polytheism of the Pagans, their worshipping  
 of inferior gods (as stars and demons) was vul-  
 garly called also by the Jews and Christians idol-  
 atry, it being so denominated by them *a famosiore*  
*specie*. Lastly, the apostle plainly declares, that  
 the error of the Pagan superstition universally  
 consisted (not in worshipping many independent  
 gods and creators, but) in joining creature wor-  
 ship, as such, some way or other, with the wor-  
 ship of the Creator : ἐσιβάσθησαν καὶ ἐλάτρου-  
V. 25. σαν τῇ κτίσει παρὰ τὸν κτίσαντα, which words  
 are either to be thus rendered : They {religiously}

worshipped the creature, besides the Creator"—that preposition being often used in this sense, as for example, in this of Aristotle, where he affirmeth concerning Plato, that he did τὸ ἐν καὶ τοὺς ἀριθμούς παρά τὰ πράγματα ποιῆσαι, (not make numbers to be the things themselves, as the Pythagoreans had done, but) unity and numbers to be besides the things;—or τοὺς ἀριθμούς παρά τὰ αἰσθητὰ, numbers to exist by themselves, besides the sensibles: he by numbers meaning, as Aristotle himself there expounds it, τὰ εἶδη, the ideas contained in the first Intellect (which was Plato's second Divine hypostasis) as also by τὸ ἐν, ὃ τοῖς εἶδεσι παρέχεται τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, that *ipsam unum*, or unity, which gives being to those ideas—is understood Plato's first Divine hypostasis. Or else the words ought to be translated thus: "And worshipped the creature above or more than the Creator," that preposition παρά being sometimes used comparatively so as to signify excess, as for example in Luke xiii. 2. "Think you that these Galileans were ἀμαρτωλοὶ παρά πάντας τοὺς Γαλιλαίους, sinners beyond all the Galileans?" And, (ver. 4.) "Think you, that those eighteen, upon whom the tower of Siloam fell, were ὀφειλέται παρά πάντας, debtors above all the men, that dwelt in Jerusalem?" According to either of which interpretations, it is supposed, that the Pagans did worship the true God, the Creator of the whole world; though they worshipped the creature also, besides him, or (perhaps in some sense) above him, and more than him also. But as for that other interpretation of παρά τὸν κτίσαντα, which Beza chose rather to follow, that "they worshipped the creature, the Creator being wholly passed by," this is no true

literal version, but only a gloss or commentary upon the words, made according to a certain pre-conceived and extravagant opinion, that the Pagans did not at all worship the supreme God or Creator, but universally transfer all their worship upon the creature only. But in what sense the Pagans might be said to worship the creatures above or beyond, or more than the Creator, (because it is not possible, that the creature, as a creature, should be worshipped with more internal and mental honour than the Creator thereof; looked upon as such) we leave others to inquire. Whether or no, because when religious worship, which properly and only belongeth to the Creator, and not at all to the creature, is transferred from the Creator upon the creature, according to a Scripture interpretation and account, such may be said to worship the creature more than the Creator? Or whether because some of these Pagans might more frequently address their devotions to their inferior gods (as stars, demons, and heroes) as thinking the supreme God, either above their worship, or incomprehensible, or inaccessible by them? Or, lastly, whether because the image and statue-worshippers among the Pagans (whom the apostle there principally regards) did direct all their external devotion to sensible objects and creaturely forms? However, it cannot be thought, that the apostle here taxes the Pagans merely for worshipping creatures above the Creator, as if they had not at all offended, had they worshipped them only in an equality with him; but doubtless their sin was, that they gave any religious worship at all to the creature, though in way of aggravation of their crime it be

said, that they also worshipped the creature more than the Creator. Thus we see plainly, that the Pagan superstition and idolatry (according to the true Scripture notion of it) consisted not in worshipping of many creators, but in worshipping the creatures together with the Creator.

Besides this we have in the Acts of the Apostles an oration, which St. Paul made at Athens in the Areopagitic court, beginning after this manner: "Ye men of Athens, I perceive, that ye are every way more than ordinarily religious;" for the word *δαισδαμονεστέρους* seems to be taken there in a good sense, it being not only more likely, that St. Paul would in the beginning of his oration thus capture benevolentiam, conciliate their benevolence, with some commendation of them; but also very unlikely, that he would call their worshipping of the true God by the name of superstition, for so it followeth: "for as I passed by and beheld your sacred things (or monuments) I found an altar with this inscription, *Ἄγνωστον Θεῶν*, TO THE UNKNOWN GOD." It is true, that both Philostratus<sup>a</sup> and Pausanias<sup>b</sup> write, that there were at Athens *Ἄγνωστων Θεῶν βωμοί*, altars of unknown gods:—but their meaning in this might well be, not that there were altars dedicated to unknown gods plurally, but that there were several altars, which had this singular inscription: TO THE UNKNOWN GOD. And that there was at least one such, besides this Scripture record, is evident from that dialogue in Lucian's works entitled *Philopatris*,<sup>c</sup> where Critias useth this form of oath, *Νῆ τὸν Ἄγνωστον ἐν Ἀθήναις*, No, by the un-

<sup>a</sup> De Vita Apollonii, lib. vi. cap. iii. p. 232.

<sup>b</sup> Lib. v. p. 199.

<sup>c</sup> Cap. ix. p. 122. edit. Gesneri.



known god at Athens:—and Triephton in the close of that dialogue speaketh thus: \* *Ἡμεῖς δὲ τὸν ἐν Ἀθήναις Ἄγνωστον ἐφευρόντες, καὶ προσκυνήσαντες, χεῖρας εἰς οὐρανὸν ἐκτείναντες, τούτῳ εὐχαριστήσομεν, ὡς καταξιωθέντες, &c.* But we having found out that unknown God at Athens, and worshipped him, with hands stretched up to heaven, will give thanks to him, as having been thought worthy to be made subject to this power.—Which passages, as they do unquestionably refer to that Athenian inscription either upon one or more altars, so does the latter of them plainly imply, that this unknown God of the Athenians was the supreme Governor of the world. And so it follows in St. Paul's oration: *ὃν οὖν ἀγνοοῦντες εὐσεβεῖτε, τοῦτον ἐγὼ καταγγέλλω ὑμῖν*, Whom therefore you ignorantly worship (under this name of the unknown God) him declare I unto you, the God that made the world, and all things in it, the Lord of heaven and earth.—From which place we may upon firm Scripture authority conclude these two things: first, that by the unknown God of the Athenians was meant the only true God, he who made the world and all things in it; who in all probability was therefore styled by them *Ἄγνωστος Θεός*, the unknown God—because he is not only invisible, but also incomprehensible by mortals; of whom Josephus against Appion<sup>b</sup> writeth thus, that he is *δυνάμει μόνον ἡμῖν γινώριμος, ὅποιος δὲ κατὰ οὐσίαν ἄγνωστος*, knowable to us only by the effects of his power, but, as to his own essence, unknowable or incomprehensible.—But when in Dion Cassius the God of the Jews is said to be *ἄρρητος καὶ αἰετός*, not only invisible, but also ineffable, and when he is called

\* Cap. xxiii. p. 203.

<sup>b</sup> Lib. ii. cap. xv. p. 482.

in Lucan; *Incertus Deus*, an uncertain God—the reason hereof seems to have been, not only because there was no image of him, but also because he was not vulgarly then known by any proper name, the Tetragrammaton being religiously forbidden amongst the Jews in common use, that it might not be profaned. And what some learned men have here mentioned upon this occasion, of the Pagans, sometimes sacrificing *προσῆκοντι θεῷ*, to the proper and convenient God—without signifying any name, seems to be nothing to this purpose; that proceeding only from a superstitious fear of these Pagans (supposing several gods to preside over several things) lest they should be mistaken in not applying to the right and proper God, in such certain cases, and so their devotion prove unsuccessful and ineffectual. But that this unknown God is here said to be ignorantly worshipped by the Athenians, is to be understood chiefly in regard of their Polytheism and idolatry. The second thing, that may be concluded from hence, is this; that these Athenian Pagans did *εὐσεβεῖν*, religiously worship the true God, the Lord of heaven and earth—and so we have a Scripture confutation also of that opinion; that the Pagans did not at all worship the supreme God.

Lastly, St. Paul, citing this passage out of Aratus, a heathen poet, concerning Zeus or Jupiter,

*Τῷ γὰρ καὶ ἡμεῖς ἵσμεν*—————

For we are his offspring—and interpreting the same of the true God, “in whom we live and move, and have our being;” we have also here a plain Scripture acknowledgment, that by the Zeus of the Greekish Pagans was sometimes at least meant

the true God. And, indeed, that Aratus's Zeus was neither a man born in Crete nor in Arcadia, but the Maker and supreme Governor of the whole world, is evident both from the antecedent and the subsequent verses. For Aratus's phenomena begins thus :

Ἐκ Διὸς ἀρχώμεσθα

(which in Tully's version is " ab Jove musarum primordia") and then follows a description of this Zeus or Jupiter:

——— τὸν οὐδέποτε ἄνδρες ἴωμεν  
 Ἄφροντον μιστοὶ δὲ Διὸς πᾶσαι μὲν ἀγυαί,  
 Πᾶσαι δ' ἀνθρώπων ἀγοραί, μιστὴ δὲ θάλασσα,  
 Καὶ λιμένες· πάντα δὲ Διὸς κρηθήμεθα πάντες·  
 Τοῦ γὰρ καὶ γένος ἐσμέν.

To this sense: Him, of whom we men are never silent; and of whom all things are full, he permeating and pervading all, and being every where; and whose beneficence we all constantly make use of and enjoy: for we also are his offspring.—Where Theon the scholiast writeth thus: πάντι προπόντως ὁ Ἄρατος τὴν τῶν ἄστρον διεξιμέναι μέλλων θέσει, τὸν πατέρα τούτων καὶ δημιουργόν, Δία, ἐν πρώτοις προσφωνεῖ· Δία δὲ νῦν τὸν Δημιουργόν ἀκουστέον· Aratus being about to declare the position of the stars, doth, in the first place, very decorously and becomingly invoke Zeus, the father and maker of them: for by Zeus is here to be understood the Demiurgus of the world—or, as he afterwards expresseth it, ὁ τὰ πάντα δημιουργήσας θεός, the God who made all things.—Notwithstanding which, we must confess, that this scholiast there adds, that some of these passages of the poet, and even that cited by the apostle, τοῦ γὰρ γένος ἐσμέν, may be understood also in another sense, of the Ζεὺς φυσικός, the phy-

sical Jupiter; that is, the air; but without the least shadow of probability, and for no other reason, as we conceive, but only to shew his philological skill. However, this is set down by him, in the first place, as the genuine and proper sense of those words: Πρὸς τὸ πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε· εἰ γὰρ αὐτὸς ταῦτα ἐδημιούργησε πρὸς τὸ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις βιωφιλῆς, αὐτοῦ ἂν κληθῆμεν, αὐτὸν πατέρα καὶ δημιουργὸν ἐπιγραφόμενοι· This agreeth with that title of Jupiter, when he is called the father of gods and men: for if he made us, and all these other things for our use, we may well be called his, and also style him our father and maker."—And that this was the only notion, which the poet here had of Zeus or Jupiter, appears undeniably also from the following words; as,

————— ἰδ' ἦπιος ἐσθρόωσι:  
Δίξια σμῆματι—————

Who, as a kind and benign father, sheweth lucky signs to men;—which to understand of the air were very absurd. And,

Αὐτὸς γὰρ τάγε σήματ' ἐν οὐρανῷ ἐστήριξεν,  
"Ἄστρα διακρίνας ἐστέβητο δ' εἰς ἑνιαυτὸν  
'Ἄστρας"

For he also hath fastened the signs in heaven, distinguishing constellations, and having appointed stars to rise and set at several times of the year.—And from this,

Τῷ μιν ἀπὸ πρῶτον τε καὶ ὕστατον ἰλάσονται,

Therefore is he always propitiated and placated both first and last.—Upon which the scholiast thus: ἴσως δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν σπονδῶν, τῷ τὴν μὲν πρώτην σπονδὴν εἶναι θεῶν τῶν Ὀλυμπίων, δευτέραν δὲ ἠρώων, καὶ τρίτην Διὸς σωτηρός· This perhaps refers to the libations, in

that the first of them was for the heavenly gods, the second for heroes, and the last for Jupiter the Saviour.—From whence it plainly appears also, that the Pagans in their sacrifices (or religious rites) did not forget Jupiter the Saviour, that is, the supreme God.

Lastly, from his concluding thus ;

*καίτε πάντες μέγα θαῦμα, μέγ' ἀσθεύουσιν ὄντας*

Where the supreme God is saluted, as the great wonder of the world, and interest of mankind.

Wherefore it is evident from Aratus's context, that by his Zeus or Jupiter was really meant the supreme God, the maker of the whole world ; which being plainly confirmed also by St. Paul and the Scripture, ought to be a matter out of controversy amongst us. Neither is it reasonable to think, that Aratus was singular in this, but that he spake according to the received theology of the Greeks, and that not only amongst philosophers and learned men, but even the vulgar also. Nor do we think, that that prayer of the ancient Athenians, commended by M. Antoninus for its simplicity, is to be understood otherwise,

L. v. §. 5. Ὑσον ὕσον ὦ φίλε Ζεῦ, κατὰ τῆς ἀρούρας τῶν  
[§. 8. p. 146.] Ἀθηναίων καὶ τῶν πεδίων, Rain, rain, O good

(or gracious) Jupiter, upon the fields and pastures of the Athenians :—upon which the Emperor thus : ἤτοι οὐ δεῖ εὐχεσθαι, ἢ οὕτως ἀπλῶς καὶ ἐλευθέρως. We should either not pray at all (to God) or else thus plainly and freely.—And since the Latins had the very same notion of Jupiter, that the Greeks had of Zeus, it cannot be denied, but that they commonly by their Jupiter also understood the one supreme God, the Lord of heaven and earth. We

know nothing, that can be objected against this from the Scripture, unless it should be that passage of St. Paul,\* "In the wisdom of God the world by wisdom knew not God." But the meaning thereof is no other than this, that the generality of the world before Christianity, by their natural light, and contemplation of the works of God, did not attain to such a practical knowledge of God, as might both free them from idolatry, and effectually bring them to a holy life.

xxxii. But in order to a fuller ex- P. 314, 315.  
plication of this Pagan theology, and giving yet a more satisfactory account concerning it, there are three heads requisite to be insisted on; first, that the intelligent Pagans worshipped the one supreme God under many several names; secondly, that besides this one God, they worshipped also many gods, that were indeed inferior deities subordinate to him; thirdly, that they worshipped both the supreme and inferior gods, in images, statues and symbols, sometimes abusively called also gods. We begin with the first, that the supreme God amongst the Pagans was polyonymous, and worshipped under several personal names, according to several notions and considerations of him, from his several attributes and powers, manifestations, and effects in the world.

It hath been already observed out of P. 114, 115.  
Origen, that not only the Egyptians, but also the Syrians, Persians, Indians, and other barbarian Pagans, had; beside their vulgar theology, another more arcane and recondite one, amongst their priests and learned men; and that the same was true concerning the Greeks and Latins also,

\* 1 Corinth. i. 21.

is unquestionably evident from that account, that hath been given by us of their philosophic theology; where, by the vulgar theology of the Pagans, we understand not only their mythical or fabulous, but also their political or civil theology, it being truly affirmed by St. Austin concerning

both these, “*Et civilis et fabulosa ambæ fabulosæ sunt, ambæque civiles;*” That both the fabulous theology of the Pagans was in part their civil, and their civil was fabulous.—And by their more arcane or

recondite theology, is doubtless meant that, which they conceived to be the natural and true theology. Which distinction of the natural and true theology, from the civil and political, as it was acknowledged by all the ancient Greek philosophers, but most expressly by Antistines, Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics; so was it owned and much insisted upon, both by Scaevola, that famous Roman Pontifex, and by Varro, that most learned antiquary; they both agreeing, that the civil theology then established by the Roman laws was only the theology of the vulgar, but not the true; and that there was another theology besides it, called by them natural, which was the theology of wise men and of truth: nevertheless granting a necessity, that in cities and commonwealths, besides this natural and true theology (which the generality of the vulgar were incapable of) there should be another civil or political theology, accommodate to their apprehensions; which civil theology differed from the natural, only by a certain mixture of fabulosity in it, and was therefore looked upon by them as a middle, betwixt the natural and the *fabulous* or poetical theology.

Civ. D. l. iv.  
c. viii.  
[lib. v. cap.  
viii. p. 120.  
tom. vii.  
oper.]

Wherefore it was acknowledged, that the vulgar theology of the Pagans, that is, not only their fabulous, but even their civil also, was oftentimes very discrepant from the natural and true theology; though the wise men amongst them, in all ages, endeavoured as much as they could, to dissemble and disguise this difference, and by allegorizing the poetic fables of the gods, to bring that theology into some seeming conformity with the natural and philosophic; but what they could not in this way reconcile, was by them excused upon the necessity of the vulgar.

The fabulous theology both of the Greeks and Romans did not only generate all the other gods, but even Jupiter himself also, their supreme Numen, it assigning him both a father and a mother, a grandfather and a grandmother. And though the Romans did not plainly adopt this into their civil theology, yet are they taxed by St. Austin<sup>a</sup> for suffering the statue of Jupiter's nurse to be kept in the capitol for a religious monument: And however this differed nothing at all from that atheistic doctrine of Evemerus,<sup>b</sup> That all the gods were really no other than mortal men,—yet was it tolerated and connived at by the politicians, in way of necessary compliance with the vulgar, it being so extremely difficult for them to conceive any such living being or animal, as was never made, and without beginning. Insomuch, that Callimachus,<sup>c</sup> who would by no means admit of Jupiter's sepulchre, either in Crete or Arcadia (but looked upon it as a foul reproach to him) for this reason;

<sup>a</sup> De Civitate Dei, lib. v. cap. vii. p. 110.

<sup>b</sup> Apud Augustin. ubi supra.

<sup>c</sup> Hymno in Jovem, ver. 9.



Ἐὶ δ' αὖ Σάου' ἔσσι γὰρ αἰὼ,

Because he was immortal and could never die;— did notwithstanding himself attribute a temporary generation and nativity to him, as Origen<sup>a</sup> and others observe. Nevertheless, the generality of the more civilized and intelligent Pagans, and even of the poets themselves, did all this while constantly retain thus much of the natural and true theology amongst them, that Jupiter was the father both of gods and men; that is, the maker of the whole world, and consequently himself without father, eternal and unmade, according to that Peleadean oracle before cited out of Pausanias,

Ζεὺς ἴσ', Ζεὺς ἔσσι, Ζεὺς ἄσφατος

Again, the civil theology of the Pagans, as well as the poetic, had not only many fantastic gods in it, but also an appearance of a plurality of independent deities; it making several supreme in their several territories and functions; as one to be the chief ruler over the heavens, another over the air and winds, another over the sea, and another over the earth and hell; one to be the giver of corn, another of wine; one the god of learning, another the god of pleasure, and another the god of war; and so for all other things. But the natural theology of the Pagans (so called) though it did admit a plurality of gods too, in a certain sense, that is, of inferior deities subordinate to one supreme; yet did it neither allow of more independent deities than one, nor own any gods at all, but such as were natural, that is, such as had a real existence in nature and the world without,

<sup>a</sup> Advers. Celsum, lib. iii. p. 137.

and not in men's opinion only. And these Varro<sup>\*</sup> concluded to be no other than; first, the Soul of the world, and then the animated parts thereof superior to men; that is, one supreme universal Numen unmade, and other particular generated gods, such as stars, demons, and heroes. Wherefore all the other gods besides these are frequently exploded by Pagan writers (as Cicero and others) under the name of *dii poetici*, that is, not philosophical, but poetical gods; and *dii commentitii* and *fictitii*, that is, not natural and real, but feigned and fictitious gods.—They in the mean time giving this account of them, that they were indeed nothing else but so many several names and notions of one supreme Numen, according to his several powers and various manifestations, and effects in the world; it being thought fit by the wisdom of the ancient Pagan theologers, that all those manifold glories and perfections of the Deity should not be huddled up, and as it were crowded and crumpled together, in one general acknowledgment of an invisible Being, the maker of the world, but that they should be distinctly and severally displayed, and each of them adored singly and apart; and this too (for the greater pomp and solemnity) under so many personal names. Which perhaps the unskilful and sottish vulgar might sometimes mistake, not only for so many real and substantial, but also independent and self-existent deities.

We have before proved, that one and the same supreme God, in the Egyptian theology, had several proper and personal names given him, ac-

<sup>\*</sup> Apud Augustin. de Civitate Dei, lib. v. cap. iv. v. p. 116. tom. vii. oper. et lib. vii. cap. v. vi. p. 128.

ording to several notions of him, and his several powers and effects; Jamblichus himself, in that passage already cited, plainly affirming thus much;

De Myst. Æ. ὁ δημιουργικὸς νοῦς, &c. τὴν ἀφανῆ τῶν κεκρυμ-  
gypt.  
[sect. 8. cap. μένων λόγων δύναμιν εἰς φῶς ἄγων, Ἀμῶν κατὰ  
iii. p. 159.] τὴν τῶν Αἰγυπτίων γλώσσαιν λέγεται, συντελών  
 δὲ ἀψευδῶς ἕκαστα καὶ τεχνικῶς Φθᾶ, ἀγαθῶν δὲ ποιητικὸς  
 ὢν Ὅσιρις κέκληται, καὶ ἄλλας δι' ἄλλας δυνάμεις τε καὶ  
 ἐνεργείας, ἐπωνυμίας ἔχει: the demiurgical Mind and  
 president of Truth, as with wisdom it proceedeth  
 to generation, and bringeth forth the hidden power  
 of the occult reasons, contained within itself, into  
 light, is called in the Egyptian language Ammon;  
 as it artificially effects all things with truth, Phtha;  
 as it is productive of good things, Osiris; besides  
 which it hath also several other names, according  
 to its other powers and energies:—as, namely,  
 Neith, (or according to Proclus's copy, Νηϊθάς,  
 Neithas) the tutelar god of the city Sais, from  
 whence probably the Greek Ἀθηνα̅ was derived,  
 (the Athenians being said to have been at first a  
 colony of these Saites) and this is the Divine  
 wisdom diffusing itself through all. So likewise  
 Serapis, which though some would have to be the  
 sun, is by others plainly described as an universal  
 Numen. As Aristides in his eighth oration upon

P. 95. this god Serapis; Οἱ μὲν δὴ τῆς μεγάλης  
 πρὸς Αἰγύπτῳ πόλεως πολῖται, καὶ ἓνα τοῦτον  
 ἀνακαλοῦσι Δία· ὅτι οὐκ ἀπολείπεται δυνάμει περιτετῆ, ἀλλὰ  
 διὰ πάντων ἕκει, καὶ τὸ πᾶν πεπλήρωκε· τῶν γὰρ ἄλλων θεῶν  
 διήρηνται αἱ δυνάμεις τε καὶ τιμαί, καὶ ἄλλους ἐπ' ἄλλα ἄνθρω-  
 ποι καλοῦσιν, ὁ δὲ ὡσπερ κορυφαῖος πάντων, ἀρχὰς καὶ πέ-  
 ρατα ἔχει. They, who inhabit the great city in  
 Egypt, call upon this god Serapis as their only  
 Jupiter, he being supposed to be no way defective

in power, but to pervade all things, and to fill the whole universe. And whereas the powers and honours of the other gods are divided, and some of them are invoked for one thing, and some for another; this is looked upon by them as the Coryphæus of all the gods, who contains the beginning and end of all things, and who is able to supply all wants.—Cnep is also described by Eusebius<sup>a</sup> as that Divine Intellect, which was the Demiurgus of the world, and which giveth life to all things, as he is by Plutarch<sup>b</sup> said to be ἀγέννητος, or unmade—so that this was also another Egyptian name of God; as likewise was Emeph and Eicton in Jamblichus;<sup>c</sup> though these may be severally distinguished into a trinity of Divine hypostases. Lastly, when Isis, which was sometimes called Multimammea, and made all over full of breasts, to signify her feeding all things, thus describes herself in Apuleius,<sup>d</sup> “Summa numinum, prima cœlitum, deorum dearumque facies uniformis, cujus numen unicum multiformi specie, ritu vario, nomine multijugo totus veneratur orbis;” as she plainly makes herself to be the supreme Deity, so doth she intimate, that all the gods and goddesses were compendiously contained in her alone, and that she (*i. e.* the supreme God) was worshipped under several personal names, and with different rites, over the whole Pagan world.—Moreover, this is particularly noted concerning the Egyptians by<sup>e</sup> Damas-

<sup>a</sup> Ex Porphyrio, Præpar. Evangel. lib. iii. cap. xi. p. 115.

<sup>b</sup> De Iside et Osiride, p. 357. oper.

<sup>c</sup> De Myster. Ægypt. §. 8. cap. iii. p. 158.

<sup>d</sup> Metamorph. lib. xii. p. 258, 259. edit. Elmenhorsti.

<sup>e</sup> MS. ἀπὸ πάντων ἀρχῶν.

cus, the philosopher, that τὸ νοητὸν διηρέκασεν εἰς πολλῶν θεῶν ιδιότητας, they multiplied the first Intelligible (or the supreme Deity) breaking and dividing the same into the names and properties of many gods.—Now, the Egyptian theology was in a manner the pattern of all the rest, but especially of those European theologies, of the Greeks and Romans.

Who likewise, that they often made many gods of one, is evident from their bestowing so many proper and personal names upon each of those inferior gods of theirs; the sun, and the moon, and the earth; the first whereof, usually called Apollo, had therefore this epithet of πολυώνυμος, commonly given to him, the god with many names.—Which many proper names of his Macrobius insisteth upon in his Saturnalia, though probably making more of them than indeed they were. And the moon was not only so called, but also Diana, and Lucina, and Hecate, and otherwise; insomuch that this goddess also hath been styled Polyonymous as well as her brother, the sun. And, lastly, the earth, besides those honorary titles, of bona dea, and magna dea, and mater deorum, the good goddess, and the great goddess, and the mother of the gods, was multiplied by them into those many goddesses, of Vesta, and Rhea, and Cybele, and Ceres, and Proserpina, and Ops, &c. And for this cause was she thus described by Æschylus;\*

Καὶ γαῖα πολλῶν ὀνομάτων μορφῇ μία\*

Et Tellus multorum nominum facies una.

\* In Prometheo victo, p. 29. edit. Guil. Canteri, Antwerp. 1580. 12mo.

Now if these inferior gods of the Pagans had each of them so many personal names bestowed upon them, much more might the supreme God be polyonymous amongst them; and so indeed he was commonly styled, as that learned grammarian Hesychius intimates, upon that word Πολυώνυμον, τὴν μονάδα οὕτως ἐκάλου, καὶ ἐπίθετον Ἀπόλλωνος, they called the Monad thus, and it was also the epithet of Apollo—where, by the Monad, according to the Pythagoric language, is meant the supreme Deity, which was thus styled by the Pagans πολυώνυμον, the Being that hath many names.—And accordingly Cleanthes thus beginneth that forecited hymn of his to him,

Κύθιστ' ἀθανάτων, πολυώνυμε,

Thou most glorious of all the immortal gods, who art called by many names.—And Zeno, his master, in Laertius,<sup>a</sup> expressly declareth, ὁ Θεὸς πολλαῖς προσηγορίας ὀνομάζεται κατὰ τὰς δυνάμεις, God is called by many several names, according to his several powers and virtues—whose instances shall be afterwards taken notice of. Thus also the writer De Mundo;<sup>b</sup> Εἷς δὲ ὢν πολυώνυμός ἐστι, κατονομαζόμενος τοῖς πάθεσι πᾶσιν ἅπερ αὐτὸς νεοχμεῖ. God, though he be but one, is polyonymous, and variously denominated from his several attributes, and the effects produced by him. “Quæcunque volēs (saith Seneca) illi propria nomina aptabis, vim De Ben. l. i. aliquam effectumque cælestium rerum [cap. vii. p. 927. tom. i. continentia. Tot appellationes ejus pos- oper.] sunt esse quot munera.” You may give God whatso-

<sup>a</sup> Lib. vii. segm. 147. p. 458.

<sup>b</sup> Cap. vii. p. 866. tom. i. oper. Aristot.

ever proper names you please, so they signify some force and effect of heavenly things. He may have as many names as he hath manifestations, offices and gifts.—Macrobius,<sup>a</sup> also, from the authority of Virgil, thus determines, “unius Dei effectus varios pro variis censendos esse (or, as Vossius corrects it, *censeri*) numinibus,” that the various effects of one God were taken for several gods—that is, expressed by several personal names; as he there affirmeth, the divers virtues of the sun to have given names to divers gods, because they gave occasion for the sun to be called by several proper and personal names. We shall conclude with that of Maximus Madaurensis,<sup>b</sup> before cited out of St. Austin: “Hujus virtutes per mundanum opus diffusas nos multis vocabulis invocamus, quoniam nomen ejus proprium ignoramus. Ita fit, ut dum ejus quasi quædam membra carptim variis supplicationibus prosequimur, totum colere profecto videamur.” The virtues of this one supreme God, diffused throughout the whole world, we (Pagans) invoke under many several names, because we are ignorant what his proper name is. Wherefore we thus worshipping his several divided members, must needs be judged to worship him whole, we leaving out nothing of him.—With which latter words seemeth to agree that of the poet, wherein Jupiter thus bespeaks the other gods;

Coelicolæ, mea membra, Dei; quos nostra potestas  
Officiis divisa facit.

Where it is plainly intimated, that the many Pa-

<sup>a</sup> *Saturnal.* lib. i. cap. xvii. p. 272.

<sup>b</sup> *Epist. ad Augustin.* vide Augustin, oper. tom. ii. epist. xvi. p. 15.

gan gods were but the several divided members of the one supreme Deity, whether because, according to the Stoical sense, the real and natural gods were all but parts of the mundane soul; or else because all those other fantastic gods were nothing but several personal names, given to the several powers, virtues, and offices of the one supreme.

Now the several names of God, which the writer *De Mundo*<sup>a</sup> instanceth in, to prove him polyonymous, are first of all such as these; Βρονταῖος, and Ἀστραπαῖος, the Thunderer and Lightner, Ἰέτιος, the Giver of rain, Ἐπικάρπιος, the Bestower of fruits, Πολιεύς, the Keeper of cities, Μελίχιος, the Mild and Placable—under which notion they sacrificed no animals to him, but only the fruits of the earth; together with many other such epithets, as Φίλιος, Ξένιος, Στράτιος, Τροπαιούχος, Καθάρσιος, Παλαμναῖος, &c. and, lastly, he is called Σωτήρ and Ἐλευθέριος, Saviour and Assertor.—Answerably to which, Jupiter had many such names given him also by the Latins, as Victor, Invictus, Opitulus, Stator; the true meaning of which last, (according to Seneca)<sup>b</sup> was not that, which the historians pretend, “quod post votum susceptum, acies Romanorum fugientium stetit,” because once after vows and prayers offered to him, the flying army of the Romans was made to stand—“sed quod stant beneficio ejus omnia,” but because all things by means of him stand firm and are established.—For which same reason he was called also by them (as St. Austin informs us)<sup>c</sup>

<sup>a</sup> Cap. vii. p. 866. tom. i. oper. Aristot.

<sup>b</sup> De Benefic. lib. iv. cap. vii. p. 427. tom. i. oper.

<sup>c</sup> De Civit. Dei. lib. vii. cap. xi. p. 131.



Centupeda, as it were, standing firm upon an hundred feet; and Tigillus, the beam, prop, and supporter of the world.—He was styled also by the Latins (amongst other titles) *Almus* and *Ruminus*, *i. e.* He that nourisheth all things

RumaMamma.

Acad. Q. l. i.  
[cap. vii. p.  
2233. tom. viii.  
oper.]

as it were with his breasts.—Again, that writer *De Mundo* addeth another sort of names, which God was called by; as *Ἀνάγκη*, Necessity—because he is an immoveable essence, though Cicero gives another reason for that appellation; “*Interdum Deum necessitatem appellant, quia nihil aliter esse possit, atque ab eo constitutum sit;*” they sometimes call God Necessity, because nothing can be otherwise, than as it is by him appointed.—Likewise *Εἰμαρμένη*, because all things are by him connected together, and proceed from him unhinderably. *Πεπωρωμένη*, because all things in the world are by him determined, and nothing left infinite (or undetermined). *Μοῖρα*, because he makes an apt division and distribution of all things. *Ἀδράσθεια*, because his power is such, as that none can possibly avoid or escape him. Lastly, that ingenious fable, (as he calls it) of the three fatal sisters, Clotho, Lachesis, and Atropos, according to him, meant nothing but God neither, *ταῦτα δὲ πάντα ἐστὶν οὐν ἄλλό τι, πλὴν ὁ Θεός, καθάπερ καὶ ὁ γενναῖος Πλάτων φησί;*—all this is nothing else but God, as the noble and generous Plato also intimates, when he affirmeth God to contain the beginning, and middle, and end of all things.—And both Cicero and Seneca tell us, that, amongst the Latins, God was not only called *Fatum*, but also *Natura*, and *Fortuna*. “*Quid aliud est natura (saith Seneca)*”

<sup>a</sup> Ut supra.

quam Deus, et divina ratio, toti mundo et partibus ejus inserta?" What is nature else, but God and the Divine Reason, inserted into the whole world and all its several parts?—He adding, that God and nature were no more two different things, than Annæus and Seneca. And, "Nonnunquam Deum (saith Cicero) Fortunam appellant quod efficiat multa improvisa, et nec opinata nobis, propter obscuritatem ignoracionemque causarum;" they sometimes call God also by the name of Fortune, because he surpriseth us in many events, and bringeth to pass things unexpected to us, by reason of the obscurity of causes and our ignorance.—Seneca thus concludes concerning these, and the like names of God, "Omnia ejusdem Dei nomina sunt, varie utentis sua potestate;" these are all names of one and the same God; variously manifesting his power.

But concerning most of these forementioned names of God, and such as are like to them, it was rightly observed by St. Austin, that <sup>c. d. l. vii.</sup> they had no such appearance or shew <sup>c. xi.</sup> of many distinct gods; "Hæc omnia <sup>[p. 131.]</sup> cognomina imposuerunt uni Deo, propter causas potestatesque diversas, non tamen propter tot res, etiam tot deos eum esse coegerunt," &c. Though the Pagans imposed all these several names upon one God, in respect of his several powers, yet did they not therefore seem to make so many gods of them; as if Victor were one god, and Invictus another god, and Centupeda another god, and Tigillus another, and Ruminus another, &c. Wherefore there are other names of God used

\* Acad. Quæst. lib. i. cap. vii. p. 2233. tom. viii. oper.

amongst the Pagans, which have a greater show and appearance of so many distinct deities, not only because they are proper names, but also because each of them had their peculiar temples appropriated to them, and their different rites of worship. Now these are of two sorts; first, such as signify the Deity according to its universal and all-comprehending nature; and, secondly, such as denote the same only according to certain particular powers, manifestations, and effects of it in the world. Of the first kind there are not a few. For, first of all, PAN, as the very word plainly implies him to be a universal Numen, and as he was supposed to be the Harmostes of the whole world, or to play upon the world as a musical instrument, according to that of Orpheus\* (or Onomacritus)

*Ἀρμονίαν κόσμου κρέκων φιλοπαίγμονι μολπή,*

So have we before shewed, that by him the Arcadians and Greeks meant, not the corporeal world inanimate, nor yet as endued with a senseless nature only, but as proceeding from an intellectual principle or Divine spirit, which framed it harmoniously; and as being still kept in tune, acted and governed by the same. Which therefore is said to be the universal pastor and shepherd of all mankind, and of the whole world, according to that other Orphic passage,

*Πόσκειν ἀνθρώπων γενεὴν, καὶ ἀτέρμονα γαίαν,*

*Pascens humanum genus, ac sine limite terram.*

And this Pan Socrates, in Plato's Phædrus,

\* In Hymno in Panem, p. 109. edit. Eschenbach.

plainly invokes as the supreme Numen. Pan therefore is the one only God (for there cannot possibly be more than one Pan, more than one all or universe) who contained all within himself, displayed all from himself, framing the world harmoniously, and who is in manner all things.

Again, JANUS, whom the Romans first invoked in all their sacrifices and prayers, and who was never omitted, whatsoever god they sacrificed unto, was unquestionably many times taken for a universal Numen, as in this of Martial,<sup>a</sup>

———— Nitidique sator pulcherrime mundi.

And again in this of Ovid ;

Fast. 1.  
[v. 117.]

Quicquid ubique vides, cœlum, mare, nubila, terras,  
Omnia sunt nostra clausa patentque manu :  
Me penes est unum vasti custodia mundi.

From which passages it also appears, that Janus was not the mere senseless and inanimate matter of the world, but a principle presiding over it. And without doubt all the beginnings of things were therefore referred to this Janus, because he was accounted the most ancient god, and the beginning of all things. St. Austin concluding him to be the same with Jupiter, therefore quarrels with the Pagans, (that is, with their civil theology, for thus making two gods of one : “ Cum ergo Janus mundus sit, et Jupiter mundus sit, C. D. I. vii. unusque sit mundus, quare duo dii sunt <sup>c. x.</sup> [p. 131.] Janus et Jupiter? Quare seorsum habent templa, seorsum aras, diversa sacra, dissimilia simulacra? Si propterea, quia alia vis est primordiorum, alia

<sup>b</sup> Epigr. lib. x. epigr. xxviii. p. 411.

causarum, ex illa Jani, ex ista Jovis nomen accepit: nunquid si unus homo in diversis rebus duas habeat potestates, aut duas artes, (quia singularum diversa vis est) ideo duo dicuntur artifices?" &c. Since therefore Janus is the world, and Jupiter is the world, and there is but one world, how can Janus and Jupiter be two gods? Why have they their temples apart, their altars apart, distinct sacred things, and statues of different forms? If because the force of beginnings is one, and the force of causes another, he is therefore called Janus from the former, and Jupiter from the latter; I ask whether or no, if one man have two several arts about different things, he therefore be to be called two artificers? Or is there any more reason, why one and the same god, having two powers, one over the beginnings of things, and another over the causes, should therefore be accounted two gods?—Where, when Jupiter and Janus are both said to be the world, this is to be understood properly not of the matter, but the soul or mind of the world, as St. Austin himself elsewhere declares; "Sit Jupiter corporei hujus mundi animus, qui universam istam molem, ex quatuor elementis constructam atque compactam, implet et movet;" Let Jupiter be the mind of this corporeal world, which both filleth and moveth that whole bulk, compounded and made up of the four elements.—Nevertheless, as the soul and body both together are called the man, so was the whole animated world, by the Pagans, called God. Now the forementioned argumentation of St. Austin, though it be good against the Pagans' *civil theology*, yet their other arcane and natural

C. D. l. iv.  
c. xi.  
[p. 76.]

theology was unconcerned in it, that plainly acknowledging all to be but one God, which for certain reasons was worshipped under several names, and with different rites. Wherefore Janus and Jupiter, being really but different names for one and the same supreme God, that conjecture of Salmasius seems very probable, that the Romans derived their Janus from *Zavòs*; the Ætolian Jupiter.

GENIUS was also another of the twenty select Roman gods; and that this was likewise a universal Numen, containing the whole nature of things, appears from this of Festus,\* “Genium appellabant Deum, qui vim obtineret rerum omnium generandarum;” They called that God, who hath the power of begetting or producing all things, Genius.—And St. Austin also plainly declareth Genius to be the same with Jupiter; that is, to be but another name for the one supreme God; “Cum alio loco [Varro] dicit, Genium esse uniuscujusque animum rationalem; talem autem mundi animum Deum esse, ad hoc idem utique revocat, ut tanquam universalis Genius, ipse mundi animus esse credatur. Hic est igitur, quem appellant Jovem.”—And afterwards, “Restat ut eum singulariter et excellenter dicant deum Genium, quem dicunt mundi animum; ac per hoc Jovem.” When Varro elsewhere calleth the rational mind of every one, a genius, and affirmeth such a mind of the whole world, to be God; he plainly implieth, that God is the universal Genius of the world, and that Genius and Jupiter are the same. And though Genius be sometimes used for the mind of every man, yet the god

C. D. I. vii.  
c. xiii.  
[p. 132.]

\* De Verborum Significat. lib. vii. p. 292. edit. Godofredi.

Genius, spoken of by way of excellency, can be no other than the mind of the whole world, or Jupiter.

Again, that CHRONOS or SATURN was no particular Deity, but the universal Numen of the whole world, is plainly affirmed by Dionysius of Halicarnassus, where commending the fertility of Italy, he writeth thus : οὐδὲν οὖν θαυμαστὸν τοὺς πα-

Rom. Ant.

l. i. p. 24.

Steph.

λαίους ἱερὰν ὑπολαβεῖν τοῦ Κρόνου τὴν χώραν ταύτην, τὸν μὲν δαίμονα τούτων οἰομένους εἶναι πάσης εὐδαιμονίας δοτῆρα, καὶ πληρωτὴν ἀνθρώποις· εἴτε Χρόνον αὐτὸν δεῖ καλεῖν, ὡς Ἕλληνες ἀξιοῦσιν, εἴτε Κρόνου ὡς Ῥωμαῖοι, πᾶσαν δὲ περιελήφοτα τὴν τοῦ κόσμου φύσιν, ὁπότερον ἂν τις ὀνομάσῃ· Wherefore it is no wonder, if the ancients thought this country to be sacred to Saturn, they supposing this god to be the giver and perfecter of all happiness to men ; whether we ought to call him Chronos, as the Greeks will have it, or Cronos, as the Romans ; he being either way such a god, as comprehends the whole nature of the world.—But the word Saturn was Heturian (which language was originally Oriental) and being derived from *γηρ* signifies *hidden* ; so that by Saturn was meant that hidden principle of the universe, which containeth all things ; and he was therefore called by the Romans *Deus Latius*, the hidden God—as the wife of Saturn in the pontifical books is *Latia Saturni*, and the land itself (which in the Heturian language was *Saturnia*) is in the Roman *Latium* ; from whence the inhabitants were called *Latins*, which is as much as to say, the worshippers of the hidden God. Moreover, that Saturn could not be inferior to Jupiter, according to the fabulous theology, is plain from hence, because

he is therein said to have been his father. But then the question will be, how Saturn and Jupiter could be both of them one and the same universal Numen? To which there are several answers. For, first, Plato, who propounds this difficulty in his *Cratylus*, solves it thus; that by Jupiter here is to be understood the soul of the world, which, according to his theology, was derived from a perfect and eternal mind or intellect (which Chronos is interpreted to be) as Chronos also depended upon Uranus or Cœlus, the supreme heavenly God, or first original Deity.—So that Plato here finds his trinity of Divine hypostases, archical and universal, *Τάγαθόν*, *Νοῦς* and *Ψυχή*, in Uranus, Chronos and Zeus; or Cœlus, Saturn and Jupiter. Others conceive, that, according to the plainer and more simple sense of Hesiod's *Theogonia*, that Jupiter, who, together with Neptune and Pluto, is said to have been the son of Saturn, was not the supreme Deity, nor the soul of the world neither, but only the Æther, as Neptune was the sea, and Pluto the earth. All which are said to have been begotten by Chronos or Saturn, the son of Uranus; that is as much as to say, by the hidden virtue of the supreme heavenly God. But the writer, *De Mundo*,<sup>a</sup> though making Jupiter to be the first and supreme God, yet (taking Chronos to signify immensity of duration or eternity) will have Jupiter to be the son of Chronos in this sense, because he doth *διήκειν ἐξ αἰῶνος ἀτέλειονος εἰς ἕτερον αἰῶνα*, continue from one eternity to another—so that Chronos and Zeus are to him in a manner one and the same thing. But we are apt to think, that no ingenious and learned Pa-

<sup>a</sup> Cap. vii. p. 869. tom. i. oper. Aristot.



gan, who well understood the natural theology, would deny, but that the best answer of all to this difficulty is this, that there is no coherent sense to be made of all things in the fabulous theology. St. Austin,<sup>a</sup> from Varro, gives us this account of Saturn, that it is he, who produceth from himself continually the hidden seeds and forms of things, and reduceth or receiveth them again into himself; which some think to have been the true meaning of that fable concerning Saturn, his devouring his male children, because the forms of these corporeal things are perpetually destroyed, whilst the material parts (signified by the female) still remain. However, it is plain, that this was but another Pagan adumbration of the Deity, that being also sometimes thus defined by them, as St. Austin likewise informs

us, “Sinus quidam naturæ in seipso  
 c. D. l. iv. continens omnia,” a certain bosom, or  
 c. xii. [p. 77.] deep hollow, and inward recess of na-

ture, which containeth within itself all things.— And St. Austin himself concludes, that according to this Varronian notion of Saturn likewise, the Pagans’ Jupiter and Saturn were really but one and the same Numen. De Civ. D. l. vii. c. xiii. Wherefore we may with good reason affirm, that Saturn was another name for the supreme God amongst the Pagans, it signifying that

secret and hidden power, which com-  
 Thus in that old inscription,  
 OPTIMUS  
 MAXIMUS CÆ-  
 LUS ETER-  
 NUS JUPITER.  
 prehends, pervades, and supports the  
 whole world; and which produceth the  
 seeds or seminal principles and forms of  
 all things from itself. As also Uranus or Cœlus

<sup>a</sup> De Civit. Dei. lib. vii. cap. xiii. p. 132. tom. vii. oper.

was plainly yet another name for the same supreme Deity; (or the first Divine hypostasis) comprehending the whole.

In the next place, though it be true, that Minerva be sometimes taken for a particular god, or for God according to a particular manifestation of him in the Æther, (as shall be shewed afterwards;) yet was it often taken also for the supreme God, according to his most general notion, or as a universal Numen diffusing himself through all things. Thus hath it been already proved, that Neith or Neithas was the same amongst the Egyptians, as Athena amongst the Greeks, and Minerva amongst the Latins; which that it was a universal Numen, appears from that Egyptian inscription in the temple of this god, "I am all that was, is, and shall be." And accordingly Athenagoras tells us,<sup>a</sup> that Athena of the Greeks was *ἡ φρόνησις διὰ πάντων διήκουσα*, Wisdom passing and diffusing itself through all things—as in the book of Wisdom it is called *ἡ πάντων τεχνίτις*, the Artifex of all things, and is said *διήκειν καὶ χωρεῖν διὰ πάντων*, to pass and move through all things.—Wherefore this Athena or Minerva of the Pagans was either the first supreme Deity, a perfect and infinite mind, the original of all things; or else a second Divine hypostasis, the immediate offspring and first-begotten of that first original Deity. Thus Aristides in his oration upon Minerva,<sup>b</sup> *πάντα μὲν οὖν τὰ κάλλιστα περὶ Ἀθηναίων τε καὶ ἐξ Ἀθηναίων κεφάλαιον δὲ εἶπεν, τοῦ πάντων δημιουργοῦ καὶ βασιλέως παῖς ἐστὶ μόνη δὴ μόνου· οὐ γὰρ εἶχεν ἐξ ὅτου ὁμοτίμου ποιήσειεν αὐτήν· ἀλλ' ἀναχωρήσας αὐτὸς εἰς αὐτὸν, αὐτὸς ἐξ αὐτοῦ γεννᾷ τε καὶ τίκτει τὴν θεόν· ὥστε ἐστὶ*

<sup>a</sup> Legat. pro Christianis. cap. xix. p. 86.    <sup>b</sup> Pag. 192.

μόνη βεβαίως γνησία τοῦ πατρὸς, ἐξ ἴσου καὶ ὁμολογοῦντάς  
 ἑαυτῷ τοῦ γένους γενομένη, &c. Wherefore all the  
 most excellent things are in Minerva, and from  
 her: but, to speak briefly of her, this is the only  
 immediate offspring of the only maker and king  
 of all things; for he had none of equal honour  
 with himself, upon whom he should beget her;  
 and therefore retiring into himself, he begot her  
 and brought her forth from himself: so that this  
 is the only genuine offspring of the first father of  
 all.—And again, Πίνδαρος δ' αὖ φησι, δεξιὰν κατὰ χεῖρα  
 τοῦ πατρὸς αὐτὴν καθεζομένην, τὰς ἐντολάς τοῖς θεοῖς ἀπο-  
 δέχασθαι· ἀγγέλου μὲν γὰρ ἔστι μείζων, ἢ δὲ τῶν ἀγγέλων  
 ἄλλοις ἄλλα ἐπιτάττει πρώτη παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς παραλαμ-  
 βάνουσα, ἀντ' ἐξηγητοῦ τινος οὔσα τοῖς θεοῖς, καὶ εἰσαγωγῆς  
 ὅταν καὶ τούτου δέη. Pindar also affirmeth concern-  
 ing Minerva, that sitting at the right hand of her  
 father, she there receiveth commands from him  
 to be delivered to the gods. For she is greater  
 than the angels, and commandeth them some one  
 thing and some another, accordingly as she had  
 first received of her father; she performing the  
 office of an interpreter and introducer to the  
 gods, when it is needful.—Where we may observe,  
 by the way, that this word angel came to be in  
 use amongst the Pagans from Jews and Christians,  
 about this very age that Aristides lived in; after  
 which we meet with it frequently in the writings  
 of their philosophers. Lastly, Aristides thus con-  
 cludeth his oration upon Minerva; σχεδὸν γὰρ δύνα-  
 μιν τοῦ Διὸς εἶναι λέγων τίς αὐτὴν ἐκ τούτων, οὐκ ἂν ἀμαρτά-  
 νοι ὥστε τί δὴ μικρολογεῖσθαι τὰς ἐν μέρει πράξεις αὐτῆς  
 διηγούμενον, ὅπου ἔξῃσι τὰ τοῦ Διὸς ἔργα κοινὰ τοῦ Διὸς  
 εἶναι φῆσαι καὶ τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς. He that from what we  
 have said will determine, that Minerva is as it

were the power and virtue of Jupiter himself; will not err. Wherefore (not to enumerate all the minute things belonging to Minerva) we conclude thus concerning her, that all the works of Jupiter are common with Jupiter and Minerva. Wherefore that conceit, which the learned and industrious Vossius\* sometimes seems to favour, that the Pagans' universal Numen was no other than a senseless nature, or spermatie reason of the whole world, undirected by any higher intellectual principle (which is indeed no better than downright Atheism), is plainly confuted from hence, they making wisdom and understanding, under these names of Neith, Athena, and Minerva, to be either the absolutely supreme Deity, or the first begotten offspring of it.

To Minerva may be added Apolló, who, though often taken for the sensible sun animated, and so an inferior deity, yet was not always understood in this sense, nor indeed then when he was reckoned amongst the twelve consentes, because the sun was afterwards added to them, in the number of the eight select gods. And that he was sometimes taken for the supreme universal Numen, the maker of the sun and of the whole world, is plainly testified by Plutarch (who is a competent witness in this case, he being a priest of this Apollo), writing thus concerning him in his Defect of Oracles: *Εἴτε ἡλῖός ἐστιν εἴτε κύριός ἡλίου,* Pag. 413.  
*καὶ πατήρ, καὶ ἐπέκανα τοῦ ὄρατος παντός, οὐκ*  
*εἰκός ἀπαξιῶν φωνῆς τοὺς νῦν ἀνθρώπους, οἷς αἰτίος ἐστὶ*  
*γενέσεως καὶ τροφῆς, καὶ τοῦ εἶναι καὶ φρονεῖν.* Whether Apollo be the sun, or whether he be the lord and father of the sun, placed far above all sen-

\* De Idololatr. lib. vii. cap. i. p. 718.

sible and corporeal nature, it is not likely that he should now deny his oracles to them, to whom himself is the cause of generation and nourishment, of life and understanding.

Moreover, Urania Aphrodite, the heavenly Venus or Love, was a universal Numen also, or another name of God, according to his more general notion, as comprehending the whole world; it being the same with that *Ἔρως*, or Love, which Orpheus, and others in Aristotle, made to be the first original of all things: for it is certain, that the ancients distinguished concerning a double Venus and Love. Thus Pausanias in Plato's

P. 108. Symposium: *Ἡ μὲν γέ που πρεσβυτέρα καὶ ἀμῆτωρ Οὐρανοῦ θυγάτηρ, ἣν δὴ καὶ οὐρανίαν ἐπονομάζομεν· ἡ δὲ νεωτέρα, Διὸς καὶ Διώνης, ἣν δὴ πάνδημον καλοῦμεν· ἀναγκαῖον δὴ καὶ Ἔρωτα, τὸν μὲν τῇ ἑτέρᾳ συνεργόν, πάνδημον ὀρθῶς καλεῖσθαι, τὸν δὲ, οὐράνιον·* There are two Venuses, and therefore two Loves; one the older and without a mother, the daughter of Uranus or heaven, which we call the heavenly Venus; another younger, begotten from Jupiter and Dione, which we call the vulgar Venus: and accordingly are there of necessity two Loves, answering to these two Venuses, the one vulgar and the other heavenly.—The elder of these two Venuses is in Plato said to be senior to Japhet and Saturn, and by Orpheus\* the oldest of all things, and *πρῶτος γενέτωρ*, the first begetter of all.—Upon which account, perhaps, it was called by the oriental nations Mylitta or Genitrix, as being the fruitful mother of all. This was also the same with Plato's *τὸ πρῶτον καλόν*, the first fair;—the cause of all pulchritude, order and harmony;

\* In Hymno in Venerem, p. 151. oper.

in the world. And Pausanias<sup>a</sup> the writer tells us that there were temples severally erected to each of these Venuses or Loves, the heavenly and the vulgar; and that Urania, or the heavenly Venus, was so called, ἐπὶ ἔρωτι καθαρῷ καὶ ἀπηλαμένῳ πόθου σωμαίων, because the love belonging to it was pure, and free from all corporeal affection:—which, as it is in men, is but a participation of that first Urania, or heavenly Venus and Love, God himself. And thus is Venus described by Euripides in Stobæus,<sup>b</sup> as the supreme Numen:

Τὴν Ἀφροδίτην οὐχ ἕρκος ὄση θεός;  
 Ἄλλ' οὐδ' ἂν εἴπωσι, οὐδὲ μετρήσιμος ἂν,  
 Ὅση πίκρα καὶ ἴψ' ὄση δίσχεται.  
 Αὐτὴ τρίψει δὲ καμὶ καὶ πάντας βροτῶς, &c.

Thus also by  
 Æschylus, Ἐρῶ  
 μὴν ἄγχιος οὐρα-  
 νός, &c. Ἐρως δὲ  
 γαίαν λαμβά-  
 νει, &c.—τῶν

To this sense: Do you not see how great a god this Venus is? But you are never able to declare her greatness, nor to measure the vast extent thereof. For this is she, which nourisheth both thee and me, and all mortals, and which makes heaven and earth friendly to conspire together, &c.—But by Ovid this is more fully expressed, in his *Fastorum*:<sup>c</sup>

*Illa quidem totum dignissima temperat orbem,  
 Illa tenet nullo regna minora Deo:  
 Juraque dat cœlo, terræ; natalibus undis;  
 Perque suos initus continet omne genus.  
 Illa deos omnes (longum enumerare) creavit;  
 Illa satis causas arboribusque dedit.*

Where all the gods are said to have been created or made by Venus, that is, by the one supreme Deity. But, lastly, this is best of all performed by Severinus Boetius, a Christian philosopher and poet, in this manner:

De Cons. l. ii.  
 Met. 8.

<sup>a</sup> In *Bœotic*. lib. ix. cap. xvi. p. 742.  
<sup>b</sup> *Eclog*. Phys. lib. i. cap. xvii. p. 97.  
<sup>c</sup> Lib. iv. ver. 91.

Quod mundus stabili fide  
 Concordes variat vices,  
 Quod pugnantia semina  
 Fœdus perpetuum tenent;  
 Quod Phœbus roseum diem  
 Curru provehit aureo; &c.  
 Hanc rerum seriem ligat,  
 Terras ac pelagus regens,  
 Et cœlo imperitans, AMOR, &c.  
 Hic si frenâ remiserit,  
 Quicquid nunc amat invicem,  
 Bellum continuo geret.  
 Hic sancto populos quoque  
 Junctos fœdere continet;  
 Hic et conjugii sacrum  
 Castis nectit amoribus, &c.  
 O felix hominum genus,  
 Si vestros animos AMOR,  
 Quo cœlum regitur, regat.

And to this Urania, or heavenly Venus, was near of kin also that third Venus in Pausanias called *Ἀποστροφία*, and by the Latins Venus verticordia, pure and chaste Love—expulsive of all unclean lusts, to which the Romans consecrated a statue, as Valerius M. tells us, (l. viii. c. xv.) “quo facilius virginum mulierumque mentes a libidine ad pudicitiam converterentur;” to this end, that the minds of the female sex might then the better be converted from lust and wantonness to chastity.—We conclude, therefore, that Urania, or the heavenly Venus, was sometimes amongst the Pagans a name for the supreme Deity, as that which is the most amiable being, and first pulchritude, the most benign and fecund begetter of all things, and the constant harmonizer of the whole world.

Again, though Vulcan, according to the most common and vulgar notion of him, be to be reckoned amongst the particular gods, yet had he also another more universal consideration.

For Zeno in Laertius<sup>a</sup> tells us, that the supreme God was called Ἡφαιστος, or Vulcan, κατὰ τὴν εἰς τὸ τεχνικὸν πῦρ διάτασιν τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ αὐτοῦ, as his hegemonic acted in the artificial fire.—Now Plutarch<sup>b</sup> and Stobæus<sup>c</sup> testify, that the Stoics did not only call nature, but also the supreme Deity itself (the Architect of the whole world), τεχνικὸν πῦρ, an artificial fire—they conceiving him to be corporeal. And Jamblichus<sup>d</sup> making Phtha to be the same supreme God, amongst the Egyptians, with Osiris and Hammon, or rather, more properly, all of them alike the soul of the world, tells us, that Hephæstus, in the Greekish theology, was the same with this Egyptian Phtha; Ἕλληνες εἰς Ἡφαιστον μεταλαμβάνουσι τὸν Φθα, τῷ τεχνικῷ μόνον προσβάλλοντες, amongst the Greeks Hephæstus (or Vulcan) answers to the Egyptian Phtha.—Wherefore as the Egyptians by Phtha, so the Greeks by Hephæstus, sometimes understood no other than the supreme God, or at least the soul of the world, as artificially framing all things.

Furthermore, Seneca gives us yet De Ben. l. iv. c. viii. other names of the supreme Deity, according to the sense of the Stoics; “Hunc et liberum patrem, et Herculem, ac Mercurium nostri putant, Liberum Patrem, quia omnium parens, &c. Herculem, quod vis ejus invicta sit; Mercurium, quia ratio penes illum est, numerusque, et ordo, et scientia.” Furthermore, our philosophers take this auctor of all things to be Liber Pater, Hercules, and Mercury; the first, be-

<sup>a</sup> Lib. vii. segm. 147. p. 458.

<sup>b</sup> De Placit. Philos. lib. i. cap. vii. p. 881. oper.

<sup>c</sup> Eclog. Phys. lib. i. cap. ii. p. 17.

<sup>d</sup> De Mystér. Ægyptior. sect. 8. cap. iii. p. 159.



cause he is parent of all things, &c. the second, because his force and power are unconquerable, &c. and the third, because there is in and from him reason, number, order, and knowledge.—And now we see already, that the supreme God was sufficiently polyonymous amongst the Pagans; and that all these, Jupiter, Pan, Janus, Genius, Saturn, Cœlus, Minerva, Apollo, Aphrodite Urania, Hephæstus, Liber Pater, Hercules, and Mercury, were not so many really distinct and substantial gods, much less self-existent and independent ones; but only several names of that one supreme, universal, and all-comprehending Numen, according to several notions and considerations of him.

But, besides these, there were many other Pagan gods called by Servius *dii speciales*, special or particular gods;—which cannot be thought neither to have been so many really distinct and substantial beings (that is, natural gods), much less self-existent and independent, but only so many several names or notions of one and the same supreme Deity, according to certain particular powers and manifestations of it. It is true, that some late Christian writers against the Polytheism and idolatry of the Pagans, have charged them with at least a trinity of independent gods, viz. Jupiter, Neptune, and Pluto, as sharing the government of the whole world amongst these three, and consequently acknowledging no one universal Numen. Notwithstanding which, it is certain, that, according to the more arcane doctrine and cabala of the Pagans, concerning the natural true theology, these three considered as distinct and independent gods, were accounted but *dii poetici*

et commentitii, poetical and fictitious gods—and they were really esteemed no other than so many several names and notions of one and the same supreme Numen, as acting variously in those several parts of the world, the heaven, the sea, the earth, and hell. For, first, as to Pluto and Hades, called also by the Latins Orcus, and Dis (which latter word seems to have been a contraction of Dives to answer the Greek Pluto), as Balbus in Cicero attributes to him, “omnem vim terrenam,” all terrene power,—so others commonly assign him the regimen of separate souls after death. Now it is certain, that, according to this latter notion, it was by Plato understood no otherwise than as a name for that part of the Divine Providence, which exercises itself upon the souls of men after death. This Ficinus observed upon Plato’s Cratylus: “Animadvertite præ cæteris, Plutonum hic significare præcipue providentiam divinam ad separatatas animas pertinentem.” You are to take notice, that by Pluto is here meant that part of Divine Providence, which belongeth to separate souls.—For this is that, which, according to Plato, “binds and detains pure souls in that separate state, with the best *vinculum* of all, which is not necessity, but love and desire; they being ravished and charmed as it were with those pure delights, which they there enjoy.” And thus is he also to be understood in his book of Laws, writing in this manner concerning Pluto; lib. viii. [p. 642.]

Καὶ οὐ δυσχεραντέον πολεμικοῖς ἀνθρώποις τὸν τοιοῦτον θεόν, ἀλλὰ τιμητέον, ὡς ὄντα αἰεὶ τῷ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένει ἄριστον· κοινωνία γὰρ ψυχῆ καὶ σώματι, διαλύσεως οὐκ ἔστιν ἢ κρείττον, ὡς ἐγὼ φαίην ἂν, σπουδῇ λέγων·

\* De Natur. Deor. lib. ii. cap. xxvii. p. 2094. oper.

Neither ought military men to be troubled or offended at this God Pluto, but highly to honour him, as who always is the most beneficent to mankind. For I affirm, with the greatest seriousness, that the union of the soul with this terrestrial body is never better than the dissolution or separation of them.—Pluto, therefore, according to Plato, is nothing else but a name for that part of the Divine Providence, that is exercised upon the souls of men, in their separation from these earthly bodies. And upon this account was Pluto styled by Virgil,<sup>a</sup> the Stygian Jupiter. But by others Pluto, together with Ceres, is taken in a larger sense, for the manifestation of the Deity in this whole terrestrial globe; and thus is the writer De Mundo<sup>b</sup> to be understood, when he tells us, that God or Jupiter is οὐράνιος τε καὶ χθόνιος, πάσης ἐπιώνυμος ὧν φύσεως τε καὶ τύχης, ἀτε πάντων αὐτὸς αἴτιος ὧν both celestial and terrestrial, he being denominated from every nature, forasmuch as he is the cause of all things.—Pluto therefore is Ζεὺς χθόνιος or καταχθόνιος, the terrestrial (also as well as the Stygian and subterranean) Jupiter; and that other Jupiter, which is distinguished both from Pluto and Neptune, is properly Ζεὺς οὐράνιος, the heavenly Jupiter—God as manifesting himself in the heavens. Hence is it, that Zeus and Hades, Jupiter and Pluto, are made to be one and the same thing, in that passage, which Julian<sup>c</sup> cites as an oracle of Apollo, but others impute to Orpheus,

Εἰς Ζεὺς, εἰς Αἰδης.

Jupiter and Pluto are one and the same God. As

<sup>a</sup> Æneid. lib. vii. ver. 327.

<sup>b</sup> Cap. vii. p. 869. oper. Aristot.

<sup>c</sup> Orat. iv. in Regem Solem, p. 136.

also that Euripides, in a place before produced, is so doubtful whether he should call the supreme God (τὸν πάντων μεδέοντα, that takes care of all things here below) Zeus or Hades :

———— Ζεὺς, εἴτε Ἅιδης  
Ὀνομαζόμενος στίβγαις

Whether thou hadst rather be called Jupiter or Pluto.

Lastly, Hermesianax the Colophonian poet, in those verses of his (afterwards to be set down) makes Pluto in the first place (with many other Pagan gods) to be really one and the same with Jupiter.

That Neptune was also another name of the supreme God, from another particular consideration of him, namely, as acting in the seas (at least according to the arcane and natural theology of the Pagans), is plainly declared by divers of the ancients. Xenocrates in Stobæus,<sup>a</sup> and Zeno in Laertius,<sup>b</sup> affirm, that God as acting in the water is called Posidone or Neptune. To the same purpose Balbus in Cicero: “Sed tamen his De N. D. l. ii. [cap. xxviii. p. 2996.] fabulis spretis ac repudiatis, Deus pertinens per naturam cujusque rei, per terras Ceres, per maria Neptunus, alii per alia, poterunt intelligi, qui qualesque sint,” &c. But these poetic fables concerning the gods being despised and rejected, it is easy for us to understand, how God passing through the nature of every thing, may be called by several names, as through the earth Ceres (and Pluto), through the seas Neptune, and through other parts of the world by other names:—so that all these titular gods were

<sup>a</sup> Eclog. Physic. lib. i. cap. ix. p. 56,

<sup>b</sup> Lib. vii. scgm. 147. p. 458.

but so many several denominations of one supreme Deity. And Cotta afterward thus represents the sense of this theology: "Neptunum esse dicis animum cum intelligentia per mare pergentem, idem de Cerere." Your meaning is, Neptune is a mind, which with understanding passes through the sea, and the like of Ceres through the earth.—Lastly, to name no more,

Maximus Tyrius agreeth also herewith, Dissert. 30. [cap. xxix. p. 290.] *καλεῖ τὸν μὲν Δία νοῦν πρεσβύτατον, &c. τὸν δὲ Ποσειδῶν, πνεῦμα διὰ γῆς καὶ θαλάττης ἰὼν, οἰκονομοῦν αὐτῶν τὴν στάσιν καὶ τὴν ἁρμονίαν.* You are to call Jupiter that princely mind, which all things follow and obey, &c. and Neptune that spirit, which passing through the earth and sea, causes their state and harmony.

Lastly, That these three, Jupiter, Neptune and Pluto, were not three really distinct substantial beings, but only so many several names for one supreme God (according to the true and natural theology of the Pagans), is thus plainly declared by Pausanias in his *Corinthiacs*;<sup>\*</sup> he there expounding the meaning of a certain statue of Jupiter with three eyes (called the country Jupiter of the Trojans) in this manner: *τρεις δὲ ὀφθαλμοὺς ἔχειν ἐπὶ τῷδε ἂν τις τεκμαίροιο αὐτόν· Δία γὰρ ἐν οὐρανῷ βασιλεύειν, οὗτος μὲν λόγος κοινὸς πάντων ἐστὶν ἀνθρώπων. Ὀν δὲ ἄρχειν φασὶν ὑπὸ γῆς, ἔστιν ἔπος τῶν Ὀμήρου Δία ὀνομάζον καὶ τοῦτον,*

*Ζεὺς τε καταχθόνιος, καὶ ἑκατὴ Περσεφόνηα.*

*Αἰσχύλος δὲ ὁ Εὐφορίωνος καλεῖ Δία καὶ τὸν ἐν θαλάσῃ· Τρισὶν οὖν ὀρῶντα ἐποίησεν ὀφθαλμοῖς ὅστις δὴ οὖν ὁ ποιήσας,*

<sup>\*</sup> Lib. ii. cap. xxiv. p. 166.

ἄτε ἐν ταῖς τρισὶ ταῖς λεγομέναις λήξουσιν ἄρχοντα τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦτον θεόν· Now that this statue of Jupiter was made to have three eyes, one may guess this to have been the reason; because first the common speech of all men makes Jupiter to reign in the heaven. Again, he that is said to rule under the earth, is in a certain verse of Homer called Zeus or Jupiter too, namely, the infernal or subterraneous Jupiter, together with Proserpina. And, lastly, Æschylus, the son of Euphorion, calls that God, who is the king of the sea also, Jupiter. Wherefore this statuary made Jupiter with three eyes, to signify, that it is one and the same God, which ruleth in those three several parts of the world, the heaven, the sea, and the earth.—Whether Pausanias were in the right or no, as to his conjecture concerning this three-eyed statue of Jupiter, it is evident, that himself, and other ancient Pagans, acknowledged Jupiter, Neptune, and Pluto, to be but three several names, and partial considerations of one and the same God, who ruleth over the whole world. And since both Proserpina and Ceres were really the same with Pluto, and Salacia with Neptune; we may well conclude, that all these, Jupiter, Neptune, Salacia, Pluto, Proserpina, and Ceres, though several poetical and political gods, yet were really taken but for one and the same natural and philosophical God.

Moreover, as Neptune was a name for God, as manifesting himself in the sea, and ruling over it, so was Juno another name of God, as acting in the air. This is expressly affirmed both by Xenocrates in Stobæus,<sup>a</sup> and Zeno in Laertius.<sup>b</sup>

<sup>a</sup> Ubi supra.

<sup>b</sup> Ubi supra.

And St. Austin\* propounding this query, why Juno was joined to Jupiter as his wife and sister? makes the Pagans answer thus to it, “Quia Jovem (inquiunt) in æthere accipimus, in aëre Junonem;” because we call God in the ether Jupiter, in the air Juno.—But the reason, why Juno was feminine and a goddess, is thus given by Cicero,<sup>b</sup> “Effæminarunt autem eum, Junonique tribuerunt, quod nihil est aëre mollius;” they effeminated the air, and attributed it to Juno a goddess, because nothing is softer than it.—Minerva was also sometimes taken for a special or particular god, and then was it nothing (as Zeno informs us) but a name for the supreme God, as passing through the (higher) ether: which gave occasion to St.

Austin thus to object against the Pagan theology: “Si ætheris partem superiorem Minerva tenere dicitur, et hac occasione fingere poetas, quod de Jovis capite nata sit, cur non ergo ipsa potius deorum regina deputatur, quod sit Jove superior?” If Minerva be said to possess the highest part of the ether; and the poets therefore to have feigned her to have been begotten from Jupiter’s head, why is not she rather called the queen of the gods, since she is superior to Jupiter?—Furthermore, as the supreme God was called Neptune in the sea, and Juno in the air, so by the same reason may we conclude, that he was called Vulcan in the fire. Lastly, as the sun and moon were themselves sometime worshipped by the Pagans for inferior deities, they being supposed to be animated with particular souls of their own; so was the supreme

\* *De Civit. Dei*, lib. iv. cap. x. p. 74.

<sup>b</sup> *De Natur. Deor.* lib. ii. cap. xxvi. p. 2994. tom. ix. oper.

God also worshipped in them both (as well as in other parts of the world); and that under those names of Apollo and Diana. Thus the Pagans; appointing a God to preside over every part of the world, did thereby but make the supreme God polyonymous, all those gods of theirs being indeed nothing but several names of him. Which theology of the ancient Pagans, Maximus Tyrius, treating concerning Homer's philosophy (after he had mentioned his tripartite empire of the world, shared between Jupiter, Neptune, and Pluto), thus declareth: *Εύροις δ' ἂν καὶ ἄλλας παρ' Ὀμήρῳ ἀρχὰς καὶ γενέσεις παντοδαπῶν ὀνομάτων.* Dissert. xvi. p. 163. ὦν ὁ μὲν ἀνόητος ὡς μύθων ἀκούει, ὁ δὲ φιλόσοφος ὡς πραγμάτων. ἔστιν αὐτῷ καὶ ἀρετῆς ἀρχή· ἀλλ' Ἀθηνᾶ λέγεται, &c. You may find also in Homer other principles and the originals of several names: which the ignorant hear as fables, but a philosopher will understand as things and realities. For he assigns a principle of virtue and wisdom, which he calls Minerva; another of love and desire, which he calls Venus; another of artificialness, and that is Vulcan, who rules over the fire. And Apollo also with him presides over dancings, the muses over songs, Mars over war, Æolus over winds, and Ceres over fruits.— And then does he conclude thus, *Καὶ οὐδὲν μέρος Ὀμήρῳ ἄθεον; οὐδὲ δυνάστου ἄπορον; οὐδὲ ἀρχῆς ἔρημον, ἀλλὰ πάντα μεστὰ θεῶν ὀνομάτων, καὶ θεῶν λόγων, καὶ θείας τέχνης.* So that no part neither of nature, nor of the world, is to Homer godless (or void of a God) none destitute of a ruler, or without a superior government; but all things full of Divine names, and of Divine reason, and of Divine art.— Where his *θεῖα ὀνόματα*, his Divine names—are



nothing but several names of God, as manifesting himself variously in the several things of nature, and the parts of the world, and as presiding over them.

Wherefore, besides those special gods of the Pagans, already mentioned, that were appointed to preside over several parts of the world, there are others, which are but several names of the supreme God neither, as exercising several offices and functions in the world, and bestowing several gifts upon mankind : as when in giving corn and fruits, he is called Ceres ; in bestowing wine, Bacchus ; in men's recovery of their health, Æsculapius ; in presiding over traffic and merchandizing, Mercury ; in governing military affairs, Mars ; in ordering the winds, Æolus ; and the like.

That the more philosophic Pagans did thus really interpret the fables of the gods, and make their many poetical and political gods to be all of them but one and the same supreme natural God, is evident from the testimonies of Antisthenes, Plato, Xenocrates, Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus (who allegorized all the fables of the gods accordingly), and of Scævola the Roman Pontifex, of Cicero, Varro, Seneca, and many others. But that even their poets also did sometimes venture to broach this arcane theology, is manifest from those fragments preserved of Hermetianax the Colophonian amongst the Greeks, and of Valerius Soranus amongst the Latins ; the former thus enumerating the chief Pagan gods, and declaring them to be all but one and the same Numen :

Πλούτων, Περσεφώνη, Δημήτριος, Κόρη, Ἑστίας,  
Τελτωνίς, Νηρηΐς, Τηθύς, καὶ Κουνοχάλτης,

Ἐγὼ δὲ ἠφαιστὸς τε κλυτὸς Πάν, Ζεὺς τε καὶ Ἥρα,  
Ἄρταμις, ἢ ἱεράργος Ἀπόλλων, εἷς θεὸς ἴσται.

Pluto, Persephone, Ceres, et Venus alma, et Amores,  
Tritones, Nereus, Tothys, Neptunus et ipse,  
Mercurius, Juno, Vulcanus, Jupiter, et Pan,  
Diana, et Phoebus Jaculator, sunt Deus unus.

The latter \* pronouncing universally, that Jupiter  
Omnipotens is

—————Dens unus et omnes,

one God, and all gods. Whether by his Jupiter he here meant the soul of the world only, as Varro would interpret him, agreeably to his own hypothesis, or whether an abstract mind superior to it; but probably he made this Jupiter to be all gods, upon these two accounts; first, as he was the begetter and creator of all the other natural gods, which were the Pagans' inferior deities (as the stars and demons); secondly, as that all the other poetical and political gods were nothing else but several names and notions of him.

We shall add, in the last place, that St. Austin, making a more full and particular enumeration of the Pagan gods, and mentioning amongst them many others besides the select Roman gods (which are not now commonly taken notice of), does pronounce universally of them all, according to the sense of more intelligent Pagans, that they were but one and the same Jupiter: "Ipse in æthere sit Jupiter, ipse in aëre Juno, ipse in mari Neptunus, in inferioribus etiam maris ipse Salacia, in terra Pluto, in terra inferiore Proserpina, in focis domesticis Vesta, in

D. Civ. D.  
l. iv. c. xi.  
[p. 76.]

\* Apud Augustin. de Civit. Dei, lib. vii. cap. ix. p. 131.

fabrorum fornace Vulcanus, in divinantibus Apollo, in merce Mercurius, in Jano initiator, in Termino terminator, Saturnus in tempore, Mars et Bellona in bellis, Liber in vineis, Ceres in frumentis, Diana in silvis, Minerva in ingeniis. Ipse sit postremo etiam illa turba quasi plebeiorum deorum, ipse præsit nomine Liberi virorum seminibus, et nomine Liberæ fœminarum. Ipse sit Diespiter, qui partum perducit ad diem: ipse sit dea Mena, quam præfecerunt menstruis fœminarum; ipse Lucina, quæ a parturientibus invocatur, ipse opem ferat nascentibus, excipiens eos sinu terræ, et vocetur Opis. Ipse in vagitu os aperiat, et vocetur, Deus Vagitanus. Ipse levet de terra, et vocetur dea Levana. Ipse cunas tueatur et vocetur dea Cunnina. Sit ipse in deabus illis, quæ fata nascentibus canunt, et vocantur Carmentes. Præsit fortuitis, voceturque Fortuna. In Diva Rumina mammam parvulis immulgeat. In Diva Potina potionem immisceat. In Diva Educa escam præbeat. De pavore infantium Paventia nuncupetur. De spe quæ venit Venilia; de voluptate Volupia. De actu Agenoria. Destimulis, quibus ad nimium actum homo impellitur, dea Stimula nominetur. Strenua dea sit, strenuum faciendo. Numeria quæ numerare doceat; Camæna quæ canere. Ipse sit et Deus Consus præbendo consilia; et Dea Sentia sententias inspirando. Ipse dea Juventas, quæ post prætextam excipiat juvenilis ætatis exordia. Ipse sit Fortuna Barbata, quæ adultos barba induit, quos honorare voluerit. Ipse in Jugatino Deo conjuges jungat; et cum virgini uxori zona solvitur, ipse invocetur et dea Virginensis invocetur. Ipse sit Mutinus, qui est apud Græcos Priapus, si non pudet. Hæc omnia quæ dixi,

et quæcunque non dixi, hi omnes dii deæque sit unus Jupiter; sive sint, ut quidam volunt, omnia ista partes ejus, sicut eis videtur, quibus eum placet esse mundi animum; sive virtutes ejus, quæ sententia velut magnorum multorumque doctorum est." Let us grant, according to the Pagans, that the supremè God is in the ether Jupiter; in the air Juno; in the sea Neptune; in the lower parts of the sea Salacia; in the earth Pluto; in the inferior parts thereof Proserpina; in the domestic hearths Vesta; in the smiths' forges Vulcan; in divination Apollo; in traffic and merchandize Mercury; in the beginnings of things Janus; in the ends of them Terminus; in time Saturn; in wars Mars and Bellona; in the vineyards Liber; in the corn-fields Ceres; in the woods Diana; and in wits Minerva. Let him be also that troop of plebeian gods; let him preside over the seeds of men under the name of Liber, and of women under the name of Libera; let him be Diespiter, that brings forth the birth to light; let him be the goddess Mena, whom they have set over women's monthly courses; let him be Lucina, invoked by women in child-bearing; let him be Opis, who aids the new-born infants; let him be Deus Vagitanus, that opens their mouths to cry; let him be the goddess Levana, which is said to lift them up from the earth; and the goddess Cunina, that defends their cradles; let him be the Carmentes also, who foretel the fates of infants; let him be Fortune, as presiding over fortuitous events; let him be Diva Rumina, which suckles the infant with the breasts; Diva Potina, which gives it drink; and Diva Educa, which affords it meat; let him be called the god-

dess Paventia, from the fear of infants; the goddess Venilia, from hope; the goddess Volupia, from pleasure; the goddess Agenoria, from acting; the goddess Stimula, from provoking; the goddess Strenua, from making strong and vigorous; the goddess Numeria, which teacheth to number; the goddess Camæna, which teaches to sing; let him be Deus Consus, as giving counsel; and Dea Sentia, as inspiring men with sense; let him be the goddess Juventas, which has the guardianship of young men; and Fortuna Barbata, which upon some more than others liberally bestoweth beards; let him be Deus Jugatinus, which joins man and wife together; and Dea Virginensis, which is then invoked, when the girdle of the bride is loosed; lastly, let him be Mutinus also (which is the same with Priapus amongst the Greeks), if you will not be ashamed to say it. Let all these gods and goddesses, and many more (which I have not mentioned), be one and the same Jupiter, whether as parts of him, which is agreeable to their opinion, who hold him to be the soul of the world; or else as his virtues only, which is the sense of many and great Pagan doctors.

But that the authority and reputation of a late learned and industrious writer, G. I. Vossius, may not here stand in our way, or be a prejudice to us, we think it necessary to take notice of one passage of his, in his book *De Theologia Gentili*, and freely to censure the same; where, treating concerning that Pagan goddess Venus, he writeth thus: “*Ex philosophica de diis doctrina, Venus est vel Luna (ut vidimus) vel Lucifer, sive Herperus. Sed ex poetica ac civili, supra hos cælos*

statuuntur mentes quædam a syderibus diversæ : quomodo Jovem, Apollinem, Junonem, Venerem, cæterosque Deos Consentes, considerare jubet Apuleius. Quippe eos (inquit), natura visibus nostris denegavit : necnon tamen intellectu eos mirabundi contemplamur, acie mentis acrius contemplantes. Quid apertius hic, quam ab eo per Deos Consentes intelligi, non corpora cœlestia vel subcœlestia, sed sublimiorem quandam naturam, nec nisi animis conspicuam?" According to the philosophic doctrine concerning the gods, Venus is either the moon, or Lucifer, or Hesperus ; but according to the poetic and civil theology of the Pagans, there were certain eternal minds, placed above the heavens, distinct from the stars : accordingly as Apuleius requires us to consider Jupiter and Apollo, Juno and Venus, and all those other gods called Consentes ; he affirming of them, that though nature had denied them to our sight, yet notwithstanding, by the diligent contemplation of our minds, we apprehend and admire them. Where nothing can be more plain (saith Vossius) than that the Dii Consentes were understood by Apuleius, neither to be celestial nor subcelestial bodies, but a certain higher nature perceptible only to our minds. Upon which words of his we shall make these following remarks ; first, that this learned writer seems here, as also throughout that whole book of his, to mistake the philosophic theology of Scævola and Varro, and others, for that which was physiological only (which physiological theology of the Pagans will be afterwards declared by us). For the philosophic theology of the Pagans did not deify natural and sensible bodies only, but the

principal part thereof was the asserting of one supreme and universal Numen, from whence all their other gods were derived. Neither was Venus, according to this philosophic and arcane theology, taken only for the moon, or for Lucifer, or Hesperus, as this learned writer conceives, but, as we have already proved, for the supreme Deity also, either according to its universal notion, or some particular consideration thereof. Wherefore the philosophic theology, both of Scævola and Varro, and others, was called natural, not as physiological only (in another sense), as real and true; it being the theology neither of cities, nor of stages, or theatres, but of the world, and of the wise men in it: philosophy being that properly, which considers the absolute truth and nature of things. Which philosophic theology therefore was opposed, both to the civil and poetical, as consisting in opinion and fancy only. Our second remark is, that Vossius does here also seem incongruously to make both the civil and poetical theology, as such, to philosophize; whereas the first of these was properly nothing but the law of cities and commonwealths, together with vulgar opinion and error; and the second nothing but fancy, fiction, and fabulosity. "Poetarum ista sunt," saith Cotta in Cicero; "nos autem philosophi esse volumus, rerum authores, non fabularum." Those things belong to poets, but we would be philosophers, authors of things (or realities), and not of fables.—But the main thing which we take notice of in these words of Vossius is this, that they seem to imply the *Consentes*, and *select*, and other civil and poetical gods of

\* *De Natur. Deor. lib.iii. cap. xxxi. p. 3096. tom. ix. opet.*

the Pagans, to have been generally accounted so many substantial and eternal minds, or understanding beings supercelestial and independent; their Jupiter being put only in an equality with Apollo, Juno, Venus, and the rest. For which, since Vossius pretends no other manner of proof than only from Apuleius's *De Deo Socratis*, who was a Platonic philosopher; we shall here make it evident, that he was not rightly understood by Vossius neither: which yet ought not to be thought any derogation from this eminent philologer (whose polymathy and multifarious learning are readily acknowledged by us), that he was not so well versed in all the niceties and punctilios of the Platonic school. For though Apuleius does in that book, besides those visible gods the stars, take notice of another kind of invisible ones, such as the twelve *Consentes*, and others, which (he saith) we may "*animis conjectare, per varias utilitates in vita agenda, animadversas in iis rebus, quibus eorum singuli curant,*" make a conjecture of by our minds from the various utilities in human life, perceived from those things, which each of these take care of:—yet that he was no bigot in this civil theology, is manifest from hence, because in that very place, he declares as well against superstition, as irreligious profaneness. And his design there was plainly no other, than to reduce the civil and poetical theologies of the Pagans into some handsome conformity and agreement with that philosophical, natural, and real theology of theirs, which derived all the gods from one supreme and universal Numen: but this he endeavours to do in the Platonic way, himself being much addicted to that philosophy. "Hos



deos in sublimi ætheris vertice locatos, Plato existimat veros, incorporales, animales sine ullo neque fine neque exordio, sed prorsus ac retro æviternos, corporis contagione sua quidem natura remotos, ingenio ad summam beatitudinem porrecto, &c. Quorum parentem, qui omnium rerum dominator atque auctor est, solum ab omnibus nexibus patiendi aliquid gerendive, nulla vice ad alicujus rei mutua obstrictum, cur ego nunc dicere exordiar? Cum Plato cœlesti facundia præditus, frequentissime prædicet, hunc solum majestatis incredibili quadam nimietate et ineffabili, non posse penuria sermonis humani quavis oratione vel modice comprehendere." All these gods placed in the highest ether Plato thinks to be true, incorporeal, animal, without beginning or end, eternal, happy in themselves without any external good. The parent of which gods, who is the Lord and author of all things, and who is alone free from all bonds of doing and suffering, why should I go about in words to describe him? since Plato, who was endued with most heavenly eloquence, equal to the immortal gods, does often declare, that this highest God, by reason of his excess of majesty, is both ineffable and incomprehensible.—From which words of Apuleius it is plain, that, according to him, the twelve Consentes, and all the other invisible gods were derived from one original Deity, as their parent and author. But then if you demand, what gods of Plato these should be, to which Apuleius would here accommodate the civil and poetic gods contained in those two verses of Ennius,

Juno, Vesta, Minerva, Ceres, Diana, Venus, Mars,  
Mercurius, Jovi, Neptunus, Vulcanus, Apollo,

And the rest of this kind, that is, all their other gods (properly so called) invisible? we reply, that these are no other than Plato's ideas, or first paradigms and patterns of things in the archetypal world, which is the Divine Intellect (and his second hypostasis) derived from his first original Deity, and most simple monad. For as Plato writeth in his *Timæus*: *Ἀνάγκη τόνδε τὸν κόσμον, εἰκόνα τινὸς εἶναι*, This sensible world must needs be the image of another intelligible one. And again afterwards, *τίμι τῶν ζώων αὐτὸν εἰς ὁμοίωτα ὁ ξυριστὰς ξυνέστησε; τῶν μὲν οὖν ἐν μέρους εἶδει πεφυκότων μηδενὶ καταξιώσωμεν ἀτε-* Plato in *Tim.* p. 30. [cap. xv. p. 238.]  
*λεῖ γὰρ εἰκοὸς οὐδέν ποτ' ἂν γένοιτο καλόν. οὐ δ' ἔστι τᾶλλα ζῶα καθ' ἐν καὶ κατὰ γένη μόρια, πάντων ὁμοιώτατον αὐτῷ εἶναι τιθῶμεν. Τὰ γὰρ δὴ νοητὰ ζῶα πάντα ἐκείνο ἐν ἑαυτῷ περιλαβὼν ἔχει, καθάπερ ὁδε ὁ κόσμος ἡμᾶς, ὅσα τε ἄλλα θρέμματα συνέστηκεν ὁρατά.* What animal was the pattern, according to whose likeness he that made this great animal of the world, formed it? Certainly, we must not think it to be any particular animal, since nothing can be perfect, which is made according to an imperfect copy. Let us therefore conclude it to be that animal, which containeth all other animals in it as its parts. For that intelligible world containeth all intelligible animals in it, in the same manner as this sensible world doth us, and other sensible animals.—Wherefore Plato himself, here and elsewhere, speaking obscurely of this intelligible world, and the ideas of it, no wonder, if many of his Pagan followers have absurdly made so many distinct animals and gods of them. Amongst whom Apuleius accordingly would refer all the

civil and poetic gods of the Pagans (I mean their gods, properly so called invisible) to this intelligible world of Plato's, and those several ideas of it. Neither was Apuleius singular in this, but others of the Pagan theologers did the like; as, for example, Julian in his book against the

S. Cyril.  
cont. Jul.  
l. ii. p. 65.

Christians : Θεοὺς ὀνομάζει Πλάτων τοὺς ἔμφανεις, ἥλιον, καὶ σελήνην, ἄστρα καὶ οὐρανὸν, ἀλλ' οὗτοι τῶν ἀφανῶν εἰσιν εἰκόνες· ὁ φαινόμενος τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς ἥλιος, τοῦ νοητοῦ καὶ μὴ φαινομένου· καὶ πάλιν, ἡ φαινόμενη τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς ἡμῶν σελήνη, καὶ τῶν ἄστρον ἕκαστον, εἰκόνες εἰσὶ τῶν νοητῶν· ἐκείνους οὖν τοὺς ἀφανεῖς θεοὺς ἐννύπαρχοντας καὶ συννύπαρχοντας, καὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ γεννηθέντας, καὶ προελθόντας, ὁ Πλάτων οἶδεν· εἰκόντως οὖν φησὶν ὁ δημιουργὸς ὁ παρ' αὐτῶ, θεοὶ, πρὸς τοὺς ἀφανεῖς λέγων, θεῶν, τῶν ἔμφανῶν δηλονότι· κοινὸς δὲ ἀμφοτέρων δημιουργὸς οὗτός ἐστιν, ὁ τεχνησάμενος οὐρανὸν καὶ γῆν, καὶ θάλασσαν, καὶ ἄστρα γενήσας τὰ τούτων ἀρχέτυπα· Plato, indeed, speaketh of certain visible gods, the sun, and the moon, and the stars, and the heaven; but these are all but images of other invisible gods; that visible sun, which we see with our eyes, is but an image of another intelligible and invisible one: so likewise the visible moon, and every one of the stars, are but the images and resemblances of another moon, and of other stars intelligible. Wherefore Plato acknowledged also these other invisible gods, inexisting and coexisting with the Demiurgus, from whom they were generated and produced. That Demiurgus in him thus bespeaking these invisible and intelligible gods; Ye gods of gods, that is, ye invisible gods, who are the gods and causes of the visible gods. There is one common maker therefore of both these kinds

of gods ; who first of all made a heaven, earth, sea, and stars, in the intelligible world, as the archetypes and paradigms of these in the sensible.—Where St. Cyril in his Confutation writeth thus ; "Εουκε δὲ διὰ τούτων ὁ γενναῖος ἡμῖν Ἰουλιανός, τὰς ἰδέας βούλεισθαι καταδηλοῦν, ἅς, ποτὲ μὲν οὐσίας, καὶ ὑφισταναὶ καθ' ἑαυτὰς διίσχυρίζεται Πλάτων, ποτὲ δὲ καὶ ἐννοίας εἶναι θεῶν διορίζεται πλὴν ὅπως περ ἂν ἔχοι, καὶ τοῖς αὐτοῦ μαθηταῖς ἀπαράδεκτον εἶναι φασὶ τὸν ἐπὶ τῷδε λόγον οἱ ταῦτα τεχνύται· τὰ γὰρ εἶδη χαιρέτω, φησὶν ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης, τερπελίσματα γὰρ ἐστί, καὶ εἰ ἔστιν, οὐδὲν πρὸς τὸν λόγον. This our excellent Julian, by his intelligible and invisible gods, seems here to mean those ideas, which Plato sometimes contends to be substances, and to subsist alone by themselves, and sometimes again determineth to be nothing but notions or conceptions in the mind of God. But however the matter be, the skilful in this kind of learning affirm, that these ideas have been rejected by Plato's own disciples ; Aristotle discarding them as figments, or at least such, as being mere notions, could have no real causality and influence upon things.—But the meaning of this Pagan theology may be more fully understood from what the same St. Cyril thus further objecteth against it : Προσεπάγει δὲ ὅτι καὶ τῶν ἐμφανῶν καὶ τῶν νοητῶν δημιουργός ἐστιν ὁ τῶν ὄλων θεός, ὁ γῆν καὶ οὐρανὸν τεχνησάμενος, ὅτε τοίνυν, καθὰ καὶ αὐτὸς διωμολόγηκεν ἐναργῶς, τούτων τε κἀκείνων γενεσιουργός ἐστιν ὁ ἀγέννητος θεός, πῶς ἐξ αὐτοῦ γεγενῆσθαι φησὶν αὐτοὺς, συνυπάρχειν τε καὶ ἐνυπάρχειν αὐτῷ, πῶς, εἰπέ μοι, τῷ ἀγεννήτῳ θεῷ συνυπάρξει τὸ γεννητόν ; ἐνυπάρξει δὲ κατὰ ποῖον τρόπον ; ἡμεῖς μὲν γὰρ ἀγέννητον ὄντα τὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ λόγον, συνυπάρχειν ἀναγκαίως τῷ φύσαντι διίσχυρίζομεθα, καὶ ἐνυπάρχειν μὲν αὐτῷ, προελθεῖν δὲ γεννητῶς ἐξ αὐτοῦ· ὁ δὲ γε τῆς Πλάτωνος εὔρεσι-

πέρας συνήγορος ἀκριβῆς, ἀγέννητον μὲν εἶναι φησὶ τὸν ἀνωτάτω Θεόν· ἐνυπάρχειν δὲ καὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ γεννηθῆναι καὶ προελθεῖν τοὺς παρ' αὐτοῦ γεγονότας, τὰ πάντα κυκῶν καὶ συγχέων·

The sense whereof seems to be this : Julian addeth, that the God of the universe, who made heaven and earth, is alike the Demiurgus, both of these sensible, and of the other intelligible things. If therefore the ingenite God be alike the creator of both, how can he affirm those things, that are created by him, to coexist with and inexist in him? How can that, which is created, coexist with the ingenite God? but much less can it inexist in him. For we Christians indeed affirm, that the unmade Word of God doth of necessity coexist with and inexist in the Father, it proceeding from him, not by way of creation, but of generation. But this defender of Platonic trifles, acknowledging the supreme God to be ingenite, affirmeth, notwithstanding, those things, which were made and created by him, to inexist in him; thus mingling and confounding all things.—Where, notwithstanding, Julian and the Platonic Pagans would in all probability reply, that those ideas of the intelligible and archetypal world (which is the first *Noûs*, or Intellect) proceeding from the highest hypostasis, and original Deity, by way of necessary and eternal emanation, are no more to be accounted creatures, than the Christian *Λόγος*; and therefore might, with as little absurdity, be said to exist with and in that first original Deity. But besides, the same Julian, elsewhere in that book of his, accommodates this Platonic notion also to the Pagan gods in particular, in like manner as Apuleius had done before, he writing of *Æsculapius*

after this canting way: 'Ο γὰρ Ζεὺς, ἐν μὲν Cyr. C. Jul.  
 τοῖς νοητοῖς ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ τὸν Ἀσκληπιὸν ἐγέννησεν, l. vi. p. 200.  
 αἷς δὲ τὴν γῆν διὰ τῆς ἡλίου γονίμου ζωῆς ἐξέφηνεν· οὗτος  
 ἐπὶ γῆς ἐξ οὐρανοῦ ποιησάμενος πρόοδον, ἐνοειδῶς μὲν ἐν ἀν-  
 θρώπου μορφῇ περὶ τὴν Ἐπίδαυρον ἐφάνη, &c. Jupiter,  
 amongst the intelligible things, generated out of  
 himself Æsculapius, and by the generative life of  
 the sun manifested him here upon earth, he com-  
 ing down from heaven, and appearing in a human  
 form, first about Epidaurus; and from thence  
 extending his salutary power or virtue over the  
 whole earth.—Where Æsculapius is, first of all,  
 the eternal idea of the medicinal art or skill ge-  
 nerated by the supreme God in the intelligible  
 world; which afterward, by the vivific influence  
 of the sun, was incarnated, and appeared in a  
 human form at Epidaurus. This is the doctrine  
 of that Julian, who was so great an opposer of the  
 incarnation of the eternal Logos in our Saviour  
 Jesus Christ. Neither was this doctrine of many  
 intelligible gods, and powers eternal (of which  
 the archetypal world consisteth), first invented by  
 Platonic Pagans, after the times of Christianity,  
 as some might suspect; but that there was such  
 a thing extant before amongst them also, may be  
 concluded from this passage of Philo's: De Confus. l.  
 Ἐἷς ὢν ὁ θεὸς ἀμυθήτους περὶ αὐτὸν ἔχει δυνάμεις occxlv. Par.  
 ἀρωγούς καὶ σωτηρίους τοῦ γενομένου πάσας· δι' αὐτῶν  
 τῶν δυνάμεων, ὁ ἀσώματος καὶ νητὸς ἐπάγη κόσμος, τὸ τοῦ  
 φαινομένου τοῦδε ἀρχέτυπον, ἰδέαις ἀοράτοις συσταθεῖς, ὥσπερ  
 οὗτος σώμασιν ὀρατοῖς καταπλαγέντες οὖν τινὲς τὴν ἑκα-  
 τέρου τῶν κόσμων φύσιν, οὐ μόνον ὅλους ἐξεθείωσαν, ἀλλὰ  
 καὶ τὰ κάλλιστα τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς μερῶν, ἡλίον, καὶ σελήνην,  
 καὶ τὸν σύμπαντα οὐρανὸν, ἄπερ οὐδὲν αἰδεσθέντες θεοὺς  
 ἐκάλεσαι. Though God be but one, yet hath he

about himself innumerable auxiliatory powers, all of them salutiferous, and procuring the good of that which is made, &c. Moreover, by these powers, and out of them, is the incorporeal and intelligible world compacted, which is the archetype of this visible world, that consisting of invisible ideas, as this doth of visible bodies. Wherefore, some admiring, with a kind of astonishment, the nature of both these worlds, have not only deified the whole of them, but also the most excellent parts in them, as the sun, and the moon, and the whole heaven, which they scruple not at all to call gods.—Where Philo seems to speak of a double sun, moon, and heaven, as Julian did, the one sensible, the other intelligible. Moreover, Plotinus himself sometimes complies with this notion, he calling the ideas of the Divine Intellect *νοητούς θεούς*, intelligible gods;—as in that place before cited, where he exhorteth men, ascending upward above the soul of the world, *θεούς ὑμνεῖν νοητούς*, to praise the intelligible gods—that is, the Divine intellect, which, as he elsewhere\* writeth, is both *εἷς καὶ πολλοί*, one and many.

We have now given a full account of Apuleius's sense in that book *De Deo Socratis*, concerning the civil and poetical Pagan gods; which was not to assert a multitude of substantial and eternal deities or minds independent in them, but only to reduce the vulgar theology of the Pagans, both their civil and poetical, into some conformity with the natural, real, and philosophic theology; and this according to Platonic principles. Wherein many other of the Pagan Platonists, both before and after Christianity, con-

\* Vide *Ennead. v. lib. viii. cap. ix. p. 559.*

occurred with him; they making the many Pagan invisible gods to be really nothing but the eternal ideas of the Divine Intellect (called by them the parts of the intelligible and archetypal world), which they supposed to have been the paradigms and patterns, according to which this sensible world, and all particular things therein, were made, and upon which they depended, they being only participations of them. Wherefore, though this may well be looked upon as a monstrous extravagancy in these Platonic philosophers, thus to talk of the Divine ideas, or the intelligible and archetypal paradigms of things, not only as substantial, but also as so many several animals, persons, and gods; it being their humour thus upon all slight occasions to multiply gods: yet nevertheless must it be acknowledged, that they did at the very same time declare all these to have been derived from one supreme Deity, and not only so, but also to exist in it; as they did likewise at other times, when unconcerned in this business of their Pagan Polytheism, freely acknowledge all these intelligible ideas to be really nothing else but *noûmata*, conceptions in the mind of God—or the first Intellect (though not such slight accidental and evanid ones, as those conceptions and modifications of our human souls are); and, consequently, not to be so many distinct substances, persons, and gods (much less independent ones), but only so many partial considerations of the Deity.

What a rabble of invisible gods and goddesses the Pagans had, besides those their *dii nobiles*, and *dii majorum gentium*, their noble and greater gods (which were the *consentes* and *selecti*),



hath been already shewed out of St. Austin, from Varro, and others; as namely, Dea Mena, Deus Vagitanus, Dea Levana, Dea Cunina, Diva Rumina, Diva Potina, Diva Educa, Diva Paventina, Dea Venilia, Dea Agenoria, Dea Stimula, Dea Strenua, Dea Numeria, Deus Consus, Dea Sentia, Deus Jugatinus, Dea Virginensis, Deus Mutinus. To which might be added more out of other places of the same St. Austin, as Dea Deverra, Deus Domiducus, Deus Domitius, Dea Manturna, Deus Pater Subigus, Dea Mater Prema, Dea Pertunda, Dea Rusina, Dea Collatina, Dea Vallonia, Dea Seia, Dea Segetia, Dea Tutilina, Deus Nodotus, Dea Volutina, Dea Patelena, Dea Hostilina, Dea Flora, Dea Lacturtia, Dea Matura, Dea Runcina. Besides which, there are yet so many more of these Pagan gods and goddesses extant in other writers, as that they cannot be all mentioned or enumerated by us; divers whereof have very small, mean, and contemptible offices assigned to them, as their names for the most part do imply; some of which are such, as that they were not fit to be here interpreted. From whence it plainly appears, that there was *μὴδὲν ἄθεον*, nothing at all without a God—to these Pagans, they having so strong a persuasion, that Divine Providence extended itself to all things, and expressing it after this manner, by assigning to every thing in nature, and every part of the world, and whatsoever was done by men, some particular god or goddess by name, to preside over it. Now, that the intelligent Pagans should believe in good earnest, that all these invisible gods and goddesses of theirs were so many several substantial minds, or *understanding beings* eternal and unmade, really exist-

ing in the world, is a thing in itself utterly incredible. For how could any possibly persuade themselves, that there was one eternal unmade mind or spirit; which, for example, essentially presided over the rockings of infant's cradles, and nothing else? another over the sweeping of houses? another over ears of corn? another over the husks of grain? and another over the knots of straw and grass, and the like? And the case is the very same for those other noble gods of theirs (as they call them), the consentes and selecti; since there can be no reason given, why those should, all of them, be so many substantial and eternal spirits self-existent or unmade, if none of the other were such. Wherefore, if these be not all so many several substantial and eternal minds, so many self-existing and independent deities, then must they, of necessity, be either several partial considerations of the Deity, viz. the several manifestations of the Divine Power and Providence personated, or else inferior ministers of the same. And thus have we already shewed, that the more high-flown and Platonic Pagans (as Julian, Apuleius, and others) understood these consentes and select gods, and all the other invisible ones, to be really nothing else but the ideas of the intelligible and archetypal world (which is the Divine Intellect); that is, indeed, but partial considerations of the Deity, as virtually and exemplarily containing all things: whilst others of them, going in a more plain and easy way, concluded these gods of theirs to be all of them but several names and notions of the one supreme Deity, according to the various manifestations of its power in the world; as Seneca<sup>a</sup> ex-

<sup>a</sup> De Beneficiis, lib. iv. cap. viii. p. 427, 428.

pressly affirmeth, not only concerning Fate, Nature, and Fortune, &c. but also Liber Pater, Hercules, and Mercury (before mentioned by him), that they were "omnia ejusdem Dei nomina, varientis sua potestate," all names of one and the same God, as diversely using his power;—and as Zeno in Laertius<sup>a</sup> concludes of all the rest: or else (which amounts to the same thing), that they were the several powers and virtues of one God fictitiously personated and deified; as the Pagans in Eusebius apologize for themselves, that they

Pr. Ev. l. iii. did θεοποιεῖν τὰς ἀοράτους δυνάμεις αὐτοῦ τοῦ  
e. xiii. p. 121. ἐπὶ πᾶσιν, deify nothing but the invisible powers of that God, which is over all.—Nevertheless, because those several powers of the supreme God were not supposed to be all executed immediately by himself, but by certain other ὑποστρογοὶ δυνάμεις, subservient ministers under him, appointed to preside over the several things of nature, parts of the world, and affairs of mankind (commonly called demons); therefore were those gods sometimes taken also for such subservient spirits or demons collectively; as perhaps in this of Epictetus:

L. i. c. i. Πότε ὁ Ζέφυρος πνεύσει; ὅταν αὐτῷ δόξῃ, ὃ βέλ-  
p. 85. τιστε, ἢ τῷ Αἰόλῳ· σὲ γὰρ οὐκ ἐποίησεν ὁ θεὸς  
[apud Arrian.] ταμίαν τῶν ἀνέμων, ἀλλὰ τὸν Αἰόλον· When will Zephyrus, or the west wind, blow? When it seemeth good to himself or to Æolus; for God hath not made thee steward of the winds, but Æolus.

But for the fuller clearing of the whole Pagan theology, and especially this one point thereof, that their Πολυθεΐα was in great part nothing else but Πολυωνυμία, their Polytheism, or multiplicity

<sup>a</sup> Lib. vii. segm. 147. p. 458.

of gods—nothing but the polyonymy of one god, or his being called by many personal proper names, two things are here requisite to be further taken notice of; first, that, according to the Pagan theology, God was conceived to be diffused throughout the whole world, to permeate and pervade all things, to exist in all things, and intimately to act all things. Thus we observed before out of Horus Apollo, <sup>a</sup> that the Egyptian theologers conceived of God, as τοῦ παντός κόσμου τὸ διήκον πνεῦμα, a spirit pervading the whole world;—as likewise they concluded <sup>b</sup> δίχα θεοῦ μηδὲν ὄλως συνιστάται, that nothing at all consisted without God:—Which same theology was universally entertained also amongst the Greeks. For thus Diogenes the Cynic, in Laertius, <sup>c</sup> αὐτοῦ πάντα πλήρη, all things are full of him.—And Aristotle, or the writer De Plantis, makes God not only to comprehend the whole world, but also to be an inward principle of life in animals; τίς οὖν ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρχὴ ἢ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τοῦ ζώου; τί ἄλλο, εἰ μὴ τὸ εὐγενες ζῶον, ὃ τὸν οὐρανὸν περιοδεύει, τὸν ἥλιον, τὰ ἄστρα, καὶ τοὺς πλανήτας.

What is the principle in the life or soul of animals? Certainly no other than that noble animal (or living being) that encompasses and surrounds the whole heaven, the sun, the stars, and the planets.—Sextus Empiricus thus represents the sense of Pythagoras, Empedocles, and all the Italic philosophers; μὴ μόνον ἡμῖν πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς εἶναι τινα κοινωνίαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἄλογα τῶν ζῶων· ἐν γὰρ ὑπάρχεν πνεῦμα τὸ διὰ παντός κόσμου διήκον, ψυχῆς τρόπον, τὸ καὶ ἐνοῦν ἡμᾶς πρὸς ἕκαστα. That we

Lib. i. cap. i.  
[tom. iv.  
oper. Arist.  
p. 492.]

Adv. Ma-  
them. p. 331.  
[lib. i. Ad-  
vers. Physic.  
§. 127. p.  
580.]

<sup>a</sup> Hieroglyph. lib. i. cap. lxiv. p. 77.

<sup>b</sup> Ibid. lib. i. cap. xiii. p. 26.

<sup>c</sup> Lib. vi. segm. 37. p. 333.

men have not only a conjunction amongst ourselves with one another, but also with the gods above us, and with brute animals below us; because there is but one spirit, which, like a soul, pervades the whole world, and unites all the parts thereof together.—Clemens Alexandrinus writeth thus of the Stoics, *διὰ πάσης ὕλης, καὶ διὰ τῆς* *Πρότρεπ. π. ἀτιμοσύνης τὸ θεῖον διήκειν λέγουσι;* they affirm, that God doth pervade all the matter of the universe, and even the most vile parts thereof—which that father seems to dislike; as also did Tertullian,<sup>a</sup> when he represented their doctrine thus; “*Stoici volunt Deum sic per materiam decucurrisse, quomodo mel per favos;*” the Stoics will have God so to run through the matter, as the honey doth the combs. Strabo testifies of the ancient Indian Brachmans, *καὶ* *lib. xi. p. πολλῶν τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ὁμοδοξεῖν, ὅτι γὰρ γενητὸς* *730. ὁ κόσμος καὶ φθαρτὸς λέγειν κἀκείνους; ὅτε δι-* *οικῶν αὐτὸν καὶ ποιῶν θεός, δι’ ὅλου διαπεφάιτηεν αὐτοῦ* That in many things they philosophized after the Greekish manner, as when they affirm, that the world had a beginning, and that it would be corrupted, and that the maker governor thereof pervades the whole of it.—The Latins also fully agreed with the Greeks in this; for though Seneca somewhere<sup>b</sup> propounds this question, “*Utrum extrinsecus operi suo circumfusus sit Deus, an toti inditus?*” Whether God be only extrinsically circumfused about his work, the world, or inwardly insinuating do pervade it all? yet himself elsewhere<sup>c</sup> answers it, when he calls God “*Di-*

<sup>a</sup> Advers. Hermogen. cap. xlv. p. 149.

<sup>b</sup> De Otio Sapientis, cap. xxxi. p. 347. tom. i. oper.

<sup>c</sup> De Consol. ad Helviam. cap. viii. p. 106.

vinum spiritum per omnia, maxima, ac minima, æquali intentione diffusum :” a Divine spirit, diffused through all things, whether smallest or greatest, with equal intention. God, in Quintilian’s<sup>a</sup> theology, is “spiritus omnibus partibus immistus;” and “Ille fusus per omnes rerum naturæ partes spiritus,” a spirit which insinuates itself into, and is mingled with, all the parts of the world; and that spirit, which is diffused through all the parts of nature.—Apuleius<sup>b</sup> likewise affirmeth “Deum omnia permeare,” that God doth permeate all things; and that “nulla res est tam præstantibus viribus, quæviduata Dei auxilio, sui natura contenta sit;” there is nothing so excellent or powerful, as that it could be content with its own nature alone, void of the Divine aid or influence. And again, “Dei præstantiam, non jam cogitatio sola, sed oculi, et aures, et sensibilis substantia comprehendit;” that God is not only present to our cogitation, but also to our very eyes and ears, in all these sensible things.—Servius, agreeably with this doctrine of the ancient Pagans, determineth, that “nulla pars elementi sine Deo est,” that there is no part of the elements devoid of God.—And that the poets fully closed with the same theology, is evident from those known passages of theirs, “Jovis omnia plena,”<sup>c</sup> and *μετα-  
ραι δὲ Διὸς πᾶσαι μὲν ἀγυαί,*<sup>d</sup> &c. i. e. “All the things of nature, and parts of the world, are full of God;”—as also from this of Virgil:

Virg. Georg.  
l. iv. [var.  
222.]

<sup>a</sup> Instit. Orator. lib. vii. cap. iii. p. 412.

<sup>b</sup> De Mundo, p. 88; edit. Elmenhorstii.

<sup>c</sup> Virgil. Eclog. iii.

<sup>d</sup> Arabi Phænomen. apud Clement. Alexand. Stromat. lib. v. p. 708.

————— Deum namque ire per omnes  
Terrasque, tractusque maris, coelumque profundum.

Lastly, We shall observe, that both Plato and Anaxagoras, who neither of them confounded God with the world, but kept them both distinct, and affirmed God to be οὐδενὶ μεμιγμένον, *Cratyl.* p. 413. unmingled with any thing;—nevertheless concluded, αὐτὸν πάντα κοσμεῖν τὰ πράγματα διὰ πάντων ἰόντα, that he did order and govern all things passing through and pervading all things;—which is the very same with that doctrine of Christian theologers,\* τὸν θεὸν διὰ πάντων ἀμγῶς δῆκειν, that God permeates and passes through all things, unmingledly.—Which Plato also there, in his *Cratylus*, plainly making δίκαιον to be a name for God, etymologizeth it from διὰ ἰόν, *i. e.* passing through all things, and thereupon gives us the best account of Heraclitus's theosophy, that is any where extant (if not rather a fragment of Heraclitus's own) in these words; ὅσοι γὰρ ἡγούνται τὸ πᾶν εἶναι ἐν πορείᾳ, τὸ μὲν πολὺ αὐτοῦ ὑπολαμβάνουσι τοιοῦτόν τι εἶναι, οἷον οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ χωρεῖν· διὰ δὲ τούτου παντὸς εἶναι τι διεξιόν, δι' οὗ πάντα τὰ γιγνόμενα γίνεσθαι· εἶναι δὲ τάχιστον τοῦτο καὶ λεπτότατον, οὐ γὰρ ἂν δύνασθαι ἄλλως διὰ τοῦ ὄντος εἶναι παντὸς, εἰ μὴ λεπτότατόν τε ἦν, ὥστε αὐτὸ μηδὲν στέγειν, καὶ τάχιστον, ὥστε χρῆσθαι ὡσπερ ἐστῶσι τοῖς ἄλλοις, ἐπεὶ δὲ οὖν ἐπιτροπενεῖ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα διαῖον, τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα ἐκλήθη ὀρθῶς δίκαιον, εὐστομίας ἕνεκα, τὴν τοῦ κ δύναμιν προσλαβόν· They who affirm the universe to be in constant motion, suppose a great part thereof to do nothing else but move and change; but that there is something, which passes through and pervades this whole universe, by which all those things that are

\* *Joh. Damascen. de orthodoxa fide, lib. i. cap. xiii. p. 149. tom. i. oper. edit. Lequien.*

made, are made: and that this is both the most swift and most subtile thing; for it could not otherwise pass through all things, were it not so subtile, that nothing could keep it out or hinder it; and it must be most swift, that it may use all things, as if they stood still, that so nothing might escape it. Since therefore this doth preside over, and order all things, permeating and passing through them, it is called *δικαιον*, quasi *δαιών*; the letter cappa being only taken in for the more handsome pronounciation.—Here we have therefore Heraclitus's description of God; namely this; *τὸ λεπτότατον καὶ τὸ τάχιστον, διὰ παντός διεξίον, δι' οὗ πάντα τὰ γινόμενα γίνονται*, that most subtile and most swift substance, which permeates and passes through the whole universe, by which all things that are made, are made.—Now, saith Plato, some of these Heraclitics say, that this is fire, others that it is heat; but he, deriding both these conceits, concludes, with Anaxagoras, that it is a perfect mind, unmixed with any thing; which yet permeating and passing through all things, frames, orders, and disposes all.

Wherefore this being the universally-received doctrine of the Pagans, that God was a spirit or substance diffused through the whole world, which permeating and inwardly acting all things, did order all; no wonder if they called him, in several parts of the world and things of nature, by several names; or, to use Cicero's language, \* no wonder, if "Deus pertinens per naturam cujusque rei, per terras Ceres, per maria Neptunus," &c. if God, pervading the nature of every thing, were in the earth called Ceres, in the sea Neptune, in the air

\* De Natur. Deor. lib. ii. cap. xxviii. p. 2996. oper.



Juno, &c.—And this very account does Paulus Orosius (in his historic work against the Pagans, dedicated to St. Austin) give of the original of the L. vi. c. i. Pagan Polytheism; “*Quidam, dum in* [p. 416.] *multis Deum credunt, multos Deos, indiscreto timore, fixerunt;*” that some, whilst they believe God to be in many things, have therefore, out of an indiscreet fear, feigned many gods:—in which words he intimates, that the Pagans’ many gods were really but several names of one God as existing in many things, or in the several parts of the world, as the same ocean is called by several names, as beating upon several shores.

Secondly, The Pagan theology went sometimes yet a strain higher, they not only thus supposing God to pervade the whole world, and to be diffused through all things (which as yet keeps up some difference and distinction betwixt God and the world), but also himself to be in a manner all things. That the ancient Egyptian theology, from whence the theologies of other nations were derived, ran so high as this, is evident from that excellent monument of Egyptian antiquity, the Saitic inscription often mentioned, “I am all that was, is, and shall be.” And the Trismegistic books insisting so much every where upon this notion, that God is all things (as hath been observed) renders it the more probable, that they were not all counterfeit and supposititious; but that, according to the testimony of Jamblichus, they did at least contain *δόξας Ἑρμαϊκάς*, some of the old Theistical or Hermaical philosophy in them. And from Egypt, in all probability, was this doctrine by Orpheus derived into Greece, the Orphic verses themselves *running* much upon this strain, and the Orphic

theology being thus epitomized by Timotheus, the chronographer; "That all things were made by God, and that himself is all things." To this purpose is that of Æschylus,

Ζεὺς ἕστω αἰθέρ, Ζεὺς δὲ γῆ, Ζεὺς δ' αἰετός·  
Ζεὺς τοὶ τὰ πάντα, καὶ τοὶ τὸν δ' ἴσ' ἐνέπρασεν·

Grot. Exo.  
p. 57.

Et terra, et æther, et poli arx est Jupiter,  
Et cuncta solus, et aliquid sublimius.

And again,

————— Περὶ μὲν ἐς αἴθερα φαίνεται·  
"Ασπαστω ὄραμ'· περὶ δ' ὕδατος, περὶ δὲ γῆρας·  
καὶ θεοῖν αὐτὸς γίνεταί· παραμυθεῖς,  
"Αἴμα, νέφει τε, καὶ ὑπερραῖ, βροντῇ, βροχῇ·

Ib. p. 53.

————— Nunc ut implacabilis  
Apparet ignis : nunc tenebris, nunc aquæ  
Par ille cerni : simulat interdum feram,  
Tonitrua, ventos, fulmina, et nubila.

As also this of Lucan, amongst the Latins,

————— Superos quid quærimus ultra?  
Jupiter est quodcumque vides, quocumque moveris.

Lib. ix.  
v. 589.

Whereunto agree also these passages of Seneca the philosopher, "Quid est Deus? Quod vides totum, et quod non vides, totum." And<sup>b</sup> "Sic solus est omnia; opus suum et extra et intra tenet;" What is God? he is all that you see, and all that you do not see. And he alone is all things, he containing his own work not only without, but also within.—Neither was this the doctrine only of those Pagans, who held God to be the soul of the world, and consequently the whole animated world to be the supreme Deity, but of those

<sup>a</sup> Natural. Quæst. lib. i. Præfat. p. 485. tom. i. oper.

<sup>b</sup> De Benefic. lib. iv. cap. viii. p. 247.

others also, who conceived of God as an abstract mind, superior to the mundane soul, or rather as a simple monad, superior to mind also; as those philosophers, Xenophanes, Parmenides, and Melissus, who described God to be one and all things, they supposing, that, because all things were from him, they must needs have been first in a manner in him, and himself all things. With which agreeth the author of the Asclepian Dialogue, when he maketh *Unus omnia*, and *Creator omnium*, One all things and the Creator of all things, to be but equivalent expressions; and when he affirmeth, that before things were made, “in eo jam tunc erant, unde nasci habuerunt;” they then existed in him from whom afterwards they proceeded.—So likewise the other Trisemegistic books; when they give this account of God’s being both all things that are, and all things that are not, τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὄντα ἐφανερώσῃ, τὰ δὲ μὴ ὄντα ἔχει ἐν ἑαυτῷ, because those things, that are, he hath manifested from himself, and those things, that are not, he still containeth within himself;—or, as it is elsewhere expressed, he doth κρύπτειν, hide them and conceal them in himself. And the Orphic verses gave this same account likewise of God’s being all things, Πάντα τὰδε κρύψας, &c. because he first concealed and hid them all within himself before they were made, and thence afterward from himself displayed them, and brought them forth into light: or because

—Ζεὺς δ’ ἐν γαστέρι πάντα κρύπτει.

before they were produced, they were all contained together in the womb of God.

Now this was not only a further ground of that

seeming Polytheism amongst the Pagans, which was really nothing but the polyonymy of one God, and their personating his several powers; but also of another more strange and puzzling phenomena in their theology, namely, their personating also the parts of the world inanimate, and things of nature, and bestowing the names of gods and goddesses upon them. It was before observed out of Moschopulus, that the Pagans did *ἐνὶ ὀνόματι τότε τὴν δύναμιν ἔχον, καὶ τὸν ἐπιστατούντα τούτῳ θεὸν ὀνομάζειν*, call the things in nature, and the gods, which presided over them, by one and the same name.—As for example, they did not only call the god, which presideth over those arts that operate by fire, Hephæstus or Vulcan, but also fire itself: and Demeter or Ceres was not only taken by them for that god, who was supposed to give corn and fruits, but also for corn itself. So Dionysus or Bacchus did not only signify the god that giveth wine, but also wine itself. And he instancing further in Venus, and Minerva, and the Muses, concludes the same universally <sup>L. v. [p. 236.]</sup> of all the rest. Thus Arnobius, in his book against the Pagans, “in usu sermonis vestri, Martem pro pugna appellatis, pro aqua Neptunum, Liberum Patrem pro vino, Cererem pro pane, Minervam pro stamine, pro obscœnis libidinis Venerem.” Now we will not deny, but that this was sometimes done metonymically, the efficient cause and the ruling or governing principle, being put for the effect, or that which was ruled and governed by it. And thus was war frequently styled Mars; and that of Terence may be taken

De Is. et Os. also in this sense, “Sine Cerere et Libero friget Venus.” And Plutarch (who declares his great dislike of this kind of language conceives, that there was no more at first in it than this; ὡςπερ ἡμεῖς τὸν ὠνοόμενον βιβλία Πλάτωνος, ὠνοίεσθαι φάμεν Πλάτωνα, καὶ Μένανδρος τὸν ὑποκρίεσθαι τὰ Μενάνδρου ποιήματα ὑποκρίεσθαι, οὕτως ἔκείνοι, τοῖς τῶν θεῶν ὀνόμασι τὰ τῶν θεῶν δῶρα καὶ ποιήματα καλεῖν οὐκ ἐφείδοντο, τιμῶντες ὑπὸ χροίας καὶ σεμνύνοντες. As we, when one buys the books of Plato, commonly say, that he buys Plato; and when one acts the plays of Menander, that he acts Menander; so did the ancients not spare to call the gifts and effects of the gods, by the names of those gods respectively, thereby honouring them also for their utility.—But he grants, that afterward this language was by ignorant persons abused, and carried on further, and that not without

great impiety; οἱ δὲ ὕστεροι ἀπαιδέως δεχόμενοι καὶ ἀμαθῶς ἀναστρέφοντες, ἐπὶ τοὺς θεοὺς τὰ πάθη τῶν καρπῶν καὶ τὰς παρουσίας τῶν ἀναγκαιῶν καὶ ἀποκρίσεις, θεῶν γενέσεις καὶ φθοράς, οὐ προσαγορεύοντες μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ νομίζοντες, ἀτόπων καὶ παρανόμων καὶ τετραγαμῆων δοξῶν αὐτοὺς ἐπέπλησαν. Their followers mistaking them, and thereupon ignorantly attributing the passions of fruits (their appearances and occultations) to the gods themselves, that preside over them, and so not only calling them, but also thinking them to be the generations and corruptions of the gods, have by this means filled themselves with absurd and wicked opinions.—Where Plutarch well condemns the vulgar both amongst the Egyptians and Greeks, for that, in their mournful solemnities, they sottishly attributed to the gods the passions

belonging to the fruits of the earth, thereby indeed making them to be gods. Nevertheless the inanimate parts of the world, and things of nature, were frequently deified by the Pagans; not only thus metonymically, but also in a further sense, as Cicero plainly declares; “*Tum illud, quod erat a Deo natum, nomine ipsius Dei nuncupabant, ut cum fruges Cere-  
 rum appellamus, vinum autem Liberum: tum autem res ipsa, in qua vis inest major, sic appellatur, ut ea ipsa res nominetur Deus.*” Both that which proceeds from God, is called by the name of a god, as corn is sometimes thus called Ceres; and wine Liber; and also whatsoever hath any greater force in it, that thing itself is often called a god too. Philo also thus represents the religion of the Pagans, as first deifying corporeal inanimate things, and then bestowing those proper personal names upon them: *ἐκθειώσασιν* De Decal. γὰρ οἱ μὲν τὰς τέσσαρας ἀρχάς, γῆν, καὶ ὕδωρ, καὶ ἀέρα, καὶ πῦρ· οἱ δὲ ἥλιον καὶ σελήνην καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους πλανήτας, καὶ ἀπλανεῖς ἀστέρας· οἱ δὲ μόνον τὸν οὐρανόν, οἱ δὲ σύμπαντα κόσμον· τὸν δὲ ἀνωτάτω καὶ πρεσβύτατον, τὸν γενετήν, τὸν ἄρχοντα τῆς μεγάλης πόλεως, τὸν στρατιάρχην τῆς ἀπητήτου στρατιᾶς, τὸν κυβερνήτην ὃς οἰκονομεῖ σωτηρίως αἰεὶ ἅπαντα, παρεκαλύψαντο, ψευδωνύμους προσρήσεις ἐκείνοις ἐπιφημίσαντες, ἑτέρας ἑτεροῖ· καλοῦσι γὰρ τὴν γῆν Κόρην, Δῆμητρα, Φλούωνα· τὴν δὲ θάλασσαν Ποσειδῶνα, δαίμονας ἐναλίους ὑπάρχους αὐτῷ προσαναπλάττοντες, &c. Ἦσαν δὲ τὸν ἀέρα, καὶ τὸ πῦρ Ἡφαιστον, καὶ ἥλιον Ἀπόλλωνα, καὶ σελήνην Ἄρτεμιν, &c. Some have deified the four elements, the earth, the water, the air and the fire: some the sun and the moon, and the planets and fixed stars: others the heaven, others the whole world. But that

highest and most ancient Being, the parent of all things, the chief prince of this great city, and the emperor of this invincible army, who governeth all things salutiferously, him have they covered, concealed, and obscured, by bestowing counterfeit personal names of gods upon each of these things. For the earth they called Proserpina, Pluto, and Ceres; the sea Neptune, under whom they place many demons and nymphs also as his inferior ministers; the air Juno; the fire Vulcan; the sun Apollo; the moon Diana, &c. and dissecting the heaven into two hemispheres, one above the earth, the other under it, they call these the Dioscuri, feigning them to live alternately one one day, and the other another.—We deny not here, but that the four elements, as well as the sun, moon, and stars, were supposed by some of the Pagans to be animated with particular souls of their own, (which Ammianus Marcellinus<sup>a</sup> seems principally to call “spiritus elementorum,” the spirits of the elements—worshipped by Julian) and upon that account to be so many inferior gods themselves. Notwithstanding which, that the inanimate parts of these were also deified by the Pagans, may be concluded from hence; because Plato, who in his Cratylus etymologizeth Dionysius from giving of wine, and elsewhere calls

the fruits of the earth τὰ Δήμητρος δῶρα,  
 the gifts of Ceres—doth himself nevertheless, in compliance with this vulgar speech, call wine and water as mingled together in a glass (or cup) to be drunk, gods: where he affirmeth,

De Leg. I. vi. that a city ought to be δίκην κρατῆρος κεκρα-  
 μένην, οὗ μαινόμενος μὲν οἶνος ἐγκεχυμένος ζεῖ,

<sup>a</sup> Vide lib. xxi. cap. i. p. 263.

κολαζόμενος δὲ ὑπὸ νήφοντος ἐτέρου θεοῦ, καλὴν κοινωνίαν λαβὼν, ἀγαθὸν πόμα καὶ μέτριον ἀπεργάζεται, so tempered, as in a cup, where the furious wine poured out bubbles and sparkles, but being corrected by another sober god, (that is, by water) both together make a good and moderate potion.—Cicero also tells us, that before the Roman admirals went to sea, they were wont to offer up a sacrifice to the waves. But of this more afterward. However, it is certain, that mere accidents and affections of things in nature were by these Pagans commonly personated and deified; as Time, in Sophocles' *Electra*,<sup>a</sup> is a god; Χρόνος γὰρ εὐμαρῆς Θεός, for Time is an easy god—and Love, in Plato's *Symposium*, where it is wondered at, that no poet had ever made a hymn τῷ Ἔρωτι τηλικούτῳ ὄντι καὶ τοσούτῳ θεῷ, to Love, being such and so great a god.—Though the same Plato, in his *Philebus*, when Protarchus had called Pleasure a goddess too, was not willing to comply so far there with vulgar speech; τὸ δ' ἐμὸν δέος, ὦ Πρωταρχε, αἰὲ πρὸς τὰ τῶν θεῶν ὀνόματα οὐκ ἔστι κατ' ἀνθρώπον, ἀλλὰ πέρα τοῦ μεγίστου φόβου· καὶ νῦν τὴν μὲν Ἀφροδίτην, ὅπη ἐκείνη φίλον, ταύτην προσαγορεύω, τὴν δὲ ἡδονὴν οἶδα ὡς ἔστι ποικίλον· My fear, O Protarchus, concerning the names of the gods is extraordinary great: wherefore, as to Venus, I am willing to call her what she pleases to be called; but Pleasure, I know, is a various and multiform thing.—Wherefore, it cannot be denied, but that the Pagans did in some sense or other deify or theologize all the parts of the

<sup>a</sup> Ex Stobæo apud Hug. Grot. Excerpt. veter. Comicor. et Tragico. p. 66.



world, and things of nature. Which we conceive to have been done at first upon no other ground than this, because God was supposed by them, not only to permeate and pervade all things, to be diffused through all, and to act in and upon all, but also to be himself in a manner all things; which they expressed after this way, by personating the things of nature severally, and bestowing the names of gods and goddesses upon them. Only we shall here observe, that this was done especially (besides the greater parts of the world) to two sorts of things; first, such in which human utility was most concerned; thus Cicero, “*Mul-*  
N. D. l. ii. p. 222. *tæ aliæ naturæ deorum ex magnis beneficiis eorum, non sine causa, et a Græciæ sapientibus, et a majoribus nostris, constitutæ nominatæque sunt:*” Many other natures of gods have been constituted and nominated; both by the wise men of Greece, and by our ancestors, merely for the great benefits received from them.—The reason whereof is thus given by him; “*Quia quicquid magnam utilitatem generi afferret humano, id non sine divina bonitate erga homines fieri arbitrabantur:*” Because they thought, that whatsoever brought any great utility to mankind, this was not without the Divine goodness.—Secondly, such as were most wonderful and extraordinary, or surprising; to which that of Seneca seems pertinent, “*Magnorum fluminum capita veneramur; subita et ex abdito vasti amnis eruptio aras habet: coluntur aquarum calentium fontes; et stagna quædam vel opacitas vel immensa altitudo sacra-*  
Ep. 41. [p. 101. tom. ii. oper.] *vit.*” We adore the rising heads and springs of *great rivers*; every sudden and plentiful eruption

of waters out of the hidden caverns of the earth hath its altars erected to it; and some pools have been made sacred for their immense profundity and opacity.

Now this is that, which is properly called the physiological theology of the Pagans, their personating and deifying (in a certain sense) the things of nature, whether inanimate substances, or the affections of substances. A great part of which physiological theology was allegorically contained in the poetic fables of the gods. Eusebius, indeed, was of opinion, that those poetic fables were at first only historical and herological, but that afterwards some went about to allegorize them into physiological senses, thereby to make them seem the less impious and ridiculous:

*τοιάντη ἦν τὰ τῆς παλαιᾶς θεολογίας, ἣν μεταβα-* Pr. Ev. l. iii.  
*λόντες νέοι τινές, χθές καὶ πρόησ' ἐπιφύοντες, λο-* c. vi. [lib. ii.  
*γκώτερόν τε φιλοσοφεῖν ἀνχοῦντες, τὴν δὲ φυσι-* cap. vi. p. 73.]  
*κωτέραν τῆς περὶ θεῶν ἱστορίας δόξαν εἰσηγήσαντο, σεμνο-*  
*τέρας εὐρεσιολογίας τοῖς μύθοις προσεπινοήσαντες, &c. θερα-*  
*πεῦσαι δὲ οὖν ὁμῶς οἶδε τὸ πατρικὸν ἀμάρτημα προθυμηθέν-*  
*τες, ἐπὶ φυσικὰς διηγήσεις καὶ θεωρίας τοὺς μύθους μετεσκευά-*  
*σαντο.* Such was the ancient theology of the Pagans (namely, historical, of men deceased, that were worshipped for gods) which some late upstarts have altered, devising other philosophical and physiological senses of those histories of their gods, that they might thereby render them the more specious, and hide the impiety of them. For they being neither willing to abandon those fopperies of their forefathers, nor yet themselves able to bear the impiety of these fables (concerning the gods) according to the literal sense of them have gone about to cure them thus by physio-

gical interpretations:—Neither can it be doubted, but that there was some mixture of herology and history in the poetic mythology; nor denied, that the Pagans of latter times, such as Porphyrius and others, did excogitate and devise certain new allegorical senses of their own, such as never were intended; Origen, before both him and

I. iii. c. Cels. Porphyry, noting this of the Pagans, that p. 123.

when the absurdity of their fables concerning the gods was objected and urged against them, some of them did *περὶ τούτων ἀπολογούμενοι ἐπὶ ἀλληγορίας καταφεύγειν*, apologizing for these things, betake themselves to allegories.—But long before the times of Christianity, those first Stoics, Zeno, Cleanthes and Chrysippus, were famous for the great pains which they took in allegorizing these poetic fables of the gods. Of which Cotta in Cicero<sup>a</sup> thus; “Magnam molestiam suscepit et minime necessariam primus Zeno, post Cleanthes, deinde Chrysippus, commentitiarum fabularum reddere rationem, et vocabulorum, cur quidque ita appellatum sit, causas explicare. Quod cum facitis, illud profecto confitemini, longe aliter rem se habere atque hominum opinio sit; eos, qui Dii appellantur, rerum naturas esse, non figuras Deorum.” Zeno first, and after him Cleanthes and Chrysippus, took a great deal more pains than was needful, to give a reason of all those commentitious fables of the gods, and of the names that every thing was called by. By doing which they confessed, that the matter was far otherwise than according to men’s opinion, inasmuch as they, who are called gods in them, were nothing but

<sup>a</sup> De Nat. Deor. lib. ii. cap. xxiv. p. 3089. tom. ix. oper.

the natures of things. From whence it is plain, that, in the poetic theology, the Stoics took it for granted, that the natures of things were personated and deified, and that those gods were not animal, nor indeed philosophical, but fictitious, and nothing but the things of nature allegorized. Origen also gives us a taste of Chrysippus's thus allegorizing, in the interpreting an obscene picture or table of Jupiter and

L. iv. p. 196.

Juno, in Samos; λέγει γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ συγγράμμασιν ὁ σεμνὸς φιλόσοφος, ὅτι τοὺς σπερματικούς λόγους τοῦ θεοῦ ἢ ὕλη παραδεξαμένη, ἔχει ἐν ἑαυτῇ, εἰς κατακόσμησιν τῶν ὄλων· ὕλη γὰρ ἢ ἐν τῇ κατὰ τὴν Σάμον γραφῇ, ἢ Ἥρα, καὶ ὁ θεὸς ὁ Ζεὺς. This grave philosopher, in his writings, saith, that matter having received the spermatic reasons of God, containeth them within itself for the adorning of the whole world; and that Juno, in this picture in Samos, signifies Matter, and Jupiter God.—Upon which occasion that pious father adds, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα δὴ ἡμεῖς, καὶ διὰ τοὺς τοιούτους μύθους καὶ ἄλλους μυθίους, οὐδὲ μέχρι ὀνόματος θέλομεν Δία καλεῖν τὸν ἐπὶ πᾶσι θεὸν, ἀλλὰ καθαρὰν εὐσίβειαν εἰς τὸν δημιουργὸν ἀσκοῦντες, οὐδὲ μέχρι ὀνόματος χροαίνομεν τὰ θεῖα. For the sake of which, and innumerable other such-like fables, we will never endure to call the God over all by the name of Jupiter, but, exercising pure piety towards the Maker of the world, will take care not to defile Divine things with impure names.—And here we see again, according to Chrysippus's interpretation, that Hera or Juno was no animal nor real god, but only the nature of matter personated and deified; that is, a mere fictitious and poetic god. And we think it is unquestionably evident from Hesiod's Theogonia, that many of these poetic fables, accord-

ing to their first intention, were really nothing else but physiology allegorized; and consequently those gods nothing but the natures of things personated and deified. Plato himself, though no friend to these poetic fables, plainly intimates as

P. 378. much, in his second De Rep. καὶ θεομα-  
[p. 430.] χίας ὅσας Ὅμηρος πεποίηκεν, οὐ παραδεκτέον εἰς τὴν πόλιν, οὐτ' ἐν ὑπονοίαις πεποιημένας, οὐτ' ἀνευ ὑπονοιῶν· ὁ γὰρ νέος, οὐχ οἴός τε κρίνειν ὃ, τι τε ὑπόνοια καὶ ὃ μὴ· The fightings of the gods, and such

other things, as Homer hath feigned concerning them, ought not to be admitted into our commonwealth, whether they be delivered in way of allegory, or without allegories; because young men are not able to judge when it is an allegory, and when not.—And it appears from Dionysius Halicarnass. that this was the general opinion concerning the Greekish fables, that some of them were physically, and some tropologically alle-

L. ii. p. 68. gorical: μηδεὶς ὑπολάβοι με ἀγνοᾶν, ὅτι τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν μύθων εἰσὶ τινες ἀνθρώποις χρήσιμοι, οἱ μὲν ἐπιδεικνύμενοι τὰ τῆς φύσεως ἔργα δι' ἀλληγορίας, οἱ δὲ παραμυθίας ἕνεκα συγκείμενοι τῶν ἀνθρωπείων συμφορῶν, &c. Let no man think me to be ignorant, that some of the Greekish fables are profitable to men, partly as declaring the works of nature by

N. D. i. ii. allegories, partly as being helpful for  
p. 223. human life, &c. Thus also Cicero, "Alia  
[cap. xxiv. quoque ex ratione, et quidem physica,  
p. 2990.] magna fluxit multitudo Deorum, qui induti specie humana fabulas poetis suppeditaverunt, hominum autem vitam superstitione omni refercerunt."

Eusebius,\* indeed, seems sometimes to cast it as an imputation upon the whole Pagan theology,

\* Præpar. Evang. lib. iii. cap. i.

that it did *θειάζειν τὴν ἀψυχὴν οὐσίαν*, deify the inanimate nature—but this is properly to be understood of this part of their theology only, which was physiological, and of their mythology or poetic fables of the gods allegorized; it being otherwise both apparently false, and all one as to make them downright Atheists. For he that acknowledges no animant God, as hath been declared, acknowledges no God at all, according to the true notion of him; whether he derive all things from a fortuitous motion of matter, as Epicurus and Democritus did, or from a plastic and orderly, but senseless nature, as some degenerate Stoics, and Strato the Peripatetic; whose Atheism seems to be thus described by Manilius:<sup>a</sup>

Aut neque terra patrem novit, nec flamma, nec aër,  
 Aut humor, faciuntque Deum per quatuor artus,  
 Et mundi struxere globum, prohibentque requiri  
 Ultra se quidquam.

Neither ought this physiological theology of the Pagans, which consisted only in personating and deifying inanimate substances, and the natures of things, to be confounded (as it hath been by some late writers) with that philosophical theology of Scævola, Varro and others, (which was called natural also, but in another sense, as true and real) it being indeed but a part of the poetical first, and afterward of the political theology, and owing its original much to the fancies of poets, whose humour it was perpetually to personate things and natures. But the philosophic theology, properly so called, which, according to Varro,<sup>b</sup> was that, “de qua multos libros philo-

<sup>a</sup> Astronomic. lib. i. ver. 137.

<sup>b</sup> Apud Augustin. de Civit. Dei. lib. v. cap. v. p. 116. tom. vii. opex.

sophi reliquerunt;" as it admitted none but animal gods, and such as really existed in nature, (which therefore were called natural) namely one supreme, universal Numen, a perfect soul or mind comprehending all, and his *ὑπουργοὶ δυνάμεις*, other inferior understanding beings his ministers created by him, such as stars and demons, so were all those personated gods, or natures of things, deified in the arcane theology, interpreted agreeably thereunto.

St. Austin often takes notice of the Pagans thus mingling, and, as it were, incorporating physiology with their theology, he justly condemning the same: as in his forty-ninth epistle; "Neque illinc excusant impii sua sacrilega sacra et simulachra, quod eleganter interpretantur quid quæque significant: omnis quippe illa interpretatio ad creaturam refertur, non ad creatorem, cui uni debetur servitus religionis, illa quæ uno nomine Latria Græce appellatur." Neither do the Pagans sufficiently excuse their sacrilegious rites and images from hence, because they elegantly (and ingeniously) interpret, what each of those things signifieth. For this interpretation is referred to the creature, and not to the Creator, to whom alone belongeth religious worship, that which by the Greeks is called Latria.—And again in his book *De Civ. D. l. vi. c. viii.* "At enim habent ista physiologicas quasdam (sicut aiunt) id est, naturalium rationum interpretationes. Quasi vero nos in hac disputatione physiologiam quæramus, et non theologiam; id est, rationem naturæ, et non Dei. Quamvis enim qui verus Deus est, non

‡ *Epist. cii. Quæst. iii. §. xx. p. 212. tom. ii. oper. edit. Benedictin.*

opinione sed natura sit Deus; non tamen omnis natura Deus est." But the Pagans pretend, that these things have certain physiological interpretations, or according to natural reasons; as if in this disputation we sought for physiology, and not theology, or the reason of nature, and not of God. For although the true God be not in opinion only, but in nature God, yet is not every nature God.—But certainly the first and chief ground of this practice of theirs, thus to theologize physiology, and deify (in one sense or other) all the things of nature, was no other than what has been already intimated, their supposing God to be not only diffused through the whole world, and in all things, but also in a manner all things; and that therefore he ought to be worshipped in all the things of nature, and parts of the world.

Wherefore these personated gods of the Pagans, or those things of nature deified by them, and called gods and goddesses, were for all that by no means accounted, by the intelligent amongst them, true and proper gods. Thus Cotta in Cicero: "Cum fruges Cererem, vinum Liberum dicimus, genere nos quidem sermonis utimur usitato: sed equum tamen amentem esse putas, qui illud, quo vescatur, Deum esse credat?" Though it be very common and familiar language amongst us, to call corn Ceres, and wine Bacchus, yet who can think any one to be so mad, as to take that to be really a god, which he feeds upon?—The Pagans really accounted that only for a god, by the worshipping and invoking whereof they might reasonably expect benefit to themselves, and therefore nothing was truly and properly a god to them, but what

Li- Deo N. D. I. iii.  
berum dicimus, genere nos quidem ser- p. 345. [c. xvi.  
monis utimur usitato: sed equum tam p. 3071.  
tam. ix.]



was both substantial, and also animant and intellectual. For Plato writes, that the atheistic wits of his time therefore concluded the sun and moon, and stars, not to be gods, because they were nothing but earth and stones (or a certain fiery matter) devoid of all understanding and sense; and for this cause, οὐδὲν τῶν ἀνθρωπείων πραγμάτων φροντίζειν δυνάμενα, unable to take notice of any human affairs.—And Aristotle affirmeth concerning the gods in general, ζῆν τε πάντες ὑπελήφασαν αὐτοὺς, καὶ ἐνεργεῖν ἄρα, &c. that all men conceived them to live, and consequently to act, since they cannot be supposed to sleep perpetually as Endymion did.—The Pagans universally conceived the gods to be happy animals; and Aristotle there concludes the happiness of them all to consist in contemplation. Lucretius himself would not debar men of that language (then vulgarly received amongst the Pagans) of calling the sea Neptune, corn Ceres, wine Bacchus, and the Earth the mother of the gods too, provided that they did not think any of these, for all that, to be truly and really gods:

L. ii. p. 165. Hic si quis mare Neptunum, Cereremque vocare  
[ver. 654. Constituit fruges, et Bacchi nomine abuti  
p. 380. ed. Mavolt, quam laticis proprium proferre vocamen;  
Havercamp.] Concedamus, ut hic terrarum dicitur orbem  
Esse deum matrem, dum non sit re tamen apse.

And the reason, why the earth was not really a goddess, is thus given by him;

Terra quidem vero caret omni tempore sensu.

Because it is constantly devoid of all manner of sense.—Thus Balbus in Cicero tells us, that the first thing included in the notion

N. D. l. ii.  
p. 220.

<sup>a</sup> Magn. Moral. lib. v. cap. viii. p. 184. tom. iii. oper.

oridea of a god is this : “ Ut sit animans,” That it be animant ;—or endued with life, sense, and understanding. And he conceiving the stars to be undoubtedly such, therefore concludes them to be gods: “ Quoniam tenuissimus est æther, et semper agitatur et vigeat, necesse est, quod animal in eo gignatur, idem quoque sensu acerrimo esse. Quare cum in æthere astra gignantur, consentaneum est in iis sensum inesse et intelligentiam. Ex quo efficitur in deorum numero astra esse ducenda.”—Because the ether is most subtile, and in continual agitation, that animal, which is begotten in it, must needs be endued with the quickest and sharpest sense. Wherefore since the stars are begotten in the ether, it is reasonable to think them to have sense and understanding ; from whence it follows, that they ought to be reckoned in the number of gods.—And Cotta in the third De N. D. p. 241. D. book affirms, that all men were so far from thinking the stars to be gods, that “ multi ne animantes quidem esse concedant,” many would not so much as admit them to be animals—plainly intimating, that unless they were animated, they could not possibly be gods. Lastly, Plu- De Is. et Os. p. 377. tarch, for this very reason, absolutely condemns that whole practice of giving the names of gods and goddesses to inanimate things, as absurd, impious, and atheistical ; *δεινὰς καὶ ἀθέτους ἐμποιῶσι δόξας, ἀναισθητοῖς, καὶ ἀψύχοις, καὶ φθειρομέναις ἀναγκαίως ὑπ’ ἀνθρώπων δεομένων καὶ χρωμένων φύσει καὶ πράγμασιν ὀνόματα θεῶν ἐπιφέροντες· τὰντα μὲν γὰρ αὐτὰ νοῆσαι θεοὺς οὐκ ἔστιν· οὐ γὰρ οὖν οὐδὲ ἀψυχον ἀνθρώποις ὁ θεός·* They, who give the names of gods to senseless and inanimate natures and things, and such as are destroyed by men in the use of them, beget

most wicked and atheistical opinions in the minds of men; since it cannot be conceived, how these things should be gods, for nothing, that is inanimate, is a god.—And now we have very good reason to conclude, that the distinction or division of Pagan gods (used by some) into animal and natural (by natural being meant inanimate) is utterly to be rejected, if we speak of their true and proper gods; since nothing was such to the Pagans but what had life, sense and understanding. Wherefore those personated gods, that were nothing but the natures of things deified, as such, were but “*dii commentitii et fictitii*,” counterfeit and fictitious gods—or, as Origen calls them in that place before cited, *τὰ Ἑλλήνων ἀναπλάσματα, σωματοποιεῖσθαι δοκούντα ἀπὸ τῶν πραγμάτων*, figments of the Greeks (and other Pagans) that were but things turned into persons and deified.—Neither can there be any other sense made of these personated and deified things of nature, than this, that they were all of them really so many several names of one supreme God, or partial considerations of him, according to the several manifestations of himself in his works. Thus, according to the old Egyptian theology before declared, God is said to have both no name, and every name; or, as it is expressed in the Asclepian Dialogue, “*Cum non possit uno quamvis e multis composito nomine nuncupari, potius omni nomine vocandus est, siquidem sit unus et omnia; ut necesse sit, aut omnia ipsius nomine, aut ipsum omnium nomine nuncupari.*” Since he cannot be fully declared by any one name, though compounded of never so many, therefore is he rather to be called *by every name*, he being both one and all things:

so that either every thing must be called by his name, or he by the name of every thing.—With which Egyptian doctrine Seneca<sup>a</sup> seemeth also fully to agree, when he gives this description of God, “Cui nomen omne convenit,” He to whom every name belongeth—and when he further declares thus concerning him, “Quæcunque voles illi nomina aptabis;” and, “Tot appellationes ejus possunt esse, quot munera,” You may give him whatsoever names you please, &c.—and, There may be as many names of him as there are gifts and effects of his;—and, lastly, when he makes God and nature to be really one and the same thing, and every thing we see to be God. And the writer De Mundo<sup>a</sup> is likewise consonant hereunto, when he affirmeth, that God is πάσης ἐπιώνυμος φύσεως ἅτε πάντων αὐτὸς αἴτιος ὢν, or, may be denominated from every nature, because he is the cause of all things.—We say; therefore, that the Pagans in this their theologizing of physiology, and deifying the things of nature and parts of the world, did accordingly call every thing by the name God, or God by the name of every thing.

Wherefore these personated and deified things of nature were not themselves properly and directly worshipped by the intelligent Pagans (who acknowledged no inanimate thing for a god) so as to terminate their worship ultimately in them; but either relatively only to the supreme God, or else at most in way of complication with him, whose effects and images they are; so that they were not so much themselves worshipped, as God was worshipped in them. For these Pagans pro-

<sup>a</sup> De Benefic. lib. iv. cap. vii. p. 427, tom. i. oper.

<sup>b</sup> Cap. vii. p. 869, tom. i. oper. Aristot.

Julian, Orat. 4 [p. 148.] fessed, that they did τὸν οὐρανὸν μὴ παρ-  
 ἔργως, μηδὲ ὥσπερ τὰ βροσκήματα θεωρεῖν, look  
 upon the heaven (and world) not slightly and su-  
 perficially; nor as mere brute animals, who take  
 notice of nothing, but those sensible phantasms,  
 which from the objects obtrude themselves upon  
 them—or else, as the same Julian, in that oration,  
 P. 286. again more fully expresseth it, τὸν οὐρανὸν  
 οὐχ ὥσπερ ἵππους καὶ βόας ὁρᾶν, ἤτι τῶν ἀλό-  
 γων καὶ ἀμαθῶν ζώων· ἀλλὰ ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ φανεροῦ τὴν ἀφα-  
 νῆ πολυπραγμονεῖν φύσιν. Not view and contemplate  
 the heaven and world, with the same eyes that  
 oxen and horses do, but so as from that, which is  
 visible to their outward senses, to discern and  
 discover another invisible nature under it.—That  
 is, they professed to behold all things with reli-  
 gious eyes, and to see God in every thing; not  
 only as pervading all things, and diffused through  
 all things, but also as being in a manner all things.  
 Wherefore they looked upon the whole world as  
 a sacred thing, and as having a kind of divinity  
 in it; it being, according to their theology, no-  
 thing but God himself visibly displayed. And  
 thus was God worshipped by the Pagans, in the  
 whole corporeal world taken all at once together,  
 or in the universe, under the name of Pan. As  
 they also commonly conceived of Zeus and Jupi-  
 ter, after the same manner; that is, not abstractly  
 only (as we now use to conceive of God) but con-  
 cretely, together with all that which proceedeth  
 and emaneth from him, that is, the whole world.  
 And as God was thus described in that old Egp-  
 tian monument, to be “all that was, is, and shall  
 be;” so was it before observed out of Plutarch,  
*that the Egyptians took the first God, and the*

universe, for one and the same thing; not only because they supposed the supreme God virtually to contain all things within himself, but also because they were wont to conceive of him, together with his overflowing, and all the extent of his fecundity, the whole world displayed from him, all at once, as one entire thing. Thus likewise do the Pagans in Plato confound τὸν μέγιστον θεόν, and ὅλον τὸν κόσμον, the greatest De Leg. l. vii. p. 821.

God, and the whole world together, as being but one and the same thing. And this notion was so familiar with these Pagans, that Strabo himself, writing of Moses, could not conceive of his God, and of the God of the Jews, any otherwise than thus; τὸ περιέχον ἡμᾶς ἅπαντας, καὶ γῆν, καὶ θάλατταν, ὃ καλοῦμεν οὐρανὸν καὶ κόσμον, καὶ τὴν τῶν ὄλων φύσιν, namely, that which containeth us all, and the earth, and the sea, which we call the heaven and world, and the nature of the whole.—By which, notwithstanding, Strabo did not mean the heaven or world inanimate, and a senseless nature, but an understanding Being, framing the whole world, and containing the same which was conceived together with it: of which therefore he tells us, that, according to Moses, no wise man would go about to make any image or picture, resembling any thing here amongst us. From whence we conclude, that when the same Strabo, writing of the Persians, affirmeth of them, that they did τὸν οὐρανὸν ἠγαῖσθαι Δία, take the heaven for Jupiter; and also Herodotus<sup>b</sup> before him, that they did κύκλον πάντα τοῦ οὐρανοῦ Δία καλεῖν, call the whole circle of the heaven Jupiter—that is, the supreme God; the meaning of neither of them was, that the body of the heaven inanimate was to them the

<sup>a</sup> Lib. xv. p. 697.

<sup>b</sup> Lib. i. cap. cxxxix. p. 55.

highest God, but that though he were an understanding nature, yet framing the whole heaven or world, and containing the same, he was at once conceived together with it. Moreover, God was worshipped also by the Pagans, in the several parts of the world, under several names; as, for example, in the higher and lower ether, under those names of Minerva and Jupiter; in the air, under the name of Juno; in the fire, under the name of Vulcan; in the sea, under the name of Neptune, &c. Neither can it be reasonably doubted, but that when the Roman sea-captains sacrificed to the waves, they intended therein to worship that God, who acteth in the waves, and whose wonders are in the deep.

But, besides this, the Pagans seemed to apprehend a kind of necessity of worshipping God, thus, in his works, and in the visible things of this world, because the generality of the vulgar were then unable to frame any notion or conception at all of an invisible Deity; and, therefore, unless they were detained in a way of religion, by such a worship of God as was accommodate and suitable to the lowness of their apprehensions, would unavoidably run into Atheism. Nay, the most philosophical wits amongst them confessing God to be incomprehensible to them, therefore seemed themselves also to stand in need of some sensible props, to lean upon. This very account is given by the Pagans, of their practice, in Eusebius; *ἀσωμάτως καὶ ἀφανῶς ἐν πᾶσιν ὄντα* Pr. Ev. l. iii. c. xiii. *Θεόν, καὶ διὰ πάντων διήκοντα, καὶ τοῦτον εἰκότως διὰ τῶν δεδηλωμένων σέβειν φασί*, that God being *incorporeally* and invisibly present in all things, and pervading or passing through all things, it was reasonable, that men should worship him, by

and, through those things that are visible and manifest.—Plato likewise represents this as the opinion of the generality of Pagans De Leg. l. vii. p. 821. [p. 640.] in his time, τὸν μέγιστον θεόν, καὶ ὅλον τὸν κόσμον φαμέν οὔτε ζητεῖν δεῖν, οὔτε πολυπραγμανεῖν, τὰς αἰτίας ἐρευνῶντας· οὐ γὰρ οὐδ' ὅσιον εἶναι· That as for the greatest God, and the whole world, men should not busily and curiously search after the knowledge thereof, nor pragmatically inquire into the causes of things, it being not pious for them so to do.—The meaning whereof seems to be no other than this, that men ought to content themselves to worship God in his works, and in this visible world, and not trouble themselves with any further curious speculations concerning the nature of that, which is incomprehensible to them. Which though Plato professeth his dislike of, yet does that philosopher himself elsewhere plainly allow of worshipping the first invisible God in those visible images, which he hath made of himself, the sun and moon, and stars. Maximus Tyrius doth indeed exhort men to ascend Dissert. i. [p. 12.] up, in the contemplation of God, above all corporeal things; τέλος τῆς ὁδοῦ οὐχ ὁ οὐρανός, οὐδὲ τὰ ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ σώματα, (καλὰ μὲν γὰρ ταῦτα καὶ θεοπέσια, ἀτε ἐκείνου ἔγγονα ἀκριβῆ καὶ γνήσια, καὶ πρὸς τὸ κάλλιστον ἡρμοσμένα) ἀλλὰ καὶ τούτων ἐπέκεινα ἔλθειν δεῖ, καὶ ὑπερκύψαι τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, ἐπὶ τὸν ἀληθῆ τόπον, &c. The end of your journey (saith he) is not the heaven, nor those shining bodies in the heaven; for though those be beautiful and Divine, and the genuine offspring of that supreme Deity, framed after the best manner, yet ought these all to be transcended by you, and your head lifted up far above the starry heavens, &c.—Nevertheless, he closes his



discourse thus: *εἰ δὲ ἕλασθενῆς πρὸς τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ δημιουργοῦ θεῶν, ἀρκεῖ σοι τὰ ἔργα ἐν τῷ παρόντι ὄρατι, καὶ προσκυνεῖν τὰ ἔγγωνα, πολλά καὶ παντοδαπὰ ὄντα, οὐχ ὅσα ὁ Βοιωτίος ποιητῆς λέγει· οὐ γὰρ τρισμῦριοι μόνον θεοὶ θεοῦ παῖδες καὶ φίλοι, ἀλλ' ἀληπτοὶ ἀριθμῷ· τοῦτο μὲν κατ' οὐρανὸν αἱ ἀστέρων φύσεις, &c.* But if you be too weak and unable to contemplate that father and maker of all things; it will be sufficient for you for the present to behold his works, and to worship his progeny or offspring, which is various and manifold. For there are not only, according to the Bœotian poet, thirty thousand gods, all the sons and friends of the supreme God, but innumerable. And such in the heaven are the stars, in the ether demons, &c.—Lastly, Socrates himself also did not only allow of this way of worshipping God, (because himself is invisible) in his works that are visible, but also commend the same to Euthydemus; *ὅτι δὲ γε ἀληθῆ λέγω, καὶ σὺ γνώσῃ, ἂν μὴ ἀναμένῃς, ἕως ἂν τὰς μορφὰς τῶν θεῶν ἴδῃς,* Xenoph. Memor. l. iv. [p. 633.] *ἀλλ' ἐξαρκῆ σοι, τὰ ἔργα αὐτῶν ὁρῶντι σέβεσθαι καὶ τιμᾶν τοὺς θεούς·* That I speak the truth, yourself shall know, if you will not stay expecting, till you see the forms of the gods themselves, but count it sufficient for you beholding their works to worship and adore them.—Which afterward he particularly applies to the supreme God, who made and containeth the whole world, that being invisible, he hath made himself visible in his works, and consequently was to be worshipped and adored in them. Whether Socrates and Plato, and their genuine followers, would extend this any further than to the animated parts of the world, such as the *sun*, *moon*, and stars were to them, we cannot

certainly determine. But we think it very probable, that many of those Pagans, who are charged with worshipping inanimate things, and particularly the elements, did notwithstanding direct their worship to the spirits of those elements, as Ammianus Marcellinus tells us Julian did, that is, chiefly the souls of them, all the elements being supposed by many of these Pagans to be animated, (as was before observed concerning Proclus;) and partly also those demons, which they conceived to inhabit in them, and to preside over the parts of them; upon which account it was said by Plato, and others of the ancients, that πάντα θεῶν πλήρη, all things are full of gods and demons.

xxxiii. But that these physiological gods, that is, the things of nature personated and deified, were not accounted by the Pagans true and proper gods, much less independent and self-existent ones, may further appear from hence, because they did not only thus personate and deify things substantial, and inanimate bodies, but also mere accidents and affections of substances. As, for example, first, the passions of the mind; τὰ πάθη θεοὺς ἐνόμισαν, ἢ θεοὺς ἐτίμησαν, saith St. Greg. Nazianzen,<sup>a</sup> They accounted the passions of the mind to be gods—or at least worshipped them as gods; that is, built temples or altars to their names. Thus was Hope, not only a goddess to the poet Theognis,<sup>b</sup>

Ἐλπίς ἐν ἀνθρώποισι μὴν θεὸς ἰσθλὴ ἦσθαι,  
Ἄλλαι δ' οὐλομένων ἐκπερὸν ἴβαν

(where he fancifully makes her to be the only Nu-

<sup>a</sup> Orat. xxxiv. tom. i. oper. p. 546.

<sup>b</sup> In Sententiis, ver. 1131, 1132, p. 115.

## 528. ACCIDENTS AND AFFECTIONS PERSONATED

men, that was left to men in heaven, as if the other gods had all forsaken those mansions and the world;) but also had real temples dedicated to her at Rome, as that consecrated by Attilius in the Forum Olitorium, and others elsewhere, wherein she was commonly pictured or feigned, as a woman, covered over with a green pall, and holding a cup in her hand.<sup>a</sup> Thus also Love and Desire were gods or goddesses too, as likewise were care, memory, opinion, truth, virtue, piety, faith, justice, clemency, concord, victory, &c. Which victory was, together with virtue, reckoned up amongst the gods of Plautus in the prologue of his *Amphitryo*; and, not only so, but that there was an altar erected to her also, near the entrance of the senate-house at Rome, which having been once demolished, Symmachus earnestly endeavoured the restoration thereof, in the reign of Theodosius; he amongst other things writing thus concerning it,<sup>b</sup> “*Nemo colendam neget, quam profitetur optandam;*” Let no man deny that of right to be worshipped, which he acknowledgeth to be wished for, and to be desirable.—Besides all which, Echo was a goddess to these Pagans too, and so was Night (to whom they sacrificed a cock) and Sleep and Death itself, and very many more such affections of things, of which Vossius has collected the largest catalogue, in his eighth book *De Theologia Gentili*. And this personating and deifying of accidental things was so familiar with these Pagans, that, as St. Chrysostom hath observed, St. Paul was therefore said by some of the vulgar

<sup>a</sup> Vide Vossium, de Idololatr. lib. viii. cap. x. p. 748.

<sup>b</sup> Epistolar. lib. ix. Epist. lxi. p. 441.

Athenians to have been a setter forth of strange gods, "when he preached to them Jesus and the resurrection," because they supposed him, not only to have made Jesus a God, but also Anastasis, or resurrection; a goddess too. Nay, this humour of theologizing the things of nature transported these Pagans so far, as to deify evil things also, that is, things both noxious and vicious.

Of the former Pliny thus: "*Inferi quo-* H. N. l. ii.  
*que in genera describuntur, morbique,* c. vii.

*et multæ etiam pestes, dum esse placatas trepido metu cupimus. Ideoque etiam publice febri fanum in palatio dedicatum est, Orbonæ ad ædem Iarium ara, et malæ fortunæ Exquiliis.*" So great is the number of these gods, that even hell, or the state of death itself, diseases and many plagues are numbered amongst them, whilst with a trembling fear we desire to have these pacified. And therefore was there a temple publicly dedicated in the palace to the Fever, as likewise altars elsewhere erected to Orbona, and to evil fortune.—

Of the latter, Balbus in Cicero; "*Quo ex* N. D. l. ii.  
*genere Cupidinis et Voluptatis, et Lu-* [cap. xxiii. p.  
*bentina Veneris; vocabula consecrata* 2988. tom. ix.  
oper.]

*sunt, vitiosarum rerum et non naturalium.*" Of which kind also are those names of lust, and pleasure, and wanton venery, things vicious, and not natural, consecrated and deified.—Cicero, in his book of Laws,<sup>a</sup> informs us, that at Athens there were temples dedicated also to contumely and insolence, but withal giving us this censure and reprehension; "*Quæ omnia ejus-* Gruter's edi-  
*modi sunt, et detestanda sunt.*" All tion a little  
otherwise.

i. p. 3354. tom. ix. oper.

and rejected, and nothing to be deified, but what is virtuous or good.—Notwithstanding which, it is certain, that such evil things as these were consecrated to no other end, than that they might be deprecated. Moreover, as these things of nature, or natures of things, were sometimes deified by the Pagans plainly and nakedly in their own appellative names, so was this again sometimes done disguisedly, under other counterfeit proper names: as pleasure was deified under the names of Volupia, and of Lubentina Venus; time, (according to the opinion of some) under the name of Cronos or Saturn, which as it produceth all things, so devours all things into itself again; prudence or wisdom, likewise, under the names of Athena or Minerva. For it is plain, that Origen C. Cels. l. viii. gen understood it thus, when Celsus p. 421. not only approved of worshipping God Almighty, in the sun, and in Minerva, as that which was lawful, but also commended it as a thing highly pious; he making this reply; *ἐφήμοῦμεν ἥλιον ὡς καλὸν θεοῦ δημιουργημα, &c. Ἀθηνᾶν μένται μετὰ ἡλίου τασσομένην, ἐμυθοποίησαν οἱ Ἑλλήνων λόγοι, εἴτ' ἐν ὑπονοίαις, εἴτε χωρὶς ὑπονοιῶν, φάσκοντες ἐκ τῆς τοῦ Διὸς γεγενῆσθαι κεφαλῆς, καθωπλισμένην, &c.* We speak well of the sun, as a good work of God's, &c. but as for that Athena or Minerva, which Celsus here joineth with the sun, this is a thing fabulously devised by the Greeks, (whether according to some mystical, arcane, and allegorical sense, or without it) when they say that she was begotten out of Jupiter's brain all armed.—And again afterwards, *ἵνα δὲ καὶ τροπολογῆται καὶ λέγεται φρόνησις εἶναι ἡ Ἀθηνᾶ,* If it be granted, that by Athena or Minerva be tropologically meant

prudence, &c.—Wherefore, not only according to the poetical, but also to the political and civil theology of the Pagans, these accidental things of nature, and affections of substances, personated, were made so many gods and goddesses; Cicero himself in his book of Laws approving of such political gods as these: “Benevero, quod mens, pietas, virtus, fides; con-<sup>L. ii. [cap.</sup>  
<sup>xi. p. 3354.]</sup>secratur manu; quarum omnium Romæ dedicata publice templa sunt, ut illa, qui habeant (habent autem omnes boni) deos ipsos in animis suis collocatos putent.” It is well, that mind, piety, virtue, and faith, are consecrated, (all which have their temples publicly dedicated at Rome) that so they, who possess these things, (as all good men do) may think, that they have the gods themselves placed in their minds.—And himself makes a law for them in his own commonwealth, but with a cautionary provision, that no evil and vicious things be consecrated amongst them: “Ast olla, propter quæ datur homini ascendensus in cœlum, mentem, virtutem, pietatem, fidem, earumque laudum delubra sunt. Nec ulla vitiorum solemnia obeunto.” Let them also worship those things, by means whereof men ascend up to heaven; and let there be shrines or temples dedicated to them. But let no religious ceremonies be performed to vicious things.

Notwithstanding all which, according to that theology of the Pagans, which was called by Varro natural, (whereby is meant not that which was physiological only, but that which is true and real) and by Scævola philosophical; and which is by both opposed, not only to the poeti-

cal and fabulous, but also to the political and civil: I say, according to this theology of theirs, these accidental things of nature deified could by no means be acknowledged for true and proper gods; because they were so far from having any life and sense in them, that they had not so much as *υπόστασιν καὶ οὐσίαν*, any real subsistence or substantial essence of their own. And thus does Origen dispute against Minerva's godship, as tropologically interpreted to prudence, *ἡ*

Fig. 422. *δὲ καὶ τροπολογῆται καὶ λέγεται φρόνησις εἶναι ἡ Ἀθηνᾶ, παραστησάτω τις αὐτῆς τὴν ὑπόστασιν καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν, ὡς ὑφέστηκυίας κατὰ τὴν τροπολογίαν ταύτην.* If Athena or Minerva be tropologized into prudence, then let the Pagans shew what substantial essence it hath, or that it really subsists according to this tropology.—Which is all one, as if he should have said, let the Pagans then shew; how this can be a god or goddess, which hath not so much as any substantial essence, nor subsists by itself, but is a mere accidental affection of substances only. And the same thing is likewise urged by Origen, concerning other such kind of gods of theirs, as Memory the mother of the muses, and the Graces all naked, in his first book; where Celsus contended for a multiplicity of gods against the Jews; that these things having not *υπόστασιν καὶ οὐσίαν*, any substantial essence or subsistence, could not possibly be accounted gods, and therefore were nothing else but *Ἑλλήνων ἀναπλάσματα σωματοποιηθέντα ἀπὸ τῶν πραγμάτων*, mere figments of the Greeks, things made to have human bodies, and so personated and deified.—And we think, there cannot be a truer commen-

tary upon this passage of Origen's, than these following verses of Prudentius, in his second book against Symmachus ;

Page. 285.

Desine, si pudor est, gentilis ineptia, tandem  
Res incorporeas simulatis fingere membris :

Let the Gentiles be at last ashamed, if they have any shame in them, of this their folly, in describing and setting forth incorporeal things with counterfeit human members.—Where accidents and affections of things, such as victory was, (whose altar Symmachus there contended for the restoration of) are by Prudentius called “res incorporeæ,” incorporeal things—accordingly as the Greek philosophers concluded, that ποιότητες, were ἀσώματα, qualities incorporeal.—Neither is it possible, that the Pagans themselves should be insensible hereof; and accordingly we find, that Cotta in Cicero doth for this reason utterly banish and explode these gods out of the philosophic and true theology :

N. D. I. III.  
[cap. xxiv. p. 5088.]

“ Num censes igitur subtiliore ratione opus esse ad hæc refellenda? Nam mentem, fidem, spem, virtutem, honorem, victoriam, salutem, concordiam, cæteraque ejusmodi, rerum vim habere videmus, non deorum. Aut enim in nobismet insunt ipsis, ut mens, ut spes, ut fides, ut virtus, ut concordia; aut optandæ nobis sunt, ut honos, ut salus, ut victoria. Quare autem in his vis deorum sit, tum intelligam, cum cognovero.” Is there any need, think you, of any great subtilty to confute these things? For mind, faith, hope, virtue, honour, victory, health, concord, and the like, we see them to have the force of things, but not of gods. Because they either exist in us, as mind,



hope, virtue, concord; or else they are desired to happen to us, as honour, health, victory (that is, they are nothing but mere accidents or affections of things), and therefore how they can have the force of gods in them cannot possibly be understood.—And again, afterwards he affirmeth, “Eos, qui dii appellantur, rerum naturas esse, non figuras deorum,” that those, who, in the allegorical mythology of Pagans, are called gods, are really but the natures of things, and not the true figures or forms of gods.

Wherefore since the Pagans themselves acknowledged, that those personated and deified things of nature were not true and proper gods; the meaning of them could certainly be no other than this, that they were so many several names, and partial considerations of one supreme God, as manifesting himself in all the things of nature. For that *vis* or force, which Cicero<sup>a</sup> tells us, was that in all these things, which was called God or deified, is really no other, than something of God in every thing that is good. Neither do we otherwise understand those following words of Balbus

N. D. l. ii.  
[cap. xxiii.  
p. 2988.]

in Cicero, “Quarum rerum, quia vis erat tanta, ut sine Deo regi non posset, ipsa res deorum nomen obtinuit:” Of which things because the force is such, as that it could not be governed without God, therefore have the things themselves obtained the names of gods;—that is, God was acknowledged and worshipped in them all, which was paganically thus signified, by calling of them gods. And Pliny, though no very divine person, yet being ingenious, easily understood this to be the mean-

Nat. H. l. ii.  
c. vii.

<sup>a</sup>De Natur. Deor. lib. ii. cap. xxiii. p. 2988. tom. ix. oper.

ing of it; “Fragilis et laboriosa mortalitas in partes ista digessit, infirmitatis suæ memor, ut portionibus quisque coleret, quo maxime indigeret;” frail and toilsome mortality has thus broken and crumbled the Deity into parts, mindful of its own infirmity; that so every one, by parcels and pieces, might worship that in God, which himself most stands in need of.—Which religion of the Pagans, thus worshipping God, not entirely all together at once, as he is one most simple Being, unmixt with any thing, but as it were brokenly, and by piece-meals, as he is severally manifested in all the things of nature, and the parts of the world, Prudentius thus perstringeth in his second book against Symmachus;

Tu, me præterito, meditaris numina mille,	N. 236.
Quæ similes parere meis virtutibus, ut me	[p. 289.]
Per varias partes minuas, cui nulla recidi	
Pars aut forma potest, quia sum substantia simplex,	
Nec pars esse queo.	

From which words of his we may also conclude, that Symmachus, the Pagan, who determined, that it was one thing, that all worshipped, and yet would have victory, and such-like other things, worshipped as gods and goddesses, did by these and all those other Pagan gods beforementioned, understand nothing but so many several names, and partial considerations of one supreme Deity, according to its several virtues or powers: so that when he sacrificed to Victory, he sacrificed to God Almighty, under that partial notion, as the giver of victory to kingdoms and commonwealths. It was before observed out of Plutarch, that the Egyptian fable of Osiris being mangled and cut in pieces by Typhon, did allego-  
That Osiris was the hu-

preme Deity,  
see the Egyptian inscription, in Theophrast. Smyrn. Mathem. c. xlvii.  
Ἡεοθεός  
εἰς τὸν βασιλέα  
Ὀσίρις, Osiris  
the most ancient  
king of all  
things.

rically signify the same thing, viz. the one simple Deity's being as it were divided (in the fabulous and civil theologies of the Pagans) into many partial considerations of him, as so many nominal and titular gods; which Isis, notwithstanding, that is true knowledge and wisdom, according to the natural or philosophic theology, unites all together into one. And that not only such gods as these, Victory, Virtue, and the like, but also those other gods, Neptune, Mars, Bellona, &c. were all really but one and the same Jupiter, acting severally in the world, Plautus himself seems sufficiently to intimate in the prologue of his *Amphitryo* in these words;

Nam quid ego memorem, ut alios in tragœdiis  
Vidi, Neptunum, Virtutem, Victoriam,  
Martem, Bellonam, commemorare quæ bona  
Vobis fecissent? Queis benefactis meus pater,  
Deum regnator, architectus omnibus.

Whereas there was before cited a passage out of G. I. Vossius's book *De Theolog. Gent.* which we could not understand otherwise than thus, that the generality of the Pagans by their political (or civil) gods, meant so many eternal minds independent and self-existent; we now think ourselves concerned to do Vossius so much right, as to acknowledge, that we have since met with another place of his in that same book, wherein he either corrects the former opinion, or else declares himself better concerning it, after this manner: That the Pagans generally conceived their political gods to be so many substantial minds (or spirits) not independent and self-existent, nor indeed eter-

nal neither, but created by one supreme Mind or God, and appointed by him to preside over the several parts of the world, and things of nature, as his ministers. Which same thing he affirmeth also of those deified accidents and affections, that by them were to be understood so many substantial minds or spirits created, presiding over those several things, or dispensing of them. His words in the beginning of his eighth book, \* (where he speaks concerning these affections and accidents deified by the Pagans) are as followeth: "Hujusmodi deorum prope immensa est copia. Ac in civili quidem theologia considerari solent, tanquam mentes quædam, hoc honoris a summo Deo sortitæ, ut affectionibus istis præessent. Nempe crediderunt Deum, quem optimum, max. vocabant, non per se omnia curare, quo pacto, ut dicebant, plurimum beatitudini ejus decederet, sed, instar regis, plurimos habere ministros et ministras, quorum singulos huic illive curæ præfecisset. Sic justitia, quæ et Astræa ac Themis, præfecta erat actibus cunctis, in quibus justitia attendere-tur; Comus curare creditus est comessationes; et sic in cæteris id genus diis, nomen ab ea affectione sortitis, cujus cura cuique commissa crederetur. Quo pacto si considerentur, non aliter differunt a spiritibus sive angelis bonis malisque, quam quod hi revera a Deo conditi sint; illæ vero mentes, de quibus nunc loquimur, sint figmentum mentis humanæ, pro numero affectionum, in quibus vis esse major videretur, comminiscens mentes affectionibus singulis præfectas. Facile autem sacerdotes sua commenta persuadere simplicioribus potuerunt, quia satis videretur verisi-

mile, summæ illi menti, deorum omnium regi, innumeras servire mentes, ut eo perfectior sit summi dei beatitudo, minusque curis implicetur; inque tot famulantium numero, summi numinis majestas magis eluceat. Ac talis quidem opinio erat theologiæ civilis." Of such gods as these there was an innumerable company amongst the Pagans. And in their civil theology they were wont to be considered; as certain minds (or spirits) appointed by the supreme God, to preside over the affections of things; they supposing, that God, whom they called the best, and the greatest, did not immediately himself take care of every thing, since that must needs be a distraction to him, and a hinderance of his happiness; but that he had, as a king, many he and she ministers under him; which had their several offices assigned to them. Thus justice, which was called also Astræa and Themis, was by them thought to preside over all those actions, in which justice was concerned; and Comus over all revellings; and the like. Which gods, if considered after this manner, will no otherwise differ from angels, good and bad, than only in this, that these latter are beings really created by God, but the former the figments of men only; they, according to the number of affections, that have any greater force in them, devising and imagining certain minds to preside over each of them, And the vulgar might therefore be the more easily led into this persuasion by their priests, because it seemed reasonable to them, that that supreme Mind, who is the King of all the gods, should have many other minds as his subservient *ministers* under him, both to free him from *sollicitous* care, and also to add to his grandeur and

majesty. And such was the doctrine of the civil theology. Where, though Vossius speak particularly of that kind of Pagan gods, which were nothing but affections and accidents deified, (which no man in his wits could possibly suppose to be themselves true and proper gods, they having no subsistence of their own) that these by the generality of the vulgar Pagans were conceived to be so many created minds or spirits, appointed by the supreme God, to preside as his ministers over those several affections of substances; yet does he plainly imply the same of all those other political gods of these Pagans likewise, that they were not looked upon by them, as so many unmade, self-existent, and independent beings, but only as inferior minds or spirits, created by the supreme God, and by him appointed to preside over the several parts of the world, and things of nature, and having their several offices assigned to them. Wherefore, as to the main, we and Vossius are now well agreed, *viz.* that the ancient Pagans asserted no such thing as a multitude of independent deities; so that there only remain some particular differences of smaller moment betwixt us.

Ourselves have before observed, that *Æolus* was probably taken by Epictetus in Arrianus, (not indeed for one, but) for many created ministers of the supreme God, or demons collectively, appointed by him to preside over the winds, in all the several parts of the world. And the Pagans in St. Austin seem to interpret those deified accidents, and things of nature, after the same manner, as the names of certain unknown gods or demons, (one or more) that were appointed to preside over them respectively, or to dispense

Civ. D. I. iv. *the same.* "Quoniam sciebant majores  
 c. xxiv.  
 [p. 83. tom.  
 vii. OPER.] nostri nemini talia, nisi aliquo Deo largiente concedi, quorum deorum nomina non inveniebant, earum rerum nominibus appellabant deos, quas ab iis sentiebant dari; aliqua vocabula inde flectentes; sicut a bello Bellonam nuncupaverunt, non Bellum; sicut a cunis Cuni-  
 nam, non Cunam; sicut a segetibus Segetiam, non Segetem; sicut a pomis Pomonam, non Pomum; sicut a bobus Bobonam, non Bovem. Aut certe nulla vocabuli declinatione sicut res ipsæ nominantur; ut Pecunia dicta est dea, quæ dat pecuniam, non omnino pecunia dea ipsa putata: Ita virtus, quæ dat virtutem, honor qui honorem, concordia quæ concordiam, victoria quæ victoriam dat. Ita, inquit, cum felicitas dea dicitur, non ipsa quæ datur, sed numen illud attenditur, a quo felicitas datur." Because our forefathers knew well, that these things do not happen to any, without the special gift and favour of some god; therefore were those gods, whose names they knew not, called from the names of those very things themselves, which they perceived to be bestowed by them, there being only a little alteration made in them; as when the god, that causeth war, was called not Bellum, but Bellona; the god, which presideth over infants cradles, not Cuna, but Cunina; that which giveth corn, Segetia; and that which affordeth apples, Pomona, &c. But, at other times, this was done without any declension of the word at all, they calling both the thing, and the god, which is the bestower of it, by one and the self-same name. As Pecunia doth not only signify money, but also the goddess, which giveth

money; Virtus, the goddess, which giveth virtue; Honor, the god, that bestoweth honour; Concordia, the goddess, that causeth concord; Victory, the goddess, which affordeth victory: So also when Felicity is called a goddess, by it is not meant that thing, which is given, but that Divine power, from whence it is given.—Here, I say, the Pagans may seem to have understood, by those deified things of nature, certain inferior gods or demons (one or more) the ministers of the supreme God, appointed by him to preside over those several things respectively, or to dispense the same. Neither can we deny, but that in so much ignorance and diversity of opinions, as there was amongst the Pagans, some might possibly understand those political gods, and deified things also, after the way of Vossius, for so many single minds or spirits, appointed to preside over those several things respectively throughout the whole world, and nothing else. Nevertheless, it seemeth not at all probable, that this should be the general opinion amongst the civilized Pagans; that all those gods of theirs were so many single created minds or spirits, each of them appointed to preside over some one certain thing every where throughout the whole world, and nothing else. As, for example, that the goddess Victory was one single created she-spirit, appointed to bestow victory, to whosoever at any time enjoyed it, in all parts of the world; and so, that the goddess Justice should be such another single mind or spirit, created to dispense justice every where, and meddle with nothing else. And the like of all those other accidental things, or affections deified, as virtue, honour, concord, felicity, &c.



And Lactantius Firmianus, taking notice of that profession of the Pagans, to worship nothing but one supreme God, and his subservient ministers, generated or created by him, (according to that of Seneca in his exhortations, "Genuisse regni sui ministros Deum;") That the supreme God had generated other inferior ministers of his kingdom under him," which were called by them also gods) plainly denies all the Pagan gods save one, to be the created ministers of that one supreme, he making this reply; "Verum hi neque dii sunt, neque deos se vocari, aut coli volunt, &c. Nec tamen illi sunt, qui vulgo coluntur, quorum et exiguus et certus est numerus." But these ministers of the Divine kingdom, or subservient created spirits, are neither gods, nor would they be called gods, or honoured as such, &c. Nor indeed are they those gods, that are now vulgarly worshipped by the Pagans, of which there is but a small and certain number.—That is, the Pagan gods are reduced into certain ranks, and the number of them is determined by the utilities of human life; of which their noble and select gods are but a few. Whereas, saith he, the ministers of the supreme God are, according to their own opinion, not twelve nor twenty, nor three hundred and sixty, but innumerable, stars and demons.

Moreover, Aristotle, in his book against Zeno, (supposing the idea of God to be this, the most powerful of all things, or the most perfect Being) objecteth thus, that according to the laws of cities and countries, (that is, the civil theology) there

*seems to be no one absolutely powerful Being,*

De Fal. Rel.  
c. vii. [In-  
stit. Divin.  
lib. i. cap.  
vii. p. 51.]

Arist. in  
Zen. Gor. p.  
1246. [cap.  
iv. p. 841.  
tom. ii.  
oper.]

but one god is supposed to be most powerful as to one thing, and another as to another: *εἴπερ ἅπαντα ἐπικράτιστον τὸν θεὸν λαμβάνει τοῦτο δυνατώτατον καὶ βέλτιστον λέγων, οὐ δοκεῖ τοῦτο κατὰ τὸν νόμον, ἀλλὰ πολλὰ κρείττους εἶναι ἀλλήλων οἱ θεοί· οὐκὸν ἐκ τοῦ δοκούντος εἴληφε ταύτην κατὰ τοῦ θεοῦ τὴν ὁμολογίαν*. Whereas Zeno takes it for granted, that men have an idea in their minds of God, as one the most excellent and most powerful Being of all; this doth not seem to be according to law, (that is, the civil theology) for there the gods are mutually better one than another, respectively as to several things; and therefore Zeno took not this consent of mankind, concerning God, from that which vulgarly seemeth.—From which passage of Aristotle's we may well conclude, that the many political gods of the Pagans were not all of them vulgarly looked upon, as the subservient ministers of one supreme God; and yet they generally acknowledging, (as Aristotle himself confesseth) a monarchy, and consequently not many independent deities, it must needs follow, as Zeno doubtless would reply, that these their political gods were but one and the same supreme natural God, as it were parcelled out, and multiplied: that is, receiving several denominations, according to several notions of him, and as he exerciseth different powers, and produceth various effects. And this we have sufficiently proved already to have been the general sense of the chief Pagan doctors; that these many political and popular gods were but the polyonymy of one natural God, that is, either partial considerations of him, or his various powers and virtues, effects and manifes-

tations in the world, severally personated and deified.

And thus does Vossius himself afterwards confess also; that, according to the natural theology, the many Pagan gods were but so many several denominations of one God; though this learned philologer doth plainly straiten and confine the notion of this natural theology too much, and improperly call the God thereof the nature of things; however, acknowledging it such a nature, as was endued with sense and understanding. His words

are these: “ *Dispar vero sententia theologorum naturalium, qui non aliud nomen agnoscebant, quam naturam rerum, eoque omnia gentium numina referebant, &c. Nempe mens eorum fuit, sicut natura esset occupata circa hanc vel illam affectionem, ita numina nominaque deorum variare. Cum igitur ubicunque vim aliquam majorem viderent, ita divinum aliquid crederent; eo etiam devenere, ut immanem deorum dearumque fingerent catervam. Sagaciores interim hæc cuncta, unum esse numen aiebant; puta rerum naturam, quæ licet una foret, pro variis tamen effectis varia sortiretur nomina, vario etiam afficeretur cultu.*” But the case is very different as to the natural theologers, who acknowledged no other god, but the nature of things, and referred all the Pagan gods to that. For they conceived, that as nature was occupied about several things, so were the Divine powers and the names of gods multiplied and diversified. And wherever they saw any greater force, there did they presently conceit something Divine, and by that means came they at length to feign an in-

numerable company of gods and goddesses. But the more sagacious in the mean time affirmed all these to be but one and the same God; to wit, the nature of things, which, though really but one, yet according to its various effects, both received divers names, and was worshipped after different manners.—Where Vossius calls the supreme God of these natural theologers the nature of things, as if the natural theology had been denominated from physics, or natural philosophy only; whereas we have already shewed, that the natural theology of Varro and Scævola, was of equal extent with the philosophic; whose only Numen, that it was not a blind and unintelligible nature of things, doth sufficiently appear from that history thereof before given by us: as also that it was called natural in another sense, as real, and as opposite to opinion, fancy, and fabulosity, or what hath no reality of existence any where in the world. Thus does St. Austin distinguish betwixt “*natura deorum,*” the true nature of the gods—and “*hominum instituta,*” the institutes of men concerning them.—As also he sets down the difference betwixt the civil and natural theology, according to the mind of Varro, in this manner: “*Fieri potest, ut in urbe, secundum falsas opiniones ea colantur et credantur, quorum in mundo vel extra mundum natura sit nusquam:*” It may come to pass, that those things may be worshipped and believed in cities, according to false opinions, which have no nature or real existence any where, either in the world, or without it.—Wherefore, if instead of this nature of things, which was properly the god of none

C. D. I. vi.  
c. v. [p. 116.  
tom. vii.]

but only of such atheistic philosophers, as Epicurus and Strato, we substitute that great Mind or Soul of the whole world, which pervadeth all things, and is diffused through all (which was the true God of the Pagan Theists); this of Vossius will be unquestionably true concerning their natural theologers, that, according to them, those many poetical and political gods beforementioned were but one and the same natural or real god; who, in respect of his different virtues, powers, and effects, was called by several names, and worshipped after different manners; yet nevertheless so, as that, according to those theologers, there were really also many other inferior ministers of this one supreme God (whether called minds or demons), that were supposed to be the subservient executioners of all those several powers of his. And accordingly we had before this full and true account of the Pagans' natural theology set down out of Prudentius :<sup>a</sup>

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In uno  
Constituit jus omne Deo, cui serviat ingens  
Virtutum ratio, variis instructa ministris.

viz. That it acknowledged one supreme omnipotent God, ruling over all, who displayeth and exerciseth his manifold virtues and powers in the world (all severally personated and deified in the poetic and civil theologies), together with the subservient ministry of other inferior created minds, understanding beings, or demons, called also by them gods.

<sup>a</sup> In Apotheosi, ver. 191.

It is very true, as we have already declared, that the more high-flown Platonic Pagans did reduce those many poetical and political gods, and therefore doubtless all the personated and deified things of nature too, to the Platonic ideas, or first paradigms and patterns of things in the archetypal world, which they affirmed to have been begotten from the supreme Deity, that is, from the first hypostasis of the Platonic trinity; and which were commonly called by them *νοητοὶ θεοὶ*, intelligible gods,—as if they had been indeed so many distinct substances and persons. And, as we have also proved out of Philo, that this high-flown Paganic theology was ancients than either Julian or Apuleius; so do we think it not unworthy our observation here, that the very same doctrine is, by Celsus, imputed also to the Egyptian theologers, as pretending to worship brute animals no otherwise than as symbols of those eternal ideas: *Καὶ φησὶ γε ἡμᾶς τῶν μὲν* Orig. c. Cels. l. iii. p. 120,  
*Αἰγυπτίων καταγελάειν, καὶ τοὶ πολλὰ καὶ οὐ*  
*φαῦλα παρεχόντων αἰνίγματα, ἐπὶ τῶν αἰδίων καὶ οὐχ*  
*(ὡς δοκοῦσι οἱ πολλοὶ) ζώων ἐφημερίων τιμὰς εἶναι τὰ*  
*τοιαῦτα διδάσκουσιν.* Celsus also addeth, that we Christians deride the Egyptians without cause, they having many mysteries in their religion, forasmuch as they profess, that perishing brute animals are not worshipped by them, but the eternal ideas.—According to which of Celsus it should seem, that this doctrine of eternal ideas, as the paradigms and patterns of all things here below in this sensible world, was not proper to Plato, nor the Greeks, but common with them to the Egyptians also. Which eternal ideas, however

supposed to have been generated from that first Divine hypostasis of the Platonic and Egyptian trinity, and called intelligible gods, were nevertheless acknowledged by them all to exist in one Divine intellect, according to that of Plotinus,\* *οὐκ ἔξω τοῦ νοῦ τὰ νοητά*, that the intelligibles exist no where of themselves, without Mind or Intellect;—which Mind or Intellect being the second Divine hypostasis, these intelligible and invisible gods (however generated from God), yet are therefore said by Julian, in his book against the Christians, both to coexist with God, and to inexist in him. To which purpose also is this other passage of Julian's in his sixth oration :

P. 347.

*Πάντα γὰρ αὐτός ἐστιν, ἅπασα καὶ ἐν ἑαυτῷ καὶ παρ' ἑαυτῷ ἔχει τῶν ὄντων ὄντων τὰς αἰτίας· εἴτε ἀθανάτων ἀθανάτους. εἴτε ἐπικτήτων οὐ θνητῶν οὐδὲ ἐπικτήτων, αἰδίους δὲ καὶ μενούσας αἰεὶ, αἱ καὶ τούτοις εἰσὶν αἰτίαι τῆς αἰγιγενείας.* For God is all things, forasmuch as he containeth within himself the causes of all things that any way are; whether of immortal things immortal; or of corruptible and perishing things, not corruptible but eternal also, and always remaining; which therefore are the causes of their perpetual generation, and new production.—Now these causes of all things contained in God are no other than the Divine ideas. Wherefore, from hence it plainly appears, that these Platonic and Egyptian Pagans, who thus reduced their multiplicity of gods to the Divine ideas, did not therefore make them to be so many minds or spirits, really distinct from the

\* Eusebius. v. lib. v. p. 519.

supreme God (though dependent on him too), but indeed only so many partial considerations of one God, as being all things, that is, containing within himself the causes of all things. And accordingly we find in Origen, that, as the Egyptian theologers called their religious animals, symbols of the eternal ideas, so did they also call them symbols of God. *Τὰ τῶν Αἰγυπτίων σεμνολογούντων καὶ τὰ περὶ τῶν ἀλόγων ζώων, καὶ φασκόντων εἶναι τινα αὐτὰ καὶ Θεοῦ σύμβολα.* Celsus applauds the Egyptian theologers talking so magnificently and mysteriously of those brute animals worshipped by them, and affirming them to be certain symbols of God.

And now we have given some account of the Polyonymy of the one supreme God, in the theologies of the Pagans; or of his being called by many proper personal names, carrying with them an appearance of so many several gods. First, that God had many several names bestowed upon him, from many different notions and partial considerations of him, according to his universal and all-comprehending nature. Janus, as the beginning of the world, and the first original of the gods. Whom therefore that ancient lyric poet, Septimius Apher, accordingly thus invoked ;\*

O cate rerum Sator! o PRINCIPIUM DEORUM!  
Stridula cui limina, cui cardinei tumultus,  
Cui reserata mugiant aurea claustra mundi:

Genius, as the great mind and soul of the whole world. Saturn, as that hidden source and prin-

\* Apud Terentium Maurum de Litteris, &c. inter Grammaticos veteres a Putschio editos, p. 2396.



ciple, from which all forms and lives issue forth and into which they again retire ; being there laid up as in their secret storehouse : or else, as one of the Egyptian or Hermaic writers expresseth it, that which doth πάντα ποιῆν καὶ εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἀποποιῆν, make all things out of itself, and unmake them into itself again ;—this Hetrurian Saturn, answering to the Egyptian Hammon, that likewise signified hidden, and is accordingly thus interpreted by Jamblichus,<sup>a</sup> ὁ τὴν ἀφανῆ τῶν κεκρυμμένων λόγων δύναμιν εἰς φῶς ἄγων, he that bringeth forth the secret power of the hidden reasons of things (contained within himself) into light.—God was also called Athena or Minerva, as wisdom diffusing itself through all things : and Aphrodite Urania, the heavenly Venus or Love. Thus Phanes, Orpheus's supreme God (so called according to Lactantius),<sup>b</sup> “ Quia cum adhuc nihil esset, primus ex infinito apparuerit ;” because when there was yet nothing, he first appeared out of that infinite abyss ;—but according to Proclus, because he did ἐκφαίνων τὰς νοητὰς ἐνάδας, discover and make manifest the intelligible unities (or ideas) from himself ;—though we think the conjecture of Athanasius Kircherus<sup>c</sup> to be more probable than either of these, that Phanes was an Egyptian name) ; this Phanes, I say, was in the Orphic and Egyptian theology, as Proclus upon Plato's Timæus informs us, styled ἀβροὸς ἔρωσ, tender and soft Love.—And Pherecydes Syrus<sup>d</sup> likewise affirmed, εἰς ἔρωτα μεταβεβλήσθαι

<sup>a</sup> De Mysteriis Ægyptior. sect. 8. cap. iii. p. 169.

<sup>b</sup> Institut. Divin. lib. i. cap. v. p. 31.

<sup>c</sup> In Œdipo Ægyptiaco, p. 498.

<sup>d</sup> Apud Proclum in Comment. in Timæum Platon. lib. iii. p. 156.

τὸν Δία μέλλοντα δημιουργεῖν, that Jupiter was turned all into love, when he went about to make the world.—Besides which, there were other such names of the supreme God, and more than have been mentioned by us: as for example, Summanus amongst the ancient Romans, that afterward grew obsolete: of which St. Austin thus; “*Romani veteres nescio quem Summanum, cui nocturna fulmina tribuebant, coluerunt magis quam Jovem, ad quem diurna fulmina pertinebant. Sed postquam Jovi templum insigne ac sublime constructum est, propter ædis dignitatem, sic ad eum multitudo confluit, ut vix inveniatur, qui Summani nomen, quod audiri jam non potest, se saltem legisse meminerit.*” The ancient Romans worshipped I know not what god, whom they called Summanus more than they did Jupiter. But after that a stately and magnificent temple was erected to Jupiter, they all betook themselves thither; insomuch that the name of Summanus, now not at all heard, is scarcely to be found in ancient writings.

C. D. l. iv.  
c. xxiii. [p.  
82. tom. vii.  
oper.]

Again, as the Pagans had certain other gods, which they called special; so were these but several names of that supreme God also, according to particular considerations of him, either as presiding over certain parts of the world, and acting in them; or as exercising certain special powers and virtues in the world; which several virtues and powers of one God, personated and deified by the Pagans, though they had an appearance also of many distinct gods, yet were they really nothing but several denominations of one supreme God; who as yet is considered as a thing distinct from the world and nature.

But lastly, as God was supposed by these Pagans, not only to pervade all things, and to fill all things, but also, he being the cause of all things, to be himself in manner all things; so was he called also by the name of every thing, or every thing called by his name: that is, the several things of nature and parts of the world were themselves verbally deified by these Pagans, and called gods and goddesses. Not that they really accounted them such in themselves, but that they thought fit in this manner to acknowledge God in them, as the author of them all. For thus the Pagans in St. Austin: \* “ Usque adeone, inquam, majorem nostrum insipientes fuisse credendum est, ut hæc nescirent munera divina esse, non deos? Can you think, that our Pagan ancestors were so sottish, as not to know, that these things are but Divine gifts, and not gods themselves?—And Cicero also tells us, that the meaning of their thus deifying these things of nature, was only to signify, that they acknowledged the force of all things to be Divine, and to be governed by God; and that whatsoever brought any great utility to mankind, was not such without the Divine goodness. They conceiving also, that the invisible and incomprehensible Deity, which was the cause of all things, ought to be worshipped in all its works and effects, in which it had made itself visible, accordingly as they declare in that place of Eusebius before cited in part; *μη τὰ*  
Pr. Roman. l. iii.  
 c. xliii. [p.  
 121.] *ἀνώμενα σώματα ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης καὶ ἄστρον,*  
*μηδέγε τὰ αἰσθητὰ μέρη τοῦ κόσμου φήσους*  
*θεοποιῖν, ἀλλὰ τὰς ἐν τούτοις ἀοράτους δυνάμεις, αὐτοῦ δε*

\* Ubi supra.

τοῦ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν· ἓνα γὰρ ὄντα θεόν, παντοίας δυνάμει τὰ πάντα πληροῦν, καὶ διὰ πάντων διήκειν, καὶ τοῖς πᾶσιν ἐπιστατεῖν· ἀσωμάτως δὲ καὶ ἀφανῶς ἐν πᾶσιν ὄντα, καὶ διὰ πάντων διήκοντα, καὶ τοῦτον εἰκότως διὰ τῶν δεδηλωμένων σέβειν· that they did not deify those visible bodies of the sun, and moon, and stars, nor the other sensible parts of the world themselves, but those invisible powers of the God over all, that were displayed in them. For they affirm, that that God, who is but one, but yet filleth all things with his various powers, and passes through all things, forasmuch as he is invisibly and incorporeally present in all, is reasonably to be worshipped in and by those visible things.

Athanasius bishop of Alexandria, in his book against the Greeks, reduces all the false gods of the Pagans under two general heads; the first, poetical, fictitious, or fantastical gods; the second, creatures or real things of nature deified by them. His words are these: *Εἰ γὰρ δὴ τοὺς παρὰ ποιηταῖς λεγομένους θεοὺς, οὐκ εἶναι θεοὺς ὁ λόγος ἔδειξε, καὶ τοὺς τὴν κτίσιν θεοποιῶντας ἤλεγξε πλανωμένους, &c.* Since this reason or discourse of ours hath sufficiently convinced, both the poetical gods of the Pagans to be no gods at all; and also that they, who deify the creatures, are in a great error; and so hath confuted the whole Pagan idolatry, proving it to be mere ungodliness and impiety; there is nothing now but the true piety left; he, who is worshipped by us Christians, being the only true God, the Lord of nature, and the Maker of all substances.—From whence we may observe, that, according to Athanasius, the Pagan poetic gods were no real things in nature, and therefore they

could be no other, than the several notions and the powers of the one supreme God deified, or several names of him. So that Athanasius's poetic gods, or *οἱ παρὰ ποιηταῖς μυθεύομενοι θεοί*, gods fabulously devised by the poets—were chiefly those two kinds of Pagan gods, first mentioned by us; that is, the various considerations of the one supreme Numen, according to its general notion, expressed by so many proper names; and, secondly, his particular powers diffused through the world, severally personated and deified. Which, considered as so many distinct deities, are nothing but mere fiction and fancy, without any reality. And this do the Pagans themselves

P. 14. [tom. i. oper. p. 17.] in Athanasius acknowledge: *Ἴσως γὰρ ὡς αὐτοὶ φασὶ, καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα πέπλασται, καὶ οὐκ ἔστι μὲν ὅλως Ζεὺς, οὐδὲ Κρόνος, οὐδὲ Ἥρα,*

*οὐδὲ Ἄρης: πλάττονται δὲ τούτους, ὡς ὄντας, οἱ ποιηταὶ πρὸς ἀπάτην τῶν ἀκούόντων.* They say, that the names of those gods are merely fictitious, and that there does no where really exist any such Jupiter, or Saturn, or Juno, or Mars; but that the poets have feigned them to be so many persons existing, to the deception of their auditors.—Notwithstanding which that third sort of Pagan gods also mentioned by us, which were inanimate substances and the natures of things deified, may well be accounted poetical gods likewise; because though those things themselves be real and not feigned, yet is their personation and deification mere fiction and fancy: and however the first occasion thereof sprung from this theological opinion or persuasion, that God, who is in all things, and is the cause of all things, ought to be worshipped in all things, especially

he being himself invisible? yet the making of those things themselves therefore to be so many persons and gods, was nothing but poetic fiction and phantastry, according as their old mythology and allegorical fables of the gods run much upon this strain.

**END OF VOL. II.**















